Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
12/12/1962
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION:
1963 AIR 1480 1963 SCR (3) 995
ACT:
Industrial Dispute-Provident Fund-Production Bonus-Basic
Wages-Whether the former is excluded from the latter
-Provident Fund Scheme-Quota-Proportion of production
Corresponding to-Minimum basic wages and dearness allowance
-Norm-Higher than quota-Worker failing to produce norm-
Guilty of misconduct-Production above quota or above norms Which should
be taken for computation of provident fund-
Constitution of India, Art. 32-Employees Provident Funds,
Act, 1952(19 of 1952), s. 2(b).
HEADNOTE:
Following the major awards in the engineering industries in
1948, 1950 and 1958 the petitioner company and its workmen
entered into an agreement in 1958. By this agreement a
scheme was established. Under this scheme a certain
proportion of the production was taken to correspond to the
minimum basic wages and dearness allowance fixed by the
awards and this was termed as quota’. The production above
the quota was paid at piece rates. But there was a ’norm’
also fixed which was much higher than quota. Every workman
who failed to produce the ’norm’ would be considered guilty
of misconduct and would be liable to be dismissed.
The petitioner’s contention was that the entire payment for
production above the quota was payment of production bonus
and therefore could not be taken into account for the
purposes of provident fund in view of the decision of this
Court in Bridge and Roof Co. Ltd. v. Union of India. It was
further contended that even if the payment for production
between quota and norm was not production bonus which can be
taken out of the definition of basic wages in the Act it
should be treated as payment in the nature of ’other similar
allowances’ appearing in S.2(b) (II) of the Employees
Provident Fund Act, 1952. The workmen contended that the
scheme in force in the petitioner company was a peculiar one
which did not correspond to any standard scheme of
production bonus in as much as it had two bases. It was
their contention that in the scheme in question production
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bonus started after the norm and that the payment for
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production between the quota and the norm was nothing more
than basic wages as defined in Employees Provident Fund Act,
1952.
Held, that straight piece rate plan was the simplest of the
incentive wage plans. In such a case all payment would be
basic wage as defined in s.2(b) of the Employees Provident
Fund Act, 1952.
M/s. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1959)
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 1012 and Bridge and Roof Co. Ltd. v. Union of
India (1962) 2 L.L.J. 490, referred to.
In the scheme of the petitioner Company however the worker
cannot stop at the quota he must produce upto the norm on
pain of being charged with misconduct. Therefore the real
base or standard which is the core of a 1 typical production
bonus scheme is, in the case of the petitioner company the
norm. Any payment above the norm would be real production
bonus under the present scheme and any payment upto the norm
whether made in one firm or the other, is basic wage for the
purpose of the Act.
Mr. Ziakh v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. (1954)1
L.L.J. 281, distinguished.
The payment for production between the quota and the norm
having nothing of the nature of an allowance and it being a
straight payment for the daily work must be included in the
words defining basic wage. The portion of the payment which
is made by the petitioner for production above the norm’
would be production bonus and would be covered by the
judgment of this Court in Bridge & Roof Company.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 64 of 1962.
Petit-ion under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
enforcement of fundamental rights.
G.B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and
RavinderNarain, for the petitioners.
M.S. K. Sastri, R. H. Dhebar and P. D. Menon, for
respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
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A. S. R. Chari,R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, M. K. Ramamurthi
and D.P. Singh, for respondent No. 3.
1962. December 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
WANCHOO, J.-This writ petition was heard along with writ
petition No. 62 of 1962 (Bridge and Roof Company (India),
Limited v. Union of India), as the short question in both of
them was whether production bonus was excluded from the term
"basic wages" as defined in s.2 (b) of the Employees
Provident Funds Act, No. 19 of 1952, (hereinafter referred
to as the Act). A further question also arose in this writ
petition as to the nature of’ the production bonus scheme in
force in the petitioner company, and the patties were given
time to file additional affidavits in that connection. The
main point raised in the two writ petitions was decided in
Bridge and Roof Company (India) Limited v. of India(1). The
only question that now remains is whether the production
bonus scheme in force in the petitioner-company is of the
same type as in Bridge & Roof Company(1). If it is of the,
same nature the present petition would be governed by that
decision and production bonus would be excluded from the
term "basic wages" as defined in the Act. The parties have
filed additional affidavits and it now remains to determine
the nature of production bonus in force in the petitioner-
company and to decide whether the decision in the Bridge and
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Roof Company(1) would apply in the present case, and if so,
to what extent.
It appears that some kind of production bonus scheme was
started in the petitioner-company in 1947 and that scheme is
said to have been more or less
(1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 978.
998
on a straight piece-rate system. Then came the major
engineering awards in the years 1948, 1950 and 1958 fixing
basic minimum wages and dearness allowance. This was
followed by an agreement between the petitioner-company and
its workmen in August 1958, in which the present scheme in
force was established even though some kind of production
bonus on a. more or less straight piece-rate system was in
force from as far back as 1947. The scheme which was
established by the agreement of 1958 was this. A certain
proportion of the production was taken to correspond to the
minimum basic wages and dearness allowance fixed by the
awards, and this was termed as "quota". The production
above the quota was paid for at piece-rates. But there was
a "norm" also fixed which was much higher than the "quota"
and every workman was normally expected to produce the
"norm" as the minimum production. If the workman did not
produce the ’norm", he would be guilty of misconduct and
would be liable to dismissal, as the agreement provided that
any deliberate deviation from production norms would amount
to go-slow tactics. The standing orders of course provide
that go-slow tactics would amount to misconduct and may lead
to dismissal of the workman concerned.
It will be seen therefore that the peculiar feature of the
production bonus scheme in force in the petitioner-company
is that it has got two bases namely, (i) the quota, and (ii)
the norm, the quota being much lower than the norm. In view
of the agreement between the parties and the precise defi-
nition of "go-slow" contained in that agreement, it is clear
that workmen are expected to give the "norm" as the minimum
production and if there is any deliberate deviation
therefrom they are liable to be charged with misconduct in
the shape of go-slow and may be dismissed for such
misconduct.
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The minimum wages and the dearness allowance fixed by the
major engineering awards are payable for production upto the
quota and thereafter extra payments are made on piece-rate
basis upto the norm, and even beyond it where the workmen
produce beyond the norm. The question that falls for
consideration is whether such a system is a typical
production bonus system described in the case of Bridge and
Roof Company(1).
The main dispute centers around production between the quota
and the norm. The petitioner’s case is that the entire
payment for production above the quota is payment of
production onus and therefore cannot be taken into account
for the purpose of provident fund, in view of the decision
in Bridge and Roof Company(1). The workmen however, contend
that the scheme in force in the petitioner-company is a
peculiar one which does not correspond to any standard
scheme of production bonus as known in standard books on
such schemes. It is contended that no scheme dealing with
production bonus or incentive wage has two bases of the kind
in force in the petitioner-company. The workmen, therefore,
contend that in a scheme of the kind prevalent in the
petitioner-company, production bonus as well understood in
industry only starts after the norm and that payment for
production between the quota and the norm is nothing more
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than basic wage as defined in the Act and that the exception
of bonus from basic wage will only apply to that part of the
payment which is made for production above the norm. The
workmen further point out that the straight piece-rate
system was in force in the petitioner-company before the
major engineering awards fixing minimum basic wages and
dearness allowance. When such minimum basic wages and
dearness allowance were fixed by the
(1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 978.
1000
awards they became applicable to the petitioner company
also. It was then that the system was evolved of having a
quota which would represent production for the minimum basic
wages and dearness allowance and the rest of the production
was to be paid on a piece-rate basis. The change that
resulted was that instead of a straight piece-rate system,
the petitioner-company introduced the piece-rate system
along with a guaranteed time wage. The workmen contend that
the quota which was to represent payment for production upto
the basic wages and dearness allowance was fixed arbitrarily
and had no relation to the productive capacity of the
workmen, which is the basis for fixing the base or standard
in a typical scheme of production bonus. Therefore, what
happened was that the petitioner-oompany though it fixed the
quota, expected much higher production even before the
agreement of 1958 for a fair day’s work and used to pay
extra for this production. This matter was finally
stabilised by the agreement of 1958 by which norms were
fixed and the workmen were expected to give production upto
the norms as a rule and any deliberate deviation from such
production amounted to go-slow tactics, resulting in
misconduct, which might lead to the dismissal of the
workman. The union therefore contends that the real base or
standard of a typical production bonus scheme in the case of
the petitioner-company is not the quota but the Dorm, and
the payment between the quota and the norm can only be basic
wages within the meaning of the Act and it is only payment
above the re norm" which would be production bonus as under-
stood in industry. It was conceded on behalf of the workmen
in arguments that any payment for production above the
"norm" would be payment of production bonus and would be
covered by the judgment of this Court in Bridge and Roof Co.
(1)
(1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 978,
1001
What is a typical production bonus scheme was considered by
this Court in M/s. Titaghur Paper Mills Co Ltd. v. Its
Workmen, (1) and that has been confirmed in Bridge and Roof
Company(2). It was pointed out that the straight piece-rate
plan was the simplest of the incentive wage plans. In such
a case all payments would be basic wage as defined in s. 2
(1)) of the Act, even though the worker is working under an
incentive wage plan. But the difficulty arises where the
straight piece-rate system cannot work. In such cases the
system of production bonus by tonnage or by any other
standard is introduced. The core of such a plan is that
there is a base or a standard above which extra payment is
carried for extra production in addition to the basic wages
which is the payment for work upto the base or standard.
Such a plan typically guarantees time wage up to the time
represented by standard performance and gives workers a
share in the savings represented by superior performance.
The typical scheme thus has only one base or standard and
time wages are guaranteed upto that base or standard and any
production above that base or standard is production bonus.
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But it is clear that in such a scheme of production bonus
the workers are not bound to produce beyond the base or
standard and no disciplinary action can be taken against
them for riot producing above the base or standard. Learned
counsel for the petitioner has been unable to point out any
scheme of production bonus which has two bases or standards
as is the case in the petitioner-company in the shape of a
quota and a norm, the quota being much lower than the norm.
What we have to decide is whether in the case of the
peculiar system which is in force in the petitioner-company,
production bonus, as generally understood, can be said to
start immediately after the first base (namely, the quota)
or it can only start after the second base (namely, the
norm). It was urged on behalf of the petitioner
(1) 1959 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 1012.
(2) [1963] 3 S.C R. 9 .
1002
that production bonus schemes have safeguards for both the
employer and the employee, and that production upto the norm
in addition to the quota in the scheme in force in the
petitioner-company is a mere safeguard. Reliance in this
connection was placed on a passage in the book "Payment by
Results" issued by International Labour Office, Geneva at p.
164, which is as follow :
"No employee will be compelled to produce more
than union has stated was fair, but continued
failure of an employee to co-operate in
establishing a fair standard or to meet the
agreed rate of production of an established
standard or the rate of production as stated
by the union as fair, without a reason mutu-
ally satisfactory to both union and company
will result in dismissal or, if the
circumstances warrant unusual treatment,
transfer to another department."
That passage appears under the heading "Management
Safeguards", and apparently is concerned primarily with time
studies for the purposes of setting up production standards.
Therefore that passage cannot be taken as an indication that
a typical production bonus scheme can fix two bases or
standards, at the best the passage only indicates that
disciplinary action may be taken in certain cases where the
established standard is not reached by a workman without a
reason mutually satisfactory to both union and company. We
may add that learned counsel relied on this book which deals
with a large number of various types of incentive wages
plans or production bonus plans; but he was unable to draw
our attention to any plan in this book which fixes two bases
or standards. It is true that when fixing a base or
standard the employers sometimes fix a standard which is
below the normal production worked out on the basis
1003
of time studies. Not infrequently such base is fixed at 80
per centum of the normal production found on time studies
and in some cases it has been known to go as low as 67 per
centum. That if; however a matter of agreement between the
employer and the employee and depends upon various factors.
But the reason behind fixing the base or standard somewhat
below the normal which might have been found by time studies
is to make an allowance for workers who may be little slower
than the average and also to allow for some incentive even
before the normal is reached so that there may be an effort
on the part of the workman to produce not merely the normal
but something more than normal. This is helped by fixing
the base or standard somewhat below the normal production as
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found by time studies and gives the workmen a greater
incentive to produce without fail not only upto the normal
but also beyond the normal. The fact however that the
standard or the base may be fixed somewhat below the normal
production found by time studies is of no help to the
petitioner, for the scheme in the present case is not a
typical production bonus scheme, if the quota is taken to be
the base. As we have already indicated, in a typical
production bonus scheme the worker is not bound to produce
more than the base or standard, though he way do so in order
that his earnings may go up. In the scheme in force in the
petitioner-company however the worker cannot stop at the
quota; he must produce up to the norm on pain of being
charged with misconduct in the shape of go-slow and being
liable to be dismissed. It seems to us therefore that the
real base or standard which is the core of a typical
production bonus scheme is, in the case of the petitioner-
company, the norm. Any payment for production above the
norm would be real production bonus under the scheme in
force in the petitioner-company. The production upto the
1004
norm is the standard which is expected of a workman in the
company and payment into that production must be basic wages
as defined in the Act. it is true that this payment is split
up into two parts. The first part consists of basic wages
and dearness allowance fixed in the awards for production up
to the quota and the latter part is payment at piece-rate
for production upto the norm; but the two together in our
opinion represent the base or standard of a typical
production bonus scheme and so only payment above the norm
in the case of the petitioner-company can be properly called
production bonus. The mere fact that part of the basic wage
as defined in the Act is paid in one form as a time wage and
part in another form as a piece rate wage would make no
difference to the whole being basic wage within the meaning
of the Act. The real base of production bonus scheme in
force in the petitioner company is the norm and not the
quota and therefore payment upto the norm whether made in
one form or the other, is basic wage for the purpose of the
Act.
It is however urged on behalf of the petitioner that it is
open to the employer to punish a workman for go-slow, even
where wages are paid on a piece-rate basis and in this
connection reliance was placed on Mr. Ziakh v. Firestone
Tyre and Rubber Co. Limited, (1) where it was held that
there could be go-slow even where wages are being paid on
piece-rate basis. Assuming that to be so, we are of opinion
that does not affect the validity of the conclusion as to
base or standard in the present scheme at which we have
arrived. It may be possible to punish for go slow even
where wages are paid on a piece-rate system because the
employee deliberately does not produce what he had been
normally producing. But in the present case, the position
has been
(1) (1954) I I.L.J. 281.
1005
crystallised by the agreement and what is go-slow has been
precisely defined; usually it is rather a difficult matter
for the employer to prove a case of go-slow, more
particularly when the piece-rate system of payment is in
vogue. Under the agreement however any deliberate deviation
from production norms immediately becomes go-slow and the
workman is liable to disciplinary action which may even
result in dismissal. In these circumstances when go-slow is
precisely defined it is obvious that of two bases to be
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found in the scheme in the petitioner-company it is the norm
which is the real base to be found in all typical production
bonus schemes and that it is only when payment is made for
production above the "norm" that it can be said that the
workman is earning production bonus as generally understood
in industry. It would in our opinion be utterly wrong and
unrealistic in the present ease to call payment for
production between the quota and norm as production bonus
when the employee is bound to produce up to norm
practically on pain of dismissal.
It was further urged that norms have been fixed for a small
proportion of workmen employed in the petitioner-company and
therefore all payments above the quota which is apparently
fixed for all workmen should be treated as production bonus
in the case of workmen other than this small proportion.
This in our opinion is a disingenuous argument and the
union’s reply show that though norms have been fixed by
agreement only with respect to a small proportion of workmen
in actual practice there are norms for all workmen governed
by the scheme, these norms being based on normal performance
before the agreement of 1958. It is not disputed that these
actual norms are much higher than the quota.
1006
Finally, it was urged that even if the payment for
production between the quota and the norm is not production
bonus which can be taken out of’ definition of basic wages
in the Act, it should be treated as payment in the nature of
"other similar allowance" appearing in s. 2 (b) (ii). We
are of opinion that this payment for work done between the
quota and the norm cannot be treated as any other similar
allowance". The allowances mentioned in the relevant
clause are dearness allowance, house-rent allowance,
overtime allowance, bonus., and commission. Any "other
similar allowance", must be of the same kind. The payment
in this case for production between the quota and the norm
has nothing of the nature of an allowance, it is a straight
payment for the daily work and must be included in the words
defining basic wage i.e., "all emoluments which are earned
by an employee while on duty or on leave with wages in
accordance with terms of the contract of employment".
In the view we have taken of the scheme in this case, the
petition succeeds partly. We direct that the portion of the
payment which is made by the petitioner for production above
the "norm" would be production bonus and would be covered by
the judgment of this Court in Bridge and Roof Company, but
that portion of the payment which is made by petitioner for
production up to the quota as well as production between the
"quota" and the " norm" is basic wage within the meaning of
that term in the Act, The petition is therefore partially
allowed as indicated above. In the circumstances we pass no
order as to costs.
Petition allowed in part.
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