Full Judgment Text
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
| NAL APP | EAL NO. |
|---|---|
S. Govidaraju …Appellant
Versus
State of Karnataka …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order
dated 6.6.2007, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
in Criminal Appeal No.1146 of 2000, preferred by the State against
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the judgment and order of the Sessions Judge, Bangalore city dated
8.6.2000, passed in Sessions Case No.550 of 1995, by which and
whereunder, the appellant stood acquitted of all the charges under
Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘IPC) and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act (hereinafter called the ‘DP Act’). The High Court on appeal
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convicted the appellant under Section 304B IPC and awarded a
sentence of 7 years; under Section 498A IPC awarded the sentence for
a period of 3 years and also a fine of Rs.5,000/- was imposed, and in
| urther sent | ence of 6 |
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also convicted under Section 3 of DP Act and imprisonment for a
period of 5 years was awarded alongwith a fine of Rs.10,000/-, and in
default to undergo imprisonment for one year; under Section 4 of DP
Act, imprisonment for a period of 6 months was awarded and a fine
of Rs.10,000/- was imposed, in default, to undergo imprisonment for 3
months. However, all the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
A. The appellant got married to one Shanthi on 16.9.1994. The
marriage was negotiated by their parents at the house of one
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Jayasingh. The parents of Shanthi gave 7 to 8 gold ornaments
including a neck chain and a ring to the appellant in the marriage.
After the marriage, the appellant and Shanthi were residing at the
nd
appellant’s house bearing no.93, 2 Cross, Basaveshwara Nagar,
Magadi Road, Bangalore. It was only at a distance of one kilometre
from her parents’ house. It is alleged that Shanthi was ill-treated by
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the appellant and also physically and mentally tortured, demanding
more dowry.
B. On 14.12.1994, the appellant quarrelled with Shanthi on the
| taken Rs.5 | 0/- from |
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consent. Shanthi committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting
herself ablaze. She was taken to Victoria Hospital, Bangalore,
however, she died at about 7 p.m. on the same day. As it was a case
of unnatural death, the post-mortem was conducted on the dead body
of Shanthi on 15.12.1994 and in the opinion of Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap
(PW.17), the cause of death was shock as a result of burns sustained.
About 95% ante-mortem burns were noticed.
C. Sundaresh (PW.1), father of deceased Shanthi lodged a
complaint on 16.12.1994 alleging that the appellant was responsible
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for the death of his daughter Shanthi and in view thereof, the Police
registered an FIR in case No.773 of 1994 under Sections 498A and
304B IPC. The appellant was arrested on 17.12.1994. The
investigation commenced and charge-sheet was filed under Sections
498A, 304B IPC and 3, 4 and 6 of DP Act and the matter was
committed to Sessions.
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D. During the trial, 17 witnesses were examined by the
prosecution. The star witnesses were Sundaresh (PW.1), father of
deceased Shanthi, Manimaran (PW.2), brother of deceased Shanthi,
| ), mother | of decease |
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other witnesses were Smt. M. Sarala Somaiah, (PW.15), I.O., Dr.
B.R.S. Kashyap (PW.17) who conducted the post-mortem
examination. The appellant was examined at the verge of conclusion
of trial under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’) and vide judgment and order
dated 8.6.2000, the appellant was acquitted of all the charges.
E. Aggrieved, the State preferred an appeal before the High Court
which has been allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated
6.6.2007.
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Hence, this appeal.
3. Mr. Rohat Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
has submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the judgment of
the Trial Court in the correct perspective and interfered with the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court in
contravention of the parameters laid down by this Court. There had
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been material contradictions in the statements of PWs.1, 2, 6 and 7.
Therefore, the Trial Court had rightly passed the order of acquittal.
The FIR itself was lodged on 16.12.1994 though Shanthi died on
| estion of d | owry dem |
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statement made by Sarasa, sister of deceased before her family
members was accepted by the High Court without realising that
Sarasa was not examined by the prosecution. The High Court failed
to appreciate that when two views are possible, the view beneficial to
the accused must be accepted. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be
allowed.
4. Per contra, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned counsel for the State
has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that Shanthi, a 20 year
old girl died within 3 months of her marriage in the house of the
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appellant. Therefore, the incident was within the special knowledge
of the appellant and he failed to explain how Shanthi had died. The
appellant doubted the fidelity of Shanthi alleging that she had
developed illicit relations with Raju, a friend of her brother
Manimaran (PW.2) and got pregnant before their marriage and that is
why she had committed suicide. Though the medical report
specifically revealed that Shanthi was not pregnant, the doubt
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harboured in the mind of the appellant would itself a ground for
torturing Shanthi, which had driven her to commit suicide. Law is
well settled that in case the findings recorded by the Trial Court are
| of acquitta | l can be i |
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Court. Thus, in view of the above, no interference is called for. The
appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The case of the prosecution had been that Shanthi was treated in
a hostile and cruel manner by the appellant who asked her to bring
additional gold articles which drove her to commit suicide. She had
also been assaulted by the accused/appellant on 14.2.1994 suspecting
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that she had taken Rs.50/- from his pocket without his consent. The
undisputed facts remain that Shanthi was residing at 1 Km. distance
from her parents’ house and she had been visiting the said family
quite often and died within a period of three months of her marriage
as she suffered from 95% burn injuries.
7. Sundaresh (PW.1), father of the deceased deposed that about
one month earlier to her marriage, the marriage talks were held at the
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house of Jayasingh, a relative of the appellant-accused and his parents
had demanded 10 sovereign gold ornaments as dowry. He could give
only some lesser gold ornaments then what had been demanded. That
| arriage, wh | en Shanth |
|---|
house and told him that she was beaten by her husband and asked to
bring the balance 4 sovereign gold ornaments from her parents.
8. Manimaran (PW.2), brother of the deceased, deposed that about
6 months prior to the marriage, talks were held at the house of
Jayasingh and his parents had demanded 10 sovereign gold
ornaments. Gold necklace, jumuki, gold ring and silver leg chain were
given in the marriage alongwith other articles like wrist watch, clothes
and almirah etc. About 15-20 days prior to the death of Shanthi, some
neighbours had informed his family that there were always quarrels
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and galata between the appellant and his sister Shanthi in their house.
His other sister Sarasa, who had visited the house of Shanthi-
deceased, told him that her husband was often quarrelling with her
saying that the dowry gold articles given at the time of marriage were
not sufficient and the same were of less quantity.
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9. Sakkubai (PW.6), mother of the deceased, deposed that talks
for marriage took place six months prior to the marriage at the house
of Jayasingh and appellant’s parents and uncles had demanded 10
| ents but th | ey express |
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7-8 sovereign gold ornaments. She corroborated the version of other
witnesses about the quarrels and galata between the appellant and
Shanthi, deceased. That after her marriage Shanthi did not have a
peaceful married life and it had been revealed by Shanthi herself to
the witness that quarrels used to take place frequently between them.
Shanthi, deceased, had visited her parents’ house 7-8 times.
10. Hamsaveni (PW.5) deposed that talks for marriage took place at
the house of Jayasingh about 1-1/2 months earlier to the marriage but
she did not depose about the demand of gold ornaments.
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11. Bhuvaneshwari (PW.7) who was tenant of Sundaresh (PW.1),
deposed that when Shanthi visited her parents’ house, she had told her
that quarrels and galata used to take place between Shanthi and her
husband as he had been demanding gold ring etc.
12. The aforesaid evidence reveals the following facts:
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I) The talk of marriage was held at the house of Jayasingh, a
relative of the appellant/accused.
II) The version of the aforesaid witnesses in respect of the time
| s took pla | ce varied |
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months.
III) The demand of 10 sovereign gold ornaments by the appellant
from the parents of deceased Shanthi had been revealed in the
depositions of Sundaresh (PW.1), Manimaran (PW.2) and
Sakkubai (PW.6). The deposition of Hamsaveni (PW.5) in
regard to such demand is silent.
IV) In respect of cruelty, Sundaresh (PW.1) deposed that he got this
information from Shanthi, deceased herself, though, Manimaran
(PW.2) deposed that he came to know about it from his sister
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Sarasa. Sakkubai (PW.6) and Bhuvaneshwari (PW.7) deposed
that regarding the demand of dowry and cruelty, they had been
informed by Shanthi, deceased.
13. The Trial Court appreciated the aforesaid evidence and found
that the time with regard to the negotiations of marriage varied
between one month and six months prior to marriage. There were
contradictions, in this respect in the statements of witnesses. The
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demand of quantity of gold varied from 7-10 sovereign as per the
version given by the witnesses. Sakkubai (PW.6) has also deposed in
respect of the demand made by the uncles of the accused and such
| n given by | Sundare |
|---|
(PW.2). Different versions had been given in respect of description of
articles of gold ornaments by Sundaresh (PW.1), Manimaran (PW.2).,
and Sakkubai (PW.6), i.e., as to whether it was a necklace, Jumuki,
ring or silver leg chain. Sundaresh (PW.1) did not mention the fact
while lodging the FIR that negotiation of marriage took place at the
house of Jayasingh but he had specifically mentioned therein that
there was a demand of 8 to 10 sovereign gold.
In view of aforesaid findings, the trial court came to the
conclusion that there had been material contradictions in the
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statements of the witnesses on material issues and therefore the same
could not be relied upon. Hence, the court accorded acquittal.
14. The High Court reversed the findings of fact observing that the
same were perverse and there were no material contradictions
whatsoever as the material aspects of the case had been whether there
was a demand of gold articles at the time of negotiations of marriage
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and whether subsequent to marriage Shanthi was ill-treated by the
appellant.
15. It is a settled legal proposition that in exceptional
| pellate cou | rt, for com |
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hesitate to reverse a judgment of acquittal passed by the court below,
if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be
perverse, i.e. if the conclusions arrived at by the court below are
contrary to the evidence on record, or if the court’s entire approach
with respect to dealing with the evidence is found to be patently
illegal, leading to the miscarriage of justice, or if its judgment is
unreasonable and is based on an erroneous understanding of the law
and of the facts of the case. While doing so, the appellate court must
bear in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused,
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and also that an acquittal by the court below bolsters such
presumption of innocence.
16. The time when the talks of marriage were held and the place
where the negotiations took place are totally irrelevant. More so, the
marriage took place in September 1994, incident occurred on
14.12.1994 and evidence of the witnesses was recorded in August
1999 i.e. after 5 years of the date of marriage. Thus, it may not be
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possible for the witnesses to remember dates etc. exactly at such a
belated stage. The quantity of gold demanded by the accused side may
vary as per the versions of the prosecution witnesses but the demand
| e most mat | erial issue |
|---|
Further, it is also immaterial as to whether the uncles of the accused
also joined negotiations in this regard as stated by Sakkubai (PW.6).
In the FIR, if the issue of demand had been mentioned. It may not be
fatal if it had not been mentioned therein that negotiations took place
at the house of Jayasingh for the reason that the place of negotiation is
totally immaterial as it has no relevance to determine the issue of
demand. If the description of ornaments varied to a limited extent in
the versions of the prosecution witnesses, it remains of no
consequence for the reason that people may not remember exactly
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what had been given.
17. Similarly, in respect of the issue of cruelty, it could not be held
to be any contradiction if Sundaresh (PW.1) and Sakkubai (PW.6)
deposed that Shanthi, deceased herself told them and Manimaran
(PW.2) deposed that she was informed by his other sister Sarasa.
We do not see any contradiction, forget material contradictions on the
basis of which the Trial Court had granted acquittal.
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18. It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the
evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the
| r contradic | tions, inco |
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or improvements in relation to trivial matters, which do not effect the
core of the case of the prosecution, must not be made a ground for
rejection of evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going
through the entire evidence available, must form an opinion about the
credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court in the normal
course of action, would not be justified in reviewing the same, without
providing justifiable reasons for doing so. Where the omission(s)
amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the
truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material
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improvements before the court in order to make the evidence
acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. The
discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found not to be
minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting
their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses may not inspire
confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and
contradiction with other evidence available or with a statement that
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has already been recorded, then in such a case, it cannot be held that
the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
| ions with o | ne Raju, a |
|---|
Manimaran (PW.2) and was pregnant at the time of marriage. The
Trial Court accepted this version in spite of the fact that the medical
evidence was otherwise. Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap (PW.17) mentioned in
the post-mortem report (Ex.P-12) that the uterus was intact.
Subsequently, an explanation was specifically sought on 2.2.1995 as
to whether Shanthi was pregnant at the time of death. Dr. Kashyap
(PW.17) opined that she was not pregnant at the time of post-mortem
examination. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) denied the suggestion that he had
issued report (Ex.P-14) in collusion with the complainant to the effect
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that she was not pregnant.
20. The Trial Court placed reliance on the medical history (Ex.P-
10) mentioned in the Accident Register of the hospital that Shanthi
had 3 months pregnancy. We have examined the original documents
also, there is nothing on record to show as at whose behest remarks
had been recorded therein.
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Thus, the finding of the Trial Court about pregnancy of Shanthi
recorded by the Trial Court is not worth acceptance.
| ound by t | he trial c |
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major/material contradictions. Therefore, the finding of the trial court
to the extent that there was material contradiction, is not worth
acceptance.
22. The appellant-accused denied all the questions put to him in his
examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and did not furnish any
explanation whatsoever to any question. He did not give any version
about the incident, rather pleaded a false defence that Shanthi,
deceased, had developed illicit relationship with Raju, a friend of her
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brother Manimaran, (PW.2) and was pregnant before marriage. To
question no. 32, as to whether he wanted to say anything, his reply
was only `No’.
23. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some explanation with respect to
the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court
must take note of such explanation even in a case of circumstantial
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evidence in order to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances
is complete. When the attention of the accused is drawn to
circumstances that inculpate him in relation to the commission of the
| offer an ap | propriate |
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answer with respect to the same, the said act may be counted as
providing a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances.
(Vide: Munish Mabar v State of Haryana , AIR 2013 SC 912).
24. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana , JT 2013
(8) SC 181 held as under:
“Undoubtedly, the prosecution has to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in
certain circumstances, the accused has to furnish
some explanation to the incriminating
circumstances, which has come in evidence, put
to him. A false explanation may be counted as
providing a missing link for completing a chain of
circumstances”. (Emphasis added)
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25. The prosecution successfully proved its case and, therefore,
provisions of Section 113 of the Evidence Act 1872 come into play.
The appellant/accused did not make any attempt, whatsoever, to rebut
the said presumption contained therein. More so, Shanthi, deceased,
died in the house of the appellant. He did not disclose as where he
had been at the time of incident. In such a fact-situation, the
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provisions of Section 106 of Evidence Act may also be made
applicable as the appellant/accused had special knowledge regarding
such facts, though he failed to furnish any explanation thus, the court
| se inferenc | e against h |
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26. In view of the above, the findings recorded by the Trial Court
on each issue had been perverse and the High Court has rightly
reversed the said findings. The conduct of the appellant/accused
during the trial also disentitled him of any indulgence whatsoever.
The appeal lacks merit, and is, accordingly dismissed. The appellant-
accused is on bail. His bail bonds stand cancelled. He must surrender
within a period of four weeks from today failing which the III
Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, CCH No.25 shall take him
in custody to serve out the remaining sentence. A copy of the order be
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sent to the learned Additional Sessions Judge for information and
compliance.
….………………..........J.
(DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)
…...................................J.
(S.A. BOBDE)
NEW DELHI;
August 19, 2013
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