Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2023INSC750
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2857 OF 2011
SHRI NASHIK PANCHAVATI PANJARPOL
TRUST & ORS. .... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE CHAIRMAN & ANR. .... RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2858 OF 2011
SHREE NASIK PANCHAVATI PANJARAPOLE
TRUST & ORS. .... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. .... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The Respondent no. 1- Market Committee had preferred
two First Appeals being Nos. 1447 of 2006 and 1490
Signature Not Verified
of 2006 before the High Court of Judicature at
Digitally signed by
Deepak Guglani
Date: 2023.08.22
13:24:40 IST
Reason:
Bombay, challenging the award dated 07.03.2006
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passed by the II Adhoc Additional District Judge,
Nashik (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Reference
Court’) in Land Reference No. 525 of 1997. The High
Court vide the impugned judgment and order dated
23.09.2009 allowed the First Appeal No. 1447 of 2006
and set aside the award dated 07.03.2006 passed by
the Reference Court, and remanded the matter to the
Reference Court to decide the question as to whether
the Reference made to the Reference Court was within
the limitation as per Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Act’) and decide the Reference afresh. The High
Court vide the separate order of the even date,
disposed of the First Appeal No. 1490 of 2006
observing that in view of the order passed in First
Appeal No. 1447 of 2006, the appeal had become
infructuous. The appellant- trust has preferred the
instant appeals being aggrieved by the judgments
and orders passed in First Appeal Nos. 1447 of 2006
and 1490 of 2006 by the High Court.
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2. Though the case has a chequered history, the bare
facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the
present appeals may be summarised as under:
(i) The lands bearing Survey Nos. 74, 75, 76 and
29 situated at Nashik, Makhamalabad belonging
to the appellant- trust were sought to be
acquired by the respondent no. 2 for the
respondent no. 1– Agricultural Produce Market
Committee under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act read with Section 126 of the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 vide the Notification dated 17.06.1993.
(ii) In the said acquisition proceedings, an award
was declared under Section 11 of the Act on
12.01.1996. The appellant- trust filed the
Writ Petition being No. 607 of 1996
challenging the said proceedings on the
ground that the award declared was beyond the
statutory period of limitation. Initially the
High Court granted an ad-interim injunction
in favour of the appellant (the petitioner in
the said petition) on 06.02.1996, against
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which the respondent had preferred a special
leave petition before this Court. However,
the SLP came to be dismissed by this Court.
(iii) Since by virtue of the said interim order
passed in the said writ petition, the
possession of the lands in question continued
with the appellant- trust, and though an
award was declared under Section 11 of the
Act, the amount awarded remained with
respondent no. 2, considering the hardship
caused to both the parties, the appellant
(the petitioner in the said petition) and the
respondent no. 1- Agricultural Produce Market
Committee (the respondent no. 4 in the said
writ petition) arrived at a Settlement on
20.10.1997 and requested the High Court to
dispose of the said writ petition in terms of
the consent terms arrived at between the
parties.
(iv) The High Court disposed of the said Writ
Petition No. 607 of 1996 by passing the
th
following order on 20 October, 1997: -
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“By consent of Parties Petition taken up
for final hearing on board today. The
consent terms between the petitioner and
4th Respondent taken on record.
Perused the Consent Terms. The same are
just, fair, and equitable and hence are
accepted.
In view of the above, this shall be an
order in terms of Consent Terms and it
is hereby directed as under:
(a) It is directed that the
relevant date for determining
market value of suit land would
be 1 & 1/2 year after the
publication of (illegible)
Notification under Section 6
i.e., 17.06.1993 and
consequently both parties agree
and admit that Market Value be
determined as on 17.12.1994
date.
(b) It is further directed that the
petitioner shall hand over
vacant and peaceful possession
to the 4th Respondent through
2nd respondent within 4 weeks
from the date of this order and
that the petitioner Trust shall
be paid the amount determined
under the Award under section
11 by the 2nd respondent at the
time of handing over
possession.
(c) It is further directed that the
Petitioner Trust shall within 4
weeks file an Application to
2nd respondent under section 18
of the Land Acquisition Act and
that the 2nd Respondent is
directed to send the reference
to District Court, Nasik within
4 weeks from the date of
receipt. It is further directed
that the District Court after
hearing the reference shall
determine the Market Value as
on 17.12.1994 dated as agreed
between the parties hereto.
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(d) The parties are at liberty to
challenge the decision
regarding valuation given in
Reference in the District
Court, in accordance with law.
(e) The compromise & decision so
arrived finally, should not be
treated as a precedent.
In view of the above, petition
shall stand disposed of. No
order as to cost.”
(v) Pursuant to the said order passed by the High
Court, the payment was made to the appellant
on 17.11.1997 and the possession of lands was
handed over by the appellant. The appellant
thereafter submitted an application on
03.12.1997 to respondent no. 2– Collector
seeking reference to the District Court. The
respondent No. 2– Collector accordingly
referred the matter to the District Court on
18.12.1997.
(vi) The Reference Court after considering the
issue of limitation raised on behalf of the
respondents in the said Reference, held that
the Reference filed with the Collector was
within the period of limitation as per the
order of the High Court. The Reference Court
further determined the amount of additional
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compensation to be paid to the appellant-
trust vide the award dated 07.03.2006.
(vii) The respondent no. 1- Committee, being
aggrieved by the said award preferred the
First Appeals being 1447 of 2006 and 1490 of
2006 before the High Court, which came to be
allowed vide the impugned orders as stated
herein above.
3. The learned senior counsel Mr. B.H. Marlapalle
appearing for the appellant- trust submitted that
findings arrived at by the High Court with regard
to the issue of limitation are ex facie erroneous.
According to him, though the consent terms, more
particularly, clause (c) thereof was not happily
worded, the High Court while disposing of the Writ
Petition vide the order dated 20.10.1997 had
specifically directed the Reference Court to
determine the market value of the lands in question
as on 17.12.1994 as agreed between the parties, and
therefore, the respondents could not have raised the
issue of limitation contained in Section 18 of the
Act. He further submitted that both the parties had
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to act in terms of the order passed by the High
Court based on the consent terms, and therefore the
respondent- Committee could not have raised the
issue of limitation under Section 18.
4. Per Contra , the learned senior Counsel Mr. Parag
Tripathi appearing for respondent no. 1- Committee
pressing into service clause (c) of the consent
terms vehemently submitted that there being no time
limit mentioned in the said clause, it was required
to be construed that the appellant- trust had to
make an application to the second respondent under
Section 18 of the said Act within four weeks from
the date of the order passed by the High Court i.e.
from 20.10.1997 and the appellant having made the
application seeking reference on 03.12.1997 i.e.
after four weeks of the order dated 20.10.1997, such
an application was clearly barred by limitation in
view of the consent terms as well as under Section
18 of the said Act.
5. Having carefully gone through the order dated
20.10.1997 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition
No. 607 of 1996 based on the consent terms arrived
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at between the appellant- trust and the respondent
no. 1- Committee, and the award passed by the
Reference Court as also the impugned judgments and
orders passed by the High Court, we are of the
opinion that the issue of limitation raised by
respondent- Committee before the Reference Court and
before the High Court was not only not tenable but
was highly unreasonable and improper. As discernible
from the consent terms, the very purpose of arriving
at the said consent terms was to do away with the
hardship caused to both the parties because of the
pendency of the Writ Petition. A monetary loss was
being caused to the appellant- trust as it was
losing the interest on the awarded amount under
Section 11 of the said Act, and the respondent no.
1- Committee though was in dire need of the land,
was deprived of the possession of the said lands
under Acquisition. As per the said consent terms,
both the parties had agreed that the relevant date
for determining the market value of the lands in
question would be 17.12.1994. It was further agreed
that the appellant- trust would hand over the vacant
9
and peaceful possession to the respondent- Committee
and the appellant would be paid the amount
determined under the Award under Section 11 of the
Act by the respondent- Committee within four weeks
from the date of the order passed by the Court.
Lastly, it was agreed that the appellant- trust
shall within a period of four weeks file an
application to the respondent no. 2 under Section
18 of the Act and the respondent no. 2 shall send
the said reference for determination of value of the
land as on 17.12.1994 to the District Court, Nashik.
The High Court disposed of the said Writ Petition
giving directions in terms of the said consent
terms.
6. Now, since the consent terms as well as the
directions contained in the order of High Court were
silent as to within what period the appellant should
make application to the respondent- Collector
seeking Reference under Section 18 of the Act, the
respondent- Committee taking undue advantage of such
ambiguity in the consent terms, raised the issue of
limitation before the Reference Court. Such a plea
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raised after taking over the possession of lands in
question from the appellant was not only not in
consonance with the tenor of the consent terms but
it smacked of ulterior motive on the part of the
respondent. The High Court while disposing of the
Writ Petition No. 607 of 1996 had given directions
in terms of the consent terms, and both the parties
were expected to act accordingly. In view of said
directions given by the High Court, the issue of
limitation contained in Section 18 of the Act had
clearly paled into insignificance, and the
respondent could not have raised such a plea before
the Reference Court or before the High Court.
7. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal
proposition that in view of the proviso to Section
18 of the said Act, every application to the
Collector seeking reference under Section 18 is
required to be made within the time limit prescribed
in the proviso to Section 18. However, in the
instant case, the parties having entered into the
consent terms on 20.10.1997 after the award under
Section 11 was made on 12.01.1996, and the
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respondent having specifically agreed to pay the
compensation awarded under Section 11 and take over
the vacant and peaceful possession of the lands in
question from the appellant as also having agreed
to make reference to the District Court, Nashik, for
the determination of market value of the said lands
as on 17.12.1994, it did not lie in the mouth of the
respondent- Committee to say that the application
made by the appellant- trust seeking reference to
the District Court, Nashik was beyond the period of
limitation prescribed under Section 18 or was not
in consonance with the consent terms arrived at
between the parties. Since the market value of the
lands as on 17.12.1994 which was the reckonable date
agreed by the parties, was required to be determined
by the District Court, Nashik, making of an
application to the Collector seeking a Reference
under Section 18 was a sheer procedural formality
required to be followed by the appellant. Though the
consent terms and the directions of High Court were
silent as to within what period the appellant had
to make such an application, it was required to be
12
construed that appellant had to make application
after it received the compensation awarded under
Section 11 and after it handed over possession of
the lands, which it did.
8. It cannot be gainsaid that as per the rules of
doctrine of harmonious construction, the document
has to be read as a whole and in its totality. If
there is any ambiguity either patent or latent, in
any of the clauses of the document, the courts
should interpret such clause in such manner which
is consistent with the other clauses and with the
purpose and intent of the parties executing it.
9. The Reference Court after considering all the legal
and factual aspects of the matter had rightly held
that the Reference was filed with the Collector
within the period of limitation as per the order
passed by the High Court. In our opinion, the High
Court had committed gross error in interfering with
the said well-reasoned findings recorded by the
Reference Court, and in setting aside the entire
award and remanding the matter back to the Reference
Court for deciding it afresh. The impugned judgments
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and orders passed by the High Court being ex facie
erroneous, the same are set aside.
10. In that view of the matter, both the appeals are
allowed.
……………………………………J.
[BELA M. TRIVEDI]
……………………………………J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
NEW DELHI;
nd
August 22 , 2023
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