Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4
PETITIONER:
VASUDHA SRIVASTAVA AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. KAMLA CHAUHAN AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT24/01/1992
BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 1454 1992 SCR (1) 356
1992 SCC (1) 645 JT 1992 (1) 353
1992 SCALE (1)190
ACT:
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972:
Sections 3(j), 12 and 30:
Tenant inducted by one of the co-owners-The other
residing elsewhere-Authority of such person who inducted the
tenant-Whether could be questioned in an eviction suit on
the ground of non-joinder of party-Finding of fact recorded
by trial court-Confirmed by High Court-Whether could be
reopened in appeal.
HEADNOTE:
The first appellant and her sister succeeded to the
suit premises on the death of their father. Respondent No.
2 was the tenant in the premises. The first appellant who
was managing the property on her behalf as also on behalf of
her sister, who was residing elsewhere, instituted a suit
for eviction of Respondent No.2 on the ground of non-payment
of rent. She did not join her sister as co-plaintiff. The
defendant-Respondent No. 2 took the plea that his wife was
the tenant and that she had already deposited the rent under
Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The trial court
rejected the defence and decreed the suit. On an appeal by
the defendants, the High Court reversed the decree and
dismissed the suit for non-joinder of the plaintiff’s
sister.
The present appeal, by special leave, is against the
High Court’s order. The appellant contended that the
expression ‘land-lord’ in Section 3(j) of the Act was not
limited to denote the owner of the house, but should be
understood in a wider sense to include a person to whom rent
is payable, as also, the agent of such a person, such as the
plaintiff-appellant in the instant case.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1. Since appellant No. 1 was entrusted with the
management
357
of the house as her sister was staying with her husband
elsewhere and it was appellant No. 1 who had inducted the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4
respondent No.2 in the premises as a tenant, it was not open
to the tenant-respondent to question her authority. If he
was desirous of contesting the factual aspect, it was
essential for him to have raised the issue of non-
maintainability in his written statement which was not done.
In reversing the decree passed by the trial court the High
Court committed a serious error in not appreciating this
position. [358 F-H]
2. Much significance cannot be attached to the aspect
as to whether the husband became defaulter or not when the
wife had already offered to pay the rent, in view of the
importance of the issue in the proceeding under Section 12
of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972. In that background the parties went to
trial and led their full evidence on the point and the
trial court dealt with the dispute thoroughly and recorded a
finding in favour of the appellants which has been confirmed
by the High Court. The respondent, therefore, cannot be
allowed to reopen this question. [359C-D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 243 of
1992.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.1989 of the
Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 480 of 1983.
Sunil Gupta, Vikram Nath and H.K. Puri for the
Appellants.
Manoj Swarup and Ms. Lalita Kohli for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHARMA, J. Special leave is granted.
2. The appeal arises out of a suit for eviction of the
respondents from a building in the city of Allahabad. The
premises belonged to one G.D. Srivastava, who on his death
was succeeded by his two daughters Smt. Shashi Srivastava,
the sole original plaintiff since dead (substituted, by her
legal representatives) and the appellant No. 6 Smt.
Sarojini. According to the case of the appellants the
property remained under the management of Shashi Srivastava
on her own behalf as well as her sister Sarojini Sinha, who
was not residing in Allahabad. The house was let out
358
to the respondent No. 2 Harpal Singh Chauhan, a Government
servant, in 1968. In 1978 Harpal Singh Chauhan was
transferred outside Allahabad, and certain strangers
initiated a proceeding under section 12 (3A) of the U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 (hereinafter refered to as the ‘Act’) with a
prayer to declare the premises vacant. Harpal Singh
contested the case on the ground that his wife, respondent
No. 1 Smt. Kamla Chauhan and not he was the tenant. It is
not necessary to set out the details relating to the said
proceeding except stating that Rent Control Officer as well
as the appellate authority rejected the case of tenancy in
favour of Smt. Kamla Ghauhan and held that Harpal Singh was
the tenant. It is said on behalf of the appellants that
the proceeding, however, has not finally terminated in view
of a remand order by the appellate authority on another
issue. In the meantime Shashi Srivastava instituted the
present suit for eviction of Harpal Singh without Sarojini
Sinha joining as a co-plaintiff, as according to the
appellant’s case she was not available in Allahabad, on the
ground of non-payment of rent. Although the action was
opposed, the defendants did not take a plea of non-
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4
maintainability of the suit on the ground of non-joinder of
Sarojini Sinha as a plaintiff. The defence was once more
the same plea which was taken in the proceeding under
section 12 (3A) that Smt. Kamla Chauhan was the tenant who
had deposited the rent under section 30 of the Act. The
Judge, Small Causes Court, rejected the defence and decreed
the suit. The defendants challenged the decree before the
Allahabad High Court under section 25 of the Small Causes
Courts Act. The High Court has, by impugned judgment,
reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on the ground of
non-joinder of Sarojini Sinha.
3. The learned counsel for the appellants was right in
relying upon the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 3 (j)
of the Act in support of the appeal. The expression is not
limited to denote the owner of the house but it has to be,
for the purposes of the Act understood in the wide sense to
include a person to whom the rent is payable as also his
agent. As has been stated earlier, according to the case of
Shashi Srivastava she was entrusted with the management of
the house as here sister was staying with her husband
outside Allahabad and it was Shashi Srivastava who had
inducted the tenant-respondent in the premises as a tenant.
It was, therefore not open to the tenant-respondent to
question the authority of Shashi Srivastava. If he was
desirous of contesting the factual aspect pleaded by Shashi
Srivastava, it was essential for him to have raised the
issue of non-maintainability in his written statement which
was not done. In reversing the decree passed by the trial
court the High Court committed a serious error in not
appreciating this position. The impugned judgment has,
therefore,
359
to be set aside.
4. It has been strenuously contended by Mr. Manoj
Swarup, appearing on behalf of the respondents that in view
of the facts and circumstances of the case Smt. Kamla
Chauhan must be held to be the tenant and not her husband.
We are not inclined to go into this issue of fact afresh as
both the courts below have categorically recorded their
findings against them.
5. Mr. Swarup, next, argued that in any event the suit
is fit to be dismissed as Smt. Kamla Chauhan has deposited
the arrears of rent under section 30 of the Act. Stress was
laid on the close relationship of husband and wife and it
was suggested that it will be highly technical to hold the
husband defaulter when the wife had already offered to pay
the rent. We have considered the matter closely and held
that whatever be the weight given to this argument in an
ordinary case, much significance cannot be attached to this
aspect in view of the importance of the issue in the
proceeding under section 12 of the Act. In that background
the parties went to trial and led their full evidence on the
point and the trial court dealt with the dispute thoroughly
and recorded a finding in favour of the appellant which has
been confirmed by the High Court. The respondent, in the
circumstances, cannot be allowed to reopen this question.
6. In the result the impugned judgment of the High
Court is set aside and the decree passed by the trial court
is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there
will be no order as to costs of the High Court and this
Court.
G.N. Appeal allowed.
360
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4