Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SMT. KILASHO DEVI BURMAN & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
COMMNR. OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL CALCUTTA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/02/1996
BENCH:
BHARUCHA S.P. (J)
BENCH:
BHARUCHA S.P. (J)
AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)
CITATION:
JT 1996 (2) 555 1996 SCALE (1)801
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
BHARUCHA . J.
This is an appeal by special leave. The order that is
impugned was passed by the High Court at Calcutta in an
income-tax reference. The questions that the High Court was
called upon to answer were :
"1. Whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, there
was a valid assessment on an H.U.F.
for the assessment year 1955-56?
2. If the answer to question
no.1 is in the affirmative, Then,
whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the
assessments for 1958-59 to 1962-63
in the status of H.U.F. are valid?"
The reference related to Assessment Years 1958-59 to
1962-63, the relevant previous years whereof were B.S. years
1364 to 1368. The assessee was Rash Behari Das Burman, who
was governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. It is
unnecessary for the purposes of this decision to go into his
family history, which is referred to both in the Statement
of Case placed before the High Court by the Income Tex
Appellate Tribunal and the judgment of the High Court. What
we now set out is what is relevant and it is taken from the
Statement of Case. For the Assessment Year 1955-56 the
assessee submitted a return dated 14th November, 1957,
describing himself as the karta of his H.U.F. An assessment
was said to have been made on the H.U.F. The assessment
order on the record of the Revenue bears no signature. There
is no signed copy of the assessment form. There is a demand
notice dated 10th April, 1958 with some initial or signature
on it. According to the assessse neither the statutory
notices nor the demand notice nor the assessment order had
been received. On the record there is an acknowledgement
slip bearing the date 25th April, 1958 signed by one Phool
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Singh. According to the assessee, there was no such person
who had any authority to receive any notice on his behalf.
There was no material to show that the demand raised in the
demand notice had been paid by the assessee.
The assessee filed a partition suit (bearing No.665 of
1955 in the Calcutta High Court). A settlement was arrived
at. The properties were to be divided by metes and bounds,
but that remained to be done when the Statement of Case was
drawn by the Tribunal.
For the Assessment Years 1956-57 to 1961-62, no notices
were issued to the H.U.F. under Section 22 of the Income Tax
Act, 1922. Similarly, for the Assessment Year 1962-63, no
notice was issued to the H.U.F. under Section 139 of the
income tax Act, 1961. the income from the properties which
were covered by the partition suit were returned by and
assessed in the hands of the erstwhile members of the H.U.F.
The Income Tax Officer thereafter took proceedings
under Section 147(a) of the income tax Act, 1961 and
concluded that the assessee’s H.U.F. had escaped assessment;
this was on the basis that no genuine partition had taken
place and that the assessee had made a return which
misrepresented the facts. The I.T.O. started proceedings
under Section 148 for the Assessment Years 1958-59 to 1961-
62 and under Section 139(2) for the Assessment year 1962-63.
The assessee filed ’nil’ returns under protest. The I.T.O.
rejected the assessee s contention and made assessments on
the H.U F. The assessee appealed but, except for certain
reduction in the quantum, the orders of the ITO were
affirmed.
The assessee appealed to the Tribunal. The assessee
urged that during the relevant assessment years there was no
H.U.F and no valid proceedings thereagainst could be taken.
It was also urged that the H.U.F. had never been assessed
and that, therefore, there was no reason to make an
application under Section 25A of the 1922 Act. On behalf of
the Revenue it was submitted that there was an assessment on
the H.U.F. as was clear from the order for A.Y. 1955-56 and
that, so long as that assessment stood, it was permissible
to proceed against the H.U.F. for the H.U F. was presumed to
exist until an order under Section 25A of the 1922 Act was
passed. The Tribunal went into the question as to whether
there was an assessment on the H.U.F. for the Assessment
year 1955-56. Its conclusions were :
"(i) There was no signed assessment
order;
(ii) even if a demand notice is
taken to exist in this case, the
assessment is invalid as, in spite
of there being a positive demand
thereunder, it had not been served
on the assessee;
(iii) if there was no assessment on
the H.U.F. (for 1955-56), there was
no need on the part of the assessee
to come forward with an application
under Section 25A as that section
contemplated an application being
made thereunder only when there was
already an assessment on the
H.U.F.;
(iv) the absence of an application
under section 25A could not, under
these circumstances, give the
Income-tax authorities any
jurisdiction to proceed against the
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family as such;
(v) section 25A(3) had no operation
because there was no assessment on
the family, the disputed H.U.F.
being in the same position as a
dead assessee whose income until
Section 24B was enacted could not
be subjected to tax (see Ellis Read
vs. C.I.T. 5 I.T.C. 100) and
(vi) the assessment in the status
of an H.U.F. when the family had
ceased to exist had to be set aside
as it was not valid."
The Revenue sought a reference to the High Court
contending, among other things, that the factual findings of
the Tribunal were "unsupported by any evidence and is
unreasonable any perverse". The Tribunal modified the
questions suggested and framed the two questions which are
quoted above. Having regard to the frame of the questions
that the Revenue wanted the Tribunal to refer to the High
Court, lt was, in our view, open to the High Court to
consider the record before the Tribunal to determine whether
the Tribunal’s factual conclusions were perverse.
The High Court in a reference under the taxation
statutes exercises advisory jurisdiction in regard to
questions of law. It is only when it has before it a
question that asks whether the Tribunal has, upon the
evidence on record before it, come to a conclusion which is
perverse that it may go into facts for this is a question of
low. A conclusion if perverse only if it is such that no
person, duly instructed, could, upon the record before him,
have reasonably come to it.
In the instant case, the High Court placed reliance
upon the acknowledgement slip dated 25th April, 1968 signed
by Phool Singh. lt said, "Records show this Phool Singh to
have received a number of notices on behalf of the assessee
on widely separated dates". The "records" which the High
Court referred in was a statement of "Facts which are
admitted and/or found by the Tribunal and which are
necessary for drawing up a statement of the case (vide para
3 of the Reference application)" which was annexed to the
Revenue’s reference application. This statement said,
"Records show this Phool Singh to have received a number of
notices on behalf of the assessee on widely separated
dates". The Statement of Case does not say this about Phool
Singh.
It is the Tribunal that finds facts. It sets these out
in the Statement of Case whereby it retries questions of law
to the High Court The High Court, in reference proceedings,
cannot go behind the facts found. Where the High Court is of
the view that it is requisite that facts other than those
found need to be ascertained it must call upon the Tribunal
to submit a Supplemental Statement of Case. Even when, as
here, the High Court is required to decide whether the
findings of fact reached by the Tribunal are perverse, the
High Court is continued to the evidence that was before the
Tribunal. The High Court cannot look at evidence that was
not before the Tribunal when it reached the impugned
findings to hold that these findings are perverse.
The statement of "admitted" facts was placed by the
Revenue before the Tribunal as an annexure to its reference
application That the Statement of Case does not state that
Phool Singh had received earlier notices on behalf of the
assessee shows that the Tribunal had not so found that there
is no mention of this at all suggests that the Revenue did
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not place this argument and the supporting material before
the Tribunal. The High Court could have required the
Tribunal to ascertain whether Phool Singh had received
earlier notices on behalf of the assessee and prepare a
Supplemental Statement of Case, out the High Court could
not, upon these "admitted" facts, have reached the
conclusion that the Tribunal’s findings of fact were
perverse.
The F High Court based itself upon the demand notice
and the acknowledgement slip signed by Phool Singh and
observed, "Unless an assessment order was passed under or in
pursuance of the Act question of a notice of demand on the
prescribed form specifying the High Court did not give due
importance to the fact that upon the record produced by the
Revenue before the Tribunal there was no signed assessment
from.
That an assessment order has to be signed is
established by the judgment of this Court in Kalyankumar Ray
vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, 191 I.T.R.634.It said:
"If, therefore, the Income-tax
Officer first draws up an order
assessing the adjustments to be
made, directs the office to compute
the tax payable on that basis and
then approves of it, either
immediately or some time later, no
fault can be found with the
process, though it is only when
both the computation sheets are
signed or initialled by the Income-
tax Officer that the process
described in section 143(3) will be
complete.
*
All these decisions emphasis that
all that is needed is that there
must be some writing initialled or
signed by the Income-tax Officer
before the period of limitation
prescribed for completion of the
assessment has expired in which the
tax payable is determined and not
that the form usually styled as the
"assessment order" should itself
contain the computation of tax as
well."
A valid assessment upon the H.U.F. for the Assessment
Year 1955-56 was central to the case of the Revenue. Since
at was unable to establish, by the production of a signed
assessment order for that year, that there was such valid
assessment, its case fell and the Tribunal was right in so
holding. The High Court was in error in concluding that the
findings of the Tribunal on the record were perverse.
The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under
appeal is set aside. The Judgment and order of the Tribunal
is restored.
The respondents shall pay to the appellants the costs
of the appeal.