Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GANPAT LADHA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SASHIKANT VISHNU SHINDE
DATE OF JUDGMENT21/02/1978
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ)
BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1978 AIR 955 1978 SCR (3) 198
1978 SCC (2) 573
CITATOR INFO :
R 1980 SC 954 (9,10,11,14)
R 1980 SC1605 (12)
O 1985 SC 796 (1,3,20,33,35)
O 1987 SC 117 (51)
R 1987 SC1939 (27)
ACT:
Constitution of India--Articles 226-227--Power of High Court
to interfere with exercise of discretion by Courts
below--Bombay Rent Act 1947--Sec. 5(11)c, 12(3)a &
12(3)b--Whether definition of tenant includes a member of a
family of a deceased tenant residing with him at the time of
his death in case of business premises--Object of rent
restriction act--If conditions of 12(3)b are complied with
whether Court can exercise discretion in favour of a
tenant--Whether conditions laid down by Sec. 12(3)b are to
be strictly complied with by tenant.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent tenant made an application in 1956 for
fixation of standard rent under section 11 of the Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In
February, 1960, in the said proceedings, the contractual
rent of Rs. 80/- per month was reduced to Rs. 54.25 per
month in respect of the shop in dispute. The rent remained
in arrears from 1956 to 1960. In June and July, 1960, the
appellant landlord issued a notice to quit to the res-
pondent. Nearly 5 months after the fixation of standard
rent the respondent filed a Revision Application under
section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code which was summarily
dismissed by the High Court. In November, 1960, the
appellant filed present suit for eviction. On 30-8-1962,
issues were framed and therefore that was the first date of
hearing. In June, 1963 the Trial Court held that since the
dispute about the standard rent was pending when the suit
was filed the provisions of section 12(3)(a) were not
attracted. However, the appellant was entitled to a decree,
under section 12(3) (b) since the respondent had not paid
the rent regularly in accordance with the provisions of
section 12(3)(b). The Appellate Court held that the case
was governed by section 12(3)(a) and, therefore, the
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appellant was entitled to a decree of eviction. The
Appellate Court further held that even if the case was
governed by section 12(3)(b), since the respondent had not
complied with its provisions the suit was bound to be
decreed in accordance with the decision of this Court in the
case of Shah Dhansukhlal. The Appellate Court also held
that even if any discretion was vested in. the Court under
section 12(3)(b) of the Act that discretion had been
properly exercised by the Trial Court.
The respondent filed a Writ Petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution against the judgment of the Appellate
Court. The Writ Petition succeeded before the High Court
because the High Court thought that the view expressed by
this Court in Shah Dhansukhlal’s case still left room for
the application of what was laid down by Chagla C. J. in
Kalidas Bhavan’s case. The original tenant of the shop in
question having died during the course of litigation, the
present respondent, who is the son of the original tenant
was impleaded in the petition. Section 5(11)(c) of the Act
defines a tenant as including any member of the tenant’s
family residing with him at the time of his death. The High
Court took the view that section 5(11)(c) applies not only
to residential premises but also to business premises and
that, therefore, on the death of a tenant of business
premises any member of the tenant’s family residing with him
at the time of his death would become a tenant.
Al lowing the appeal,
HELD : (1) It is difficult to see how in case of business
premises the need for showing residence with the original
tenant at the time of his death would be relevant. It is
obvious from the language of section 5(11)(c) that the
intention of the Legislature in giving protection to a
member of the family of the tenant residing with him at the
time of his death was to secure that on
199
the death of the tenant the member of his family residing
with him at the time of his death is not thrown out. This
protection would be necessary only in case of residential
premises. When a tenant is in occupation of business pre-
mises there would be no question of protecting against
dispossession a member of his family. The tenant may be
carrying on a business in which the member of his family
residing with him may not have any interest at all and yet
on the construction adopted by the High Court, such member
of the family would become a tenant in respect of the
business premises. Such a result could not have been
intended to be brought about by the legislature. The basic
postulate of the protection under the Rent Act is that the
person who is sought to be protected must be in possession
of the premises and his possession is protected by the
legislation. But in case of business premises a member of
the family of the tenant residing with him at the time of
his death may not be in the possession of the business
premises and yet, on the view taken by the High Court, he
would become tenant in respect of the business premises with
which he has no connection. [203A-C, F-G]
Parubai Manilal Brahmin & Ors. v. Baldevdas Zaverbhai
Tapodhan, [1964] 5 Gujarat L.R. 563 approved.
Heirs of Deceased Darji Mohanlal Lavji v. Muktabai Shamji,
[1971] 12 Gujarat L.R. 272, over-ruled.
(2) The Act interferes with the landlord’s right to
property and freedom of contract only for the limited
purpose of protecting tenants against exercise of the
landlord’s power to evict them in these days of scarcity of
accommodation by asserting superior rights in property or
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trying to exploit his position by extracting too high rents
from helpless tenants. The object was not to deprive the
landlord altogether of his rights in property which have
also to be respected. Another object was to make possible
eviction of tenants who fail to carry out their obligation
to pay rent to the landlord despite opportunities given by
law in that behalf. Thus, section 12(3)(a) makes it
obligatory for the court to pass a decree when its
conditions are satisfied. [205B-C]
Hatilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchodbhai Shankrbhai Patel and
Ors., A.I.R. 1968 Gujarat p. 172. approved.
If there is statutory default or neglect on the part of the
tenant whatever may be its cause the landlord acquires a
right under section 12(3)(a) to get a decree for eviction
but where the conditions of section 12(3)(a) are not
satisfied there is a further opportunity given to the tenant
to protect himself against eviction. He can comply with the
conditions set out in section 12(3)(b) and defeat the
landlord’s claim for eviction. If, however, he does not
fulfil those conditions he cannot claim protection of
section 12(3)(b) and in that event there being no other
protection available to him a decree for eviction would have
to go against him. It is difficult to see how by any judi-
cial velour discretion exercisable in favour of the tenant
can be found in section 12(3)(b) even where the conditions
laid down by, it are not satisfied. [205-C-E]
Kalidas v. Bhavan Bhagwandas, 60 Bombay L.R. 1359 overruled.
Section 12(3)(b) does not create any discretionary
jurisdiction in the Court. It provides protection to the
tenant on certain conditions and these conditions have to be
strictly observed by the tenant who seeks the benefit of
this section. If the statutory provisions do not go far
enough to relieve the hardship of the tenant the remedy lies
with the legislature. It is not in the hands of the Court.
1205-F-G]
(3) The High Court committed a gross error in interfering
with what was a just and proper exercise of discretion by
the Court of small Causes, in exercise of its power under
Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court without
even considering or setting aside the findings of the Court
in regard to the circumstances calling for the exercise of a
discretion in favour of the appellant allowed the
application under Article 227. This was quite unwarranted.
[205GH. 206A]
200
Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte & Anr., A.I.R.
1975 S.C. 1297, relied on.
A finding as to whether circumstances justified the exercise
of discretion or not, unless clearly perverse and patently
unreasonable, is, after all, a finding of fact only and it
cannot be interfered with either under Article 226 or 227 of
the Constitution [206 C-D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1717 of
1975.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
29-8-1975 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 334 of
1970).
F. S. Nariman, P. H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for the
Appellant.
U. R. Lalit and V. N. Ganpule for the Respondent.
P. H. Parekh, for the Intervener.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, C.J. If the quest for certainty in law is often
baffled, as it is according to Judge Jerome Frank in "Law
and the Modern Mind", the reasons are mainly two : firstly,
the lack of precise formulation of even statutory law so as
to leave lacunas and loopholes in it giving scope to much
avoidable disputation; and, secondly, the unpredictability
of the judicial rendering of the law after every conceivable
as well as inconceivable aspect of it has been explored and
subjected to forensic debate. Even the staunchest exponents
of legal realism, who are apt to treat the quest for
certainty in the administration of justice in accordance
with law, in an uncertain world of imperfect human beings,
to be practically always futile and doomed to failure, will
not deny the. desirability and the beneficial effects of
such certainty in law as may be possible. Unfortunately,
there are not infrequent instances where what should have
been clear and certain, by applying well established canons
of statutory construction becomes befogged by the vagaries,
if one may use a possibly strong word without disrespect, of
judicial exposition divorced from these canons. The case
before us is an instance of the artificial uncertainty
created by such a fog after the law found in Section 12 (3)
of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act No. LVII of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’)
had been laid down with sufficient clarity by this Court in
Shah Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal v. Dalichand Firchand Shroff &
Ors.(1) and correctly understood and applied by a Bench of
the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. It is a cardinal tenet
of sound administration of justice that the judicial
function must not stray, so far as possible, into the domain
of legislation wearing a veil, whether thin or thick, of
"interpretation". We are impelled to make these remarks
because we find that a case of the commonest type between a
landlord and tenant, in the city of Bombay, the decision of
which the Act before us was presumably designed to
facilitate and expedite, consistently with justice to the
landlord as well as the tenant, has dragged on for years,
owing to the kind of difficulties we have referred to, so
that justice delayed has veritably become justice denied.
(1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 347.
201
The history of the litigation before us goes back to 3rd
September, 1956, when the predecessor-in-interest of the
defendant-respondent filed an application for fixation of
standard rent under Section 1 1 of the Act. On 17th
February, 1960 as a consequence, the contractual rent of Rs.
80/- per month was reduced and the standard rent was fixed
at Rs. 54.25 per month of a shop in Santa Cruz, Bombay.
Nevertheless, the tenant, predecessor-in-interest of the
respondent, did not pay rent. The payments remained in
arrears from 1956 to 1960. Therefore, the landlord was
compelled to send a registered notice to quit with a claim
for arrears of rent for four years @ Rs. 54.25 per month.
On 30th June, 1960, he repeated this notice to quit by a
letter sent under certificate of posting. On 1st July,
1960, the registered ’ notice came back with the word
"refused" endorsed on it. On 15th July, 1960, a notice to
quit was tendered personally to the respondent but refused.
The notice was then said to have been affixed to the
premises. On 18th July, 1960, nearly five months after
fixation of standard rent, the tenant filed a Revision
application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which was dismissed summarily on 1st September, 1960, by the
High Court.
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On 6th November, 1960 the appellant-landlord filed a suit
for eviction which is now before us. On 30th August, 1962,
the first date of hearing, the issues were framed. On 18th
June, 1963, the Trial Court decreed the suit on the
following findings : the notice, to quit was valid and duly
served; the arrears of rent were properly demanded under
section 12 (2) of the Act; the demand was not complied with
in accordance with law by the tenant within a month of the
demand; the case was governed by the provisions of section
12(3) (b) and not by the provisions of section 12(3) (a)
because a dispute about the fixation of standard rent was
still pending when the notice demanding standard rent was
given; nevertheless, the tenant was not entitled to the
protection of section 12(3) (b), since he had not paid the
rent regularly in accordance with the conditions under which
the protection of section 12 (3) (b) could be given to him.
On 12th August, 1963, the tenant filed an appeal in the
Small Causes Court challenging the validity of the notice
on the ground that the "notice to quit must be for 30 days’.
On 19th April, 1968, this appeal was allowed. On, 11th
April, 1969, the High Court set aside the finding of the
Appellate Court on the notice to quit which was held to be
valid and properly served and sent back the case to the
appellate court for decision of other questions. On 8th
December, 1969, the special leave petition against the order
of remand was dismissed by this Court. On 22nd January,
1970, the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court passed a
decree for ejectment holding that a valid notice had been
served; the case was governed by the provisions of section
12 (3) (a) and not section 12(3) (b); even if the case was
governed by section 12 (3) (b), its provisions not having
been complied with, the suit was bound to be decreed in
accordance with what was clearly held by this Court in Shah
Dhansukhlars case (supra), where it was laid down
"To be within the protection of that provision
(section 12 (3) (b) ) the tenant must
thereafter continue to pay or
14-211SCI/78
202
tender in Court regularly the rent and
permitted increases till the suit is finally
decided".
it also held that even if any discretion was vested in the,
Court under section 12(3) (b) of the Act, that discretion
had been properly exercised by the Trial Court.
Against the last mentioned judgment the tenant filed on 8th
February, 1970 an application under article 227 of the
Constitution which, rather unexpectedly, succeeded before a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court because the learned
Judges thought that the view expressed by this Court in Shah
Dhansukhlal’s case (supra), still left room for the
application of what was laid down by Chagla C.J., in Kalidas
Bhavan Bhagwandas(1). The learned Judges of the High Court
did not, we find, address themselves to the argument
that, even if, on the view taken by Chagla, C.J., in Kalidas
Bhavan’s case (supra), a discretion was left to the Court to
deviate, in special circumstances, from the obligation to
pass a decree, it was not proper for the High Court, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution, to interfere with what the appellate Court had
found to be a just and proper exercise of discretion to
pass the degree. As the High Court allowed the application
under article 227 on 29th August, 1975 without even
considering or setting aside the appellate Court’s finding
on the correct exercise of discretion by the Trial Court,
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the landlord brought the case before us by grant of special
leave to appeal.
Before deciding the main question we may refer to, another
question which would also be sufficient for the decision of
this appeal. That arises out of an event which is to be
expected when the course of litigation is so long drawn out
as the one before us. Smt. Shantibai Vishnumal, the original
tenant of the shop in question died on 9th December, 1973,
during the course of litigation, and the respondent, her
son, was impleaded as the claimant to her alleged tenancy
rights under Section 5 (1 1) (c) of the Act which lays down
"5 (1 1) : ’tenant means any person by
whom or on whose account rent is payable for
any premises and includes-
(a) x x x x
(b) x x x x
(e) any member of the tenant’s family
residing with him at the time of his death as
may be decided in default of agreement by the
Court.
In these circumstances, the question arose for decision
whether the present respondent, whose residence is given in
the special leave petition as "Agakhan Building, Haines
Road, Bombay", could possibly claim to be a tenant in
respect of the shop which admittedly constitutes business
premises by reason of Section 5 (11) (c) of the Act. The
High Court took the view that section 5 (11) (c) applies not
only to resi-
(1) 60 Bombay L.R. 1359.
203
dential premises but also to business premises and
therefore, on the death of a tenant of business premises,
any member of tenant’s family residing with him at the time
of his death would become a tenant. We do not think this
view taken by the high Court is correct. It is difficult to
see how in case of business premises, the need for showing
residence with the original tenant at the time of his death
would be relevant. It is obvious from the language of
section 5(11)(c) that the intention of the legislature in
giving protection to a member of the family of the tenant
residing with him at the time of his death was to secure
that on the death of the tenant, the member of his family
residing with him at the time of his death is not thrown out
and this protection would be necessarily only in case of
residential premises. When a tenant is in occupation of
business premises, there would be no question of protecting
against dispossession a member of the tenant’s family
residing with him at the time of death. The tenant may be
carrying on a business in which the member of his family
residing with him may not have any interest at all and yet
on the construction adopted by the High Court, such member
of the family would become a tenant in respect of the
business premises. Such a result could not have been
intended to be brought about by the legislature. It is
difficult to discern any public policy which might ’seem to
require it. The principle behind section 5 (1 1) (c) seems
to be that when a tenant is in occupation of premises, the
tenancy is taken by him not only for his own benefit, but
also for the benefit of the members of the family residing
with him and, therefore, when the tenant dies, protection
should be extended to the members of the family who were
participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for whose
needs inter alia the tenancy was originally taken by the
tenant. This principle underlying the enactment of Section
5 (II) (c) also goes to indicate that it is in respect of
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residential premises that the protection of that section is
intended to be given. We can appreciate a provision being
made in respect of business premises that on the death of a
tenant in respect of such premises, any member of the
tenant’s family carrying on business with the tenant in such
premises at the time of Ms death shall be a tenant and the
protection of the Rent Act shall be available to him. But
we fail to see the purpose the legislature could have had in
view in according protection in respect of business premises
to a, member of the tenant’s family residing with him at the
time of his death. The basic ’postulate of the protection
under the Rent Act is that the person who is sought to be
protected must be in possession of the premises and his
possession is protected by the legislation. But in case of
business premises, a member of the family of the tenant
residing with him at the time of his death may not be in
possession of the business.premises; he may be in service or
be may be carrying on any other business. And yet on the
view taken by the-High Court, he would become tenant in
respect of the business premises with which he has no
connection. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view
taken by one of us (Bhagwati J.) in the Gujarat High Court
about the correct meaning of Section 5 (11) (c) in Parubai
Manilal Brahmin & Ors. v. Baldevdas Zaverbhai Tapodhan(1),
in preference to the view adopted in the sub-
(1) (1964) 5 Gujarat L.R. 563.
204
sequent decision of the Gujarat High Court in Heirs of
deceased Darji Mohanlal Lavji v. Muktabai Shamji(1) which
decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in the
judgment impugned in the present appeals before us.
It is significant to note that after the decision of Gujarat
High Court in Parubai Manilal Brahmin & Ors. v. Baldevdas
Zaverbhai Tapodhan (supra) the Gujarat legislature amended
the Rent Act by substituting the following provision for
section 5 (1 1) (c)
"5 (11) (c) (i) in relation to premises let
for residence, any member of the tenant’s
family residing with the tenant’ at the time
of. or within three months immediately
preceding, the death of the tenant as may be
decided in default of agreement by the Court,
and
(ii) in relation to premises let for
business, trade or storage, any member of the
tenant’s family carrying on business, trade or
storage with the tenant in the said premises
at the time of the death of the tenant as, may
continue, after his death, to carry on the
business, trade or storage, as the case may
be, in the said premises and as may be decided
in de-fault or agreement by the Court."
This amendment was of course necessitated by the decision in
Parubai Manilal Brahmin & Ors. v. Baldevdas Zaverbhai
Tapodhan (supra) and it cannot, therefore, be relied upon
for the purpose of supporting the view taken in that
decision. But what is of significance is that when the
legislature enacted a provision in regard to business
premises in clause (ii) of Section 5 (11) (c), the
legislature made it clear that the protection in respect of
business premises was intended to be given, not to any
member of the tenant’s family residing with him at the time
of his death, but to a member of the tenant’s family
carrying business with him in such premises at the time of
his death. The legislative intent, therefore, never was to
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confer protection in respect of business premises on a
member of the tenant’s family residing with him at the time
of his death. This is also a circumstance which supports
the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in the earlier
decision in Parubai Manilal Brahmin & Ors. v. Baldevdas
Zaverbhai Tapodhan and shows that the view taken in the
subsequent decision in Heirs of deceased Darji Mohanlal
Lavji v. Muktabai Shamji is not correct. Of course, the
amendment made in Rent Act in the State of Gujarat cannot
assist us in interpreting Section 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act
in the Act of Maharashtra, but it is not wholly irrelevant,
since the judgment of the Bombay High Court in appeal before
us relies heavily on the decision of the Gujarat High Court
’in Heirs of deceased Darji Mohanlal Lavji v. Muktabal
Shamji (supra) and if that decision is incorrect, the
judgment in appeal before us must also likewise be held to
suffer from same infirmity. We must, therefore, hold that
Section 5 (11) (c) applies only in respect of residential
premises and since the premise%, in question before us were
admittedly business premises in the respondent, who was son
of the original tenant, could not claim to be a tenant under
section 5 (11) (c).
(1) (1971) 12 Gujarat L.R. 272.
2 05
Coming now to the first question to which we referred
earlier, we think that the problem of interpretation and
application of section 12 (3 ) (b) need not trouble us after
the decision of this Court in Shah Dhansukhlal Chagganlal’s
case (supra) followed by the more recent decision in
Harbanslal Jagmohandas & Anr. v. Prabhudas Shiv lal(1) which
completely covers the case before us.
It is clear to us that the, Act interferes with the
landlord’s right to property and freedom of contract only
for the limited purpose of protecting tenants from misuse of
the landlords power to evict them, in these days of scarcity
of accommodation, by asserting his superior rights in
property or trying to exploit his position by extracting
too, high rents from helpless tenants. The object was not
to deprive the landlord altogether of his rights in property
which have also to be respected. Another object was to make
possible eviction of tenants who fail to carry out their
obligation to pay rent to the landlord despite opportunities
given by law ’in that behalf. Thus, section 12 (3) (a) of
the Act makes it obligatory for the Court to pass a decree
when its conditions are satisfied as was pointed out by one
of us (Bhagwati, J) in Hatilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchodbhai
Shankarbhai Patel & Ors.(2). If there is statutory default
or neglect on the part of the tenant, whatever may be its
cause, the landlord acquires a right under section 12 (3)
(a) to get a decree. for eviction. But where the conditions
of Section 12 (3) (a) are not satisfied, there is a further
opportunity given to the tenant to protect himself against
eviction. He can comply with the conditions set out in
Section 12 (3) (b) and defeat the landlord’s claim for
eviction. If, however, he does not fulfil those conditions,
he can not claim the protection of section 12(3) (b) and in
that event, there being no other protection available to
him, a decree for eviction would have to go against him. It
is difficult to see how by any judicial valour discretion
exercisable in favour of the tenant can be found hi section
12(3) (b) even where the conditions laid down by it are not
satisfied. We think that Chagla, C.J., was doing nothing
less than legislating in Kalidas Bhavan’s case (supra), in
converting the provisions of section 12 (3) (b) into a sort
of discretionary jurisdiction of the Court to relieve
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tenants from hardship. The decisions of this Court referred
to above, in any case, make the position quite clear.
Section 12 (3) (b) does not create any discretionary
jurisdiction in the Court. It provides protection to the
tenant on certain conditions and these conditions have to be
strictly observed by the tenant who seeks the benefit of the
section. If the statutory provisions do not go far enough
to relieve the hardship of the tenant the remedy lies with
the legislature. ’It is not in the hands of Courts.
Lastly we think that the High Court committed a gross error
in interfering, upon an application under. article 227 of
the Constitution with what was a just and proper exercise of
its discretion by the Court of Small Causes in Bombay even
on the erroneous view that the Court had a discretion in the
matter. The High Court, without even considering or setting
aside the findings of the Court in regard to the circum-
(1) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 629.
(2) A.I.R. 1968 Gujarat p. 172.
206
stances calling for the, exercise of a discretion in favour
of the appellant. Allowed the application under article 227
of the Constitution. This, we think, was quite unwarranted.
We feel certain that the High Court would not have fallen
into such an error if its attention was drawn to the law as
laid down by this Court in Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v.
Laxmibai R. Tarte & Anr.(1). There, this Court, in an appeal
by special leave from a judgment of the Bombay High Court
observed (at p. 1297) :
"It is a litigation between landlord and
tenant and as is usual with this type of
litigation, it has been fought to a
bitter end. Much-of the agony to, which the
tenant has been subjected in this litigation
would have been spared if only the High Court
had kept itself within the limits of its
supervisory jurisdiction and not ventured into
fields impermissible to it under article 226
or 227 of the Constitution"
A finding as to whether circumstances justify the exercise
of a discretion or not, unless clearly perverse and patently
unreasonable is, after all, a finding. of fact only, which
could not be interfered with either under article 226 or
under article 227 of the Constitution. In Babhutmal
Raichand Oswal’s case (supra) this Court also said (at p.
1302)
"It would, therefore, be seen that the High
Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction
under Art. 227, interfere with findings of
fact recorded by the subordinate court or
tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing
that the subordinate court or tribunal
functions within the limits of its authority."
Even that certainty and predictability in the administration
of justice in accordance with law which is possible only if
lawyers and Courts care to scrupulously apply the law
clearly declared by this Court, would not be attainable if
this elementary duty is overlooked.
For the reasons given above, we allow this appeal, set aside
the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that
passed by the appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court on
22nd January, 1970. The respondent will pay the costs of
the appellants.
P.H.P. Appeal allowed.
(1) A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297.
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