Full Judgment Text
Neutral Citation Number : 2023:DHC:2745-DB
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 18 April 2023
Judgment pronounced on: 25 April 2023
+ LPA 304/2023 & CM APPL. 18859/2023, CAV 195/2023
D.A.V. COLLEGE MANAGING COMMITTEE, THROUGH
ITS GENERAL SECRETARY ..... Appellant
Through: Ms. Pinky Anand, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Saudamini Sharma,
Mr. Anurag Lakhotia and Mr.
Udit Dwivedi, Advocates.
versus
SEEMA ANIL KAPOOR & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Sermon Rawat, Mr. Vikas
Rathee and Ms. Aastha
Vishwakarma, Advocates.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, Standing
Counsel with Ms. Jyoti Tyagi
and Ms. Manisha, Advocates
for Respondent/DOE.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YASHWANT VARMA
J U D G M E N T
1. The Managing Committee of the D.A.V. College has
approached this Court assailing the validity of an interim direction
dated 02 March 2023 framed by the learned Single Judge in a pending
writ petition. In terms of the order impugned the learned Single Judge
taking note of the claim of the petitioners who were seeking benefits
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of pay revision under the 6 and 7 Central Pay Commission along
with other benefits, has called upon the appellant to refix the pay band
th
of the petitioners in accordance with the 6 CPC and to release arrears
within four weeks. It has been further observed that it would be open
for the appellant while disbursing arrears to make appropriate
adjustments bearing in mind any amounts that may have already been
released while implementing the recommendations of the CPC.
2. The aforesaid interim order is assailed solely on the ground of
the claim raised in the writ petition being barred by delay and laches.
The writ petition was filed originally in April 2021 seeking the
absorption of the petitioners in a recognised school run by the D.A.V.
College Managing Committee as well as for the release of arrears of
th th
salaries and other dues as flowing from the 6 and 7 CPCs‟. As per
the appellants, the school in question had sought closure permission in
2014. That permission was not granted. It is further disclosed in the
appeal that while initially the writ petition had dealt with the validity
of a transfer order dated 26 March 2021, ultimately the issue of
th th
asserted arrears payable in terms of the 6 and 7 CPCs came to be
raised. It was while dealing with the aforesaid issue that the
impugned order of 02 March 2023 came to be passed.
3. Ms. Anand, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the
appeal has questioned the validity of the aforesaid order contending
that the claim as raised is clearly hit by laches, a principle which must
necessarily be recognised to apply bearing in mind the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rushibhai Jagdishchandra
1
CPC
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2
Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation . According to Ms.
Anand, Rushibhai reiterates the salient principles which were
propounded by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tarsem
3
Singh and which had held that stale claims should not be
countenanced by High Courts in exercise of their writ jurisdiction.
Ms. Anand further submitted that even if the question of arrears were
to be considered, the claim could have at best been entertained for the
period of three years immediately preceding institution of proceedings
before this Court. According to learned senior counsel, the interim
directions, if permitted to hold the field, would place a huge financial
burden upon the appellant and in any case amount to the recognition
of a claim which is clearly barred by laches.
4. It is pertinent to note that the sheet anchor of the challenge
raised in the appeal rests on Rushibhai and on the strength of which,
Ms. Anand had sought to contend that the principle of laches would
clearly apply and that the learned Single Judge should have at best
restricted the claim of the writ petitioners to a period of three years
prior to the initiation of proceedings before this Court. The decision
in Rushibhai was essentially dealing with the correctness of a decision
of the Gujarat High Court which had proceeded to partially allow an
appeal preferred by the Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation accepting
its challenge to the grant of a higher pay scale to the appellants there
as being barred by delay and laches. As the Supreme Court records in
Rushibhai , the appellants there were essentially aggrieved by the
2
2022 SCC OnLine SC 641
3
(2008) 8 SCC 648
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refixation of their pay scales in terms of an order dated 28 October
2010. It was that order which was assailed before the Gujarat High
Court by way of a writ petition preferred in September 2017. While
dealing with the issue of delay and laches which arose, the Supreme
Court in Rushibhai had observed as follows:-
“ 9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of
limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of
peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed. The
courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on
the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely,
(a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of
action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with
reasonable diligence. Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period of time,
waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are
equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is
prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ
petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is
exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with
the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and
perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. Therefore,
some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and
laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the
persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts
for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of
limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules
are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger
public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a
lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their
remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the
rights and obligations of the parties. Referring to the principle of
delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R.
Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay , had referred to the
view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum
Company AND. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and
John Kemp , in the following words:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
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party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of
time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is
founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the
validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the interval, which
might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy.”
10. At the same time, the law recognises a „continuing‟ cause of
action which may give rise to a „recurring‟ cause of action as in the
case of salary or pension. This Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of
India , has held that so long as the employee is in service, a fresh
cause of action would arise every month when they are paid their
salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to the
rules. If the employee's claim is found to be correct on merits, they
would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay-
scale in future and the question of limitation would arise for
recovery of the arrears for the past period. The Court held that the
arrears should be calculated and paid as long as they have not
become time-barred. The entire claim for the past period should not
be rejected.
11. Relying upon the aforesaid ratio, this Court in the case of Union
of India v. Tarsem Singh , while referring to the decision in Shiv
Dass v. Union of India , quoted the following passages from the
latter decision:
“8…The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated
resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its
train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised
after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of
inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also
injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with
the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an
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important factor which also weighs with the High Court in
deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually
continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be
a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. … If
petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years
normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the
relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of
about three years.”
12. In Tarsem Singh (supra), reference was also made to Section 22
of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the following passage
from Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree
Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan , which had explained the concept
of continuing wrong in the context of Section 23 of the Limitation
Act, 1908, corresponding to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
observing that:
“31…It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is
an act which creates a continuing source of injury and
renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the
continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes
an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong
even though the damage resulting from the act may
continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character
that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act
constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is
necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused
by the wrongful act and what may be described as the
effect of the said injury.”
13. Accordingly, in Tarsem Singh (supra) it has been held that
principles underlying „continuing wrongs‟ and
„recurring/successive wrongs‟ have been applied to service law
disputes. A „continuing wrong‟ refers to a single wrongful act
which causes a continuing injury. „Recurring/successive wrongs‟
are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a
distinct and separate cause of action. Having held so, this Court
in Tarsem Singh (supra) had further elucidated some exceptions to
the aforesaid rule in the following words:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim
will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where
remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation
(where remedy is sought by an application to the
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Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the
said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a
service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief
can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing
wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to
the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to or affected
several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would
affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will
not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to
payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be
granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of
third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to
seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would
render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will
be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery
of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles
relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, the High Courts will restrict the
consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period
of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ
petition.”
14. In Tarsem Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching
the courts affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this
Court set aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with
interest. The Court restricted “ the relief relating to arrears to only
three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of
demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser ”. Further, the
grant of interest on arrears was also denied.
16. In the facts of the present case, it is accepted that the
respondent-Corporation had accepted the interpretation rendered by
the High Court of Gujarat to the Scheme whereby the appellants,
on financial upgradation, would be entitled to the higher grade pay-
scale of the next promotional post, which is Rs. 5,000-8,000/- in
the present case. As noted above, the impugned judgment of the
Division Bench accepts the said position and grants the appellants
the said pay-scale but restricts the benefit from the date of the
judgment of the Single Judge in the Writ Petitions filed by the
st
appellants, that is, with effect from 31 July 2018. The Division
Bench should not have taken the date of the decision/judgment of
the Single Judge for grant of the said benefit in view of the decision
and ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) which has been followed in
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several other decisions. That apart, the date of the decision of the
Single Judge is a fortuitous circumstance. Only the date of filing of
the writ petition is relevant while examining the question of delay
and laches or limitation. The appellants would, in consonance with
the case law referred to above, be entitled to the arrears for three
years before the date of filing of the Writ Petitions.
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the prayer of the appellants
that they should be given arrears right from 2010 has to be rejected.
We also reject the prayer of the appellants that they should be
refunded the entire amount which had been collected by the
th
respondent-Corporation in terms of the order dated 28 October
2010.
19. Recording the aforesaid, we partly allow the present appeals
with a direction that the appellants would be entitled to arrears in
the pre-revised pay-scale of Rs. 5,000-8,000/- for three years prior
to the date of filing of the Writ Petitions along with interest at the
st
rate of 7% per annum with effect from 1 September 2017. The
arrears, with interest, would be paid within a period of four months
from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. A computation
sheet/statement of accounts on the basis of which payment is made
by the respondent-Corporation shall be furnished to the appellants.
The impugned judgment is, accordingly, partly set aside and the
Writ Petitions filed by the appellants would be treated as allowed in
the aforesaid terms. There would be no order as to costs.”
5. As is evident from the aforesaid passages, Rushibhai reiterates
the principles which were enunciated in Tarsem Singh . Tarsem Singh
was a judgment which arose out of a claim for grant of disability
pension. The respondent in that matter who had been relieved from
service on 13 November 1983 had approached the High Court in 1999
praying for the grant of disability pension. The said writ petition
came to be allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court
upholding the claim for grant of disability pension. However, arrears
were restricted to a period of 38 months prior to the filing of the writ
petition. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment, the respondent
there preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of
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that High Court. That appeal came to be allowed in toto with the
Division Bench holding that he would be entitled to disability pension
from the date it had fallen due. While dealing with the correctness of
that judgment rendered by the Division Bench, the Supreme Court in
Tarsem Singh observed as follows: -
“7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought
by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by
an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the
exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong.
Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong,
relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong
commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source
of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the
grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision
which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening
of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the
claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to
payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in
spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if
the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of
laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief
of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles
relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief
relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the
date of filing of the writ petition.
8. In this case, the delay of sixteen years would affect the
consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in
directing payment of arrears relating to sixteen years, and that too
with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears
to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date
of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought
not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances.”
6. Ms. Anand further submitted that this Court too has frowned
upon belated claims being raised in relation to pay and other
allowances. Ms. Anand submitted that in Prem Thakran v. Govt.
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4 th
(NCT of Delhi) a prayer for release of arrears of the 6 CPC came to
be negatived on the ground of delay by the learned Judge, as would be
evident from the following extracts of that decision:-
“5. Upon hearing and on perusal of material on record and the
decision cited, I find that the application of doctrine of delay and
laches in a writ petition is to be considered in a liberal manner.
That is to say, if there is any ground for extension of limitation, it
has to be considered liberally.
6. In the instant case, respondent-School in its communication of
th
5 February, 2011 (Annexure P-4) had undertaken to pay the
arrears of Sixth Pay Commission to the regular staff with effect
st
from 1 January, 2006. On the strength of that undertaking,
petitioner ought to have approached the Court within three years
i.e. in the year 2014. The lack of diligence is apparent from the
fact that petitioner had not even made a Representation in the year
2014 to seek the arrears of Sixth Pay Commission with effect
st
from 1 January, 2006 and only in the year 2017, writ petition has
been filed. Therefore, in view of the decision in Preeti
Sharma (Supra), the benefit of Sixth Pay Commission to
petitioner prior to 2013 cannot be extended.”
7. It was pointed out that the aforesaid judgment was ultimately
upheld by the Division Bench which had proceeded to dismiss the
Letters Patent Appeal. Ms. Anand pointed out that the view as
expressed by the Court in Prem Thakran was approved and attained
finality consequent to the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition taken
against the same.
8. Having heard learned senior counsels, we find ourselves unable
to sustain the challenge raised in the present appeal for the following
reasons.
9. It must at the outset be noticed that neither Rushibhai nor
Tarsem Singh were dealing with benefits claimed as flowing from
4
2018 SCC OnLine Del 9446
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recommendations made by a Pay Commission. In Rushibhai , the writ
petitioners had questioned the validity of the pay fixation order after
almost seven years. Tarsem Singh was dealing with a claim for
payment of disability pension along with arrears. The employee there
had raised the aforesaid issue for the first time by filing a writ petition
in 1999 even though he stood relieved from service in 1983. Both
Rushibhai and Tarsem Singh were therefore decisions rendered in the
backdrop of individual claims raised by employees in respect of
benefits asserted to have become due and payable while they were in
service. Those employees essentially sought to raise claims with
respect to benefits which according to them were due and payable
while they were still in employment. While in Tarsem Singh , a claim
for disability pension was raised long after the employee had been
relieved from service, in Rushibhai the challenge to an order by which
the claim stood decided was assailed after long delay. It was in the
aforesaid backdrop that the Supreme Court observed that even if those
claims fell in the genre of a continuing wrong, it was incumbent upon
the employee to claim those benefits with due dispatch. It was in the
that context that the Supreme Court had proceeded to frame the
principle of arrears being restricted to a period of three years, the
generally understood period of limitation for a money claim, prior to
the initiation of action before a court.
10. In the considered opinion of this Court such claims clearly stand
on a pedestal distinct and different from benefits which are stated to
flow from recommendations made by a CPC. It would be pertinent to
note that the salary of employees working in schools governed by the
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5
Delhi School Education Act, 1973 is governed by Section 10
thereof. The said provision reads thus: -
“10. Salaries of employees.-
(1) The scales of pay and allowances, medical facilities,
pension, gratuity, provident fund and other prescribed benefits
of the employees of a recognised private school shall not be
less than those of the employees of the corresponding status in
schools run by the appropriate authority.
Provided that where the scales of pay and allowances, medical
facilities, pension, gratuity, provident fund and other
prescribed benefits of the employees of any recognised private
school are less than those of the employees of the
corresponding status in the schools run by the appropriate
authority, the appropriate authority shall direct, in writing, the
managing committee of such school to bring the same up to the
level of those of the employees of the corresponding status in
schools run by the appropriate authority:
Provided further that the failure to comply with such direction
shall be deemed to be non-compliance with the conditions for
continuing recognition of an existing school and the provisions
of section 4 shall apply accordingly.
(2) The managing committee of every aided school shall
deposit, every month, its share towards pay and allowances,
medical facilities, pension, gratuity, provident fund and other
prescribed benefits with the Administrator and the
Administrator shall disburse, or cause to be disbursed, within
the first week of every month, the salaries and allowances to
the employees of the aided schools.”
11. It is manifest from a reading of the aforesaid provision that the
obligation to release pay and allowances on terms and at par with
those paid to teachers and staff employed in schools run by the Central
Government, State Government or a Municipal Corporation is
essentially placed upon the employer. Recommendations of a CPC
5
1973 Act
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once accepted are liable to be factored in by the employer itself.
Those benefits are not dependent upon an assertion of a right by the
employee but are those which must automatically be implemented
once those recommendations come to be accepted by the competent
authority. Viewed in that light, it is evident that benefits flowing from
a CPC report are not dependent upon a claim being raised but are
those which must necessarily be implemented and released by an
employer of its own volition. It is this feature which distinguishes
claims flowing from the recommendations made by a CPC from
individual assertions that may be raised by an employee with respect
to salary or other allowances.
12. This aspect has been duly noticed by a Division Bench of our
6
Court in Vidya Bharati School v. Directorate of Education & Ors.
where the following observations came to be made: -
“ 5 . The limitation of claim to arrears of three years is
untenable in view of the dicta of the Supreme Court in
Keraleeya Samajam & Anr. Vs Pratibha Dattatray Kulkarni
(Dead) Lrs & Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 853:
“……4. Therefore the entitlement of the teacher‟s
th th
salaries as per the 5 and 6 Pay Commission to
the teaching and non-teaching staff of the second
petitioner – school is not required to gone into
and only issue which is required to be considered
is whether the arrears ought to have been
restricted to three years preceding the filing of the
writ petition?
5. Having heard Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioners and learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents and considering orders
passed in earlier round of litigations which ended
6
2022/DHC/004536
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up to this court the liability of the management to
pay the salaries to the teaching and nonteaching
th th
staff as per the 4 Pay Commission and 5 Pay
Commission ended in favour of the teaching and
nonteaching staff working with the petitioners.
th
Therefore as and when the 6 Pay Commission
recommendations was made applicable as such it
was the duty case upon the petitioners‟ institution
to pay the salary/wages to the teaching and
nonteaching staff as per the applicable pay scale
th
as per the 6 Pay Commission recommendation
and for which the staff was not required to move
before the Deputy Director (Education) again and
again. Therefore, the submissions on behalf of the
petitioners that as the respondents approached the
Deputy Director (Education) subsequently and
therefore the question with respect to the
limitation will come into play and therefore the
respondents shall be entitled to the arrears of last
three years preceding the filing of the writ
petitions cannot be accepted.
6. The respondents were compelled to approach
the Deputy Director only when the petitioners
though were required to pay the wages as per the
applicable rules and as per the recommendation
th
of the 6 Pay Commission, failed to make the
payment, the respondents were compelled to
approach the Deputy Director (Education)
thereafter. Therefore for the lapse and inaction on
the part of the petitioners, the respondents cannot
be made to suffer and deny the arrears of the
th
salaries as per the 6 Pay Commission
recommendation, which otherwise they are
entitled to. Every time the teachers were not
supposed to approach the appropriate authority
for getting the benefit as and when there is a
revision of pay as per the pay commission
recommendations….”
6 . In the present case, the school was to pay monies/salaries in
terms of the salary fixation done by DOE way back on
11.02.2009. The school kept pursuing its position and
understanding of the law before the DOE, avoiding the
statutorily mandated payment, on the basis of a purported
waiver by the teachers‟ association. In compliance with the
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directions issued on 21.12.2015 in W.P.(C) 11800/2015, the
DOE‟s order directing the school to pay salary and arrears to the
teachers was passed on 10.10.2016. The school did not comply
with the directions: Now, due to lapse of time, it cannot take any
benefit because of its own recalcitrance to comply with the
Government‟s directions and statutory obligations. Its non-
compliance over a long period would not create any special
equities in its favour and it does not get absolved of the statutory
obligation to pay the salary fixed by the government in terms of
the 6th Pay Commission Recommendation. The so-called
collective waiver by the teachers of their respective statutory
dues can hardly be given cognizance because the nature of
employment puts the teachers of a private school on a weaker
footing vis-à-vis the school management. What was the nature
of the teacher‟s association meeting, thereby rendering the
purported resolution untenable. Pay revision in terms of the Pay
Commission Recommendations is a matter of public policy,
with objective of ensuring that with the passage of time the
purchasing power of the government employee is not denuded
by inflation and other related factors. It can hardly be anyone‟s
case and will be against public policy that the remuneration of
teachers and employees of a school be, for all times, below the
standard fixed by the government. The after-effects of such
monetary relinquishment on the employees, their families and
their financial planning would be dire. Nobody would ordinarily
volunteer for such financial deprivation and yet be expected to
discharge their duties as teachers with the same devotion and
dedication as before the pay revision. The individual
remuneration and relinquishment of rights by each teacher, for
all times, is not evidenced. The school‟s contentions were
rightly rejected in the impugned order. We find no reason to
differ.”
13. It becomes pertinent to note that in Vidya Bharati School , the
Division Bench had an occasion to notice the judgment rendered by
the Supreme Court in Keraleeya Samajam and Another v. Pratibha
7
Dattatray Kulkarni (Dead) Through LRs and Others . Keraleeya
Samajam too was a judgment which was rendered in the context of a
th
claim for the payment of arrears as flowing from the 6 CPC. In
7
2021 SCC OnLine SC 853
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Keraleeya Samajam the Supreme Court laid emphasis upon the
obligation of the employer to implement the recommendations of the
th
6 CPC and the duties cast upon it in this respect. It was held that
once the employer itself had faulted in implementing the
recommendations of the CPC, the claim could not have been denied
on the ground of delay or laches. We deem it apposite to extract the
following paragraphs from the decision of the Supreme Court in
Keraleeya Samajam :-
“5. Having heard Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the petitioners and learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents and considering orders
passed in earlier round of litigations which ended up to this court
the liability of the management to pay the salaries to the teaching
th th
and non-teaching staff as per the 4 Pay Commission and 5 Pay
Commission ended in favour of the teaching and non-teaching staff
th
working with the petitioners. Therefore as and when the 6 Pay
Commission recommendations was made applicable as such it was
the duty cast upon the petitioners' institution to pay the
salary/wages to the teaching and non-teaching staff as per the
th
applicable pay scale as per the 6 Pay Commission
recommendation and for which the staff was not required to move
before the Deputy Director (Education) again and again. Therefore,
the submissions on behalf of the petitioners that as the respondents
approached the Deputy Director (Education) subsequently and
therefore the question with respect to the limitation will come into
play and therefore the respondents shall be entitled to the arrears of
last three years preceding the filing of the writ petitions cannot be
accepted.
6. The respondents were compelled to approach the Deputy
Director only when the petitioners though were required to pay the
wages as per the applicable rules and as per the recommendation of
th
6 Pay Commission, failed to make the payment, the respondents
were compelled to approach the Deputy Director (Education)
thereafter. Therefore for the lapse and inaction on the part of the
petitioners, the respondents cannot be made to suffer and deny the
th
arrears of the salaries as per the 6 Pay Commission
recommendation, which otherwise they are entitled to. Every time
the teachers were not supposed to approach the appropriate
LPA 304/2023 Page 16 of 17
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authority for getting the benefit as and when there is a revision of
pay as per the pay commission recommendations.
7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above both these
special leave petitions deserve to be dismissed and accordingly
dismissed.
8. It is directed to the petitioners to clear the arrears within a period
of eight weeks from today failing which it shall carry interest at
9%. The Deputy Director (Education), Nasik Division is hereby
directed to see that the present order is complied with by the
petitioners and the amount is disbursed to the respective
respondents by account payee cheques.”
14. Accordingly, and for all the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit
in the instant appeal. It shall, consequently, stand dismissed.
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ.
YASHWANT VARMA, J.
APRIL 25, 2023/ SU
LPA 304/2023 Page 17 of 17
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By:NEHA
Signing Date:25.04.2023
15:35:41