Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
CENTRAL PROVINCES MANGANESE ORE CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/07/1986
BENCH:
PATHAK, R.S.
BENCH:
PATHAK, R.S.
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 438 1986 SCR (3) 140
1986 SCC (3) 461 JT 1986 35
1986 SCALE (2)41
CITATOR INFO :
R 1988 SC 427 (9)
ACT:
Income-tax Act, 1961-Ss. 139(8), 215, 246 & 264/rr.
117A(v) and 40(1) & (5) of Income-tax Rules, 1962: Order
levying interest-Whether appealable-Revision petition during
pendency of appeal-Whether maintainable.
HEADNOTE:
Where an assessee failed to furnish the income-tax
return within the prescribed period or did not furnish it at
all, sub-s. (8) of s. 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as it
stood at the relevant time, provided for levy of interest on
him. The second proviso to that sub-section empowered the
Income-tax Officer to reduce or waive the interest payable.
Where the advance tax paid by the assessee under s. 212 on
the basis of his own estimate was less than seventy-five per
cent of the tax determined on the basis of regular
assessment, sub-s. (1) of s. 215, as it then stood, provided
for levy of interest, while sub-s. (4) thereof provided for
reduction or waiver of interest payable by the assessee,
under certain circumstances. Clause (c) of s. 246 provides
an appeal against an order where the assessee denies his
liability to be assessed under the Act or against any
assessment order under sub-s. (3) of s. 143 or s. 144, where
the assessee objects to the amount of income assessed or to
the amount of tax determined or to the amount of loss
computed or to the status under which he is assessed. Clause
(b) of sub-s. (4) of s. 264 specifically directs that the
Commissioner shall not revise any order under s. 264 where
that order is pending on an appeal before the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner.
Interest was levied against the appellant-assessee
under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 for delay in furnishing its
return, and under s. 215 for making payment of advance tax
under s. 212 at a figure less than 75 per cent of the
assessed tax. It preferred an appeal under cl. (c) of s. 246
before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner raising
objection to the total income assessed and also including
grounds objecting to the interest charged under ss. 139 and
215. On being advised that orders under ss. 139 and
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215 were not appealable, it filed two revision petitions
before the Commissioner under s. 264 objecting to the levy
of interest under s. 139(8) and s. 215 respectively. On
being informed that by reason of cl. (b) of sub-s. (4) of s.
264 the Commissioner was powerless to interfere so long as
the appeal was not withdrawn, the appellant made an
application to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
requesting permission to with- draw the grounds relating to
levy of interest. Subsequently the Commissioner dismissed
both revision petitions on the view that it was not
sufficient for the appellant to withdraw only those grounds
raised in the appeal which related to the levy of interest,
and that the appellant should have withdrawn the entire
appeal.
Writ petitions filed by the appellant in the High Court
assailing the orders of the Commissioner were rejected in
limine.
On the question: Whether orders levying interest under
sub-s. (8) of s. 139 and under s. 215 are appealable under
s. 246 of the Act.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court,
^
HELD: 1.1 Inasmuch as the levy of interest is a part of
the process of assessment, it is open to an assessee to
dispute the levy in appeal provided he limits himself to the
ground that he is not liable to the levy at all. [147A-B]
1.2 The levy of interest under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 and
under s. 215 is not in the nature of a penalty. It is levied
by way of compensation because by reason of the omission or
default the Revenue is deprived of the benefit of the tax
for the period during which it has remained unpaid. Although
s. 143 and s. 144 do not specifically provide for the levy
of interest and the levy is in fact attributable to sub-s.
(8) of s. 139 or s. 215, it is nevertheless a part of the
process of assessing the tax liability of the assessee.
[146D-G]
2.1 The question whether a case is made out for waiver
or reduction of the interest levied under sub-s. (8) of s.
139 or under s. 215 cannot be the subject of an appeal under
cl. (c) of s. 246 of the Income- tax Act. That is a matter
which can more appropriately be dealt with by the
Commissioner of Income-tax in the exercise of his revisional
jurisdiction. But before the revisional jurisdiction of the
Commissioner can be invoked, it is necessary for the
assessee to demonstrate before the Income-tax Officer that
there is a case for waiving or reducing the levy of
interest. [148F-H]
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2.2 Since the statute provides for the waiver or
reduction of interest it is open to the Income-tax Officer
before imposing a levy under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 and to the
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner before doing so under s.
215 to issue notice to the assessee and hear him in the
matter. If such an opportunity has not been made available
to the assessee before the order levying interest is made it
will be open to the assessee to apply to the Income-tax
Officer after such order has been made to show that a
reduction or waiver of interest is justified. [148H; 149A-C]
In the instant case, the assessee having made no
application to the Income-tax Officer for reduction or
waiver of interest under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 or under s.
215 no question arises of the relevant authority having
denied improperly a reduction or waiver of the interest and
that being so, no revision petition can be maintained in
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that regard by the assessee before the Commissioner of
Income-tax. [149D-E]
National Products v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Mysore, [1977] 108 I.T.R 935, Bhikhoobhai N. Shah v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-V, [1978] 114 I.T.R 197
referred to.
Premchand Sitanath Roy v. Addl. Commissioner of Income-
tax. West Bengal-III, [1977] 109 I.T.R 751 distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1338 &
1340 of 1974
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.4.1972 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in S.C.A. No. 433 of 1972.
V. Rajgopal, Vinod Bonde, A.K. Verma and P Rajagopal
for the Appellant.
Dr. V. Gauri Shankar and Ms A. Subhashini for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JUDGMENT:
PATHAK, J. These appeals by special leave are directed
against the judgments and orders of the Bombay High Court at
its Nagpur Bench dismissing two writ petitions filed by the
appellant.
The appellant is a sterling company which exports
manganese
143
extracted from its manganese mines situated in the States of
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. It held these manganese
mines up to June 30, 1962. On June 8, 1962 it entered into
an agreement with the Government of India under which all
the manganese mines except one were transferred to a new
company, the Manganese Ore (India) Limited, Nagpur in which
the Central Government, the Governments of Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh and the appellant had shares.
The appellant was assessed to income-tax for the
assessment year 1967-68, the relevant previous year being
the year ended December 31, 1966. Interest under sub-sec.
(8) of sec. 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 amounting to
Rs.56, 391 and interest under sec. 215 of that Act amounting
to Rs.9,42,336, subsequently reduced to Rs.5,07,880 were
levied against the appellant. According to the appellant
there was ample and clear justification for the delay in
furnishing the return under sec. 139 and for the payment of
advance tax under Sec. 212 at a figure less than 75 per cent
of the assessed tax. On March 22, 1971 the appellant
preferred an appeal under cl. (c) of s. 246 of the Act
before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax,
Nagpur raising objection to the total income assessed and
also including grounds objecting to the interest charged
under ss. 139 and 215 of the Act. On being advised
thereafter that the grounds objecting to the charge of
interest were infructuous inasmuch as orders under ss. 139
and 215 of the Act were not appealable, the appellant filed
two revision petitions before the Commissioner of Income-tax
under s. 264 of the Act, one objecting to the levy of
interest under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 and the other to the
interest levied under s. 215. In the two revision petitions
the appellant explained the circumstances accounting for the
delay in filing the return and in underestimating the
advance tax. It was mentioned in the revision petitions that
an appeal had been filed before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, and that notwithstanding its pendency the
revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Income-tax
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was being invoked. The Commissioner informed the appellant
that by reason of clause (b) of sub-section (4) of s. 264 of
the Act, which specifically directs that the Commissioner
shall not revise any order under s. 264 where that order is
pending on an appeal before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, he was powerless to interfere so long as the
appeal was not withdrawn. Thereafter, a few days later, the
appellant made an application to the Appellant Assistant
Commissioner in the appeal filed by it referring to the
revision petitions preferred before the Commissioner of
Income-tax on the question of interest levied under s. 139
and s. 215 of the Act and requesting permission to
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withdraw the grounds relating to the levy of interest
specially as those grounds could not be taken in the appeal
and the orders levying interest were not appealable. It does
not appear that any order was made specifically by the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner on that application, but it
is apparent from the appellate order passed by him disposing
of the appeal that he did not consider the grounds relating
to the levy of interest. On October 15, 1971 the
Commissioner of Income-tax dismissed both revision
petitions. He proceeded on the view that it was not
sufficient for the appellant to withdraw only those grounds
raised in the appeal which related to the levy of interest,
and that the appellant should have withdrawn the entire
appeal pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The acceptance of Commissioner’s view would have meant that
in order to maintain its revision petitions challenging the
levy of interest the appellant would have been obliged to
abandon also the challenge to the assessment of its income.
The appellant filed writ petitions in the Bombay High Court
at its Nagpur Bench assailing the orders of the Commissioner
of Income-tax rejecting its revision petitions, and on April
24, 1972 the High Court rejected the Writ Petitions in
limine.
At the relevant time the pertinent portion of sub-s.
(8) of s. 139 provided:
"Where the return under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) or sub-section (4) for an assessment
year is furnished after the 30th day of September
of the assessment year, or is not furnished, then
(whether or not the Income-tax Officer has
extended the date for furnishing the return under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the assessee
shall be liable to pay simple interest at nine per
cent per annum, reckoned from the 1st day of
October of the assessment year to the date of the
furnishing of the return or, where no return has
been furnished, the date of completion of the
assessment under section 144, on the amount of the
tax payable on the total income as determined on
regular assessment, as reduced by the advance tax,
if any, paid and any tax deducted at source:
Provided that in the case of any person whose
total income includes any income from business or
profession, the previous year in respect of which
expired after the 31st day of December of the year
immediately preceding the asessment year, such
interest shall be reckoned from the 1st day of
January instead of 1st day of October of the
assessment year:
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Provided further that the Income-tax Officer
may, in such cases and under such circumstances as
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may be prescribed, reduce or waive the interest
payable by any person under this sub-section."
It is clear that under the substantive portion of sub-
s. (8) of s. 139 the statute requires the levy of interest
on the assessee where he fails to furnish an income-tax
return within the prescribed period or does not furnish it
at all. The second proviso to sub-s. (8) empowers the
Income-tax Officer to reduce or waive the interest payable
by any person under the sub-section in such cases and under
such circumstances as may be prescribed. Rule 117A of the
Income-tax Rules 1962 sets forth the cases and the
circumstances in which the Income Tax Officer may reduce or
waive the interest payable under s. 139 . Among the clauses
of rule 117A is clause (v) which speaks of:
"(v) any case in which the assessee produces
evidence to the satisfaction of the Income-
tax Officer that he was prevented by
sufficient cause from furnishing the return
within time."
As has been mentioned earlier, interest was also levied
under s. 215 on the assessee. The relevant sub-sections of
section 215 are:
"215(1) Where in any financial year an assessee
has paid advance tax under section 212 on the
basis of his own estimate, and the advance tax so
paid is less than seventy five per cent of the tax
determined on the basis of the regular assessment
(reduced by the amount of tax deductible in
accordance with the provisions of sections 192 to
194, section 194A and section 195) so far as such
tax relates to income subject to advance tax and
so far as it is not due to variations in the rates
of tax made by the Finance Act enacted for the
year for which the regular assessment is made,
simple interest at the rate of nine per cent per
annum from the 1st day of April next following the
said financial year up to the date of the said
regular assessment shall be payable by the
assessee upon the amount by which the advance tax
so paid falls short of the said seventy-five per
cent.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In such cases and under such circumstances as
may be prescribed, the Income-tax Officer may
reduce or waive the interest payable by the
assessee under this section."
146
The related rule is 40 which details the cases and the
circumstances in which the interest payable under s. 215 may
be reduced or waived by the Income-tax Officer. Sub-rules
(1) and (5) of rule 40 of the Income-tax Rules refer to:
"(1) When the relevant assessment is completed
more than one year after the submission of
the return, the delay in assessment not being
attributable to the assessee.
(5) Any case in which the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner considers that the circumstances
are such that a reduction or waiver of the
interest payable under section 215 or section
217 is justified."
At the very outset, it is necessary to consider the
nature of the levy of interest under sub-s. (8) of s. 139
and under s. 215. It is not correct to refer to the levy of
such interest as a penalty. The expression ’penal interest’
has acquired usage, but is in fact an inaccurate description
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of the levy. Having regard to the reason for the levy and
the circumstances in which it is imposed it is clear that
interest is levied by way of compensation and not by way of
penalty. The Income-tax Act makes a clear distinction
between the levy of a penalty and other levies under that
statute. Interest is levied under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 and
under s. 215 because by reason of the omission or default
mentioned in the relevant provision the Revenue is deprived
of the benefit of the tax for the period during which it has
remained unpaid. The very period for which interest is
levied under the relevent provision points to the nature of
the levy. If that is borne in mind, it will be apparent that
the levy of interest is part of the process of assessment.
Although s. 143 and s. 144 do not specifically provide for
the levy of interest and the levy is in fact attributable to
sub-s. (8) of s. 139 or s. 215, it is nevertheless a part of
the process of assessing the tax liability of the assessee.
Where the Income-tax Officer considers that there is a case
for levying interest under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 or under s.
215, what he does in practice, is to make an order levying
such interest after completing the assessment of the
assessee’s total income and the tax payable by him.
Now the question is whether orders levying interest
under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 and under s. 215 are appealable
under s. 246 of the Income-tax Act. Cl. (c) of s. 246
provides an appeal against an order where the assessee
denies his liability to be assessed under the Act or
147
against any assessment order under sub-s. (3) of s. 143 or
s. 144, where the assessee objects to the amount of income
assessed or to the amount of tax determined or to the amount
of loss computed or to the status under which he is
assessed. Inasmuch as the levy of interest is a part of the
process of assessment, it is open to an assessee to dispute
the levy in appeal provided he limits himself to the ground
that he is not liable to the levy at all. In this connection
we may usefully refer to the decision of the Karnataka High
Court where in a judgment in National Products v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, [1977] 108 ITR 935.
Govind Bhat, C.J., explained the position in regard to the
levy of interest under s. 139 and under s. 215. After
referring to the earlier cases on the point he observed:
"All decided cases except one have uniformly taken
the view that levy of interets under section
18A(6) or section 18A(8) of the 1922 Act or levy
of interest under section 215 of the Act is not
appealable but in the appeal against a regular
assessment, it is open to the assessee to take
every contention which, if accepted, must result
in the Income-tax Officer holding that there was
no liability to pay advance tax and, therefore,
there was no liability to pay penal interest. In
other words, it is open to an assessee to contend
in the appeal against an order of assessment that
he is not liable to pay any advance tax at all or
the amount of advance tax determined as payable by
the Income-tax Officer is not correct; but if the
assesee does not dispute the amount of advance tax
determined as payable by the Income-tax Officer,
he merely cannot object to the levy of penal
interest or question its quantum. xx xxx xxx
xx The levy of penal interest under section 139
or section 215 is made in the regular assessment
order; the demand issued pursuant to the
assessment order is for the total amount of
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liability imposed inclusive of tax and interest.
While levy of penal interest under section 18A of
the 1922 Act up to 1st April 1952, was automatic
as was noticed by Chagla, C.J. in Ramnath’s case
[1955] 27 ITR 192 (Bom.), under the Act such levy
is not automatic; discretion is vested in the
Income-tax Officer to waive or reduce penal
interest in the cases and circumstances mentioned
in rule 117A and rule 40 of the Income-tax Rules,
1962. If the case of the assessee falls within the
scope of the
148
said Rules, the Income-tax Officer is bound in law
to consider whether the assessee was entitled to
waiver or reduction of interest. It is, therefore,
clear that levy of penal interest under sections
139 and 215 is part of assessment. When such penal
interest is levied the assessee is "assessed",
meaning thereby, he is subjected to the procedure
for ascertaining and imposing liability on him. If
the assessee denies his liability to be assessed
under the Act, he has a right of appeal to the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the order
of assessment. Where penal interest is levied
under section 215 by the order or assessment, the
assessee may altogther deny his liability to pay
such interest on the ground that he was not liable
to pay advance tax at all or that the amount of
advance tax determined by the Income-tax Officer
as payable ought to be reduced. In either case he
denies his liability, wholly or partially, to be
assessed. Similarly, where interest is levied
under section 139 of the Act, the assessee may
deny his liability to pay such interest on the
ground that the return was not belated or that the
penal provision was not attracted at all to his
case. In such a case also he denies his liability
to be assessed to interest."
The decision was noted with approval by the Gujarat
High Court in Bhikhoobhai N. Shah v. Comissioner of Income-
tax, Gujarat-V, [1978] 114 ITR 197. The only dissent
expressed in the matter by the Gujarat High Court arose on
the question whether the assessee could challenge in appeal
his partial liability to be assessed to interest. In this
area of dissent we need not enter. But we have no hesitation
in endorsing the legal position which has commonly found
favour with the two High Courts. We hold that the question
whether a case is made out for waiver or reduction of the
interest levied under sub-s. (8) of s. 139 or under s. 215
cannot be the subject of an appeal under clause (c) of s.
246 of the Income-tax Act. That is a matter which can more
appropriately be dealt with by the Commissioner of Income-
tax in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction.
But before the revisional jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Income-tax can be invoked in such a case, it
is obviously necessary for the assessee to demonstrate
before the Income-tax Officer that there is a case for
waiving or reducing the levy of interest. We do not find
from the record before us that any such attempt was made by
the assessee. Since the statute provides for the waiver or
reduction of interest it is
149
open to the Income-tax Officer before imposing a levy under
sub-s. (8) of s. 139 and to the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner before doing so under s. 215 to issue notice to
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the assessee and hear him in the matter. In cases where the
jurisdictional fact attracting the levy cannot be disputed,
for example that the return has been furnished under s. 139
with delay, it will be a question merely of satisfying the
relevant authority that there are circumstances calling for
a reduction or waiver of the interest. If an opportunity to
do so has not been made available to the assessee before the
order levying interest is made, it will be open to the
assessee to apply to the Income-tax Officer after such order
has been made to show that a reduction or waiver of interest
is justified. We have been referred to the judgment by one
of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) in Premchand Sitanath Roy v.
Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-III, [1977]
109 ITR 751. In that case the question was a very different
one. The question was whether a right of appeal was
available in regard to the improper exercise of discretion
under sub-s. (8) of s. 139. We think that in holding that no
right of appeal lay in such a case the High Court was
plainly right.
As the assessee has made no application to the Income-
tax Officer for reduction or waiver of the interest under
sub-s. (8) of s. 139 or under s. 215 no question arises of
the relevant authority having denied improperly a reduction
or waiver of the interest and that being so, no revision
petition can be maintained in that regard by the assessee
before the Commissioner of Income-tax.
In the result we affirm the orders of the Commissioner
of Income-tax rejecting the revision petitions but on
grounds different from those adopted by the Commissioner. We
leave it open to the assessee to apply to the Income-tax
Officer for waiver or reduction of interest under sub-s. (8)
of s. 139 and under s. 215 of the Income Tax Act. If the
assessee does so within six weeks from today, the Income-tax
Officer will dispose of the applications on the merits
expeditiously. Subject to the aforesaid observations the
appeals are dismissed. In the circumstances there is no
order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeals dismissed.
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