Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5614 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganial(d) through Lrs.
RESPONDENT:
Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai(d) through Lrs.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/2006
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP ( C) No.7514 of 2003)
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J
Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court. Second
appeal filed by the respondents in terms of Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the ’Code’) was allowed.
Though various questions were raised in support of the
appeal, it was primarily highlighted that the Second Appeal
was allowed without formulating any substantial question of
law.
There is no appearance on behalf of respondents when
the matter is called though learned counsel had entered
appearance.
Section 100 of the Code deals with "Second Appeal". The
provision reads as follows:
"100 (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided
in the body of this Code or by any other law for
the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to
the High Court from every decree passed in
appeal by any court subordinate to the High
Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the
case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from
an appellate decree passed ex-parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the
memorandum of appeal shall precisely state
the substantial question of law involved in the
appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a
substantial question of law is involved in any
case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question
so formulated and the respondent shall, at the
hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that
the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section
shall be deemed to take away or abridge the
power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be
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recorded, the appeal on any other substantial
question of law, not formulated by it, if it is
satisfied that the case involves such question."
A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High
Court does not show that any substantial question of law has
been formulated or that the Second Appeal was heard on the
question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment
cannot be maintained.
In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [2000 (1) SCC 434]
this Court in para 10 has stated thus:
"10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the
1976 amendment, it is essential for the High
Court to formulate a substantial question of
law and it is not permissible to reverse the
judgment of the first appellate court without
doing so."
Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh [2000 (3) SCC 708]
this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court
is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law.
Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
"7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100
CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain
a second appeal is confined only to such
appeals which involve a substantial question of
law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on
the High Court to interfere with pure questions
of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of
disposing of the matter, the High Court did not
even notice the question of law formulated by
it at the time of admission of the second
appeal as there is no reference of it in the
impugned judgment. Further, the fact finding
courts after appreciating the evidence held
that the defendant entered into the possession
of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a
tenant and his possession was permissive and
there was no pleading or proof as to when it
became adverse and hostile. These findings
recorded by the two courts below were based
on proper appreciation of evidence and the
material on record and there was no
perversity, illegality or irregularity in those
findings. If the defendant got the possession of
suit land as a lessee or under a batai
agreement then from the permissive
possession it is for him to establish by cogent
and convincing evidence to show hostile
animus Page 1532 and possession adverse to
the knowledge of the real owner. Mere
possession for a long time does not result in
converting permissive possession into adverse
possession (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind
Kumar) [1994 (6) SCC 591]. Hence the High
Court ought not to have interfered with the
findings of fact recorded by both the courts
below."
The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal v.
Anupkumar [2003 (1) SCC 430].
In Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors. [2004 (6) SCC
359], it was observed thus:
"6. In view of Section 100 of the Code the
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memorandum of appeal shall precisely state
substantial question or questions involved in
the appeal as required under Sub-section (3) of
Section100. Where the High Court is satisfied
that in any case any substantial question of
law is involved, it shall formulate that question
under Sub-section (4) and the second appeal
has to be heard on the question so formulated
as stated in Sub-section (5) of Section 100."
The position was highlighted by this Court in Joseph
Severane and Others v. Benny Mathew and Others [2005 (7)
SCC 667]; Sasikumar and Others v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair
and Others. [2005 (12) SCC 588]; Jawala Singh (D) by Lrs. v.
Jagat Singh (D) by Lrs. (JT 2006 (8) SC 483) and C.A.
Sulaiman & Ors. v. State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee and
Ors. (2006 (6) SCC 392).
The proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 100 is
applicable only when any substantial question of law has
already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to
hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other
substantial question of law. The expression "on any other
substantial question of law" clearly shows that there must be
some substantial question of law already formulated and then
only another substantial question of law which was not
formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for
reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case
involves such question.
Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set
aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for
disposal in accordance with law.
The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no
order as to costs.