Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HARDOI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAMA KRISHNA NARAIN AND OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
08/10/1953
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
JAGANNADHADAS, B.
CITATION:
1953 AIR 521 1954 SCR 506
ACT:
U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, s. 11 (2)-Proceedings
under s. 11(2)-Appeal from order rejecting claim- Creditors
who did not take active steps-Whether necessary parties.
HEADNOTE:
Creditors who did not take an active part in the proceedings
are not necessary parties to an appeal from an order
rejecting a claim made in a proceeding under section 11 (2)
of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934. The technical
rules of the Civil Procedure Code regarding the impleading
of parties should not be applied to such proceedings. The
matter should be viewed in a more liberal way, regard being
always had to the fact that there is no collusion between
the debtor and the claimant.
I Rameshwar v. Ajodhia Prasad (A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 580),
Chaudhri Bishuanth Prasad v. Sarju Saran Tewar (A.I.R. 1942
Oudh 16), Lakshmi Narain v. Satgurnath (A.I.R. 1942 Oudh
339) and Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwandas (A.I.R. 1947 All.
18) overruled.
JUDGMENT:
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 59 of1951.
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd August,
1944, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma
and Hamilton JJ.) in First Appeal No. 345 of 1940 arising
out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 24th August, 1940,
of the Court of the Special Judge, 1st Grade of Shahjahanpur
in Miscellaneous Case No. 52 of 1940 and Original Suit No. 2
of 1938.
Chaudhry Niamutullah (Gopalji Mehrotra, with him) for the
appellant.
Onkar Nath Srivastava for respondent No. 5. 1953. October
8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJANN J .
507
MAHAJAN J.-This appeal is before us on a certificate granted
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under section
110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the only point it
raises is whether the appeal preferred by the appellant to
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the High Court was imperfectly constituted, inasmuch as all
the creditors were not impleaded as parties to that appeal.
The facts are that on the 28th October, 1936, Rama Krishna
Narain and others submitted an application under section 4
of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, to the sub-
divisional officer, Tilhar, Shahjahanpur, praying that the
provisions of the -said Act be applied to them. This
application was eventually transferred by the sub-divisional
officer to the court of the special judge, first grade,
Shahjahanpur. The landlords on 26th August, 1938, submitted
a written statement to the special judge under section 8 of
the Act and therein stated inter alia that they had a pro-
prietary interest to the extent of ten annas share in 52
items of taluqdari villages which formed part of taluka
Bharawan. A notice of this application was published as
required by section 11(1) of the Act in the U.P. Gazette
dated 13th May, 1939. On 30th November, 1939, Raja Dev
Singh, who subsequently became a ward of the Court of Wards,
filed a claim petition under section 11(2) of the Act and
alleged therein that he was the proprietor of 6 1/2 pies
share in 47 items of property mentioned in schedule (A)- of
the landlords’ written statement. This claim was.
disallowed by the special judge by an order dated 24th
August, 1940, and it was held that Raja Dev Singh was not
the owner of the property claimed by him in his objection
petition. The Deputy Commissioner of Hardoi who is the
Court of Wards of Bharawan estate filed an appeal against
this decision of the special judge to the High Court. All
the applicant-landlords were impleaded as respondents in the
appeal along with the Unao Commercial Bank Ltd., one of the
creditors who had taken part in the proceedings before the
special judge at that stage. It does not appear from the
record that the other creditors had either filed written
statements
67
508
under section 10 or had made any allegation that the
landlords had secreted any property. Their names were not
mentioned in the memorandum of parties annexed to the memo
of costs, and in these circumstances they were not impleaded
as respondents in the appeal. Subsequently the appellant
made an application for impleading them as respondents in
the appeal and prayed that he be given the benefit of
section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. This application
was rejected, and eventually the appeal was dismissed on the
ground that it was. defective and could not be entertained
in the absence of all the creditors as respondents in the
appeal. The, cross-objection filed by the Unao Commercial
Bank with respect to costs was allowed.
The appellant on 21st November, 1944, filed a petition for
leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. It was alleged
in this application that the valuation of the subject-matter
of the appeal in the trial court in the High Court and
before His Majesty in Council was over Rs. 10,000 and that
though in the result the judgment and decree of the High
Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court ,
a substantial question of law affecting not only the parties
but of general interest was involved. The High Court with-
out deciding whether the appeal raised a substantial
question of law granted leave to the appellant under section
110 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the
judgment of the High Court being -one of variance, and the
value of the subject.-matter in dispute in the trial court
as well as in the appeal to His Majesty in Council being
over Rs. 10,000, the case fulfilled the requirements of that
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section.
Mr. Srivastava who represented the debtors-landlords before
us raised a preliminary objection that the certificate under
section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code was defective and
the appeal was thus incompetent and could not be entertained
by us. He contended that the only variation made by the
High Court in the judgment of the trial judge was in respect
of costs and such a variation in the matter of costs only
did not invoice the decree a decree of variance, and that
509
being. so, the ground on which the High Court had granted
the certificate was erroneous and the certificate being
defective this appeal could not be heard. In our opinion,
this contention is without force. It is no doubt true that
costs are not taken into consideration and are treated as
extraneous to the subjectmatter of a suit, and variation in
the matter of costs does not make the decree of the
appellate court a decree of variance; but as already stated,
the appellant did not pray for the certificate on that
ground. He had expressly alleged that the decree being one
of affirmance he was entitled to a certificate, because the
subject of the suit as well as of the appeal was a sum of
orver Rs. 10,000 and the case involveda4 substantial
question of law. It is obvious that the ground on which the
appeal was dismissed by the High Court raises a question of
law of importance to the parties and that being so, on that
ground alone the appellant was entitled to a certificate
under section I 10, Civil Procedure Code. The certificate
therefore is good, though the -around on which it was
granted is erroneous. It is always open to an appellant to
support the certificate on grounds other than those, on
which it has been actually ordered to be given. The
preliminary objection therefore fails.
In order to determine whether the creditors are necessary
parties in proceedings under chapters 3 and 4 of the U.P.
Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, it is necessary to refer to
the relevant provisions of the Act. The law was enacted for
giving relief to encumbered estates in U. P. Section 4
provides that any landlord, who is subject to or whose
immoveable property or any part thereof is encumbered with
private debts, may make an application in writing to the
Collector of the district, stating the amount of such
private debts and also of his public debts both decreed and
undecreed and requesting that the provisions of this Act be
applied to him.. The section gives an option to the landlord
who is subject to private debts to make an application for
obtaining relief under the provisions of the Act. The
Collector then transmits the application to the special
judge appointed under the Act.
510
The direct consequence of the acceptance of such an
application by the collector is that the creditors are
deprived of their rights of proceeding against such a
landlord in civil or revenue courts in respect of their
debts and all attachments made in execution of decrees
become null and void and no process in execution can issue
after that date. The provisions of the Act are clearly
detrimental to the contractual rights of the creditors and
to their remedies in civil law and such a statute can by no
stretch of imagination be described to have been enacted for
the benefit of creditors. Section 8 of the Act confers
power on the special judge of calling upon the applicant to
submit to him within a period to be fixed -by him in this
behalf, a written statement containing full particulars
respecting the public and private debts to which he is
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subject or with which his immoveable property is encumbered;
of the nature and extent of his proprietary rights in land;
of the nature and extent of his property which is liable to
attachment and sale; and lastly, of the names and addresses
of the creditors, so far as can be ascertained by him. If
the applicant fails to submit a written statement as called
for or furnish the information referred to in the proviso to
sub-section (2), the special judge is empowered to dismiss
the application. The landlord is not required to implead
any creditors as party respondents in his written statement,
but he has to furnish information, regarding the names and
addresses of his creditors so far as they are known to or
can be ascertained by him and his failure to give
information may result in a dismissal of the application.
Section 9 requires the special judge to publish in the
official gazette a notice in English calling upon all
persons having claims in respect of private debts both
decreed and undecreed against the person or the property of
the landlord to present to the special judge within three
months from the date of the publication of the notice, a
written statement of their claims. He is also required to
cause copies of such notice to be published in such paper or
papers as he may direct and to exhibit it at his own office,
at the office of the collector and at some
511
conspicuous place where the landlord resides. He is further
directed to send a copy of the notice and a copy of the
written statement under sub-section (1) of section 8 by
registered post to each of the creditors whose names and
addresses are mentioned in the statement under clause,(d) of
sub-section (1) of section 8. Section 10 provides that every
claimant referred to in section 9 shall in the written
statement of his claim give full particulars thereof and
shall state so far as - they are known to or can be
ascertained by him, the nature and extent of the landlord’s
proprietary rights in the land and the nature and extent of
the landlord’s property other than proprietary rights in
land. The provisions of this section not only require a
creditor to give particulars of his own debt but also give
him opportunity to contend that the landlord has secreted
some property. Section 11 (1) of the AA directs the special
judge to publish a notice specifying the property mentioned
by the applicant under section 8 or by any claimant under
section 10. The object of the provisions made in section 11
(1) is to find out the extent of the property that can be
utilized to-wards liquidation of the debts ascertained under
the subsequent provisions of the Act. Section 11 (2)
provides as follows:-
Any person having any claim to the property mentioned in
such notice shall, within a period of three months, from the
date of the publication of the notice in the official
gazette make an application to the special judge stating his
claim and the special judge shall determine whether the
property specified in the claim, or any part thereof is
liable to attachment sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the
debts of the applicant."
Sub-section (3) directs the special judge to determine such
claims before he proceeds to determine the amount due to any
creditor under section 14. He is further directed not to
pass any decree under section 14 until the expiry of a
period of one month from the last day on which he determines
a claim under section 11. Sub-section (4) off section 11
provides that any order passed by the special judge under
this section shall be
512
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deemed to be a decree of a civil court of competent
jurisdiction. Section 13 enacts that every claim, decreed
or undecreed against the landlord shall, unless made within
the time prescribed be deemed for ;III purposes and on all
occasions to have been duly discharged. Section 14 lays
down the procedure for determination of the amount of debts.
The judge is directed to give notice of the date of
enquiring into the claims of the creditors to the different
claimants and to the person who has made the application
under ,section 4. He is directed to examine each claim after
hearing all such parties as desire to be heard and after
considering the evidence, if any, produced by them. The
section lays down them mode of calculating interest on the
amount of such claims and provides for the application of
the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act to the proceedings
under the Act. Sub-section (7), provides as follows:----
"If the special judge finds that any amount is due to the
claimant be shall pass a simple money decree for such amount
together with any costs which he may allow in respect of
proceedings in his court and of proceedings in any civil
court stayed under the provisions of this Act, together with
pendente lite and future interest at a rate not greater than
the rate specified in section 27 and if he finds that no
amount is due, he may pass a decree for costs in favour of
the landlord. Such decree shall be deemed to be a decree of
a’ civil court of competent jurisdiction but no decree
against the landlord shall be executable within the United
Provinces except under the provisions of this Act." Section
18 provides that subject to the right of appeal or revision,
the effect of a decree of the special judge under sub-
section (7) of section 14 shall be to extinguish the
previously existing rights, if any, of the claimant,
together with all rights, if any, of mortgage or lien by
which the same are secured and, where any decree is given by
the special judge to substitute for those rights a right to
recover the amount of the decree in the manner and to the
extent specified in the Act. Section 45 provides for
appeals and revisions against orders and decrees of the
special judge.
513
It is apparent from the provisions of the Act cited above
that the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is no more, nor less
than, a code for the administration of the assets of the
landlord-debtor and for giving relief to him in a number of
ways against the contractual rights of his creditors. It
clearly deprives the creditors of any remedies that they
would ordinarily have in ordinary civil courts and
extinguishes the mortgages held by them. Sectional(2) deals
with claims of third parties to the property alleged by the
landlord as belonging to him and the judge is required to
determine whether such property is liable to attachment or
sale. It is noteworthy that under section 14(1) the special
judge is directed to follow a certain procedure, but no such
procedure is prescribed under section 1 1(2). In section 14
he is required to fix a date and to give notice of the date
of inquiring into the claims of the creditors to all the
claimants. There is no such parallel requirement in respect
of claims of third parties under section 11(2), though as a
matter of practice similar procedure is also followed in an
enquiry under this section.
The question that requires consideration in these
circumstances is -whether the rules of the first schedule to
the Code of Civil Procedure should be rigorously applied to
proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, and whether
the creditors who are no doubt’ .persons interested in those
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proceedings and who would ultimately be entitled to recover
their decretal debts from the property the extent of which
falls for determination in an enquiry under section II, are
necessary parties in the enquiry, or are merely proper
parties thereto and as such entitled only to notice of the
proceedings. Order 1, Rules I and 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, provide in regard to the persons who are to be
joined as plaintiffs or those who have to be joined as
defendants in suits. Rule 1 is in these terms:-
"All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiff, in whom
any right to relief in respect of or arising of the same act
or transaction or series of act transactions is alleged to
exist, whether
514
severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons
brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact
would arise."
Rule 3-provides:-
" All persons may be joined as defendants against whom any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act
or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged
to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative,
where, if separate suits were brought aaainst such persons
any common question of law or fact would arise."
It is apparent that strictly speaking the provisions of
these rules cannot be applied to the proceedings
contemplated by the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act. These
proceedings cannot be. described as suits. It was conceded
at the Bar that an inquiry into third party claims under
section 11(2) cannot be described as a suit. Neither
section 8 nor section 1 1 provides that the creditors have
to be impleaded as parties respondents in such an objection
application. As already said, the section provides that the
applicant has to give information about the names of the
creditors and the amounts due to them. Till the time that a
decree is passed under section 14 in favour of any of the
creditors it cannot be, said that any one of them is
entitled to share in the property of the debtor. It is only
when a claim has been made under section 10 by a creditor
and it has ripened into a decree that he is entitled to
share in the assets of the landlord. But if he commits a
default in submitting a written statement of the claim under
section 10, the claim stands discharged under section 13.
In this particular case it is not clear whether any of the
creditors except the Unao Commercial Bank had made a claim
under section 10. It is also -not clear whether any decree
under section 14 has been passed in favour of any of the
creditors. An inquiry for the determination of the quantum
of the debts of the landlord can only be made after third
party claims have been settled under the provisions of
section 11(2). In view of these provisions it seems
difficult to hold that the technical and
515
strict rules as to impleading of parties can have appli-
cation to proceedings under section 11 of the U.P.
Encumbered Estates Act. It is true that the creditors must
be given notice and opportunity to say whether the landlord
has secreted any property, but if they do not do so and are
content with the disclosures made by the landlord they
cannot be said to have any further interest in the quantum
of the property which the landlord has mentioned under the
provisions of section 8 in his written statement. In that
situation, if a third party claims any item of property
mentioned by the landlord in the written statement, the
controversy at that stage lies only between the landlord and
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the claimant, though in the result the creditors may either
be benefited or deprived of some of the ’assets which the
landlord discloses in the application as liable to
attachment and sale towards payment of decrees that may be
passed in favour of the creditors.
It can well be assumed that the fight at that stage being a
bona fide fight between the objector and the landlord, the
interests of the creditors will be fully represented by the
landlord and any decision obtained in his favour or against
him would be binding on all the creditors on the principles
enacted in explanation 6 to section I 1, Civil Procedure
Code. If, therefore, in such a contest the claimant loses
and the landlord succeeds, then in an appeal against that
decision he need only implead the landlord as a party
respondent and it is not necessary to implead all the
creditors as respondents merely on the ground that
ultimately they would be affected by-the result, either to
their benefit or to their detriment. The court has power,
if it considers that the presence of the creditors is
necessary at the hearing, to give them notice of the appeal
so that they may have the opportunity of placing their con-
tentions before it. The observance of such a procedure may
well conduce to a fair hearing of the appeal, even if the
creditors have raised no plea of any kind before the special
judge. In a case, however, where the creditors raise a plea
that the landlord has secreted certain property and it
should be included in the schedule and such property is then
claimed by a third
516
party, they may well be regarded as real parties to the
controversy and failure to implead them may result in the
appeal being imperfectly constituted. In the situation that
arises in the present case the appeal should have been held
to be properly constituted because all those who raised any
controversy whatsoever as to the ownership of the property
in dispute were impleaded.
We are fully conscious of the fact that the view that we
have expressed above is not in conformity with a number of
decisions of the Oudh Chief Court and the Allahabad High
Court. It is therefore necessary to examine those decisions
in order to see whether the reasons given therein are sound
or erroneous.
In Rameshwar v. Ajodhia Prasad(1) a Bench of the Oudh Court
held that all the creditors who were impleaded as parties to
the application under the Act are necessary parties to an
appeal by the objector against an adverse order passed
against him under section 11. -This judgment proceeds on the
assumption that all the creditors having been impleaded as
parties to the application and not having been made
respondents in the appeal, the appeal became imperfectly
constituted. In this case the question whether under the
provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act an applicant is
required to implead creditors as parties to the application
was neither argued nor considered; on the other hand, it was
assumed that all the creditors have to be impleaded as
parties in the application made by the claimants under the
Act. That assumption is, of course, erroneous. Under
section 4 the applicant is entitled to request the
collector, that the provisions of the Act be applied to him
and relief given to him under its provisions. He is not
required even to give information about the names and
addresses of creditors and no question of impleading anyone
as a respondent arises at that stage. When the collector
has forwarded this application to the special judge, then
the special judge is empowered to call upon the applicant to
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file a written statement and therein he is bound %to give
information About the
(1) A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 580,
517
names and addresses of his creditors so far as they are
known to him or can be ascertained by him. In the written
statement which he is called upon to file on a requisition
by the special judge he is not called upon to implead any
persons as parties, in the sense in which that term is used
in the Code of Civil Procedure. This decision therefore is
not of any help on the point that was argued before us.
In Chaudhri Bishunath Prasad v. Sarju Saran Tewari(1),
another Bench of the Oudh Court held that an enquiry into
the indebtedness of the landlord is to be carried out by the
special judge in the presence of all the creditors, that
though it is true that each creditor is interested in
establishing his own debt against the landlord, he is
further interested that the landlord should not be allowed
to withhold any property from the court, and that if ’a
claimant under section I I sets up a title to the property
shown by the landlord to belong to him, although the real
contest may for the time being be between the claimant on
the one hand and the landlord on the other hand, it is to
the ultimate interest of the entire body of the creditors
that the property should be held to belong to the landlord,
and if the decision is in favour of the landlord, all the
creditors will be entitled to have their debts satisfied out
of such property; but if, however, the decision is against
them, the property will go out of the reach of the creditors
and will not be available to them for the satisfaction of
their debts. It was further held that as all. the creditors
had not been joined as parties to the appeal and as they
were interested in the result of the appeal, it could not be
held that they were wholly unconcerned in the result of the
case and therefore the appeal was not maintainable. It
seems to us that in making these observations the learned
Judges did not clearly bear in mind the distinctions between
the provisions of sections 11 and 14 of the Act. Section 14
lays down a definite procedure so far as the enquiry into
the claims of creditors is concerned . Each creditor has to
establish his claim against the landlord as he
(1) A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 16.
518
would do if he had filed a suit against him. This enquiry
is made after the quantum of the property of the debtor has
been ascertained under section 11. As already pointed out,
if any creditor raises any dispute as to the quantum of the
property as he is entitled to raise such a dispute in his
written statement filed under section 10, in that situation
it may well be held that such a creditor is directly
interested in the enquiry under section 11 ; but it is
difficult to see that all other creditors who have accepted
the list of property filed by the debtor as true are
directly interested in the enquiry under that section and
are as such necessary parties and that without impleading
them the enquiry cannot proceed. Rules I and 3 of Schedule
I Of the Code of Civil Procedure do not lay down that every
person who is ultimately interested in the result of a suit
should be impleaded as a defendant. All that these rules
insist upon is that all persons should be joined as
defendants against whom any right to relief is alleged to
exist, provided that such right arises in respect of the
same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions
and the case is one where common question of law or fact
would arise. It is not possible to hold that the objector
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can claim any right to relief against the creditors as such.
The right to relief in the enquiry under section 11 is only
against the landlord who alleges himself to be the owner of
the property which the claimant says belongs to him, and
creditors have no right of interest in the property claimed
by the objector. The test of ultimate benefit therefore
laid down by the Oudh Court for holding that all creditors
are necessary parties in the enquiry under section 11 of the
U.P. Encumbered Estates Act does not fulfil the conditions
laid down in the Code for impleading parties as plaintiffs
or as defendants. If they are not necessary parties in the
true sense of the term in the enquiry under section 11, a
fortiori failure to implead them as respondents in the
appeal detective.
In Lakshmi Narain v. Satgurnath(1) another Bench of the Oudh
Court took the’ same view. In this case.
(1) A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 339.
519
the earlier decisions of the Oudh Court were followed The
view was reiterated that creditors are parties in the
proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act.
In Benares Bank Ltd., Benares v. Bhagwandas (1), a Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court considered this question
and expressed the same opinion as had been expressed in the
Oudh decisions referred to above. Mr. Justice Braund, who
was one of the Judges constituting the Full Bench, with
great reluctance shared the opinion of the majority merely
out of respect for the opinion of Pathak J. and it appears
that, left to himself, he would have held otherwise. The
majority judgment was delivered by Pathak J. He enunciated
two tests for deciding whether a certain person was a
necessary party in a proceeding: (1) that there must be a
right to some relief against such party in respect of the
matter involved in the proceedings in question, and (2) it
should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the
absence of such party, and proceeded to observe that the
creditors of a landlord who have claimed relief under the
Encumbered Estates Act are necessary parties to the
proceedings under that Act and that the object of the Act is
to compel the landlord to surrender his entire property for
the benefit of his creditors and to liquidate the debts of
all the creditors in accordance with and to the extent per-
mitted by the Act. There can be no question that these are
the true tests for determining whether a person is a
necessary party to certain proceedings but the question is
whether judged on these tests the creditors of a landlord
under the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act can be said to be
necessary parties in an enquiry under section 11. It seems
to us that in the first instance it is an incorrect
assumption to make that the object of the Act is to grant
relief to the creditors of a landlord; it is quite the
converse. The object of the Act is to grant relief to the
landlord whose estate is encumbered with debts, by scaling,
down the debts and by depriving the creditors of their
(1) A.I.R. 1947 All. 18.
520
civil remedies. The creditors are allowed to prove their
debts and obtain decrees from the special judge according to
the provisions of and to the extent allowed by the Act and
they lose all their rights on securities held by them.
Coming to the application of the tests laid down by the
learned Judge, it is not possible to hold that any right of
relief exists in an objector under section 11 as against the
creditors. It is also difficult to see how an effective
decree cannot be passed as regards title to the property in
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the absence of creditors. One test of the effectiveness of
a decree is whether that decree can be executed without the
presence of creditors as regards property decreed in favour
of a claimant. It is obvious that in execution proceedings
a warrant of attachment and for delivery of possession can
only be issued against the owner, viz., the landlord, and
not against the creditors. In these proceedings the special
judge can give no relief to the objector against the
creditors. So on the tests mentioned by the learned Judge
it is clear that the creditors of a debtor are not necessary
parties in these administrative proceedings under the
Encumbered Estates Act, though they may be given notice of
those proceedings and afforded opportunity to watch those
proceedings in order to see that no property is secreted
from them and it is preserved for satisfaction of decrees
that may eventually be passed in their favour.
In his judgment Pathak J. proceeded to observe that though
the landlord is a, party to the dispute under section 11, it
is obvious that the main party who is vitally interested in
that dispute is the entire body of creditors, because the
issue that arises out of such a -claim is whether the
property which is the subject matter of the claim is liable
for the satisfaction of the debts due to the entire body of
creditors. This statement also, in our opinion is not very
precise. It is not correct to say that the result of a
decision,in such a claim makes the property liable for
satisfaction of debts due to the entire body of creditors
who had made claims at that stage. The property is only
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liable for satisfaction of decrees that may be passed
subsequently under section 14. It may well be that of the
persons who have been disclosed as creditor under section 8,
a number of them may not at all be interested in the result
of the decision of the claim under section II. It is an
overstatement to make that the main party who is vitally
interested in the dispute is the entire body of creditors ’.
The dispute relates to title to property and according to
all principles of impleading of parties it is not the
eventual benefit that a person may derive from a certain
decision that is the crucial test in deciding whether a
party is a necessary party or merely a proper party. Pathak
J. proceeded to observe as follows :
"Could it be suggested that in a suit under Order XXI, rule
63, Civil Procedure Code, the decree holders who desire to
seize the property belonging to the judgment-debtor are not
necessary parties?"
With great respect again, this analogy is not very happy or
apposite. Under Order XXI, rule 63, it is only the
attaching creditor who has the right to file a suit or of
being impleaded as defendant in a suit by the judgment-
debtor. AR the creditors of the judgment debtor who have
not attached the property are not necessary parties in a
suit under Order XXI, rule 63, though after the decision in
that suit they may be entitled to share in the rateable
distribution of the property if they make an application for
that purpose. In a way it is true to say that in all suits
by a creditor against a debtor where the debtor owes to a
number of creditors, every other creditor is interested in
seeing that that creditor’s suit is dismissed or his debt is
considerably cut down; but from that it does not follow that
in a suit on a promissory note by a creditor against the
debtor all the other creditors are necessary parties. The
eventual interest of a party in the fruits of a litigation
cannot be hold to be the true test of impleading parties
under the Code of Civil Procedure and it is rather difficult
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to hold that where that is not the true test under the Code,
that should be adopted as A test in proceedings of an
administrative
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character under the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act. it cannot
be forgotten that under the provisions of section 11 no
provision has been made for issuing notice to all the
creditors. Reference may also be made to rule 6 framed
under the Encumbered Estates Act. This rule provides that
the proceedings under this Act shall be governed by the Code
of Civil Procedure so far as they are applicable. As
already pointed out, the provisions of Order 1, rules 1 and
3, cannot aptly be held applicable in such proceedings. We
cannot uphold the view of Pathak J. that all creditors
become parties to the proceedings under the Act in the
technical sense of the term after a notice has been served
upon them and in any event after they have filed the written
statements, that they continue to remain’ as parties until
the debts are liquidated or proceedings terminated in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. This seems to be
too wide a statement of the law on the point. Can it be
said that after each individual creditor obtains a decree in
respect of his claim under section 14, each one of these
creditors has to be impleaded as a party in an appeal
preferred by that creditor or by the debtor. It is not
possible to give an answer in the affirmative to such
proposition. no hesitation in saying that though he
ultimately abondoned n thinking that in. We have therefore
Mr. Justice Braund, his view, was right administrative
proceedings technical rules of the First Schedule of the
Code of Civil Procedure regarding impleading of parties
should not be invoked and that the matter should be viewed
in a more liberal way, regard always being had to the fact
that there is no collusion between the debtor and the
claimant and that there are persons who are bona fide
litigating in respect of the title of the claimant under
section 11, and if there has been such a bona fide fight
which results in a decree in an appeal against that decree
it is sufficient that those who took an active part in the
proceedings under section II are impleaded. It is not
necessary to implead each and every creditor who either did
pot appear or put forward a written statement under
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section 10 or took no active part in the proceedings under
section 11(2). In the view that we have taken it is not
necessary to decide the question whether the High Court was
right in not exercising its powers under Order XLI, rule 20,
in impleading the creditors as respondents to the appeal.
For the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside
the judgment of the High Court and remand the case to that
court for hearing the appeal in accordance with law on its
merits. If the High Court thinks fit that the presence of
any creditors would help the court in arriving at a true
decision of the matter it in its discretion may give notice
to the creditors of the date of hearing, We leave the
parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: C. P. Lal.
Agent for respondent No. 5: S. S. Shukla.