Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur
RESPONDENT:
M/s. Swaraj Developers & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/2003
BENCH:
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & ARIJIT PASAYAT.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) No. 19030 of 2002)
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 3489/2003@ S.L.P.(C)No.19852/2002,
Civil Appeal Nos.3494-98/2003@ S.L.P.(C)Nos.22848-22852/2002, and
Civil Appeal No. 3499/2003@ S.L.P.(C) No.22009/2002]
ARIJIT PASAYAT,J.
Leave granted.
A short but important question of law involving effect
of amendment to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (in short ’the Code’) is involved in these appeals.
Since the answer to the question does not involve any
factual adjudication, a brief reference thereto would
suffice.
By Section 12(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 1999 (in short ’the Amendment Act’)
operative from 1.7.2002, amendments were made to Section 115
of the Code. In all these appeals, the concerned High Courts
held that because of amended Section 115, the revision filed
before them was not maintainable, as had an order been
passed in favour of the party applying for revision, same
would not have finally disposed of the suit or other
proceeding.
It has been contended by learned counsel for the
appellants that the High Court went wrong in disposing of
the revision applications as not maintainable, on several
grounds. They are (i) the amended provisions do not apply to
petitions which were admitted before the amendment, (ii)
appeals and revisions stand on a parallel footing and are
vested rights in the appellant/applicant, as the case may
be, and as such the amended provisions would not have any
application, and (iii) the applications for injunction and
the like which form subject matter of the revisions relate
to the expression ’other proceeding’ and even if the amended
provisions apply disposal of the revision would have meant
final dismissal of such ’other proceeding’.
With reference to Section 32(2)(i) of the Amendment
Act, it is submitted that the same does not convey any
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meaning. The legislature always saved pending proceedings in
terms of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (in
short ’General Clauses Act’) and, therefore, proceedings
which were pending before the High Court on the date of
amendment are clearly outside the effect of amendment. Even
if it is conceded for the sake of arguments that there is no
specific provision in that regard, it is clearly a case of
casus omissus.
In response, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that plain meaning of provisions of a statute
have to be given full effect and even a bare reading of the
provisions makes it clear that the High Court’s order is on
terra firma. Whenever the legislature intended to keep the
pending proceedings out of the purview of amended
provisions, it was specifically so provided. Reference is
made to the amendment in 1976 to the Code which in Section
97(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976
(in short ’Old Amendment Act’) saved the pending
proceedings, ruling out operation of Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act.
In order to appreciate the rival submissions it will be
necessary to take note of the provisions of Section 115 as
they stood before amendment and after amendment.
"Section 115 (before Amendment):
(1) The High Court may call for the
record of any case which has been decided by
any Court subordinate to such High Court and
in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such
subordinate court appears
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not
vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its
jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity,
the High Court may make such order in the
case as it thinks fit:
Provided that the High Court shall not, under
this section, vary or reverse any order made,
or any order deciding an issue, in the course
of a suit or order proceeding, except where
(a) the order, if it had been made in favour
of the party applying for revision, would
have finally disposed of the suit or other
proceeding, or
(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would
occasion a failure of justice or cause
irreparable injury to the party against whom
it was made.
(2) The High Court shall not, under this
section, vary or reverse any decree or order
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against which an appeal lies either to the
High Court or to any Court subordinate
thereto.
Explanation: In this section, the expression
"Any case which has been decided: includes
any order made, or any order deciding an
issue, in the course of a suit or other
proceeding."
Section 115 (after Amendment):
(1) The High Court may call for the
record of any case which has been decided by
any Court subordinate to such High Court and
in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such
subordinate court appears
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not
vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested.
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its
jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity,
the High Court may make such order in the
case as it thinks fit:
Provided that the High Court shall not,
under this section, vary or reverse any order
made, or any order deciding an issue, in the
course of a suit or order proceeding, except
where the order, if it had been made in
favour of the party applying for revision,
would have finally disposed of the suit or
other proceedings.
(2) The High Court shall not, under this
section, vary or reverse any decree or order
against which an appeal lies either to the
High Court or to any Court subordinate
thereto.
(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay
of suit or other proceeding before the Court
except where such suit or other proceeding is
stayed by the High Court.
Explanation: In this section, the expression
"any case which has been decided" includes
any order made, or any order deciding the
issue, in the course of a suit or other
proceeding."
A comparison of two provisions shows that while proviso
(a) of the un-amended provision has been retained in its
totality, in the amended provisions clause (b) of the
proviso has been omitted.
It is to be noted that prior to the amendments to the
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Code by the Old Amendment Act, the power of revision was
wider. By the amendment, certain positive restrictions were
put on the High Court’s power to deal with revisions under
Section 115. Prior to the said amendment, it was not
strictly necessary that the impugned order would have the
result of finally deciding the lis or the proceedings in the
lower courts. In fact, the power could be exercised in any
case where jurisdictional error was committed by the
original court or where substantial injustice had resulted.
By the Old Amendment Act, the condition of finally deciding
of lis and the proceedings in the subordinate courts was
introduced. The proviso which was introduced contains
qualifications which are pre-requisites before exercise of
power under Section 115. They were clauses (a) and (b) of
the proviso. Logically, the High Court has suo motu power to
revise an order where total failure of justice would have
occasioned or where irreparable loss would have caused to
the parties against whom it was made. These powers were
retained by clause (b). Though, after 1976, the exercise of
power was somewhat circumscribed, it was not totally
curtailed. In other words, the High Court could even after
the 1976 amendment interfere in cases where there was
failure of justice or irreparable loss caused, the nature of
the proceedings was substantially changed and the suo motu
power of the High Court was retained. It was in the nature
of power of superintendence of the High Court over the
subordinate courts. Changes were related to indicating
limitations in exercise of power.
Even after the amendments in 1976, in 1999 and prior to
the amendment in 1976, the revision power was exercisable
in a case where the order or the decree, as the case may be,
was not appealable.
Sub-section (2) which was introduced by the Old
Amendment Act and retained even after present amendment,
provides that the High Court shall not interfere where the
order or the decree is appealable in courts subordinate to
the High Court.
It is interesting to note that the Law Commission of
India had recommended deletion of Section 115. In the Law
Commission’s opinion, provisions of Section 115 are
analogous to provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, 1950 (in short ’the Constitution’) and the
litigants would not be prejudiced in any way if the entire
Section is deleted. The Joint Committee of the Parliament
discussed these recommendations and only thought it proper
to make certain modifications in the Section. That led to
amendment of Section 115 by Old Amendment Act. The
deliberations of the Committee are reflected in the
following words:
"The Committee, however, feel; that, in
addition to the restrictions contained in
section 115, an overall restriction on the
scope of applications for revision against
interlocutory orders should be imposed.
Having regard to the recommendations made by
the Law Commission in its Fourteenth and
Twenty-Seventh Reports, the Committee
recommended that Section 115 of the Code
should be retained subject to the
modification that no revision application
shall lie against an interlocutory order
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unless either of the following conditions is
satisfied, namely:-
i. that if the orders were made in favour of
the applicant, it would finally dispose of
the suit or other proceeding; or
ii. that the order, if allowed to stand, is
likely to occasion a failure of justice or
cause in irreparable injury."
First aspect that has to be considered is the
respective scope of appeal and revision. It is fairly a well
settled position in law that the right of appeal is a
substantive right. But there is no such substantive right in
making an application under Section 115. Though great
emphasis was laid on certain observations in Shankar
Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (AIR 1970
SC 1) to contend that appeal and revision stand on the same
pedestal, it is difficult to accept the proposition. The
observations in the said case are being read out of context.
What was held in that case related to the exercise of power
of a higher court, and in that context the nature of
consideration in appeal and revision was referred to. It was
never held in that case that appeal is equated to a
revision.
Section 115 is essentially a source of power for the
High Court to supervise the subordinate courts. It does not
in any way confer a right on a litigant aggrieved by any
order of the subordinate court to approach the High Court
for relief. The scope for making a revision under Section
115 is not linked with a substantive right.
Language of Sections 96 and 100 of the Code which deal
with appeals can be compared with Section 115 of the Code.
While in the former two provisions specifically provide for
right of appeal, the same is not the position vis--vis
section 115. It does not speak of an application being made
by a person aggrieved by an order of subordinate court. As
noted above, it is a source of power of the High Court to
have effective control on the functioning of the subordinate
courts by exercising supervisory power.
An appeal is essentially continuation of the original
proceedings and the provisions applied at the time of
institution of the suit are to be operative even in respect
of the appeals. That is because there is a vested right in
the litigant to avail the remedy of an appeal. As was
observed in K. Eapen Chako v. The Provident Investment
Company (P) Ltd. (AIR 1976 SC 2610) only in cases where
vested rights are involved, a legislation has to be
interpreted to mean as one affecting such right to be
prospectively operative. The right of appeal is only by
statute. It is necessary part of the procedure in an
action, but "the right of entering a superior court and
invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of
the courts below. It seems to this paramount right, part of
the progress of the inferior tribunal." (Per Westbury See:
AG vs. SILLEM 33 J.Ex 209). The appeal, strictly so called,
is one in which the question is, whether the order of the
Court from which the appeal is brought was right on the
materials which that Court had before it" (Per Lord Devuil
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Ponnamal vs. Arumogam 1905 AC 390). The right of appeal,
where it exists, as a matter of substance and not of
procedure (Colonial Sugar Refining Company vs. Irtin 1905 AC
368).
Right of appeal is statutory. Right of appeal inherits
in no one. When conferred by statute it becomes a vested
right. In this regard there is essential distinction between
right of appeal and right of suit. Where there is inherent
right in every person to file a suit and for its
maintainability it requires no authority of law, appeal
requires so. As was observed in The State of Kerala vs.
K.M. Charia Abdulla and Co. (AIR 1965 SC 1585), the
distinction between right of appeal and revision is based on
differences implicit in the two expressions. An appeal is
continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire
proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has
power to review the evidence subject to statutory
limitations prescribed. But in the case of revision,
whatever powers the revisional authority may or may not
have, it has no power to review the evidence, unless the
statute expressly confers on it that power. It was noted by
the four-Judges Bench in Hari Shankar and others vs. Rao
Girdhari Lal Chowdhury (AIR 1963 SC 698) that the
distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one.
A right of appeal carries with it a right of re-hearing on
law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right
of appeal limits the re-hearing in some way, as has been
done in second appeals arising under the Code. The power of
hearing revision is generally given to a superior Court so
that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been
decided according to law. Reference was made to Section
115 of the Code to hold that the High Court’s powers under
the said provision are limited to certain particular
categories of cases. The right there is confined to
jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone.
As regards the field of operation of amended provision,
it is to be noted that the language of amended provision is
clear.
It is well settled principle in law that the Court
cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is
plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the
Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the
determinative factor of legislative intent.
Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental
references to referents. The object of interpreting a
statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature
enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr. (AIR 1998 SC 74))
The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered
from the language used, which means that attention should be
paid to what has been said as also to what has not been
said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for
its support, addition or substitution of words or which
results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be
avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore
PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures’ defective
phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by
construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See
The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel
and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)). It is contrary to all rules
of construction to read words into an Act unless it is
absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones
(Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of
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interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the
provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful
meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act
of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found
within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord
Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910)
AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v.
Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847).
The question is not what may be supposed and has been
intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be
construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand
said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of
the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley
Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated
in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem
Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).
In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport
Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was
observed that Courts must avoid the danger of apriori
determination of the meaning of a provision based on their
own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme
into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat
fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function
under the disguise of interpretation.
While interpreting a provision the Court only
interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision
of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of
law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal
it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax,
M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 515).
The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial
interpretative process.
Two principles of construction one relating to casus
omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a
whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle
a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in
the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found
in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same
time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for
that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be
construed together and every clause of a section should be
construed with reference to the context and other clauses
thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular
provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
This would be more so if literal construction of a
particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous
results which could not have been intended by the
Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable
result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou
(1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if
there is some other construction available". Where to apply
words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the
legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we
must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that
obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per
Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he
also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our
standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".
It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend
not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those
which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the
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words further than they reach, by saying it is casus
omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius
accidunt." "But," on the other hand,"it is no reason,
when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience
seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well
as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but
seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345). A casus
omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in
some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus
omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence
of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis
existit proetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the
particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed
of according to the law as it existed before such statute -
Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris
relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed Buller, J. in
Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no case be supplied by
a court of law, for that would be to make laws."
The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in
fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered
to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument,
in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and
inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L.
Cas. 61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must,
however, be applied with much caution. "if," remarked
Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain and
unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them
in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of
the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may
be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or
obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we
depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used,
merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or
manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal
meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378).
At this juncture, it would be necessary to take note of
a maxim "Ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur"
(The laws are adapted to those cases which more frequently
occur).
Laws ought to be, and usually are, framed with a view
to such cases as are of frequent rather than such as are of
rare or accidental occurrence; or, in the language of the
civil law, jus constitui oportet in his quoe ut plurimum
accidunt, non quoe ex inopinato; for, neque leges neque
senatusconsulta ita scribi possunt ut omnes casus qui
quandoque inciderint comprehendantur, sed sufficit ea quoe
plerumque accident contineri; laws cannot be so worded as to
include every case which may arise, but it is sufficient if
they apply to those things which most frequently happen. All
legislation proceeds upon the principle of providing for the
ordinary course of things, and to this principle frequent
reference is to be found, in the reports, in answer to
arguments, often speciously advanced, that the words of an
Act cannot have a particular meaning, because in a certain
contingency that meaning might work a result of which nobody
would approve. In Miller v. Salomons (7 Exch. 475) it was
argued that Parliament could not have intended that a Jew,
before sitting in the House of Commons, must use the words
"on the true faith of a Christian," prescribed in the oath
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of abjuration of 6 Geo. 3, c.53, because any person,
refusing to take the same oath when tendered by two
justices, would, under the 1 Geo. 1, st.2, c.13, be deemed
to be a popish recusant, and would be liable to penalties as
such; and to enforce these provisions against a Jew, it was
said, would be the merest tyranny. But Baron Parke thus
replied to this argument: -"If in the vast majority of
possible cases in all of ordinary occurrence the law is
in no degree inconsistent or unreasonable construed
according to its plain words, it seems to me to be an
untenable proposition, and unsupported by authority, to say
that the construction may be varied in every case, because
there is one possible but highly improbably one in which the
law would operate with great severity, and against our own
notions of justice. The utmost that can be reasonably
contended is, that it should be varied in that particular
case, so as to obviate that injustice no further."
Appeal is the right of entering a superior Court and
invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of
the court below. (per Westbury C., A.G. v. Sillem, 10 HLC
704 = 33 LJ ex.209).
"Appeal", is defined in the Oxford Dictionary, volume
I, page 398, as the transference of a case from an inferior
to a higher Court or tribunal in the hope of reversing or
modifying the decision of the former. In the Law Dictionary
by Sweet, the term "appeal" is defined as a proceeding
taken to rectify an erroneous decision of a Court by
submitting the question to a higher Court or Court of
appeal, and it is added that the term, therefore, includes,
in addition to the proceedings specifically so called, the
cases stated for the opinion of the Queen’s Bench Division
and the Court of Crown Cases reserved, and proceedings in
error. In the Law Dictionary by Bouvier an appeal is defined
as the removal of a case from a Court of inferior to one of
superior jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining a review
and re-trial, and it is explained that in its technical
sense it differs from a writ of error in this, that it
subjects both the law and the facts to a review and re-
trial, while the latter is a Common Law process which
involves matter of law only for re-examination; it is added,
however, that the term "appeal" is used in a comprehensive
sense so as to include both what is described technically
as an appeal and also the common law writ of error. As Mr.
Justice Subramania Ayyar observes in Chappan v. Moidin, 22
Mad 68 at p.80 the two things which are required to
constitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the
relation of superior and inferior Court and the power, on
the part of the former, to review decisions of the latter.
Sub-section (2) of Section 115 has remained unaltered
even after the amendment by the Amendment Act. A new sub-
section (3) has been added in Section 115 by the Amendment
Act which states that revision shall not operate as a stay
of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where
such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.
In Section 2, the expressions ’decree’ and ’order’ have
been defined in clauses (2) and (14) respectively. It is to
be noted that it matters little that the judgment is styled
as an "order". If, in fact, it fulfils the conditions of
the definition under Section 2(2), it is a decree and
becomes appealable. Orders that are not appealable are,
generally speaking, those which are procussual i.e.
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interlocutory or incidental orders regulating proceedings
but not deciding any of the matters of controversy in the
suit. Order 43 deals with the "appeals from orders".
These appeals lie under Section 104 of the Code. The said
Section deals with appeals from orders and specifies the
orders from which appeals can lie. Sub-section (2) of
Section 104 says that no appeal shall lie from any order
passed in appeal under the said Section. Section 104 and
Order 43 Rule I contain a full list of appealable orders.
An order which amounts to a decree within Section 2(2) does
not fall within Section 104 and the only applicable section
is Section 96. Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 104 were
omitted by Arbitration Act 1940. Section 105 relates to
other orders. It, inter alia, relates to any order i.e. so
appealable as well as non-appelable orders. It is in the
nature of a prohibition stipulating that save as otherwise
expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made
by a Court in exercise of original or appellate
jurisdiction; but where a decree is appealed from, any
error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the
decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of
objection in the memorandum of appeal. Sub-section (2)
deals with case of remand. This section, in fact,
contemplates two things i.e. (1) regular appeal from decree;
and (2) the provision relating to grant of objection
relating to interim order. Order 43 Rule 1 is an integral
part of Section 104.
A plain reading of Section 115 as it stands makes it
clear that the stress is on the question whether the order
in favour of the party applying for revision would have
given finality to suit or other proceeding. If the answer
is ’yes’ then the revision is maintainable. But on the
contrary, if the answer is ’no’ then the revision is not
maintainable. Therefore, if the impugned order is of
interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the
revision will not be maintainable. The legislative intent
is crystal clear. Those orders, which are interim in
nature, cannot be the subject matter of revision under
Section 115. There is marked distinction in language of
Section 97(3) of the Old Amendment Act and Section 32(2)(i)
of the Amendment Act. While in the former, there was clear
legislative intent to save applications admitted or pending
before the amendment came into force. Such an intent is
significantly absent in Section 32(2)(i). The amendment
relates to procedures. No person has a vested right in a
course of procedure. He has only the right of proceeding in
the manner prescribed. If by a statutory change the mode of
procedure is altered the parties are to proceed according to
the altered mode, without exception, unless there is a
different stipulation.
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application
because there is no substantive vested right available to a
party seeking revision under Section 115 of the Code. In
Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and another vs. Union of India
and others (AIR 2000 SC 811), it was observed that if a
provision of statute is unconditionally omitted without a
saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions
must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief
has not been granted before the omission goes into effect,
there is no scope for granting it afterwards. There is
modification of this position by application of Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act or by making special provisions.
Operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the
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past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case
where a particular provision in the statute is omitted and
in its place another provision dealing with the same
contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour
of pending proceedings, then it can be reasonably inferred
that the intention of the legislature is that the pending
proceedings shall continue but a fresh proceeding for the
same purpose may be initiated under the new provision.
In view of what has been stated above the inevitable
conclusion is that the High Courts were right in the
conclusion about non-maintainability of revision
applications.
It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants
that even if the revision applications are held to be not
maintainable, there should not be a bar on challenge being
made under Section 227 of the Constitution. It was
submitted that an opportunity may be granted to the
appellants to avail the remedy.
If any remedy is available to a party under any statute
no liberty is necessary to be granted for availing the same.
If the appellants avail such remedy, the same shall be dealt
with in accordance with law.
The appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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