Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 508
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8048/2019
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 20120/2017)
New Okhla Industrial Development Authority
…Appellant(s)
Versus
Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors. …Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8049/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8050/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8051/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8052/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8053/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8054/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8055/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8056/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8057/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8058/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8059/2019
Signature Not Verified
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8060/2019
Digitally signed by
satish kumar yadav
Date: 2024.07.10
17:36:58 IST
Reason:
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8061/2019
Page 1 of 34
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8062/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8063/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8064/2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8065/2019
JUDGEMENT
SURYA KANT, J.
1. These appeals are preferred by New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority (NOIDA) against the main judgment dated 05.01.2017 rendered in
Writ C. No. 36231/2015 (in Civil Appeal No. 8048 of 2019, titled NOIDA v.
Darshan lal Bohra & Ors. ) , passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby the land acquisition
proceedings initiated at NOIDA’s behest have been annulled by quashing the
declaration dated 14.01.2015 issued under Section 6(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, ‘1894 Act’).
ACTS
A. F
Given the broad similarity in all the connected matters, the factual
2.
matrix can be understood from the details of the lead matter, i.e., Civil
Appeal No. 8048 of 2019, titled NOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bohra & Ors.
3. A notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was issued for the
acquisition of land measuring 83.761 hectares situated in Village Badoli
Page 2 of 34
Banger, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar (hereinafter, ‘Acquired
Land’). The acquisition was intended for the “Planned Industrial
Development in Gautam Budh Nagar” by NOIDA. The notification was
published in the State Gazette on 28.09.2013 and in the daily newspapers
"Amar Ujala" and "Dainik Jagran" on 27.11.2013. Additionally, a public
announcement ( munadi ) was conducted on 18.01.2014. Through such
mechanism, the persons interested were invited and allowed to lodge their
objections, if any, against the proposed acquisition.
4. On 09.12.2013, Darshan Lal Bohra (hereinafter, ‘Respondent No. 1’)
filed his objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act (hereinafter, ‘Section
5A’) before the CollectorcumAdditional District Magistrate (hereinafter,
‘Collector’), Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. He submitted that his land
was in ‘ abadi’ area and thus ought to be excluded from the acquisition
process as per policy decision(s) of the State Government. He further stated
that the land was being used for cattle rearing and he had his farm
buildings constructed. Respondent No.1 emphasized that the acquisition
would not only jeopardize his means of livelihood but also render him
homeless.
Most of the other landowners also objected to the acquisition of their
5.
lands primarily on the ground that such lands fell within ‘ The
abadi deh’.
objections raised by Respondent No. 1, as well as by other landowners
( respondents in connected matters ), were to be adjudicated by the Collector.
The notice fixing the date of hearing was forwarded to ‘interested persons’
Page 3 of 34
through the Gram Pradhan, but the date of hearing was deferred on
multiple occasions on the ground that only a few farmers came who also
sought time to present their case(s). As a final opportunity, the matter was
posted on 03.07.2014, when the Collector dismissed the objections and
submitted a report under Section 5A(2) recommending for acquiring the
subject land.
Following the rejection of objections, a declaration under Section 6(1)
6.
of the 1894 Act was issued on 14.01.2015, for acquiring 81.819 hectares of
land. This declaration was also published in the daily newspapers "Amar
Ujala" and "Dainik Jagran." Subsequently, munadi was conducted on
16.02.2015.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the said declaration, Respondent No. 1 filed Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No. 36231/2015 before the High Court and sought
quashing of the notifications issued under Section 4(1) and Section 6(1) of
the 1894 Act.
8. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Collector passed an
award on 17.06.2016, determining the total compensation for the acquired
land to the tune of INR 2,21,79,27,378/ (INR 221.79 crores approximately).
This was followed by the possession letters issued on 20.06.2016.
9. The High Court, vide impugned judgment, scrutinized the procedural
aspects of the proceedings conducted by the Collector in hearing objections
filed under Section 5A. It has held that though the notices to the affected
Page 4 of 34
landowners were purportedly issued through the Gram Pradhan for
informing the date of hearing, there was nothing on record to show how
effectively the Gram Pradhan intimated all tenure holders. The High Court
has consequently inferred that the respondentlandowners were not properly
informed of the date of personal hearing. The High Court has also found
fault with the Collector in consolidating the objections without adequate
consideration and treating them as an empty formality. The High Court, in
light of the fact that the Collector attempted to rectify his earlier order by
issuing a corrigendum, has also raised doubts on the fairness of the
procedure. Consequently, the High Court has annulled the notification
dated 14.01.2015, issued under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act, with a
direction that a fresh opportunity be given to the respondents and similarly
situated tenure holders before proceeding further with the land acquisition
process.
10. Discontented with the quashing of notification issued under Section
6(1) of the 1894 Act, NOIDA is in appeal before us.
B. C ONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF NOIDA/S TATE
11. Mr. Ravindra Kumar, learned senior counsel representing NOIDA and
Mr. Ravindra Kumar Raizada, learned senior counsel and Additional
Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh, vehemently argued that the
High Court erred in nullifying the notification dated 14.01.2015 issued
under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act. Substantiating this, they made the
following submissions:
Page 5 of 34
On maintainability of challenge against the acquisition proceedings
a) It was explained that the respondenttenure holders fall into
four categories: (i) those who lodged objections and contested the
acquisition; (ii) those who did not lodge objections but contested the
acquisition; (iii) those who initially objected but later accepted
compensation; and (iv) the subsequent purchasers. It was urged that the
respondents falling in the second, third, and fourth categories, namely,
those who did not object, accepted compensation, or are subsequent
purchasers, do not have locus standi and/or have waived their right to
challenge the subject acquisition.
b) NOIDA has already disbursed a compensation amount of INR
147,72,68,871 (approximately INR 147 crores) and nearly 185 out of
total 210 affected landowners have accepted such compensation.
Additionally, INR 72,56,43,151 (approximately INR 72 crores) have been
distributed to the farmers as no litigation bonus. Consequently, the
challenge brought in by a miniscule group of landowners ought not to
have been entertained.
c) Moreover, post the acquisition, NOIDA has incurred a huge
expenditure of INR 202.17 crore (approximately) on subsequent
developments at the site. Hence, the annulment of acquisition process
at this juncture defeats the bona fide public purpose and public interest.
On the effectiveness of hearing under Section 5A
Page 6 of 34
d) It was then argued that the High Court fell in grave error in
holding that the landowners were deprived of the opportunity to present
evidence. Once an objector had submitted the objection in writing, no
further oral hearing was obligated to be accorded. In this instance,
affidavits were duly filed supporting the objections presented through
legal counsels and thus the statutory requirements prescribed for an
administrative enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A have been
substantially complied with.
1
e) Relying upon , it was
Sam Hiring Company v. A.R. Bhujbal
canvassed that the Land Acquisition Officer functions as an
administrative authority and not as a judicial or quasijudicial forum.
That the Act mandates consideration of objections by affording an
opportunity of hearing, if it is so requested by the aggrieved persons.
However, in this case, no such opportunity was sought by the
landowners from the Collector.
2
f) Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra was
pressed into aid to submit that Section 5A mandates an expeditious
enquiry, focusing on objections lodged by landowners challenging the
‘public purpose’ behind the acquisition. The objections that are personal
to the objectors would be irrelevant to such enquiry. In the instant case,
since the objections did not assail the genuineness or nature of the
1 1996 (8) SCC 18
2 1977 (1) SCC 133
Page 7 of 34
public purpose of acquisition, the personal claims did not warrant any
onetoone adjudication through the summary enquiry.
g) The objections raised by the respondentlandowners, seeking
exemption of their land owing to it being within village ‘ abadi ’, are wholly
misconceived. Before the issuance of Section 4 notification on
28.09.2013, a survey was conducted by the Revenue Department to
identify ‘ abadi ’ land. The State has not acquired most of the land
identified as ‘ abadi ’ in the survey, except such parcels where
unauthorized and illegal constructions had been raised as per the
Collector's report.
C. C ONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE R ESPONDENTS
12. Per contra, respondentlandowners, represented by Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
learned senior counsel along with learned Counsels S/Shri Dr. Rajeev
Sharma, Jasbir Singh Malik, Smarhar Singh, Rahul Sharma and Ms.
Jaikriti S. Jadeja, attempted to rebuff the submissions made on behalf of
the appellant(s) in the following terms:
On maintainability of challenge against the acquisition proceedings
a) Acceptance of compensation does not preclude the respondents
from challenging the acquisition proceedings. Respondent No. 1 asserts
that the compensation was received in good faith, based on a mutual
agreement with NOIDA. Under this settlement, Respondent No. 1 agreed
to relinquish 0.5671 hectares of his land in favour of NOIDA in lieu of
Page 8 of 34
the release of remainder of his ‘ abadi ’ land. The compensation was taken
to safeguard Respondent No. 1's land from demolition. However, after
accepting the compensation, NOIDA failed to honor the settlement and
proceeded to acquire his remaining ‘ abadi ’ land as well. Respondent No.
1 thus alleges mala fide intentions of NOIDA authorities behind initiating
the acquisition process.
b) Reference was made to the Full Bench decision of the High
3
Court in Gajraj v. State of U.P. , which was subsequently upheld by
4
this Court in Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. , emphasising that accepting
compensation does not amount to acquiescence to the acquisition if
such proceedings are otherwise wrongful and illegal.
On the effectiveness of hearing under Section 5A
5
c) Citing Babu Ram v. State of Haryana, Mr. Dhruv Mehta,
Learned Senior Counsel, emphatically argued that Section 5A of the
1894 Act is far more than a statutory edict, embodying Fundamental
Rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 19 of the Indian Constitution.
Hence, objections filed by the landowners were required to be considered
in a quasijudicial manner, and as the provision expressly confers the
right to hearing, the Collector was obligated to accord such an
opportunity to the affected landowners.
3 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711.
4 (2015) 7 SCC 21.
5 (2009) 10 SCC 115.
Page 9 of 34
d) Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the record of
proceedings conducted by the Collector leaves no room to doubt that: i)
the respondents were not served with notices for hearings; ii) personal
hearings were not granted; and iii) there was a complete nonapplication
of mind in addressing Section 5A objections. The personal hearing was
crucial in the present case since the objections varied from owner to
owner. The failure to provide such hearing amounts to gross violation of
Section 5A, justifying the quashing of acquisition process. In this
regard, he relied upon Shri Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal
6
Corporation .
e) It was also pointed out that the Collector manipulated the
official record of adjudication of the objections. The Collector claims to
have decided the objections through a corrigendum, which was signed
by such individuals who were either strangers to the acquisition or were
not the objectors. NOIDA has not disputed the manipulation of records
in relation thereto.
f) S/Shri Jasbir Singh Malik and Samarhar Singh, learned
counsels, further argued that the respondents had already utilised a
part of their lands for residential purposes – the same being within
‘ abadi ’ area. They relied upon an order dated 19.07.1992 passed by the
Assistant Collector, Secunderabad in purported exercise of powers under
Section 143 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
6 1976 (3) SCC 719.
Page 10 of 34
Act, 1950, whereby the subject land was classified as nonagricultural
land. They also referred to the objections which Respondent No.1 had
filed against a previous notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894
Act on 07.11.2007. In those objections, it was pointed out that the
subject land was a part of the ‘ ’ area of the village and hence
abadi
deserved to be exempted from acquisition. Those objections statedly
found favour with the State Government and the land was accordingly
excluded from the 2007 acquisition. It was, thus, contended that NOIDA
or the State Government cannot initiate a fresh acquisition process as
the subject land continues to be a part and parcel of ‘ abadi ’ land.
g) Furthermore, most of the land adjoining their lands has been
exempted from acquisition as it already stands declared as ‘ abadi ’ area.
Since only the respondents are sought to be singled out, the impugned
action does not satisfy the equality test of Article 14 of the Constitution.
h) Lastly and alternatively, learned counsels for the respondents
urged that in the event of acquisition process being upheld by this Court
due to exigency or for regulated development of the area, in that case,
the landowners be held entitled to receive compensation at the current
market value and in accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter ‘2013 Act). In support thereto, they
have placed reliance on the decisions in (i) Nareshbhai Bhaggubhai v.
Page 11 of 34
7 8
Union of India ; (ii) NOIDA v. Lt. Col. J.B. Kuchhal ; and (iii)
9
wherein, this Court
Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory,
after taking notice of the facts and circumstances, granted compensation
on the current market value of the land.
D. A NALYSIS
13. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions at
length, we find that primarily the following two issues arise for consideration
of this Court:
a) Whether the respondents have forestalled their right to
challenge the acquisition proceeding on the ground of noncompliance of
Section 5A because:
(i) they have not filed objections; or
(ii) they were not tenure holders as per the revenue records
on the date of notification under Section 4 of the 1894
Act; or
(iii) after submitting their objections, they have accepted
compensation without any demur?
b) If the answer to the aforementioned question is in negative,
whether the mandatory procedure contemplated under Section 5A has
been complied with in the instant case?
7 2019 (15) SCC 1.
8 2020 (18) SCC 619.
9 2005 (13) SCC 477.
Page 12 of 34
14. Before delving into these specific issues, it would be worthwhile to
briefly discuss the construction and import of Section 5A of the 1894 Act.
15. The 1894 Act embodies the State’s power of eminent domain,
bestowing the sovereign right to appropriate private property for the public
good. However, since the Right to Property is a significant Constitutional
Right under Article 300A and losing one’s land has grave repercussions for a
landowner, the 1894 Act also contains various provisions to compress the
State’s power of expropriation from becoming a source of exploitation. One
of such salient features is Section 5A, which inter alia provides thus:
“ 5A. Hearing of objections.—(1) Any person interested
in any land which has been notified under Section 4,
subsection (1), as being needed or likely to be needed
for a public purpose or for a Company may, within
thirty days from the date of the publication of the
notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of
any land in the locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under subsection (1) shall be made
to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give
the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or
by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by
pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and
after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks
necessary, either make a report in respect of the land
which has been notified under Section 4, subsection
(1), or make different reports in respect of different
parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government,
containing his recommendations on the objections,
together with the record of the proceedings held by him,
for the decision of that Government. The decision of the
appropriate Government on the objections shall be final.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall he
deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled
to claim an interest in compensation if the land were
acquired under this Act.”
Page 13 of 34
16. It may be seen from the plain language of Section 5A that it manifests
the cardinal principle of audi alteram partem , and obligates the Collector to
hear the person whose land is being compulsorily acquired by the State.
This provision serves as a crucial safeguard, enabling the landowners to
challenge the arbitrary acquisition and demonstrate the absence of ‘public
purpose’ or presence of mala fide motive. Considering its vital importance,
there are a string of decisions by this Court affirming that Section 5A is a
10
mandatory provision with the flavour of fundamental rights.
17. Section 5A was not originally a part of the 1894 Act. It was introduced
later by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1923, to rectify the defect
11
pointed out in case of J.E.D. Ezra v. Secretary of State for India . The
Calcutta High Court in that case expressed its inability to grant relief to the
person whose property was being acquired, noting that the 1894 Act did not
allow the landowners to raise objections against the acquisition.
Consequently, the legislature thought it appropriate to amend the 1894 Act
and insert a provision mandating that no declaration under Section 6 of the
1894 Act shall be issued unless time has been allowed to the ‘persons
interested’ in the land to put in their objections.
The landowners thus became entitled to lodge their objections within
18.
thirty days of the notification published under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
The Collector is thereafter expected to give an opportunity of hearing to the
objectors and make recommendations to the Appropriate Government after
10 Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana , (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 1.
11 1902 SCC OnLine Cal 179.
Page 14 of 34
thorough consideration of their objections. Importantly, the hearing under
Section 5A must be an effective opportunity and not an empty formality. If
necessary, the Collector shall also make further enquiries and give final
12
recommendations based on due application of mind. If it is found that
there has been total and utter noncompliance with Section 5A, thereby
causing severe prejudice to the landowner, the Court shall give such affected
person an appropriate remedy and, if feasible, even vitiate the acquisition
proceedings.
19. Having understood the nuances of Section 5A, we shall now proceed
to analyse each issue separately.
D.1. Maintainability of the respondents’ challenge
D.1.1. Respondents who have not filed objections
The High Court has vitiated the acquisition proceedings on the
20.
premise that the hearing accorded under Section 5A was ineffective.
NOIDA’s grievance is that the High Court has jumped to such a conclusion
without taking notice of the fact that some of the writ petitioners had never
lodged their objections. Having failed to avail the remedy under Section 5A,
such landowners cannot be heard to say that they were deprived of personal
hearing or that their objections were disposed of without any application of
mind.
21. We find merit in NOIDA’s contention. We say so for this reason that
while Section 5A(1) gives a “person interested” the right to file objections,
12 Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai , (2005) 7 SCC 627, para 9.
Page 15 of 34
Section 5A(2) affords only an “objector” the right to be heard. Given this
conscious departure in the use of the terminology, a person cannot claim
hearing as a matter of right under Section 5A(2) unless he has filed
objections. This is what has been precisely held by this Court in Talson
13
Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , observing that:
“15. […] In the present case, as noticed above, the
respondents have wholly complied with the
requirements of the provisions of law. The appellant
Company has not brought on record any iota of
evidence to show that the abovenamed newspapers are
not widely circulated in the locality where the land, in
question, was situated. The High Court has rightly
come to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 45
of the Act will not be attracted in cases where there is
no obligation cast upon the authorities to issue notice to
the persons interested once it is clear that
neither
Section 4 nor Section 5A of the Act contemplates
any personal notice to the person interested other
than the objectors for the purpose of conducting
inquiry under Section 5A of the Act . Therefore, the
question of applicability of Section 45 in the case of the
appellant Company would not arise at all as the
appellant Company had not filed any objection under
Section 5A to the acquisition proceedings consequent to
the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act.”
[emphasis supplied]
22. There is no gainsaying that a “person interested” under Section 5A(1),
can seek annulment of the acquisition process if no opportunity to file
objections, is accorded. However, such person cannot seek hearing as a
statutory right unless has lodged the objections. Notably, the respondents’
case is not that the objections were improperly invited. Rather, their
grievance is that the notices of hearing were clumsily issued and the
13 Talson Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 13 SCC 186, para 15.
Page 16 of 34
objections were mechanically rejected. It seems to us that even if their
contention is factually correct, such a plea can be availed by those
landowners only who had filed objections under Section 5A. An interested
person who fails to file objections, is deemed to have acquiesced to the
acquisition. The maxim i.e., every assent
‘Omnia Consensus Tollit Errorem’,
removes error, will thus be squarely attracted for such owners. Similarly, it
is also not permissible for a landowner to contend that the Collector failed to
apply his mind to objections, which were never filed before him in the first
14
place.
23. In our considered opinion, the High Court fell in error while allowing
the claim of even those landowners who did not invoke their remedy under
Section 5A(1) of the 1894 Act. We may, however, hasten to add that the
High Court could still have invalidated the acquisition qua these landowners
also had it found a reason going to the very root of the entire acquisition.
For instance, where the ‘public purpose’ of acquisition is conspicuously
absent, or the acquisition process is an outcome of colorable exercise of
power of eminent domain, all the landowners, even if they had not filed
objections, can seek annulment of the declaration issued under Section 6 of
the 1894 Act. However, no such plea was taken in the instant batch of cases
except that the procedure contemplated under Section 5A was deflated.
Such objections were surely personal to the landowners, as they sought
individual exemption on the plea that they have raised residential
constructions on their land under acquisition. Since it is a ground specific
14 Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban , (2000) 7 SCC 296, para 30.
Page 17 of 34
to each property, the High Court was wrong to grant the benefit en masse
15
and quash the entire declaration issued under Section 6 of the 1894 Act.
24. It may be noted at this stage that the respondents in Civil Appeals No.
8055, 8056, 8058, 8059, 8060, and 8062 of 2019 have not been able to
demonstrate that they ever filed objections under Section 5A of the Act. In
most instances, the objections have not been produced, and the
respondents have mentioned inconsistent dates of their filing. Further, while
objections have been produced in Civil Appeal No. 8058 and 8059 of 2019,
they precede the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of
the 1894 Act. Since these respondents could not show as to how they
became aware of the acquisition proceedings, more so when NOIDA has
cogently contested the veracity of such objections, we find it difficult to
accept the respondents’ stance with reference to the issue discussed
hereinabove.
D.1.2. Locus of the Respondents who are subsequent purchasers
25. The second subissue regarding maintainability of the respondents’
claim stems from the fact that a few of them are stated to have purchased
their lands after the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act was issued.
The short question that falls for consideration is whether such landowners
have locus standi to seek abrogation of the acquisition proceedings.
15
Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban , (2000) 7 SCC 296, para 53 and 54; Abhey Ram v.
Union of India , (1997) 5 SCC 421, para 13; V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer ,
(2012) 12 SCC 133, para 24.
Page 18 of 34
26. This issue is no longer resintegra . This Court has, in a wide range of
judicial pronouncements, held that the notification issued under Section 4
16
of the 1894 Act creates an impediment on the transfer of title in a property.
The subsequent purchasers do not acquire an unencumbered title over the
property and they deliberately run the risk of securing a defective title. The
axiom that ‘a public right cannot be altered by the agreement of private
persons’, will thus clog their right to raise objection against the acquisition.
We may usefully cite
27. Rajasthan State Industrial Development &
17
, in this
Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society
context which summed up the past precedents observing that:
“13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the
settled legal proposition that a purchaser,
subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4
notification in respect of the land, cannot
, and can
challenge the acquisition proceedings
only claim compensation as the sale transaction in such
a situation is void qua the Government. Any such
encumbrance created by the owner, or any transfer of
the land in question, that is made after the issuance of
such a notification, would be deemed to be void and
would not be binding on the Government. (Vide Gian
Chand v. Gopala [(1995) 2 SCC 528] , Yadu Nandan
Garg v. State of Rajasthan [(1996) 1 SCC 334 : AIR
1996 SC 520], Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir
Housing Coop. Society [(1996) 11 SCC 229], Jaipur
Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain [(1997) 1
SCC 35], Meera Sahniv. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(2008) 9
SCC 177], Har Narain v. Mam Chand [(2010) 13 SCC
128 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 793] and V.
Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer [(2012) 12
SCC 133 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136: JT (2012) 12 SC
260].)”
16 Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi , (2008) 9 SCC 177.
17 (2013) 5 SCC 427, para 13.
Page 19 of 34
[emphasis supplied]
28. Those respondents who clandestinely got executed sale deeds with or
without collusion with the Registering Authorities after the acquisition
process had commenced and/or whose names were not recorded in the
revenue records before issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act,
are thus denuded of any cause of action under Section 5A to object against
the acquisition proceedings. In the present batch, NOIDA has taken a
categorical and unrebutted stand that respondents in Civil Appeals Nos.
8057, 8062, and 8064 of 2019 fall under this category. That being so, no
cause of action ever accrued in favour of the respondents in these cases to
invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
D.1.3. Respondents who have accepted the compensation
29. In addition to the plea that several landowners did not file objections
and/or are subsequent purchasers, NOIDA/State have contended that some
of the respondents had filed objections, but subsequently, they accepted
compensation without any demur. Indeed, it is largely undisputed that
Respondent No. 1 in the lead case was paid INR 1.54 cr. on 28.11.2016, and
the balance amount of INR 2.61 cr. was deposited with District Judge,
Gautam Budh Nagar under Section 31 of the Act on 05.12.2016. Similarly,
in Civil Appeal 8050 of 2019, the landowner was paid INR 5.81 cr. on
04.07.2016. On this plank, it was strenuously urged on behalf of
NOIDA/State that such of the landowners who have accepted compensation,
partly or fully, without any protest, are estopped by their act and conduct
Page 20 of 34
from pursuing their objections under Section 5A. Secondly, possession of
the acquired properties having been taken through the possession letters
dated 20.06.2016, and the acquisition process being complete in all respect,
the issue of procedural lapses under Section 5A has been rendered
infructuous.
30. As regard to the question whether the landowners can still pursue
their claims under Section 5A, we are of the considered opinion that NOIDA
or the State can draw no milage out of the fact that possession of the
acquired land had since been taken. We say so for the reason that the
landowners cannot forcibly resist the delivery of possession to the
beneficiary, namely, NOIDA. Such a state action cannot impinge upon their
legal right to challenge the acquisition for noncompliance of the procedure
prescribed under Section 5A. However, if a landowner receives compensation
volitionally subsequent to filing of the objections under Section 5A and does
not preserve the right to pursue such objections, it may constitute a valid
ground to implied consent to the acquisition. Having once acquiesced so, a
landowner cannot be permitted to do a and reagitate the
volteface
18
objections. If we were to hold otherwise, it would open a Pandora’s Box
where the landowners will, on one hand, seek reenquiry of their claims
under Section 5A and, on the other, will also draw the compensation. There
would, thus, be no finality to the proceedings, and the acquisition process
would be tainted by uncertainty and unpredictability. This would further
have a chilling effect on the development projects, since the looming threat
18 Kailash N. Dwivedi v. State of U.P. , (2011) 15 SCC 98, para 14.
Page 21 of 34
of potential litigation and exemptions from acquisitions would discourage
the State from investing huge amounts and incurring development costs.
31. The respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 8048 and 8050 of 2019 are,
therefore, liable to be nonsuited on the ground that they have accepted
compensation without any protest.
32. We may in all fairness also deal with the contention of the
respondents in Civil Appeal No. 8048 of 2019, who admittedly received the
compensation but claim that it was part of a settlement wherein NOIDA
purportedly agreed to exempt the land from acquisition. It was argued that
since this settlement was not honoured by NOIDA, the acceptance of
compensation cannot be fatal to their case. However, no such settlement
has been produced on record by the respondents. Their claim is not
substantiated by any document on record, hence their explanation is devoid
of any merit.
33. Similarly, the respondents in Civil Appeal 8050 of 2019 have also not
disputed the receipt of compensation, but they are said to have not been
paid the full amount. In contrast, NOIDA has furnished detailed
information, including the calculation chart and payment record. Be that as
it may, there lies an independent remedy in law to recover the balance
amount of compensation, if any. Once these respondents have received a
substantial part of the compensation amount, their cause to pursue
objection has eclipsed.
Page 22 of 34
19
34. The respondents have relied upon Gajraj v. State of U.P. , in which
a Full Bench of the High Court held that accepting the compensation would
not amount to acquiescence. Since the cited decision was affirmed by this
20
Court in , the respondents have argued that
Savitri Devi v. State of U.P.
acceptance of compensation by some of them, does not attract principles
like estoppel or acquiescence. A closer examination of the Savitri Devi
(supra) , however, unfolds that this Court has affirmed our foregoing
analysis:
“42. We have to keep in mind that in all these cases,
after the land was acquired, which was of very large
quantity and in big chunks, further steps were taken by
passing the award, taking possession and paying
compensation. In many cases, actual possession was
taken and in rest of the cases, paper possession was
taken where because of the land under abadi, actual
possession could not be taken on spot immediately.
Fact remains that in many such cases where
possession was taken, these
landowners/appellants even received
compensation. All these petitions have been filed
only thereafter which may not be maintainable
stricto sensu having regard to the law laid down
by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975) 4 SCC
285: AIR 1974 SC 2077] and the dictum of this
judgment is followed consistently by this Court in
various cases (see Murari v. Union of India [(1997) 1
SCC 15], Ravi Khullar v. Union of India [(2007) 5 SCC
231] and Anand Singh v. State of U.P. [(2010) 11 SCC
242 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 423]).”
[emphasis supplied]
19 W.P. No. 37443/2011.
20 (2015) 7 SCC 21.
Page 23 of 34
35. In Savitri Devi (supra) , this Court considering the peculiar
circumstances and the intent of the High Court's order to provide increased
compensation, seconded the grant of that relief in the larger public
21
interest. This is explicitly observed by this Court noting that:
“50. Keeping in view all these peculiar circumstances,
we are of the opinion that these are not the cases
where this Court should interfere under Article 136 of
the Constitution. However, we make it clear that
directions of the High Court are given in the
aforesaid unique and peculiar/specific
background and, therefore, it would not form
”
precedent for future cases.
[emphasis supplied]
Having held so, we further find that there are several respondents in
36.
this batch of appeals who had raised the objection; did not accept any
compensation; and their names were duly recorded in the land records when
the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act was published. Since each
one of them has an indefeasible right to seek compliance of the procedure
engrafted under Section 5A, we shall now proceed to analyse whether the
Collector faithfully complied with the said provision in these cases.
D.2. Compliance with Section 5A of the 1894 Act
37. It may be recapitulated that according to the High Court, the Collector
failed to adhere to the mandate of Section 5A as no record of authenticity as
to how effectively the Gram Pradhan intimated all tenure holders, was
produced. This was sufficient to infer that the respondentlandowners were
21 Ibid, para 43 and 46.
Page 24 of 34
not properly informed the date of personal hearing; their objections were
treated as an empty formality since the Collector disposed them by
consolidating in groups; and there are doubts about the procedural fairness
as the Collector attempted to rectify an earlier order by issuing a
corrigendum. To ascertain whether the High Court rightly attained these
conclusions, we shall deal with each of these issues separately.
D.2.1: Presumption regarding notices not being served
38. It is timeworn law that the person who submits objections under
Section 5A must be accorded an opportunity of personal hearing. Such a
hearing must precede with an advance notice served upon the objector. As a
necessary corollary, the failure to serve the notice would be sufficient to
infer the defiance of Section 5A of the 1894 Act. Consequently, the
acquisition process would be liable to be hammered.
However, it is essentially a question fact as to whether or not an
39.
advance notice of hearing has been served upon an “objector”. Where the
Collector has taken a specific stand that notices were duly served upon the
persons concerned and the record of service of such notices has been duly
maintained, the statutory presumption inscribed under Section 114 of the
Evidence Act shall be drawn, which inter alia provides that the Court may
presume the existence of facts, including “ that judicial and official acts have
been regularly performed ”.
Page 25 of 34
40. The rule of statutory presumption is a wellrooted principle in
Common Law and founded upon the dictum ‘ omnia praesumuntur rite esse
acta’, namely, that the act can be presumed to have been rightly and
regularly done. The Court would presume that the official act was done
rightly and effectively and the burden to prove contrary lies on the party who
disputes the sanctity of such act. The High Court unfortunately
misconstrued this legal proposition while observing that there should be a
presumption regarding notices not being served on the respondents.
41. The onus thus lay on the landowners to demonstrate that the
issuance or service of notices was inefficacious. The official record suggests
that several landowners were present at the hearings on 25.04.2014 and
05.06.2014, and the proceedings were further postponed at their request.
Had the notices not been served, these landowners could not have been
aware of the date of hearing or attended such proceedings. Given their
presence at the time of hearings, it can be safely inferred that they were duly
served. The burden to prove otherwise on the respondents, which they have
failed to discharge.
42. In the absence of any allegation of mala fide exercise of power, the
vague and overly broad claim of being unaware of the acquisition
proceedings taken by the respondents during the course of hearing cannot
be countenanced. This is especially noteworthy that only a small fraction of
landowners have contested the acquisition, with nearly 90% not objecting to
Page 26 of 34
the proceedings. We are thus satisfied that the proceedings carried out
under Section 5A ought not to have been set at nought on this ground.
43. We may also hasten to add that even where the notices were not
served as per the procedure known in law, that by itself may not vitiate the
acquisition proceedings unless it is shown that severe prejudice was caused
22
to the landowners. This Court, in , viewed
Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab
that even when there was no material to show that the landowner was
heard, it would not invalidate the acquisition proceedings because the
objections were duly considered:
“6. It is true that Section 5A inquiry is an important
stage in the acquisition proceedings and a person who
is aware of Section 4(1) notification can raise objection
to the effect that his property is not required for
acquisition and he is also at liberty to raise the
contention that the property is not required for any
public purpose. It is also true, that the objector must
also be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard
and any violation of the procedure prescribed under
Section 5A would seriously prejudice the rights of the
owner of the property whose land is sought to be
acquired. In the instant case, however, it is
pertinent to note that the Collector had, in fact,
conducted the Section 5A inquiry, though there is
no material on record to show that the appellants
in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 were heard in
person. The facts and circumstances of Civil
Appeal No. 66 of 1998 clearly show that the
objection raised by the appellants was considered
and partly allowed by the Collector. About eight
acres of land was sought to be acquired from the
appellants as per the notification, but out of that, an
extent of six acres was excluded from acquisition and
only oneandahalf acres of land was actually acquired
by the authorities.
This would clearly show that the
22 (2003) 4 SCC 485, para 6.
Page 27 of 34
objection filed by the appellants was considered
by the Collector .”
[emphasis supplied]
44. Although Taj Kaur (supra) does support the NOIDA/State with
reference to the issue of compliance of Section 5A in its letter and spirit, we
need not dependent on the said reasoning in the instant case in view of
overwhelming material on record which shows that the procedure as
mandated by Section 5A has been substantially complied with. We shall now
accordingly, analyse whether the Collector had disposed of the objections
fairly and effectively?
D.2.2: Effectiveness of disposal of objections
In this regard, the High Court has held that the Collector disposed of
45.
the objections improperly by a Common Order after grouping them, instead
of evaluating merit of each claim separately.
The Collector undoubtedly decided 47 objections by clubbing them
46.
into five groups. However, such grouping was done keeping in view the
similarities of contents and the fact that they pertained to the same parcel of
land. For instance, Objection Nos 1, 17, 30, and 31 were grouped because
they pertained to the same land, i.e., Gata No. 448 and 449, and had a
common concern regarding existing construction on that land. Wherever the
objections were distinct in nature, such as Objection No. 25 (which was
regarding the quantum of compensation), the same was considered and
decided separately.
Page 28 of 34
47. Since the objections were classified because of the similarity of
substance, it was plausible to group them together and dispose of by way of
23
a Common Order. If we were to endorse the High Court’s view on this
point, it would lead to sheer wastage of time and energy that would be spent
in duplicating the recommendations for each individual objection. Moreover,
this might be nearly impossible in some cases, such as the one mentioned in
24
Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi , where more than 6000 objections were
filed under Section 5A. It will be preposterous to say that objections cannot
be consolidated even when they are similar or that the Collector must
undertake the daunting — and at the same time unnecessary — task of
disposing of thousands of objections separately. Let us appreciate that it will
serve no public purpose.
48. The High Court has thus erroneously held that the objections were
disposed of cryptically merely because they were grouped. Had the
respondents substantiated that the consolidation was done arbitrarily,
impairing the fairness in adjudication, then only it could be said that each
objection ought to have been dealt with separately.
49. We, however, find from the record that some of the objections have
ostensibly been left out from the aforementioned five groups. For instance,
the objection filed by the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 8053 of 2019 was
summarised as Objection No. 22, but have not been included in any of the
groups per se while disposing it off. Similar is the case with the objections in
23
Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana , (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 33.
24 Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi , (1975) 4 SCC 285, para 13.
Page 29 of 34
Civil Appeals Nos. 8054 and 8061 of 2019, which were mentioned as
Objection No. 23 and 8, respectively, in the Collector’s report but were not
included in any of the groups.
50. This would nevertheless lead to no legal implications. We say so for
the reason that the Collector first summarized each of these objections
separately, and noted that the objectors have sought exemption of their land
on the ground of it being an ‘ abadi ’ area. Thereafter, the Collector went on to
reject this plea, albeit while disposing of other objections. He specifically
observed that the lands claimed to be ‘ abadi ’ merely have temporary and
illegal constructions, and no person is residing there. Finally, the Collector
noted that all the objections are disposed of “in aforementioned terms”. The
objections that were left out from the groups are also squarely covered by
the abovecited reasoning.
51. In addition to what has been found on facts, it seems to us that the
absence of a formal rejection order in the case of a few objections would not
per se vitiate the acquisition proceedings for two reasons. Firstly, the non
consideration of such objections is inconsequential, because even if it was
an ‘ abadi ’ land, there is nothing in law that bars the State Government from
acquiring the same. Instead, the exemption of such lands from the
acquisition is a matter of State Policy and depends on the government's
25
discretion. If the State Government opines that the land is needed for a
25 Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana , (2005) 9 SCC 164, para 13.
Page 30 of 34
larger public purpose and development projects, such land can be acquired,
notwithstanding the fact that it was a residential property.
52. Secondly, it is an admitted position that the acquisition proceedings in
the instant case have nearly attained finality. Most landowners (i.e., 185 out
of 210) have accepted compensation and, as discussed previously in
, are deemed to have acquiesced to the acquisition
Section D.1.3. (supra)
process. Subsequently, significant investment has been made into the
development projects conceptualised there. Accepting the respondents’ claim
would require turning back the clock, which would adversely impact the
larger public interest. In some cases, reversal of small pockets of land might
be impossible also since they may lie in the middle of large development
projects. In such peculiar circumstances, even if we accept that a handful of
respondents did not get a fair enquiry under Section 5A, the same may not
be a sufficient ground to annul the acquisition process as substantial
compliance has already been made.
26
In , this Court held that:
53. Anand Singh v. State of U.P.
“56.
In the written submissions of the GDA, it is
stated that subsequent to the declaration made
under Section 6 of the Act in the month of
December 2004, award has been made and out of
the 400 landowners more than 370 have already
. It is also stated that out of
received compensation
the total cost of Rs. 8,85,14,000 for development of the
acquired land, an amount of Rs. 5,28,00,000 has
already been spent by the GDA and more than 60% of
work has been completed. It, thus, seems that barring
the appellants and few others all other tenure
26 (2010) 11 SCC 242, para 56.
Page 31 of 34
holders/landowners have accepted the “takings” of
their land. It is too late in the day to undo what
has already been done. We are of the opinion,
therefore, that in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellants are not
entitled to any relief although dispensation of
enquiry under Section 5A was not justified .”
[emphasis supplied]
Somewhat similar view has been taken by this Court in
Om Prakash
27 28
v. State of U.P . and M.S.P.L. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka .
D.2.3: Issuance of the corrigendum
54. Lastly, the High Court has held that the Collector wrongly issued a
corrigendum to its previous order on 03.07.2014, which had raised
suspicion on the fairness of the proceedings. A perusal of the corrigendum,
however, suggests that it was largely insignificant as it merely contained the
record of proceedings held before the hearing on 03.07.2014. The
corrigendum mentioned that the proceedings were postponed on 10.02.2014
since the decision on the implementation of the 2013 Act was awaited.
Subsequently, after the proceedings were adjourned on multiple dates, the
matter was finally posted for hearing on 03.07.2014.
It appears that the only purpose of the corrigendum was to bring
55.
further clarity into the ongoing process and not to tinker with the merits of
the objections. There is nothing in the contents of the corrigendum to draw
27 (1998) 6 SCC 1, para 30.
28 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1380, para 48.
Page 32 of 34
adverse inference or doubt the fairness of the procedure followed for
deciding the objections.
E. C ONCLUSION AND D IRECTIONS
56. For the aforestated reasons:
(a) the appeals are allowed; the impugned main judgment dated
05.01.2017 of the High Court as well as all other judgments
following the said judgment, which are under challenge in this
batch of appeals, are hereby set aside;
(b) consequently, the writ petitions filed by the respondents on the
ground that there is noncompliance of the procedure mandated
by Section 5A of the 1894 Act are hereby dismissed without any
order as to costs;
(c) the compensation amount, if already not paid, fully or partly, as
per the award of the Collector, shall be paid to the respondents
and other landowners along with interest at the statutory rate
within 4 weeks;
(d) the payment or receipt of compensation by the respondents shall
be without prejudice to their right to seek further enhancement
in compensation in accordance with provisions of the 2013 Act;
(e) with a view to remove any ambiguity and to prevent avoidable
future litigation, it is clarified that since the 2013 Act came into
force while the land acquisition process was still pending, the
Page 33 of 34
respondents and other landowners/tenure holders are entitled
to be paid compensation in accordance with Section 24(1) read
with other relevant provisions of the 2013 Act; and
(f) since the respondents have been pursuing their objections filed
under Section 5A of the 1894 Act in a manner, they
bonafide
shall be entitled to seek reference, if already not filed, for further
enhancement of compensation and the limitation period for filing
such reference shall commence from the date of pronouncement
of this order.
57. All the matters stand disposed of in the aforementioned terms.
………..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………… J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI
DATED: 10.07.2024
Page 34 of 34