GURBACHAN SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. vs. GURCHARAN SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. .

1 NON­REPORTABLE 2023 INSC 639 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10556­10558 OF 2010 GURBACHAN SINGH (DEAD)     …APPELLANT(S) THROUGH LRS       VERSUS GURCHARAN SINGH (DEAD)        ...RESPONDENT(S) THROUGH LRS AND ORS.      J U D G M E N T  SANJAY KAROL, J.  Background 1.  The present appeals stand filed against a judgment rendered by   the   Punjab   and   Haryana   High   Court   in   Civil   Regular th Second   Appeal   number   283   of   1984   dated   18   February, 1 2010  and in RA­RS­42­C of 2010 and Civil Misc. No.6287­C th of 2010 dated 28   May, 2010 by which the court in such jurisdiction set aside the concurrent findings returned by the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Indu Marwah Date: 2023.07.25 10:39:57 IST Reason: Additional District Judge, Jalandhar in Civil Appeal No.248 of 1 Hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment” 1 2 st st 1981 dated 1  August, 1981 and by the Sub­Judge 1  Class, Jullundur ( now Jalandhar ) in Civil Suit No.186 of 1981 dated th 24  September, 1981. 2. The crux of these appeals lies in a property dispute wherein one of the two brothers namely, Faqir Singh had allegedly sold off the portion of property belonging to him that his brother Gurbachan Singh and he inherited from their father namely Suchet Singh who died intestate in the year 1942. Gurcharan Singh   (Respondent   herein/plaintiff)   bought   a   piece   of   land belonging to Faqir Singh measuring 4 marlas vide sale deed th 2 dated 19   December, 1978   for a consideration of   ₹   6000. Thereafter, he was put in possession of such land however, it was forcibly taken by the Appellant Gurbachan Singh who stated that since Faqir Singh did not have any exclusive title or possession over the suit property, he could not purport to sell the same. 3. The   Respondent   (Gurcharan   Singh)   filed   a   suit   for possession   over   such   disputed   property   before   the   Sub­ st Judge 1  Class, Jullundur ( now Jalandhar ) , who, having considered   the   evidence   led,   framed   certain   issues   and 2 Hereinafter referred to as “disputed property” 2 3 returned   findings   in   favour   of   the   Appellant   (Gurbachan st Singh) herein. On 1  appeal, the learned Additional District Judge upheld the judgement rendered by the court below on two grounds viz. that there is no document on record to prove that the disputed property had been given to Faqir Singh in a family partition; and that if Suchet Singh had indeed  affected   partition  50   or  60   years   ago,   then  there should have been an entry in the revenue record to that effect, however, no such entry is to be found. Impugned Judgement  4. The learned single Judge framed the following questions of law (not substantial questions of law) for his consideration­ whether the findings recorded by both the courts below by relying   upon   cogent   evidence   in   the   shape   of   admissions made by witnesses of the Respondents, can be termed to be perverse given the set of circumstances or not? And, whether a person, who is concededly the owner on the basis of valid the executed sale deed and having become co­sharer by virtue of   the   same,   is   entitled   to   protect   his   possession,   if   it   is 3 4 established that he is in settled possession of a specific area or not? 5. Referring to the testimonies of DW­1, DW­3 and DW­4 the learned judge noted a categorical admission that Suchet Singh had partitioned the property during his lifetime. It was also noticed   that   the   abovenamed   witnesses   testified   to   the Respondents herein having carried out construction on the property purchased by him, the implication thereof being that after the execution of the sale deed, possession also rested with him. In view of the said facts the judge held that the judgements   of   the   courts   below   were   result   of   “complete misreading   of   the   evidence”   and   that   the   Appellant   was entitled to the possession of the specific portion sold to him, thereby setting aside the  concurrent  findings  of the  courts below. The Instant Appeals nd 6. The judgement rendered in the regular 2   appeal has been impugned before us on the ground that the High Court has transgressed the scope of second appeal; that the purchaser of a co­share does not have a right to possession [this ground 4 5 is urged on the basis of 3 judgement rendered by this court in 3 4 Jai Singh v. Gurmej Singh , Ramdas v. Sitabai   and Shyam 5 Sunder v. Ram Kumar ] and, that the High Court had erred in its  appreciation  of   evidence,  particularly   on  the   aspects of possession, the disputed property being an integral part of the Appellant herein’s house and that of the Respondents herein having raised construction on the disputed property. Our View 7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such   an   appeal   shall   only   be   maintainable   when   the   case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed  ex parte.   the latter, obviously is not the   case.   This   court   has,   in   a   multitude   of   decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In   Nazir 6 Mohamed v. J. Kamala ( 2­ Judge Bench), it was observed:­ 3  (2009) 15 SCC 747  4  (2009) SCC 444 5  (2001) 8 SCC 24 6  (2020) 19 SCC 57 5 6 “27. In HeroVinoth v. Seshammal [HeroVinoth v. S eshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545] , this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. [Chunilal   V.   Mehta   &   Sons   Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314] and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined   in   the   Code.   The   word   substantial,   as qualifying   “question   of   law”,   means—   of   having substance,   essential,   real,   of   sound   worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of   no   substance   or   consequence,   or   academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen   not   to   qualify   the   scope   of   “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance”   as   has   been   done   in   many   other provisions   such   as   Section   109   of   the   Code   or Article   133(1)(a)   of   the   Constitution.   The substantial   question   of   law   on   which   a   second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran   Ditta v. Ram   Ditta [Guran   Ditta v. Ram Ditta, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1927­28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not   mean   a   substantial   question   of   general importance   but   a   substantial   question   of   law which   was   involved   in   the   case.   In Chunilal case [Chunilal   V.   Mehta   &   Sons   Ltd. v. Century Spg.   &   Mfg.   Co.   Ltd.,   AIR   1962   SC   1314]   the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras 6 7

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7  (2016) 6 SCC 157 8  (2001) 4 SCC 262 8 9

9 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1026 9 10

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11 12 In   Nazir Mohamed   (supra) this Court has recognised three conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb

15.   A   Bench   of   three   learned   Judges,   recently   in Balasubramanian   and   Anr.   v.   M.   Arockiasamy   (Dead) 10 Through   LRs. ,   had   referred   to,   with   approval  judgement 11 rendered in   Ramathal v. Maruthathal & Ors   (two­Judge Bench)   wherein   it   was   observed   that   the   restraint   in interfering   with   questions   of   fact   under   the   jurisdiction   of second appeal, is not an absolute rule. Where the court is of the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not have a basis in the evidence led or it is of the view that the 10 (2021) 12 SCC 529 11 (2018) 18 SCC 303 12 13

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…….………………J. (ABHAY S. OKA) ……..…………..…J. (SANJAY KAROL) th Dated : 24  July, 2023; Place : New Delhi. 14