Full Judgment Text
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2835 /2014
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 7555 of 2010)
Nand Kumar … Appellant
vs.
State of Bihar & Ors. …
Respondent
(With CA No(s) 2836-2837, 2838, 2839-2841, 2842 and 2843 of
2014 @ SLP (C) No(s) 8865-8866/2010 , 10876/2010, 20833-
20835/2010, 30317 and 30818/2010)
J U D G M E N T
JUDGMENT
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Six writ petitions were filed before the High Court of Patna
which were taken up and disposed of by the High Court by a
common order dated December 9, 2009. The High Court
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rejected the prayer made by the writ petitioners for
absorption/regularisation in their posts.
3. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows:
| e appoin | ted on |
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dispute that some of the appellants had also worked as daily
wagers for a long period. It is also not in dispute that the
services of said daily wagers varied from period to period.
Nand Kumar, appellant, was appointed as an Accounts Clerk on
daily wage basis on September 18, 1982. Similarly, others
(appellants in civil appeals arising out of SLP [C] Nos.8865-
66/2010, 10876/2010, 20833-20835/2010 and 30317/2010)
were also appointed, from time to time, and served as daily
wagers. It is not in dispute that some of the appellants received
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monthly salary in the minimum pay scale with usual
allowances.
3.2 In 2006, the State Legislature passed the Bihar Agriculture
Produce Market (Repeal) Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as
the Repeal Act, 2006) with effect from September 1, 2006. As a
result whereof, the Bihar Agriculture Produce Market Act, 1960
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and rules framed thereunder in the year 1975 stood repealed,
save and except certain decisions rendered earlier as well as
disciplinary proceedings initiated or pending against its
| d. It ap | pears th |
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The claim of the appellants is that they have worked on daily
wage basis for a long period and cannot be relieved from
service by virtue of Section 6 of the Repeal Act, 2006 and,
furthermore, such decision is violative of the principles of
natural justice and accordingly is arbitrary.
4. A question has also been raised in these appeals whether the
daily wage employees are included within the meaning of “all
officers and employees” as used in Section 6(i) of the Repeal
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Act, 2006. The High Court while answering the said question
and dealing with the writ petitions, has observed that the said
Section under the Repeal Act itself maintains the distinction
between the status of daily wage employees and regular
employees of the Board.
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5. It appears to us that under Section 4 of the said Repeal Act, the
assets and liabilities of the Bihar Agriculture Produce Marketing
Board or of the Marketing Committees or Bazar Samitis
| Act of | 1960, h |
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the said Act, has the authority, power and jurisdiction to issue
necessary directions and/or orders to secure the object of the
Repeal Act, 2006.
6. In the backdrop of the facts of this case, Section 6 is relevant
for the purpose of deciding the cases of the appellants and to
find out whether it provides for absorption of the daily wagers
who worked for a longer period with the Board. It further
appears that by virtue of the said Repeal Act, a Committee of
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Secretaries was constituted under Section 6(ii) and whether the
said Committee has the power to prepare a scheme for
absorption/regularisation, denying the absorption of the
appellants on the ground that they have been appointed by the
Board/Market Committee/Bazar Samiti on daily wages or they
have a duty to prepare a scheme for such absorption.
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7. Now it is necessary for us to reproduce Section 6 of the said Act
which reads as follows :
| of Bihar<br>t Comm | Agric<br>ittee/Ba |
|---|
(i) On and from the date of repeal of the Act, all
officers and employees of the Board, shall
remain in employment, as if the Act has not
been repealed and they shall continue to be
paid same salary and allowances as was
payable on the date of repeal of the Act till
such time State Government has taken such
final decision as is provided hereafter.
(ii) The State Government shall constitute a
committee of Secretaries consisting of three
Secretaries who shall prepare detailed
scheme of absorption, retirement,
compulsory retirement or voluntary
retirement, other service conditions of
officers and employees of the Board and the
Committee. Scheme prepared by group of
Secretaries shall be placed before the State
Government within two months from the date
of enforcement of the present Act. The State
Government shall thereafter approve the
scheme;
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Provided that it shall be open to the State
Government to modify, amend or suggest
modification or amendment and the scheme
thereafter shall be made operational in such form
and intent as finally approved by the State
Government. Scheme approved by the State
Government shall be considered as statutory
scheme framed under this Act.
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(iii) After the scheme approved by the State
Government is
enforced it shall be fully implemented in its
form and intent within three months from the
date of its enforcement.
| Secreta<br>ii) abov | ries con<br>e shall |
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(v) Scheme framed under this Act shall have
effect, notwithstanding any other Act,
Ordinance, Rule, regulation, direction, order
or instruction and condition of service of
officers and employees of the Board or the
Committee, shall be governed and regulated
under the scheme to the extent provision has
been made in the scheme.
Provided further that it shall be competent
for the State Government to amend, modify, alter
or substitute the scheme so framed for removal of
difficulties in implementation of the scheme.”
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8. Mr. V.Shekhar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants in civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.
30317/2010 and 30318/2010 has contended that the daily
wagers have asked for pay parity with the State employees
treating them at par. The appellants claimed to have been
working against the posts of Agriculture Produce Marketing
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Divisions on muster roll basis for the last 5 to 15 years and are
in the employment of the Board. He further submitted that the
recommendation of the Committee of Secretaries which has
| the daily | wage e |
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long time and since they have been allowed to draw the pay
scale along with usual allowances, would automatically entitle
them to the benefit of a regular employee. He further stated
that the appellants worked under the duly sanctioned posts. He
further drew our attention to the Secretary, State of Karnataka
& Ors. V. Umadevi (3) & Ors. [2006 (4) SCC 1, paras 40, 41 and
53] and submitted that the State should take steps to
regularise all these appellants by way of one-time measure.
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9. Mr. A. Sharan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants in civil appeals arising out of SLP [C] Nos.7555/2010
and 8865-8866/2010, submitted that the appellant has worked
in the post for a long time and he should be regularised in the
said post since he has already obtained the status of employee
working in the Board. He relied upon the judgment reported in
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State of Karnataka & Ors. v.M.L. Kesari & Ors. [2010 (9) SCC
247].
10. It is further submitted that an
| ued for f | illing up |
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Some of the petitioners applied for the said post but no steps
were taken to fill the said post by the Board. Board issued
directions to pay equal pay for equal work to the daily wagers
who were working in Grade III and Grade IV. It is also stated
th
that on 27 September, 2006 Executive Engineer,
Muzaffarnagar Division Marketing Board sent a report about the
strength of the employees in the said division. In the said
report, it was also mentioned that Nand Kumar has been
th
working as an accounts clerk from 17 September, 1992 and it
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has also been mentioned that he will complete his 60 years on
th
30 September, 2018. Accordingly, it is submitted that the
petitioner and similarly situated persons have not been treated
as daily wages employees.
11. Our attention has already been drawn
by the learned senior counsel to the report of the three
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Member Committee constituted in terms of section 6(ii) of the
Repeal Act which recommended the termination of services of
all illegal and irregular employees and was submitted to the
| mending | absorp |
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termination of daily wagers in para 3.6 of the said report.
12. It is submitted by the appellants that
the appellants who have been working for more than 25 years
getting regular pay scales and work against the vacant
sanctioned posts cannot be treated as ordinary daily wage
employees. The provision in the Section 6 of the Repeal Act
deals with “all officers and employees” which includes the daily
wagers and section 6 of the Repeal Act also provide that all
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officers of the Board shall remain in employment as if the Act
has not been repealed and they would continue on the basis of
the regular pay scale, dearness pay and dearness allowances.
Therefore, it is submitted by the appellants that the rights of all
employees working were adequately protected in the said
section 6 of the Repeal Act.
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13. It is contended by the appellant that
the Committees of Secretaries have wrongly treated the
| ciating t | he facts |
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in the said post for more than 20-25 years and drawing the
salaries in pay scale with dearness allowance. Therefore they
cannot be treated differently from regular employees. It is
further contended that the term existing employees used in
section 6(ii) of the Repeal Act includes all the employees
including the petitioners, who were daily wagers. Accordingly,
it is submitted that the appellants must get a chance in the
matter to be considered by the authorities for
absorption/regularization in their posts and cannot be treated
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differently than that of regular employees.
14. It is further contended by the
appellants that the phrase “all officers and employees” in
Section 6 of the Repeal Act means all employees without any
permutation and combination or without any reservation and
qualification. The legislature was fully aware of different types
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of employees that could be in service like contractual
employees, daily wage employees, work charged employees
etc. But legislature chooses the expression “all officers and
| tion (i) | of Secti |
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employees” would continue as if the Principal Act had not been
repealed, meaning thereby that there would not be change in
service condition of whatsoever till the scheme was finalised as
contemplated under section 6(ii) of the Act. Section 6 of the
Repeal Act, 2006 provided that all officers and employees of
the Board shall remain in employment, as if the Act has not
been repealed and they continue on the basis of regular pay
scale, dearness pay and dearness allowance. Section 6(ii) of
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the Repealing Act gives jurisdiction to the Committee to
prepare “detailed scheme of absorption, retirement,
compulsory retirement or voluntary retirement of existing
employees”. The term “existing employees” used in the Act
does not distinguish between contractual or regular employee
or employees working on sanctioned, vacant post for more
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than 25 years and getting salary in minimum pay scale and
also dearness allowance.
15. The appellant further submitted that the appellants are
| he purvi | ew of U |
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our attention to para 53 which reads as follows:
“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be
cases where irregular appointments (not illegal
appointments) as explained in State of Mysore v. S.V.
Narayanappa 1967 (1) SCR 128, R.N.Nanjundappa v.
T.Thimmiah 1972 (1) SCC 409 and B.N.Nagarajan v.
State of Karnataka 1979 (4) SCC 507 and referred to in
para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly
sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and
the employees have continued to work for ten years or
more but without the intervention of orders of the
courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of
the services of such employees may have to be
considered on merits in the light of the principles
settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and
in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union
of India, the State Governments and their
instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a
one-time measure, the services of such irregularly
appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in
duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of
the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that
regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant
sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases
where temporary employees or daily wagers are being
now employed. The process must be set in motion
within six months from this date. We also clarify that
regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice,
need not be reopened based on this judgment, but
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there should be no further bypassing of the
constitutional requirement and regularising or making
permanent, those not duly appointed as per the
constitutional scheme.”
| ubmitted | by cou |
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of the State that the words “absorption, retirement, compulsory
retirement or voluntary retirement” used in Section 6 of the
Repeal Act, 2006 have been used with reference to only the
permanent employees of the Board. That absorption in the
present case does not mean regularisation. It is further submitted
that all the appellants worked on daily wage basis and had not
been regularised till the date of repeal of the said Act. It is further
submitted that with undoing of the establishment, there is no
regulation of the market and as such there is no procurement of
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revenue. In these circumstances, there cannot be any scope for
regularisation. He further pointed out that the daily wagers are
engaged in view of work exigencies prevailing in the
establishment but in the event of dissolution of the establishment,
there cannot be any work exigency. He further submitted that
regularisation is not a matter of course, it has to follow the mode
of recruitment. The Committee constituted under Section 6 of the
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Repeal Act duly examined the cases of daily wagers and clause
3.1 of the Resolution prepared by the Market Committee clearly
states that any appointment without recommendation or proper
| red as il | legal an |
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norms and in violation of the rules of recruitment and principles of
equality. Accordingly, he submitted that Section 6 of the Repeal
Act, 2006 has a provision for protection of permanent employees
and not daily wage employees, and such a provision is in violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution. The daily wagers constitute a
class within themselves and all the daily wagers have been
retrenched and not even a single one has been retained in these
cases.
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17. The High Court dismissed the writ
petition which was filed before it on the ground that petitioners
cannot claim themselves as a part of same class and the Three
Member Committee did not commit any wrong in not
recommending absorption of the petitioners.
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18. We have also noticed that Constitution Bench of this Court in
paras 44, 45 & 47 of Umadevi (supra) held :
“44. The concept of “equal pay for equal work” is
different from the concept of conferring permanency on
those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis,
temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as
envisaged by the rules. This Court has in various
decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal
work and has laid down the parameters for the
application of that principle. The decisions are rested on
the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in
the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But
the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a
position where the court could direct that appointments
made without following the due procedure established
by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to
treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation
of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to
make an order as is necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter pending before this
Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by
to the procedure established by law in the matter of
public employment. Take the situation arising in the
cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein,
after the decision in Dharwad District PWD Literate
Daily Wage Employees Assn. v. State of Karnataka
[1990 (2) SCC 396], the Government had issued
repeated directions and mandatory orders that no
temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be
given. Some of the authorities and departments had
ignored those directions or defied those directions and
had continued to give employment, specifically
interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some
of the appointing officers have even been punished for
their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an
order in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of
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power under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting
those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made
permanent, based on their appointments or
engagements. Complete justice would be justice
according to law and though it would be open to this
Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a
relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or
casual, be regularized or made permanent, the courts
are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has
worked for some time and in some cases for a
considerable length of time. It is not as if the person
who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual
in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment.
He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be
true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at
arm’s length -- since he might have been searching for
some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and
accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it
would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional
scheme of appointment and to take the view that a
person who has temporarily or casually got employed
should be directed to be continued permanently. By
doing so, it will be creating another mode of public
appointment which is not permissible. If the court were
to void a contractual employment of this nature on the
ground that the parties were not having equal
bargaining power, that too would not enable the court
to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on
such casual or temporary employment is not possible,
given the exigencies of administration and if imposed,
would only mean that some people who at least get
employment temporarily, contractually or casually,
would not be getting even that employment when
securing of such employment brings at least some
succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our
vast country are in search of employment and one is
not compelled to accept a casual or temporary
employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an
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| employment. It is in that context that one has to<br>proceed on the basis that the employment was<br>accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the<br>consequences flowing from it. In other words, even<br>while accepting the employment, the person concerned<br>knows the nature of his employment. It is not an<br>appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The<br>claim acquired by him in the post in which he is<br>temporarily employed or the interest in that post<br>cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to<br>enable the giving up of the procedure established, for<br>making regular appointments to available posts in the<br>services of the State. The argument that since one has<br>been working for some time in the post, it will not be<br>just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of<br>the nature of the employment when he first took it up,<br>is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the<br>procedure established by law for public employment<br>and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone<br>of constitutionality and equality of opportunity<br>enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. | |
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| x x x x x | |
| 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or<br>gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and<br>JUDGMENT<br>the engagement is not based on a proper selection as<br>recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is<br>aware of the consequences of the appointment being<br>temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a<br>person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate<br>expectation for being confirmed in the post when an<br>appointment to the post could be made only by<br>following a proper procedure for selection and in cases<br>concerned, in consultation with the Public Service<br>Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate<br>expectation cannot be successfully advanced by<br>temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot<br>also be held that the State has held out any promise<br>while engaging these persons either to continue them |
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where they are or to make them permanent. The State
cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also
obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a
positive relief of being made permanent in the post.”
| ring the | facts |
|---|
appears to us that the appellants were never appointed through a
proper procedure. It is not in dispute that they all served as daily
wagers. Therefore, it was within their knowledge all the
consequences of appointment being temporary, they cannot have
even a right to invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for
being confirmed in the post. Accordingly, we cannot accept the
contention of the appellants in the matter. We have further
considered the case of the appellants in the light of Section 6 of
the Repeal Act which has made it clear that the employees of the
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Board and the appellants cannot be said to be of the same status
and cannot enjoy the benefit given under Section 6(i) of the
Repeal Act, 2006. Therefore, we are unable to accept the
contention that the daily wagers would also come within the
meaning of “all officers and employees” as specifically stated in
Section 6 of the Repeal Act. In these circumstances, we are
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unable to accept the submission of learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants.
We have also considered the decision in M.L.Kesari (supra) of
| ith the e | xception |
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Umadevi (supra) but considering the facts of this case, we do not
have any hesitation to hold that the said decisions can not be a
help to the appellants.
20. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have also
perused the records placed before us. We find that the status of
the appellants was continuing to be as daily wagers. They cannot
be treated as permanent Government employees. They all
worked as employees of the Board. We have also found that no
steps were followed by the Board to safeguard the service of
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these appellants. We have not been able to find out whether any
advertisement was issued by the Government to regularise them.
In these circumstances, in view of the submission which has been
advanced on behalf of the appellants, we do not find that there is
any substance in the matter/arguments put forwarded before us
on behalf of the appellants as we have been able to find out that
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the appellants have served as daily wagers and we do find that
Section 6(i) makes it clear that after the repeal of the Agriculture
Produce Act, 1960, all officers and employees of the Board are to
| and the | y shall c |
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the State Government takes an official decision as per the further
provisions of Section 6. Such provision certainly allows
continuance of the officers and employees of the Board to
continue in employment in the same status. The status of the
daily wage employees and regular employees of the Board is
eminent from the said provision. It cannot be said that the status
of the daily wage employees can enjoy or acquire the same status
as that of the regular employees. In these circumstances, we do
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not find that there was any discrimination between the daily wage
employees and the regular employees as is tried to be contended
before us. Therefore, such submission has no substance, in our
opinion, for the reason that the difference continues and is
recognised under the said provision of the Repeal Act. So far as
the power of the Committee of Secretaries constituted in terms of
section 6(ii) of the Repeal Act is concerned, it is to prepare a
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scheme of absorption as well as of retirement, compulsory
retirement or voluntary retirement and other service conditions of
officers and employees of the Board. In our opinion, the scheme
| the Com | mittee |
|---|
to accept, modify or amend the same before granting its official
approval. Therefore, after the sanction is granted by the
Government in respect of the said scheme, it would gain the
status of statutory scheme framed under the said Act and would
be enforced within the time to be indicated in section 6(iii) of the
Repeal Act, 2006.
21. Therefore, in the light of the said provision, we do not find
that the Committee of Secretaries can be faulted in treating the
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daily wage employees on a different footing and deciding for
removal of their services.
22. We have consciously noted the aforesaid decisions of this
Court. The principle as has been laid down in Umadevi (supra) has
also been applied in relation to the persons who were working on
daily wages. According to us, the daily wagers are not appointees
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in the strict sense of the term ‘appointment’. They do not hold a
post. The scheme of alternative appointment framed for regular
employees of abolished organisation cannot, therefore, confer a
| e daily | wagers o |
|---|---|
Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Association (2006 (4) SCC 132)].
Their relevance in the context of appointment arose by reason of
the concept of regularisation as a source of appointment. After
Umadevi (supra), their position continued to be that of daily
wagers. Appointment on daily wage basis is not an appointment
to a post according to the rules. Usually, the projects in which the
daily wagers were engaged, having come to an end, their
appointment is necessarily terminated for want of work.
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Therefore, the status and rights of daily wagers of a Government
concern are not equivalent to that of a Government servant and
his claim to permanency has to be adjudged differently.
23. In these circumstances, in our considered opinion, the
regularisation/absorption is not a matter of course. It would
depend upon the facts of the case following the rules and
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regulations and cannot be de hors the rules for such
regularisation/absorption.
24. Accordingly, we do not find any substance with regard to the
| fore us o | n behalf |
|---|
not find any merit in the appeals. Accordingly, we uphold the
decision of the High Court and affirm the same, dismissing these
appeals.
.....……………………..J.
(Surinder Singh Nijjar)
New Delhi; .........
…………………….J.
February 25, 2014. (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
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