Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 958
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (Crl.) NO. 3037 OF 2025]
KRISHNAKANT KWIVEDY & ANOTHER …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
1. Leave granted.
2. The challenge in this criminal appeal is to the judgment and order dated
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20 August, 2024 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur .
By the impugned order, which was passed on a petition under Section
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482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , the High Court quashed
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proceedings arising out of a First Information Report dated 29
November, 2016, bearing no. 608 of 2016 registered at Police Station –
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Mohan Nagar, lodged by the 1 appellant against the 2 to 4
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2025.08.11
18:34:41 IST
Reason:
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impugned order
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Cr. PC
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FIR
respondents for offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
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Act, 1961 .
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3. While the 2 appellant is the daughter of the 1 appellant, the 2 , 3
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and 4 respondents are the father, mother and brother, respectively, of
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the 5 respondent.
4. The FIR was duly investigated, whereupon charge-sheet no.116/2018
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dated 27 May, 2018 under Section 173(2), Cr. PC for the aforesaid
offences was filed before the trial court.
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5. It is not in dispute that the 1 appellant and the 2 respondent had
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engaged in negotiations for solemnisation of marriage between the 2
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appellant and the 5 respondent. However, such negotiations did not lead
to the marriage. It was alleged in the FIR that the negotiations failed
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because of the inability of the 1 appellant to meet the continuous
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demands for dowry raised by the 2 respondent and the co-accused.
6. A Division Bench of the High Court recorded in paragraph ‘13’ of the
impugned order that the allegations contained in the FIR, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute an offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1961 Act against
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the 1 to 3 petitioners before it (2 , 3 and 4 respondents herein) as
the allegations “are vague and omnibus in nature and no specific
allegations are made against them” . However, the allegations levelled
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against the 5 respondent did not warrant quashing of the FIR insofar as
he is concerned. Accordingly, in exercise of inherent powers, the FIR was
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1961 Act
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quashed qua the 2 , 3 and 4 respondents, while it was sustained qua
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the 5 respondent.
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
impugned order together with the FIR to ascertain as to whether the
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allegations levelled by the 1 appellant in the FIR did disclose any offence
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alleged to have been committed by the 2 , 3 and 4 respondents under
the 1961 Act, and also as to whether the High Court was justified in
returning the findings it did.
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8. Inter alia , the direct allegations against the 2 , 3 and 4 respondents
appearing from the FIR are noted below:
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i. After the 5 respondent had met the 2 appellant on 15 April,
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2016 and expressed his willingness to marry her, the 4
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respondent came to Durg on 4 June, 2016 to talk about the
marriage and suddenly started asking for Rs. 10 lakh in marriage
and a vehicle.
ii. Having claimed Rs. 2 lakh in cash along with clothes, silverware
and other articles, on the day the tilak ceremony was held, i.e.,
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10 July, 2016, the 2 to 5 respondents were given the same by
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the 1 appellant as gift.
iii. Consequent to negotiations and upon the date of marriage being
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fixed, a venue (Indralok Bhavan) was booked by the 1 appellant
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on 18 June, 2016 by paying Rs. 61,000/- as advance. A hotel
(Sheetla) was also booked to accommodate the guests for two days
upon due advance payment.
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iv. On 21 August, 2016, in course of a telephonic conversation that
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the 3 respondent had with the 1 appellant, she once again
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demanded Rs. 10 lakh and a car as dowry. The 1 appellant having
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refused to oblige, the 2 to 5 respondents called off the marriage.
9. Having read the FIR as it is, we do find specific and definite allegations
with particulars of dates and time being disclosed which, prima facie ,
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contain ingredients of offences allegedly committed by the 2 , 3 and
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4 respondents punishable under the relevant law. In fact, on a bare
reading of the FIR, we are left to wonder what more was required of the
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1 appellant to allege that could, in the view of the High Court, constitute
full and fair disclosure of offences. In view thereof, we are at a total loss
to comprehend as to how the FIR and the consequent proceedings
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against the 2 , 3 and 4 respondents could have been quashed by the
High Court holding that the allegations against them are vague and
omnibus in nature.
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10. Learned senior counsel appearing for the 2 , 3 and 4 respondents did
not seek to justify the impugned order relying on the ground assigned by
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the High Court; instead, he sought to contend that the 1 appellant had
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made a misrepresentation to the 2 respondent about the former’s
status. Our attention is drawn to page ‘19’ of the counter affidavit to
buttress the contention regarding misrepresentation. Also, the decision
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of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal , is cited and clause 7
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1992 supp. (1) SCC 335
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of paragraph 102 thereof relied on to contend that the criminal
proceedings having been manifestly attended with mala fide and
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, the High Court
was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings.
11. We are in respectful disagreement with the aforesaid contentions for twin
reasons. First, whether or not there has been misrepresentation is
entirely a question of fact which cannot be decided at the stage when the
inherent powers of the High Court are invoked for quashing of an
FIR/criminal proceedings. Such a question obviously has to be left for a
decision at the trial, if at all a defence to that effect is raised, and it would
then be for the trial court to consider the same while it returns its findings
on the question of guilt or otherwise. Secondly, the expression
“manifestly attended with mala fide ” following criminal proceedings, as
appearing in clause 7 of paragraph 102 of Bhajanlal (supra) makes the
position clear that mala fide must be manifest on the face of the FIR. The
present case does not fall in that category. Bhajanlal (supra), therefore,
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does not aid the 2 , 3 and 4 respondents. Even otherwise, the FIR
and the consequent proceedings were not quashed by the High Court on
the ground that the same were manifestly attended with mala fide or that
the proceedings were maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance.
12. Having regard to the above, we find little reason to uphold the impugned
order.
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13. The High Court having committed a serious error in entertaining the
petition under Section 482 of the Cr. PC while exercising its inherent
power and having occasioned a grave failure of justice in granting relief
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to the 2 , 3 and 4 respondents, the impugned order stands set aside.
14. The criminal proceedings arising out of the subject FIR shall be taken to
its logical conclusion, in accordance with law.
15. None of the observations made hereinabove shall influence the trial court
while it takes the proceedings further.
16. The appeal, accordingly, stands allowed. No costs.
…………………....…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…….…….…..………………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI.
AUGUST 08, 2025.
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