Asian Paints Limited vs. Ram Babu

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 828

VERSUS

J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Leave granted.
2. I.A. No.151948/2024 seeking exemption from filing O.T. is
allowed.
3. The present Criminal Appeal traces its genesis to the impugned
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.07.14
16:30:29 IST
Reason:
Final Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2023 in S.B. Criminal Appeal
(SB) No.2354/2022 [ 2023:RJ-JP:36178 ] (hereinafter referred to as the
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‘Impugned Judgment’) rendered by a learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘High Court’), whereby the High Court dismissed the Appellant’s
appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’) as not maintainable.
A neat question of law of significance is raised herein, namely, as to

Section 2(wa) read with the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC or
whether Section 378 of the CrPC would prevail in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
FACTUAL SETTING:
4. The Appellant, Asian Paints Limited, a public limited company, has
been engaged in the business of manufacturing paint and paint products
for approximately the last 73 years. Its Head Office is located in Mumbai,
Maharashtra. In the face of counterfeit products being made and sold in
the market in its name and style, the Appellant had given a Power of
Attorney (hereinafter referred to as the ‘PoA’) to one Mr. Ajay Singh,
Proprietor, M/s Solution (an IPR consultancy firm) through its authorized
representatives, who were tasked with monitoring, tracking down and
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investigating unauthorised and illegal practices employed in respect of
the Appellant’s Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter referred to as

were to be detected, and Mr. Ajay Singh was also asked to undertake
survey, investigate and act against any person found to be engaged in
violating or infringing the Appellant’s IPR, including but not limited to the
Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Copyright Act’).

organisations/individuals for any violation/infringement/passing off or

and even counterfeit products, as also to file the necessary complaints
against organizations/individuals responsible for the same, with the
appropriate enforcement agency, Department, Police, Courts or any
special agency for this purpose and to take all necessary action for and
on behalf of M/s Solution. Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh was also to ensure
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immediate stoppage of such violation and inform and report to M/s
Solution instantly and periodically, the status of such complaints.
6. The complainant-Pankaj Kumar Singh presented written
information at the Tunga Police Station to the effect that on 06.02.2016,
when he visited Tunga, he saw that counterfeit products, claiming to be
of the Appellant, were kept at the shop of Ganpati Traders, which was
owned by Respondent No.1. He disclosed his identity to the police and
showed other relevant documents. After seeing all the documents, a
police team accompanied him to the Ganpati Traders’ shop from the
Police Station.
7. The shop was thoroughly checked, wherein 12 buckets purportedly
filled with paint bearing a mark similar to that of the Appellant were
found. When the police asked the person sitting at the shop for his name
and address, he said his name was Rambabu, Respondent No.1
[Rambabu or Ram Babu, as spelt in some records, is the same person].
In all, 4 buckets of Ace Emulsion Paint, each containing 20 litres, and 4
Ace Emulsion 10-litre buckets were allegedly filled with counterfeit paints,
and further, 4 Tractor Emulsion 10-litre buckets also filled with counterfeit
paints were discovered. When they checked the buckets, they found no
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company mark at the bottom, though the Appellant’s paint buckets
always carry such mark. The counterfeit buckets were handed over to
the police, who seized them and arrested Rambabu.
8. The complainant gave the Police two buckets filled with genuine
Asian paint, one bucket of 10 litres of Tractor Emulsion Paint and one
bucket of Ace Exterior emulsion Paint for the purpose of matching the
counterfeit paint with the genuine.
9. On 06.02.2016, the police filed First Information Report No.30/2016
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’) under Sections 420/120B of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’) and under
Sections 63/65 of the Copyright Act against Respondent No.1.
10. The investigation commenced, and the Investigating Officer
submitted the Final Report under Section 173 of the CrPC on 23.04.2016
for offences under Sections 120B and 420 of the IPC and Sections 63
and 65 of the Copyright Act against Respondent No.1.
11. The State Forensic Science Laboratory submitted its Report
No.fsl/jpr/qd/109/16 on 28.07.2016, stating that the seized counterfeit
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material(s) did not tally with the original in size, spacing and design of
characters.
12. The learned Additional Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate No.13, Bassi, Jaipur, Metropolitan City
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) vide order dated 03.10.2019
convicted the Respondent No.1 under Section 420 of the IPC and under
Sections 63 & 65 of the Copyright Act and sentenced him to undergo 3
years’ Simple Imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten
Thousand fine) under Section 420 of the IPC, 2 years’ Simple
Imprisonment with fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) under
Section 63 of the Copyright Act and 1 year Simple Imprisonment with fine
of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) under Section 65 of the
Copyright Act.
13. Pursuant to his conviction, Respondent No.1 preferred Criminal
Appeal No.1657/2019 under Section 374 of the CrPC against the order
of conviction supra before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bassi,
Jaipur Metropolitan (hereinafter referred to as the ‘First Appellate Court’).
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14. Subsequently, vide Judgment dated 16.02.2022, the First Appellate
Court set aside the order of the Trial Court and acquitted the Respondent
No.1 of the offences charged.
15. Aggrieved by Respondent No.1’s acquittal, the Appellant preferred
S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB) No.2354/2022 under the proviso to Section
372 of the CrPC before the High Court, challenging the judgment of
acquittal dated 16.02.2022. The very maintainability of such appeal was
heavily contested by the Respondent No.1 before the High Court.
16. The High Court, after perusing the relevant materials and hearing
the parties, vide impugned order dismissed S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB)
No.2354/2022 filed by the Appellant on the ground that the Appeal under
the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC to challenge an order passed in
an appeal under Section 374 of the CrPC was not maintainable. The
High Court opined that since the Appellant was neither considered as
complainant nor as victim before the Trial Court, therefore, the
Appellant’s Appeal as a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the
CrPC was unsustainable.
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
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17. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant
relates to the interpretation of the definition of ‘ victim ’ contained in
Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. It was pressed that a literal interpretation is
sufficient to establish that the Appellant squarely fell within the ambit of
the said provision.
18. Learned counsel submitted that the term ‘ person ’ in Section 2(wa)
of the CrPC also includes a ‘ Company or Association or body of persons ’
by virtue of Section 11 of the IPC. As such, the Appellant would fall within
the contours of the term ‘ victim ’.
19. To further substantiate the Appellant's claim, the learned counsel
pointed out that the underlying FIR which was lodged, giving rise to the
instant Appeal, was primarily registered under Sections 63/65 of the
Copyright Act, on account of infringement of the Appellant’s copyright by
the Respondent No.1. It was urged that this was sufficient to prove that it
was the Appellant who suffered ‘ loss or injury ’ as mentioned in Section
2(wa) of the CrPC. The loss/injury was in the nature of reputational and
financial losses on account of the commission of the afore-mentioned
offence(s) by Respondent No.1.
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20. Learned counsel vehemently argued that impleadment of the
complainant/victim in an appeal filed by the accused under Section 374
of the CrPC is not a sine qua non for the complainant/victim to file an
Appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC in the High Court.
21. Learned counsel placed reliance on the ratio laid down in Jagjeet
Singh v Ashish Mishra alias Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321 , wherein this
Court held:
‘ 23. A “victim” within the meaning of CrPC cannot be asked to
await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her right to
participate in the proceedings. He/She has a legally vested
right to he heard at every step post the occurrence of an
offence. Such a “victim” has unbridled participatory rights
from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the
proceedings in an appeal or revision. We may hasten to
clarify that “victim” and “complainant/informant” are two
distinct connotations in criminal jurisprudence. It is not always
necessary that the complainant/informant is also a “victim”,
for even a stranger to the act of crime can be an “informant”,
and similarly, a “victim” need not be the complainant or
informant of a felony .’
22. Learned counsel submitted that the proviso to Section 372 of the
CrPC is an enabling and a standalone provision meant to provide special
rights to the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal against ‘ any order ’
passed by the Court acquitting the accused and the said proviso does
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not impose any restriction upon the victim to prefer the appeal only
against the order of acquittal passed by the Court of First Instance/Trial
Court and not against an order of acquittal passed by the First Appellate
Court.
23. Learned counsel emphasised the point that the Appellant could not
have approached the High Court to invoke its revisional jurisdiction under
Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC, since sub-section (3) of Section 401
of the CrPC categorically states that ‘ Nothing in this section shall be
deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into
one conviction. ’
24. Learned counsel also invited our attention to this Court’s decision

held that a victim, as defined in Section 2(wa) of the CrPC, would be
entitled to file an appeal before the Court to which an appeal ordinarily
lies against the order of conviction and it is not necessary to consider the
effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section
372 of the CrPC is concerned. It was prayed that the appeal be allowed.
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RESPONDENT NO.1’S SUBMISSIONS:
25 . Per contra , learned counsel for Respondent No.1 persuasively
contended that an appeal under Section 372 of the CrPC is guided and
controlled by Section 374 of the CrPC, which is evident from the words
‘ such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies
against the order of conviction of such Court ’ used in the proviso to
Section 372 of the CrPC. It was submitted that Section 374 of the CrPC
does not provide for filing an appeal against an order passed in appeal
by the First Appellate Court.
26. The learned counsel also submitted that Respondent No.2/State of
Rajasthan has neither preferred an appeal nor a revision against the
judgment of acquittal dated 16.02.2022 passed by the First Appellate
Court.
27. Learned counsel further argued that the complaint dated
06.02.2016 was made by Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh, an investigator
employed by M/s Solution, who was neither an employee nor an
authorised agent of the Appellant and therefore, he cannot be said to
have acted as an agent of the Appellant apropos the Appellant being
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covered under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. As such, the Appellant
has/had no locus or authority to initiate any proceedings challenging the
correctness of Judgment dated 16.02.2022 passed by the First Appellate
Court.
28. Learned counsel advanced that the Appellant’s application seeking
impleadment in Criminal Appeal No.1657/2019 was practically rejected
by the First Appellate Court vide order dated 10.02.2022, but allowed the
Appellant to assist the prosecution. Pointing out that such order was not
challenged before the High Court by the Appellant, it was prayed that the
instant appeal deserved to be dismissed.
RESPONDENT NO.2-STATE’S SUBMISSIONS:
29. The sole contention taken by the learned counsel for the State of
Rajasthan is that the Appellant should have sought Special Leave to
Appeal under Section 378(4) of the CrPC before the High Court, if
maintainable, otherwise it ought to have filed a Revision Petition under
Sections 397 or 401 of the CrPC. Thus, the State has maintained the
position adopted by it before the High Court.
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ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

read with the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC or whether the
provisions of Section 378 of the CrPC would prevail in the facts and
circumstances. For convenience, Sections 2(wa), 372, 374 and 378 of
the CrPC are reproduced herein below:
‘ 2. Definitions. — In this Code, unless the context otherwise
requires ,—
…
(wa) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or
injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the
accused person has been charged and the expression
"victim" includes his or her guardian or legal heir;
xxx
372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided. —
No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal
Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law
for the time being in force:
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal
against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused
or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate
compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which
an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of
such Court.
xxx
374. Appeals from convictions .—
(1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its
extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the
Supreme Court.
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(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge
or an Additional Sessions Judge or on a trial held by any
other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more
than seven years has been passed against him or against
any other person convicted at the same trial, may appeal to
the High Court.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), any
person,—
(a) convicted on a trial held by a Metropolitan Magistrate or
Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class, or of
the second class, or
(b) sentenced under Section 325, or
(c) in respect of whom an order has been made or a
sentence has been passed under Section 360 by any
Magistrate,
may appeal to the Court of Session.
(4) When an appeal has been filed against a sentence
passed under Section 376, Section 376-A, Section 376-AB,
Section 376-B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section 376-
DA, Section 376-DB or Section 376-E of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860), the appeal shall be disposed of within a
period of six months from the date of filing of such appeal.
xxx
378. Appeal in case of acquittal. —
(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and
subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),—
(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public
Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from
an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a
cognizable and non-bailable offence;
(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public
Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an
original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court
other than a High Court not being an order under clause (a)]
or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in
revision.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which
the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police
Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency
empowered to make investigation into an offence under any
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Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government
may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), also direct
the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal—
(a) to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal passed
by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable
offence;
(b) to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an
acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court not
being an order under clause (a) or an order of acquittal
passed by the Court of Session in revision.
(3) No appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the
High Court.
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the
complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months,
where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in
every other case, computed from the date of that order of
acquittal.
(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for
the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal
is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie
under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2). ’

which had given Power-of-Attorney to M/s Solution through its Proprietor
Ajay Singh for protecting its IPR by undertaking survey(s), investigating
and acting against any person found to be engaged in violating/infringing
the Appellant’s IPR, including but not limited to, under the Trade Marks
Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act.
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out the task assigned by the Appellant. Thus, whatever action was taken

infringement of IPR with regard to the Appellant’s products, was clearly
for and on behalf of the Appellant. It was ultimately the interest of the
Appellant which was sought to be served through the engagement of M/s
Solution, which in turn, engaged Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh as its Field

keeping in his shop and being in possession of materials/products which
are similar to those manufactured/sold/distributed by the Appellant which

was contained, to be specific ‘paints’ which indicated/mis-indicated that
such products were of the Appellant.

was passed to the following effect:

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(emphasis supplied)

application/petition may have been passed but the Appellant’s arguments
were heard by the First Appellate Court, as the complainant. Neither the

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had agreed that the Appellant be also heard.

the plea for impleadment. This would be an incorrect appreciation of the
true import of the order passed by the First Appellate Court dated

appeal, though it has also been mentioned that it was in the background
of the consent given. Indubitably, as noted in the Impugned Judgment
itself in the very same sentence, ‘ but with the consent of respondent no.1
accused, present appellant was permitted to assist public prosecutor to
advance arguments. ’ Albeit, nothing much turns on this.

reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been

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accorded an expansive understanding to the term ‘ victim ’ and not a
narrow or restricted meaning.

ultimately, it is the Appellant who has suffered due to the counterfeit/fake
products being sold/attempted to be sold as having been manufactured
by the Appellant. The Appellant would suffer financial loss and
reputational injury if such products would be bought by the public under
the mistaken belief that the same belonged to the Appellant’s brand.

from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by
the CrPC by any other law for the time being in force. Section 372 of the
CrPC falls under Chapter XXIX which relates to Appeals. Chapter XXIX
also includes Section 378, beginning from Section 372, concluding with
Section 394, and deals with all contingencies relating to Appeals under
the CrPC.

the CrPC before reverting to Section 372 of the CrPC.
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sub-section (3) thereof stipulates that there shall be no appeal to the
High Court under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), which otherwise
stipulates the condition necessary for maintaining an appeal under sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2), except with the leave of the High Court.

impression is that leave of the High Court for maintaining an appeal to
that Court is a mandatory condition. However, examining the issue in the
facts of the present case, it has to be first considered as to whether
Section 372 of the CrPC would directly cover the situation, or be
circumscribed by the provisions of Section 378 of the CrPC.

the person who actually filed the written complaint, namely Mr. Pankaj
Kumar Singh. On this premise, it has gone on to hold that the Appellant

appeal and further, that even the complainant-Pankaj Kumar Singh could
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maintain the appeal only after seeking the leave of the High Court in view
of the provisions of Section 378(3) of the CrPC. The High Court also held
that ‘ This is a case instituted upon a police report and only in cases
instituted upon private complaint, leave to appeal under Section 378(4)
of Cr.P.C. is maintainable. Therefore, leave to appeal against order of
acquittal in appeal is also not maintainable in the instant case. ’

that the Appellant could not have maintained the appeal before it would
amount to completely negating the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC. In
our considered opinion, Section 372 of the CrPC is a self-contained and
independent Section; in other words, it is a stand-alone Section. Section
372 of the CrPC is not regulated by other provisions of Chapter XXIX of

independently of and shall not be read conjointly with any other provision

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whether an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC would
be restricted only to mean an appeal to the First Appellate Court or
include even an appeal to the Second Appellate Court/High Court, which
happens to be the case herein.

propose to complicate it! The language employed by the proviso to

shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the

imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the
Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of
such Court. ’
(emphasis supplied)
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accused. The proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC is agnostic to the
factum of such acquittal being by the Trial Court or the First Appellate
Court. We can see the situation through another lens also. In the facts at
hand, acquittal was by the First Appellate Court and not by the Trial
Court. Therefore, since, in the present case, for the first time, the
acquittal comes in at the stage of the First Appellate Court (being a
Sessions Court), in law, the right of appeal by the victim would be to the
next higher level in the judicial hierarchy, which would be the High Court.
However, for that purpose, the High Court could also have been the First
Appellate Court, if the Trial Court, being a Court of Sessions, had
acquitted the accused. Thus, the reasoning of the High Court that if the
Appellant was allowed to maintain the appeal, it would amount to an
appeal as envisaged under Section 378 of the CrPC, is factually and
legally erroneous, which proposition we negate.

substantive right of the victim as envisaged in the proviso to Section 372
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of the CrPC, the conclusive paragraphs wherefrom are reproduced
below:

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25 of 28

(emphasis supplied)

applies to the instant matter. The exposition on the term ‘ victim ’ by 3
learned Judges in Paragraph 23 of Jagjeet Singh ( supra ) has already
been taken note of by us hereinabove, with which we respectfully concur.

victim to prefer an appeal as granted under the proviso to Section 372 of

effect from 31.12.2009, is not restricted by any other provision of the
CrPC. It serves the salutary purpose of safeguarding the rights of the
victim. Upon detailed discussion, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in

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(emphasis supplied)

Judgment to be unsustainable. The same is set aside.

is held maintainable and is restored to its original file and number before
the High Court. Since the incident in question is of the year 2016, the
Registrar (Judicial), Jaipur Bench of the High Court is directed to place
the matter before the learned Chief Justice, who in turn, is requested to
allocate the same to a learned Single Bench to hear the matter on merits
expeditiously, as per the Board position.

forthwith to the Registrar (Judicial), Jaipur Bench of the High Court.
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only the question of law raised. Respondent No.1 will be at complete
liberty to raise all defences of fact and law, as may be available, on
merits.

costs.

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