Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
| L APPEA | L NO.19 |
|---|---|
| ETITION | (Crl.) |
GANESHA ..… APPELLANT
VERSUS
SHARANAPPA & ANR. ..... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
Petitioner, besides three other accused, was
put on trial for offence under Section 341, 323,
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324 and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code. Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Yadgiri Taluk, Gulbarga District, Karnataka, by its
th
judgment and order dated 14 of September, 2006
passed in CC No. 355 of 2006, acquitted them of all
the charges.
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Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the informant
preferred Criminal Revision Petition No. 147 of
2007 and the High Court, by the impugned judgment
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excepting accused no. 3, Ganesha who has been held
guilty for the offence punishable under Section 324
of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of six months and
also to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, and in default
of payment of fine, to undergo further simple
imprisonment for a period of three months.
It is against this order that Ganesha has
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preferred this special leave petition.
Leave granted.
The prosecution was set in motion on the basis
of a report given by the informant, Sharanappa,
inter alia, alleging that he made a protest when he
saw the accused persons grazing their cattle in his
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land and thereby damaging the mulberry crop. It
was alleged that Ganesha, the appellant herein
assaulted the informant with a Badige (stick) which
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accused who have allegedly participated in that
have been acquitted and we are not concerned with
that in the present appeal. The trial court, on
appraisal of the evidence, came to the conclusion
that the prosecution has not been able to prove its
case beyond all reasonable doubt and, accordingly,
acquitted all the accused. However, in revision,
the High Court re-appraised the evidence and found
the reasoning assigned by the trial court to be
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totally perverse and contrary to the evidence on
record. The High Court relied on the evidence of
Sharanappa, the informant (PW-2), Maremma (PW-4),
Sujatha (PW-5) and Hussainappa (PW-6), who claimed
to be the eye-witnesses of the occurrence. The
High Court found Maremma (PW-4) and Hussainappa
(PW-6) to be the independent eye-witnesses and
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reliable. The High Court further observed that the
evidence of Dr. Surekha (PW-1), who examined the
injured and gave the wound certificate (Exhibit 2)
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acquittal of the present appellant and convicted
him as above. While doing so, the High Court
observed as follows:
“ 17 . In my view, the aforesaid
reasoning of the trial court is
totally perverse and contrary to the
evidence on record. We have seen from
the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 4, 5 and 6
that all of them have come out
successfully in their cross-
examination and all of them have
spoken to the fact of A-3 assaulting
P.W. 2 with a stick near his left eye
and the other accused persons catching
hold of P.W.2. Furthermore, it is
also clear from the evidence of P.Ws.
2 and 5 that the incident happened in
the land of the complainant when the
cattle belonging to the accused went
to the land of the complainant for
grazing the crop. Therefore, no doubt
arises as to the place of incident.”
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Mr. Akshat Shrivastav, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant raises a very
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short point. He submits that the High Court in
revision could not convert a finding of acquittal
into one of conviction and at most, while
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counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents,
however, submits that the High Court having found
the reasoning assigned by the trial court to be
totally perverse and contrary to the evidence on
record is not precluded from setting aside the
order of acquittal and convicting the accused for
the offence charged.
Having appreciated the rival submissions we
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find substance in the submission of learned counsel
for the appellant. Section 401 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, for short ‘the Code’, confers
power of revision to the High Court, same reads
as follows:
“ 401. High Court’s powers of
revision .- (1) In the case of any
proceeding the record of which has
been called for by itself or which
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| posing<br>ly divi | the Cou<br>ded in |
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(2) No order under this section
shall be made to the prejudice of the
accused or other person unless he has
had an opportunity of being heard
either personally or by pleader in his
own defence.
(3) Nothing in this section shall
be deemed to authorise a High court to
convert a finding of acquittal into
one of conviction.
(4) Where under this Code an
appeal lies and no appeal is brought,
no proceeding by way of revision shall
be entertained at the instance of the
party who could have appealed.
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(5) Where under this Code an
appeal lies but an application for
revision has been made to the High
Court by any person and the High Court
is satisfied that such application was
made under the erroneous belief that
no appeal lies thereto and that it is
necessary in the interests of justice
so to do, the High Court may treat the
application for revision as a petition
of appeal and deal with the same
accordingly.”
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From a plain reading of sub-section (1) of
Section 401 of the Code it is evident that the High
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appeal including the power under Section 386 of the
Code, relevant portion whereof reads as follows:
“ 386. Powers of the Appellate
Court. – After perusing such record
and hearing the appellant or his
pleader, if he appears, and the Public
Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case
of an appeal under section 377 or
section 378, the accused, if he
appears, the Appellate Court may, if
it considers that there is no
sufficient ground for interfering,
dismiss the appeal, or may –
(a) in an appeal from an order of
acquittal, reverse such order and
direct that further inquiry be
made, or that the accused be re-
tried or committed for trial, as
the case may be, or find him
guilty and pass sentence on him
according to law;
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xxx xxx xxx”
Section 386(a) thus authorizes the appellate
court to reverse an order of acquittal, find the
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accused guilty and pass sentence on the person
found guilty. However, sub-section (3) of Section
401 of the Code contemplates that the power of
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the face of it, the High Court while exercising the
powers of revision can exercise all those powers
which have been conferred on the court of appeal
under Section 386 of the Code but, in view of sub
section (3) of Section 401 of the Code, while
exercising such power, cannot convert a finding of
acquittal into one of conviction.
However, in a case where the finding of
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acquittal is recorded on account of misreading of
evidence or non-consideration of evidence or
perverse appreciation of evidence, nothing prevents
the High Court from setting aside the order of
acquittal at the instance of the informant in
revision and directing fresh disposal on merit by
the trial court. In the event of such direction,
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the trial court shall be obliged to re-appraise the
evidence in light of the observation of the
revisional court and take an independent view
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of abundant caution, we may herein observe that
interference with the order of acquittal in
revision is called for only in cases where there is
manifest error of law or procedure and in those
exceptional cases in which it is found that the
order of acquittal suffers from glaring illegality,
resulting into miscarriage of justice. The High
Court may also interfere in those cases of
acquittal caused by shutting out the evidence which
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otherwise ought to have been considered or where
the material evidence which clinches the issue has
been overlooked. In such an exceptional case, the
High Court in revision can set aside an order of
acquittal but it cannot convert an order of
acquittal into that of an order of conviction. The
only course left to the High Court in such
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exceptional cases is to order re-trial. The view,
which we have taken finds support from a decision
of this Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State
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held as follows:
“ 12 . ………Sub-section (3) of Section
401 in terms provides that nothing in
Section 401 shall be deemed to
authorize a High Court to convert a
finding of acquittal into one of
conviction. The aforesaid sub-
section, which places a limitation on
the powers of the revisional court,
prohibiting it from converting a
finding of acquittal into one of
conviction, is itself indicative of
the nature and extent of the
revisional power conferred by Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
If the High Court could not convert a
finding of acquittal into one of
conviction directly, it could not do
so indirectly by the method of
ordering a retrial. It is well
settled by a catena of decisions of
this Court that the High Court will
ordinarily not interfere in revision
with an order of acquittal except in
exceptional cases where the interest
of public justice requires
interference for the correction of a
manifest illegality or the prevention
of gross miscarriage of justice. The
High Court will not be justified in
interfering with an order of acquittal
merely because the trial court has
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| but de<br>down | cisions<br>the |
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In the present case, the High Court in our
opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that it is
one of the exceptional cases as the finding of
acquittal is on a total misreading and perverse
appreciation of evidence. On the face of it, the
High Court rightly set aside the order of acquittal
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but it gravely erred in converting the order of
acquittal into that of conviction, instead of
directing re-hearing by the trial court.
Ordinarily we would have set aside the order of the
revisional court to the extent aforesaid and
directed for re-hearing by the trial court, but
taking into account the nature of offence, at such
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a distance of time we would not like to charter
that course.
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including the present one. No distinction is made
while using the words ‘informant’ and
‘complainant’. In many of the judgments, the person
giving the report under Section 154 of the Code is
described as the ‘complainant’ or the ‘de facto
complainant’ instead of ‘informant’, assuming that
the State is the complainant. These are not words
of literature. In a case registered under Section
154 of the Code, the State is the prosecutor and
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the person whose information is the cause for
lodging the report is the informant. This is
obvious from sub-section (2) of Section 154 of the
Code which, inter alia, provides for giving a copy
of the information to the ‘informant’ and not to
the ‘complainant’. However the complainant is the
person who lodges the complaint. The word
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‘complaint’ is defined under Section 2(d) of the
Code to mean any allegation made orally or in
writing to a Magistrate and the person who makes
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provides for examination of the complainant in a
complaint-case. Therefore, these words carry
different meanings and are not interchangeable. In
short, the person giving information, which leads
to lodging of the report under Section 154 of the
Code is the informant and the person who files the
complaint is the complainant.
In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside
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the order of the High Court and decline to direct
re-hearing by the trial court.
........................J
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD]
.......................J
[KURIAN JOSEPH]
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 19, 2013
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