Full Judgment Text
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NON-REPORTABLE
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | ||||||
| CIVIL APPEAL NOS._________ OF 2022 |
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 6354-6356 of 2020)
P. SESHAREDDY (D) REP. BY HIS
LR. CUM IRREVOCABLE GPA HOLDER AND
ASSIGNEE KOTAMREDDY KODANDARAMI Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeals challenge the judgment and order
dated 12.11.2019 passed by the learned Single
Judge, High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench in
W.P.Nos.201087-88/2018 c/w W.P. No. 201321/2016
(GM-CPC), thereby allowing the writ petition(s)
filed by the respondent-State.
3. The facts giving rise to the present appeals
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Singh
Date: 2022.11.16
14:36:58 IST
Reason:
arise out of the following narrow compass:
4. One P. Seshareddy S/o P.C. Venkatreddy
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entered into a contract with State of Karnataka
for execution of UKP project. He executed a
General Power of Attorney dated 21.10.1982 in
favour of one Kotermreddy Kodandarami Reddy
authorising him to do all the acts necessary with
regard to the execution of the said contract.
5. It appears that certain disputes arose
between P. Seshareddy and the respondent-State with
regard to the execution of the work, allotted to
said P. Seshareddy. As such, he initiated
arbitration proceedings by making an application
under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
6. The said petition was presented through his
General Power of Attorney holder Sri Kotemreddy
Kodandarami Reddy.
7. The original contractor, namely, P.
Seshareddy, died on 13.11.1995. After his death,
his legal heirs were brought on record. However, it
appears that the said Arbitration Case being
Arbitration Case No.03/2004 came to be dismissed
for default on 30.05.2008.
8. Thereafter, an application came to be made by
Sri Kotemreddy Kodandarami Reddy for restoration of
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the Arbitration Application under Order IX Rule 9
read with Sections 151 read with Section 146 of
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The aforesaid
application came to be allowed by the learned Trial
Judge.
9. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondent-State
filed the aforesaid writ petition(s). The learned
Single Judge vide impugned judgment and order
allowed the the writ petitions and set aside the
order(s) passed by the learned Trial Judge.
10. We have heard Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant and Ms. Soumyan
Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State.
11. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant, submits that the
learned Single Judge of the High Court while
allowing the writ petition(s) has only considered
the provision of Section 201 of the Indian Contract
Act, but has ignored the provision of Sections 202
and 209 of the said Act. She submits that since the
appellant had an interest in the said contract, he
was entitled to continue with the proceedings in
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spite of the death of the original contractor. She
submits that the learned Single Judge of the High
Court has failed to take into consideration this
aspect of the matter.
12. Ms. Soumyan Tandon, learned counsel for the
State, on the contrary, submits that merely on the
basis of General Power of Attorney, it cannot be
construed that the appellant had an interest in the
contract. In so far as the assignment deed is
concerned, she submits that since there was no
consent of the State for the said assignment deed,
the same was not valid in law. She further submits
that the rights in the contract could not have been
transferred by way of an assignment deed.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent-State has
relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Indu Kakkar Vs. Haryana State Industrial
Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr.-reported in
(1999) 2 SCC 37 and also on the judgment of this
Court in C.A. Nos. 10683-10686 of 2014 titled as
“Kapilaben & Ors. Vs. Ashok Kumar Jayantilal Sheth
Through POA Gopalbhai Madhusudan Patel & Ors” .
14. We have perused the material placed on
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record.
15. The perusal of the assignment deed dated
02.07.1990 clearly reveals that the original
contractor-P. Seshareddy had assigned all the
rights and liabilities arising out of the said
contract in favour of Sri Kotemreddy Kodandarami
Reddy.
16. The perusal of the order passed by the Trial
Court would show that, it has held that leaving
apart the nature of GPA, the appellant was entitled
to prosecute the arbitration proceedings in view of
the rights accrued to him by way of the assignment
deed.
17. We find that the view taken by the learned
Single Judge was not in consonance with of Section
202 of the Indian Contract Act, which read thus:
“202. Termination of agency, where agent has an
interest in subject-matter-where the agent has
himself an interest in the property which forms
the subject-matter of the agency, the agency
cannot, in the absence of an express contract,
be terminated to the prejudice of such
interest.”
18. No doubt, the learned Single Judge was right
in holding that on account of the death of the
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original contractor, it amounted to termination of
the agency. However, learned Single Judge could
not have read Section 201 of the Indian Contract
Act in isolation by ignoring Section 202 of the
Indian Contract Act. The learned Single Judge
failed to take into consideration that on account
of the assignment deed, an interest accrued in the
said contract in favour of the appellant.
Indisputably, the said contract was the subject
matter of the agency and as such in the absence of
an express provision to the contrary, the appellant
was entitled to continue with the said agency.
19. The learned trial Judge rightly construing
this position, allowed the application of the
appellant. In a jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India, the learned Single Judge
could not have interfered with the order of the
trial Court , unless he found the view taken by the
learned trial Judge was perverse or impossible.
20. In so far as the judgments relied upon by Ms.
Soumyan Tandon are concerned, the same are related
to an issue where the contract is contingent upon
certain rights and liabilities. One party cannot
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not be compelled to do something unless the other
party which was required to perform its obligation
has performed it. As such, the said judgments would
not be applicable in the facts of the present case.
21. In so far as the contention of Ms. Soumyan
Tandon with regard to the question as to whether
the contract could be assigned or not is concerned,
the said question is touching the merits of the
matter and cannot be gone into at this stage. These
questions can be raised by the respondent(s) in the
appropriate proceedings, if entitled in law.
22. In the result, the impugned judgment and
order is not sustainable and thus the same is
quashed and set aside. The order of the learned
trial judge is restored.
23. Since the proceedings are pending from 1992,
i.e. almost a period of more than 30 years, we
expedite the proceedings before the Trial Judge and
direct the same to be disposed of within a period
of six months from today.
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24. The appeals are disposed of in the above
terms.
25. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed
of.
….........................J
(B.R. GAVAI)
...........................J
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi
November 09, 2022
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