Channappa Since Deceased Rep By His Lrs. vs. Parvatewwa Since Deceased By Her Lrs.

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 343
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.___ OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8536 OF 2024]


CHANNAPPA (D) THR. LRS. … APPELLANTS


VS.


PARVATEWWA (D) THR. LRS. … RESPONDENTS




J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
T HE A PPEAL
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2. The present appeal stems from the judgment and order dated 30
August 2023 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Bench at
1
Kalaburagi in RSA No. 200320 of 2016, whereby the High Court, in
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
2
Procedure, 1908 , allowed the second appeal preferred by the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.04.09
18:21:35 IST
Reason:

1
High Court
2
CPC

3
respondents and set aside the concurrent findings recorded by the
courts below.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. Facts giving rise to the lis are as follows:
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3.1 The husband of Parvatewwa died on 15 January 1961. Shortly
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thereafter, on 23 March 1961, Parvatewwa is stated to have
adopted Channappa.
3.2 After a considerable lapse of time, in the year 2002, Parvatewwa
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instituted O.S. No. 346 of 2002 in the Court of the Principal Civil
5
Judge (Sr. Dn.), Bijapur seeking a declaration that the alleged
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adoption deed dated 23 March 1961 was null and void and not
binding on her, along with a consequential relief of injunction
simpliciter.
3.3 The Trial Court dismissed this suit by judgment and decree dated
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09 November 2006. Aggrieved thereby, Parvatewwa preferred
an appeal under Section 96, CPC being R.A. No. 116 of 2006
before the First Appellate Court.
3.4 During the pendency of R.A. No. 116 of 2006, Parvatewwa
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instituted a fresh suit on 06 January 2007, being O.S. No. 13
6
of 2007 before the Principal Civil Judge, Senior Division,

3
Parvatewwa (represented by Prema) and subsequent purchasers
4
Suit – I, hereafter
5
Trial Court in OS No. 346 of 2002
6
Suit – II, hereafter
2


7
Bijapur . In the said suit, she alleged that Channappa had
illegally dispossessed her from the suit schedule property
bearing CTS No. 121/B and sought a declaration of her
ownership over the said property along with recovery of
possession.
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3.5 On 18 June, 2007, Channappa filed his written statement in
Suit – II, contending, inter alia , that the suit was barred by
limitation and was hit by the principles of res judicata under
Section 11, CPC, and also by Order II Rule 2 thereof, in view of
Suit - I. It was specifically pleaded that the parties, the subject
matter and the issues involved in both suits were substantially
the same and that the appeal arising out of the earlier suit was
already pending at the relevant time.
3.6 During the pendency of Suit – II, Channappa filed two
applications, being I.A. No. 3 under Section 10, CPC seeking stay
of the said suit and I.A. No. 4 under Order II Rule 2, CPC
questioning the maintainability thereof. By separate orders
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dated 27 June 2008, the Trial Court dismissed both the
applications. Aggrieved by the rejection of I.A. No. 3, Channappa
preferred W.P. No. 40189 of 2008 (GM-CPC) under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution before the High Court. The High
rd
Court, however, dismissed the said petition on 3 February,
2009, thereby affirming the order of the Trial Court.

7
Trial Court in OS No. 13 of 2007
3


3.7 Insofar as the earlier proceedings are concerned, R.A. No. 116
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of 2006 came to be decided on 23 October 2009. The First
Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the
judgment and decree in Suit – I on the ground of limitation,
though certain findings recorded by the Trial Court on Issue Nos.
1 and 3 qua the validity of the adoption deed, were reversed.
3.8 Against the findings so recorded, Channappa preferred RSA No.
7305 of 2009 and Parvatewwa filed Cross Objection No. 101 of
2010 challenging the dismissal of the suit on the ground of
limitation. The Regular Second Appeal was allowed and the
cross-objection came to be dismissed, thereby affirming the
dismissal of Suit – I.
3.9 Meanwhile, in Suit – II, the parties led evidence. Parvatewwa
examined herself as PW-1. Channappa examined himself as DW-
1 and examined two other witnesses as DW-2 and DW-3.
3.10 Parvatewwa died during the pendency of Suit – II, and Prema
was brought in as her legal representative (respondent 1
8
herein) for prosecuting Suit – II. By judgment and decree dated
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24 July 2015, the Trial Court dismissed Suit – II holding that
the suit was barred by limitation and further hit by the principles
of res judicata , constructive res judicata and Order II Rule 2,
CPC.

8
Prema, hereafter
4


3.11 Aggrieved by dismissal of Suit – II, Prema preferred an appeal
under Section 96, CPC being R.A. No. 103 of 2015. By its
th
judgment dated 19 August 2016, the First Appellate Court held
that the suit was not barred by limitation. However, it confirmed
the dismissal of the suit on the grounds of res judicata ,
constructive res judicata and under Order II Rule 2 of CPC. Thus,
while both the Trial Court in Suit - II and the First Appellate Court
recognised Parvatewwa’s ownership over the suit schedule
properties, the suit ultimately came to be dismissed on technical
grounds relating to maintainability.
3.12 Still aggrieved, Prema instituted a second appeal, being RSA No.
th
200320 of 2016, before the High Court on 05 November 2016,
assailing the concurrent findings of the Courts below insofar as
they related to invocation of the principles of res judicata and
Order II Rule 2, CPC. During the pendency of Suit – II itself,
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Parvatewwa had, on 24 November 2009, alienated the suit
property in favour of Dhanraj, Premraj, Ashok, Ramesh and
Dinesh, who were subsequently impleaded as appellants 2 to 6
before the High Court and are arrayed as respondents 2 to 6
herein. Channappa had also passed away during the pendency
of the RSA, and his legal representatives were impleaded as the
5


respondents before the High Court and are arrayed as the
9
appellants herein.
I MPUGNED J UDGMENT
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4. By its judgment dated 30 August 2023, the High Court allowed the
said Regular Second Appeal. The High Court decided 3 (three)
substantial questions of law. For the reasons assigned, the judgments
and decrees of the Courts below on the question of res judicata and
Order II Rule 2, CPC were set aside and, consequently, Suit – II was
decreed in favour of Prema.
5. The substantial questions of law decided by the High Court are not
referred to here, since they bear resemblance to the issues we propose
to decide now.
I SSUES I NVOLVED
6. In view of the aforesaid factual narrative, the following issues fall for
determination:
A. Whether Suit – II, instituted by Parvatewwa (since deceased,
represented by Prema) was barred by the principles of res judicata
or constructive res judicata under Section 11, CPC, or by the
provisions of Order II Rule 2 thereof, in view of the earlier
proceedings in Suit – I and the appellate proceedings arising
therefrom?

9
Channappa (represented through his Legal Representatives)
6


B. Whether the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100,
CPC was justified in interfering with the concurrent findings recorded
by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court on the above question
and in decreeing Suit – II?
NALYSIS BY THE OURT
A C
ISSUE - A
7. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to address the
submission advanced on behalf of Parvatewwa (represented through
subsequent purchasers) that the Trial Court, while deciding I.A. No.
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4 in Suit – II, by order dated 27 June 2008 had already held that
the cause of action in Suit – I and that in Suit – II were altogether
different and that the subsequent suit was therefore maintainable
and not barred under Order II Rule 2, CPC. It has further been
submitted that the said application filed by Channappa was dismissed
by the Trial Court and the revision petition preferred against the same
before the High Court also came to be dismissed and, therefore, the
finding recorded in the order on I.A. No.4 has attained finality and
cannot now be re-agitated. This submission, however, cannot be
accepted.
8. At this juncture, it is necessary to clarify a factual aspect which has
not been accurately projected. Although it has been urged that the
challenge to I.A. No. 4 stood negatived upon affirmation by the High
Court, the record would reveal a different position. In fact, two
distinct applications had been filed by Channappa in Suit – II, namely,
7


I.A. No. 3 under Section 10, CPC seeking stay of further proceedings
in the suit, and I.A. No. 4 invoking Order II Rule 2, CPC questioning
the maintainability thereof. Both these applications came to be
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rejected by the Trial Court on 27 June 2008 by separate orders.
However, the writ proceedings instituted thereafter, being W.P. No.
40189 of 2008 (GM-CPC) under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution,
were directed only against the rejection of the application under
Section 10, CPC (I.A. No. 3). Significantly, no challenge appears to
have been laid to the order rejecting I.A. No. 4 under Order II Rule
2, CPC. To that extent, therefore, the premise that the High Court
had occasion to examine or affirm the rejection of I.A. No. 4 is not
borne out from the record.
9. Quite apart, such an interlocutory order (rejection of I.A. No. 4) is
not independently appealable under Section 104 read with Order
XLIII, CPC. Nevertheless, sub-section (1) of Section 105,
CPC specifically provides that although no appeal lies from such
orders, where a decree is appealed against, any error, defect or
irregularity in an order affecting the decision of the case may be
raised as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. For
facility of understanding, sub-section (1) of Section 105, CPC is
quoted hereunder:

8

10. Taking note of this provision, the dismissal of I.A. No. 4 by the Trial
Court in Suit – II, does not preclude the defendants from questioning
the correctness of that order while assailing the final decree passed in
the suit. Consequently, it remains open to the defendants to urge
before the Appellate Court that the suit was barred under Order II Rule
2 CPC, notwithstanding the earlier rejection of the application raising
that plea.
11. At this stage, it would be apposite to notice the underlying object of

provisions akin to Section 105, CPC. The legislative scheme does not
oblige a party to challenge each and every interlocutory order at the
stage at which it is made. Unless a statute expressly mandates
otherwise, such orders may be questioned in an appeal against the
final decree. As early as in Maharaja Moheshur Singh v. Bengal
10
Government , the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
underscored as follows:

*
We are not aware of any law or regulation prevailing in India which
renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every
interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved,
under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting forever the
benefit of the consideration of the appellate court. No authority or
precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we
cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the
expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule
which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing;
whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense
and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar
calamities.

10
(1859) 7 Moore’s Indian Appeals 283
9


(emphasis ours)
12. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to closely examine the opening
words of Section 105(1) of the CPC, namely, “Save as otherwise
expressly provided ...” The said expression is of determinative
significance, inasmuch as it carves out exceptions to the general rule
that interlocutory orders are not independently appealable but may be
assailed in an appeal against the final decree. The legislative intent
undergirding this phrase is to recognise that where the CPC itself
provides a specific mechanism of challenge to certain orders, such
orders must be assailed in the manner so prescribed, failing which the
right to question them may stand foreclosed.
13. The relevant observations in this regard from Arjun Singh v.
11
Mohindra Kumar , are extracted hereinbelow:
11. That the question of fact which arose in the two proceedings was
indentical ( sic, identical) would not be in doubt. Of course, they were
not in successive suits so as to make the provisions Section 11 of the
Civil Procedure Code, applicable in terms. That the scope of the
principle of res judicata is not confined to what, is contained in
Section 11 but is of more general application is also not in dispute.
Again , res judicata could be as much applicable to different stages of
the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits. In this
connection we were ‘referred to what this Court said in Satyadhan
Ghosal v. Smt Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590, where Das Gupta,
J. speaking for the Court expressed himself as thus:

‘The principle of res judicata -is based on the need of giving a finality,
to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall
not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation
and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question, of fact
or on a question of law — has been decided between two parties in
one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no
appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was
dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future
suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter
again….

11
AIR 1964 SC 993
10


The principle of res judicata applies also as between the two stages
in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial
court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in
one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a
subsequent stage of the same proceedings. …’

Mr Pathak — laid great stress on this passage as supporting him in
the two submissions that he made : (1) that an issue of fact or law
decided even in an interlocutory proceeding could operate as res
judicata in a later proceeding, and next (2) that in order to attract
the principle of res judicata the order or decision first rendered and
which is pleaded as res judicata need not be capable of being
appealed against.
12. We agree that generally speaking these propositions are not
open to objection. If the court which rendered the first decision was
competent to entertain the suit or other proceeding, and had
therefore competency to decide the issue or matter, the
circumstance that it is a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction or one from
whose decision no appeal lay would not by themselves negative the
finding on the issue by it being res judicata in later proceedings.
Similarly, as stated already, though Section 11 of the Civil Procedure
Code clearly contemplates the existence of two suits and the findings
in the first being res judicata in the later suit it is well established
that the principle underlying it is equally applicable to the case of
decisions rendered at successive stages of the same suit or
proceeding. But where the principle of res judicata is invoked in the
case of the different stages of proceedings in the same suit, the
nature of the proceedings, scope of the enquiry which the adjectival
law provides for the decision being reached, as well as the specific
provisions made on matters touching such decision are some of the
material and relevant factors to be considered before the principle is
held applicable. One aspect of this question is that which is dealt with
in a provision like Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code which
enacts:

‘105. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie
from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or
appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any
error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the
case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum
of appeal. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the
commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not
appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its
correctness.’
It was this which was explained by Das Gupta, J. in Satyadhayan
Ghosal case, already referred to:

‘Does this, however, mean that because an earlier stage of the
litigation a court had decided an interlocutory matter in one way and
no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher
court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the
11


matter again? … It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order which
had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even
though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in
an appeal from the final decree or order.’

*

14. It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various
kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed
to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that
the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the
proceedings before the court, usually take. They do not, in that
sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue
in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such
orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent
applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new
facts or new situation which subsequently emerge. As they do not
impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle
of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders
are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same
basis after the same has once been disposed of the court would be
Justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of court.
There are other orders which are also interlocutory but would fall into
a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred
to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status
quo , or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication but
are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious
disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do
not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to
the litigation. The case of an application under O. IX, Rule 7 would
be an illustration of this type. If an application made under the
provisions of that rule is dismissed and an appeal were filed against
the decree in the suit in which such application were made, there can
be no doubt that the propriety of the order rejecting the reopening
of the proceeding and the refusal to relegate the party to an earlier
stage might be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the
appellate court. In that sense, the refusal of the court to permit the
defendant to ‘set the clock back’ does not attain finality. But what we
are concerned with is slightly different and that is whether the same
Court is finally bound by that order at later stages so as to preclude
its being reconsidered. Even if the rule of res judicata does not apply
it would not follow that on every subsequent day which the suit
stands adjourned for further hearing, the petition could be repeated
and fresh orders sought on the basis of identical facts. The principle
that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the
same reliefs might be disallowed by the court does not however
necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata . Thus if an application
for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subsequent application
for the same purpose even if based on the same facts, is not barred
on the application of any rule of res judicata , but would be rejected
for the same grounds on which the original application was refused.
The principle underlying the distinction between the rule of res
12


judicata and a rejection on the ground that no new facts have been
adduced to justify a different order is vital. If the principle of res
judicata is applicable to the decision on a particular issue of fact,
even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would
continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issue,
whereas in the Other case, on proof of fresh facts, the court would
be competent, may would be bound to take those into account and
make an order conformably to the facts freshly brought before the
court.
(emphasis ours)


14. Tested on the afore-canvassed anvil, in the present case, the order on
I.A. No. 4 does not tantamount to a final adjudication of rights; nor is
it one in respect of which the CPC has “otherwise expressly provided”
a separate appellate remedy. In such circumstances, the scheme of
Section 105, CPC clearly comes into operation, enabling the legal
representatives of Channappa to assail the correctness of the said
order in an appeal against the decree. To hold that such an order has
assumed irrevocable finality would be to defeat the very purpose of
Section 105, CPC and to confer upon a non-appealable interlocutory
order a status which the legislature has consciously chosen not to
accord. Therefore, the contention that the dismissal of the application
would operate as a bar to re-agitate the issue is misconceived.
15. Having dealt with the preliminary objection regarding the effect of the
order passed on I.A. No.4, this Court now proceeds to examine the
core controversy arising in the present appeal.
16. The principal contention advanced on behalf of Channappa
(represented through his legal representatives) is that the institution
of Suit – II, wherein Parvatewwa sought declaration of ownership and
recovery of possession of the suit property, was clearly barred by the
13


provisions of Section 11, CPC as well as Order II Rule 2 thereof.
According to the legal representatives of Channappa, Parvatewwa was
fully aware, even at the time of institution of Suit – I, that Channappa
had asserted rights over the suit properties on the basis of the alleged
adoption deed and had disputed Parvatewwa’s ownership. In such
circumstances, it was incumbent upon Parvatewwa to seek all
consequential reliefs flowing from the same cause of action in the
earlier proceedings itself.
17. It was further urged by Channappa (represented through his legal
representatives) that Parvatewwa, in her evidence in Suit – I had
specifically acknowledged that Channappa was claiming ownership
over the suit properties. Having been aware of such assertion of right,
Parvatewwa ought to have sought declaration of her title and the
appropriate consequential reliefs in Suit – I. The omission to do so, it
was contended, attracts the bar contained in Order II Rule 2, CPC.
18. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Parvatewwa
(represented by Prema) contended that the two suits were founded on
distinct causes of action. According to them, the earlier suit was
confined to the validity of the adoption deed, whereas the subsequent
suit arose out of the alleged dispossession of Parvatewwa from the suit
property. It was, therefore, argued that Suit - II could not be said to
be barred either by res judicata or by Order II Rule 2, CPC.
14


19. Having considered the rival submissions and the materials on record,
it is considered appropriate to analyse the controversy in the backdrop
of the pleadings and the governing legal principles.
20. The doctrine underlying Order II Rule 2, CPC is founded upon the
salutary principle that a defendant ought not to be vexed twice for the
same cause of action and that the plaintiff must claim all reliefs arising
from a single cause of action in one and the same proceeding. Where
a plaintiff omits to claim a relief which he or she is entitled to claim on
the same cause of action, he/she is precluded from instituting a
subsequent suit in respect of such omitted relief.
21. The requirements for successfully invoking the bar under Order II Rule
2, CPC were authoritatively laid down by the Constitution Bench of this
12
Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal . It was held as follows:
6. In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil
Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea
must make out; ( i ) that the second suit was in respect of the same
cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2)
that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to
more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one
relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to
sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this
analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish
primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which
the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the
cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which
the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the
application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint
could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this
might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical
bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed
merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we
consider that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil
Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in

12
AIR 1964 SC 1810
15


evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the
Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. It is common
ground that the pleadings in CS 28 of 1950 were not filed by the
appellant in the present suit as evidence in support of his plea under
Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned trial Judge,
however, without these pleadings being on the record inferred what
the cause of action should have been from the reference to the
previous suit contained in the plaint as a matter of deduction. At the
stage of the appeal the learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in
the appellant's case and pointed out, in our opinion, rightly that
without the plaint in the previous suit being on the record, a plea of
a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code was not
maintainable.
22. Applying these principles to the present case, it becomes evident that
Parvatewwa had already approached the court in the earlier
proceedings on the basis of the same underlying dispute relating to
the rights over the suit property. The foundational facts giving rise to
the cause of action, namely the claim regarding entitlement to the
property, were already in existence at the time of the earlier suit.
23. A comparison of the pleadings and the reliefs sought in Suit – I
and Suit – II demonstrates that the cause of action and subject matter
in both suits are substantially identical. Parvatewwa had, in the earlier
suit, challenged the adoption deed of 1961 and sought to restrain the
defendants from interfering with her alleged rights over the suit
properties. These facts are evident from the pleadings contained in the
plaint filed in Suit – I. From the averments, it becomes clear that the
plaintiff was already asserting ownership and disputing the rights of
the defendants in respect of the same properties. Relevant excerpts
from the plaint read thus:
7. …The defendant told the plaintiff that he is the absolute owner of
all the properties of the plaintiff mentioned above and said that he
16


has every right to get the money after sale of the properties of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff returned to Bijapur and got all the records,
though ( sic, through) the help of Savalagappa and came to know that
the defendant has got entered hisame ( sic, his name) to all the
properties of plaintiff in collusion with CTS. Authorities. The plaintiff
also came to know that the defendant has created document to show
that he is the adopted son and the said document of adoption is
registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Bijapur on 23.3.1961 itself.
This fact of adoption is without the knowledge of the plaintiff and
behind her back…
8. Cause of action:- the cause of action for this suit arose in the
month of September 2002 when the plaintiff has discovered the fraud
played by the defendant creating documents that he is the adopted
son of plaintiff and falsely got entered his name to all the house
properties of the plaintiff as owner.
*
11. Prayer:- The plaintiff, therefore, prayer ( sic, prays) that, the
court be pleased to :-
a) Pass a decree declaring that the adoption deed created on
23.3.1961 created by the defendant Showing that the defendant is
the adopted son of plaintiff as null and void and inconsequence
thereof:
b) Pass a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant or
his agents in alienating or transferring the house and shop properties
of plaintiff mentioned in para No.2 of the plaint.

(emphasis ours)
24. Despite being fully aware that Channappa had denied her ownership
and had asserted rights on the basis of the family arrangement deed
of 1998, Parvatewwa chose to institute Suit – I merely
seeking injunction simpliciter, without seeking the necessary and
consequential relief of declaration of title. Once Channappa had clearly
contested Parvatewwa’s ownership in the pleadings, it became
incumbent upon Parvatewwa to seek the comprehensive relief of
declaration of title along with the consequential relief of injunction. The
17


omission to seek such relief in Suit – I is significant and cannot be
cured through a subsequent suit. Importantly, there is nothing on
record to suggest that Parvatewwa obtained leave of the court to
reserve these reliefs for a future proceeding.
25. The consequence of such omission is clearly contemplated under Order
II Rule 2(3), CPC, which bars the plaintiff from subsequently instituting
a suit for the omitted relief.
26. It is apposite to mention that this Court has recently in Cuddalore
Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls
13
Limited and Another clarified that the rule under Order II Rule 2,
CPC is founded on the principle that a person should not be vexed
twice for the same cause of action and that the object of this rule is to
prevent harassment of the defendant through successive litigation.
Relevant excerpt from such decision reads as follows:
47. On a conspectus of the aforesaid discussion, what follows is that:
i. The object of Order II Rule 2 is to prevent the multiplicity of suits
and the provision is founded on the principle that a person shall not
be vexed twice for one and the same cause.
ii. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole claim
arising in respect of one and the same cause of action, in one suit. It
must not be misunderstood to mean that all the different causes of
action arising from the same transaction must be included in a single
suit.
iii. Several definitions have been given to the phrase “cause of
action” and it can safely be said to mean - “every fact which would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to
support his right to the judgment of the Court”. Such a cause of
action has no relation whatsoever to the defence that may be set up
by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief
which is prayed for by the plaintiff but refers to the media upon which
the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
iv. Similarly, several tests have been laid out to determine the
applicability of Order II Rule 2 to a suit. While it is acknowledged that

13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 82
18


the same heavily depends on the particular facts and circumstances
of each case, it can be said that a correct and reliable test is to
determine whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon
a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation of the
former suit. Additionally, if the evidence required to support the
claims is different, then the causes of action can also be considered
to be different. Furthermore, it is necessary for the causes of action
in the two suits to be identical in substance and not merely
technically identical.
v. The defendant who takes shelter under the bar imposed by Order
II Rule 2(3) must establish that (a) the second suit was in respect of
the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was
based; (b) in respect of that cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled
to more than one relief; and (c) being thus entitled to more than one
relief, the plaintiff, without any leave obtained from the Court,
omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed.
27. In the present case, Parvatewwa herself had pleaded in the earlier
proceedings that Channappa was asserting rights over the suit
properties on the basis of the adoption. The dispute as to the parties’
respective rights over the property was, therefore, already in existence
at the time of institution of Suit – I. In such circumstances, the relief
of declaration of title and the consequential relief relating to possession
could and ought to have been claimed in the earlier proceedings.
28. The subsequent institution of Suit – II seeking declaration of ownership
and recovery of possession in respect of the same property and
between the same parties is, therefore, clearly hit by the provisions of
Order II Rule 2, CPC.
29. The principle of constructive res judicata embodied in Explanation IV
to Section 11, CPC also becomes relevant in the facts of the present
case. A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of
attack in the former proceedings shall be deemed to have been directly
and substantially in issue in such proceedings. Parvatewwa, having
19


omitted to seek appropriate relief in Suit – I despite being aware of
Channappa’s claim, cannot be permitted to agitate the same issue by
way of a subsequent suit.
30. The contours of this principle have been lucidly explained by this Court
14
in Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) as
follows:
20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our
opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not
operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present
petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition.
Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC provides that any matter which
might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in
such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and
substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and
final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every
other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and
have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the
subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the
legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the
matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV
is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a
matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter
had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a
matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been
actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been
heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no
force.
31. The scope of constructive res judicata has also been explained in Alka
15
Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta , where this Court referred to the
16
principle laid down in Greenhalgh v. Mallard and observed that res
judicata is not confined merely to issues that were actually decided but
extends to issues that ought to have been raised in the earlier

14
(1986) 1 SCC 100
15
2010 SCC OnLine SC 1085
16
(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)
20


proceedings. We consider it proper to quote the relevant passage,
reading as follows:
25. The principle underlying Explanation IV to Section 11 becomes
clear from Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] thus:
(All ER p. 257)
“… it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose
is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked
to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly
part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could
have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of
the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of
them .”
(emphasis supplied)

32. Similarly, the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II
17
Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra
reiterated that an adjudication is conclusive not only as to the matters
actually decided but also as to every other matter which the
parties might and ought to have litigated in the earlier proceedings.
35. … an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual
matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties
might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental
to or essentially connected with subject-matter of the litigation and
every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action
both in respect of the matters of claim and defence.
33. The Trial Court in Suit – II and the First Appellate Court, upon
appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence on record, had
concurrently recorded findings that the subsequent suit was barred by
the aforesaid principle. In the considered view of this Court, such
findings were in consonance with the settled principles governing the
application of Section 11 and Order II Rule 2, CPC.

17
(1990) 2 SCC 715
21


34. This issue is, thus, answered against Parvatewwa.
I SSUE B
35. The scope of interference in a second appeal under Section 100, CPC
is well settled. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such proceedings
is confined to cases involving a substantial question of law. Findings of
fact concurrently recorded by the courts below cannot ordinarily be
interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse or based
on no evidence.
36. In this context, it would be apposite to advert to the principles
18
reiterated by this Court in P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar ,
wherein, upon an exhaustive survey of precedents, including Nazir
19 20
Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki , the scope of
interference under Section 100 was enunciated as follows:

18
(2024) 13 SCC 553
19
(2020) 19 SCC 57
20
(2007) 1 SCC 546
22

37. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court
had independently examined the pleadings, the evidence and the
earlier proceedings between the parties and had concurrently held that
Suit – II was barred by the principles of res judicata , constructive res
judicata and Order II Rule 2, CPC.
38. Having examined the impugned judgment, we find that the High Court
proceeded to reassess the entire factual matrix and arrived at
conclusions contrary to the findings concurrently recorded by the
courts below. Such an exercise, in the absence of a clear
demonstration that the findings of the courts below were perverse or
23


contrary to law, was beyond the permissible limits of jurisdiction under
Section 100, CPC.
39. The High Court did not record any cogent reason to demonstrate that
the concurrent findings suffered from perversity or were based on a
misapplication of settled legal principles. In such circumstances, the
interference by the High Court with the concurrent findings of the Trial
Court and the First Appellate Court cannot be sustained.
40. This issue too stands answered against the plaintiff.
C ONCLUSION
41. In view of the conclusions recorded on the preceding issues,
Parvatewwa’s claim for declaration of title and recovery of possession
cannot be sustained. The High Court committed a manifest error of
law in interfering with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts
below.
42. The impugned judgment is, accordingly, set aside and Suit – II (O.S.
No.13 of 2007) instituted by Parvatewwa stands dismissed.
43. The appeal is, thus, allowed. Parties shall, however, bear their own
costs.
………………………………J
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



………………….……………………J
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
New Delhi,
April 9, 2026.
24