Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GOVIND
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DR. JEETSINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT25/11/1987
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
RANGNATHAN, S.
CITATION:
1988 AIR 365 1988 SCR (2) 44
1988 SCC (1) 198 JT 1987 (4) 525
1987 SCALE (2)1169
ACT:
M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961: Sec. 12(1)(a)-
Bonafide need of landlord-To be judged from objective point-
Not merely by assertion/denial of parties-Interference by
High Court in second appeal with findings of fact of first
appellate Court-Permissibility of.
HEADNOTE:
%
The respondent-landlord filed a suit for eviction of
the tenant from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide
requirement under s. 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation
Control Act, 1961. The appellant-tenant contended that the
respondent-landlord was already in occupation of
accommodation sufficient to meet his requirement and that
the suit was filed in order to extract higher rent. The
trial court decreed the suit.
The first appellate court, applying the tests which
appeared to it to be objective, found that the need in
respect of suit accommodation was not a bona fide one and
allowed the appeal of the appellant-tenant. E
In second appeal by the respondent-landlord, the High
Court held that the first appellate court had drawn wrong
inferences, that there was no proper appreciation of facts
and that all the facts had not been borne in mind. It
allowed the appeal, restored the order of the trial court
and ordered eviction.
Allowing the appeal,
^
HELD: The need of the landlord must be reasonable and
must be bona fide in order to evict the tenant on the
relevant provisions of the various Acts. Whether in a
particular situation the need was reasonable or bona fide
must be judged from the objective view point, not merely by
assertion or denial of the parties. [46E-F]
In second appeal, the scope of interference by the High
Court is limited. [47A]
Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 127, relied on.
45
In the instant case, prima facie, it might be possible
to hold that the High Court was in error in interfering with
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the findings of the first appellate court. But in view of
the fact that subsequent to the decision of the High Court,
the first wife of the landlord had died and the
accommodation which was in her occupation has become vacant,
and taking into cautious consideration the subsequent
events, it must be held that there was no more bona fide
need of the landlord to evict the tenant of the premises in
question. Order of eviction has, therefore, to be set aside.
[47F-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3117 of
1984.
From the Judgment and order dated 16.12.1983 of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Second Appeal No. 166 of
1980.
Dr. Shankar Ghosh, V. Gambhir, S. Sarin and S.K.
Gambhir for the Appellant.
T.S. Krishnamurti Iyer and Shakil Ahmad Syed for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is
directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh in Second Appeal No. 166 of 1980. By the
aforesaid judgment, the High Court has reversed the findings
of the first appellate court.
The respondent-landlord had filed a suit for eviction
in September, 1977, inter alia, under Section 12(1)(e) of
the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called
’the Act’) alleging that the premises in question was
required bona fide for the requirement of the landlord. It
was stated in the written statement filed by the petitioner-
tenant that the respondent-landlord had already in his
occupation sufficient accommodation and the same was
sufficient to meet his requirement and that the suit was
filed in order to extract the higher rent. The trial court
decreed the suit.
The appellant went up in appeal. The Additional
District Judge, Indore which was the first appellate court
allowed the appeal of the appellant-tenant and set aside the
decree passed by the trial
46
court under section 12(1)(e) of the Act. The first appellate
court looked into the evidence and came to the conclusion
that the need in respect of suit accommodation was not
bonafide one.
It was the case of the landlord that three rooms were
in his possession in the ground floor and one tin shed which
the landlord was formerly using as a Garage for his car but
which was no longer with him. Landlord was suffering from
Harnia and one of the wives was also suffering from Asthama.
After analysing the evidence the First Appellate Court came
to the conclusion that the evidence was not such that the
plaintiff-landlord found it difficult in climbing the stairs
and there was no danger of heart-attack as he had stated. So
far as the wife’s illness was concerned, this also, the
first appellate court did not accept the case on the
analysis of the evidence. It was observed by the first
appellate court that the wife of the landlord did not come
to the witness box to say that she was suffering from
Asthama. Nor the Doctor who was stated to be the family
Doctor affirmed that fact. It may, however, be mentioned
that the landlord himself is a Doctor. The landlord had
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stated that six rooms were in his possession and he
explained how six rooms were being used and the
accommodation with his wife in the ground floor comprises of
three rooms; for her residence, kitchen and store and a tin
shed for storing fuel etc. In the aforesaid background the
first appellate court came to the conclusion that the
requirement of the landlord was not reasonable nor bonafide.
It is a well-settled law in this branch that the need of the
landlord must be reasonable and must be bona fide in order
to evict the tenant on the relevant provisions of the
various Acts. Whether in a particular situation the need was
reasonable or bona fide must be judged from the objective
view point not merely by assertion or denial of the parties.
The learned Judge of the first appellate court applying the
tests which appeared to him to be objective tests found,
that such need is not bona fide or reasonable. He
accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the order of
eviction.
The landlord went up in appeal before the High Court in
Second Appeal. The High Court came to the conclusion that
the first appellate court had drawn wrong inferences and
there was no proper appreciation of facts and furthermore
the High Court was of the opinion that all the facts had not
been borne in mind by the first appellate court. The High
Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and
decree of the first appellate court and restored the order
of the trial court and ordered eviction.
47
The tenant has come up here. It is well-settled law
that in Second Appeal the scope of interference by the High
Court is limited.
This Court in the case of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, [1975]
1 S.C.R. 127 had occasion to consider the scope of the
Second Appeal under the Madhya Pradesh Act. There this Court
held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in
Second Appeal in reversing the decision of the first
appellate court. This Court further observed that the issues
whether the respondent required the shop in question for the
purpose of starting new business as a dealer in iron and
steel materials, and if so, whether his requirement was bona
fide were both questions of fact. Their determination did
not involve the application of any legal principles to the
facts established in the evidence. This Court further held
in that case that the findings of the first appellate court
on these issues were no doubt inferences from other basic
facts, but that did not alter the character of these
findings and they remained findings of facts and therefore,
the conclusion of the first appellate court that the
respondent did not bona fide require a shop premises in that
case for the purpose of starting new business as a dealer in
iron and steel materials represented findings of facts and
could not be interfered with by the High Court in second
appeal unless it was shown that in reaching it a mistake of
law was committed or that it was based on no evidence or was
such as no reasonable man could reach.
(Emphasis supplied).
We are prima facie inclined to take the view that it
might have been possible in this case to hold that the High
Court was in error in interfering with the findings of the
first appellate court but in the facts of this case we need
not rest our decision on that basis, because subsequent to
the decision of the High Court the first wife of the
landlord had died and three rooms which were in her
occupation have become vacant. In that view of the matter
and taking into cautious consideration to all the subsequent
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events it must be held that there was no more bona fide need
of the landlord to evict the tenant of the premises in
question.
This appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the order
of eviction set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
The parties will bear their own costs.
48
This, however, will not prevent the parties from
exchanging their position by mutual arrangements or
agreement by the tenant going upstairs in three rooms, now
in occupation of the landlord, and the landlord getting
three more rooms in the ground floor in the occupation of
the tenant.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.
49