Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MAHANT RAMDHAN PURI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BANKEY BIHARI SARAN & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
23/05/1958
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SARKAR, A.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN
CITATION:
1958 AIR 941 1959 SCR 1085
ACT:
Deed, construction of-Mortgage or lease-Accounts-Mortgagee,
if bound to render account--Transfer of Property Act (IV of
1882), ss. 76 and 77.
HEADNOTE:
D executed a document in favour of M hypothecating an eight
annas share in a village for the purpose of discharging a
debt of Rs. 29,496 payable by him to Al. In respect of this
property there was a pre-existing think in favour of j for a
period of 9 years, under which D took Rs. 2,205 as peshgi
money without interest and the annual rent was fixed at RS.
2,205. The document provided that (i) interest at 1/2 per
cent. per month was payable on the sum Of Rs. 29,496 ; (ii)
(luring the subsistence of the thika M would receive the
rent from j and appropriate Rs. 1,769-12-o towards interest
and pay Rs. 435-4-o as rent to D ; (iii) after the expiry of
the thika M would take physical possession of the land and
appropriate the produce towards interest and Pay Rs. 435-4-o
as rent to D; (iv) on the expiry of the thika M would repay
the peshgi amount of Rs. 2,205 to j and this sum was added
to principal amount due ; (v) on the expiry of 15 years, or
after the extended period, D would repay the entire
principal amount; (vi) and the property was given as
security for the amount payable by D. The respondents who
are successors of D instituted a suit for redemption on the
basis that the transaction was a usufructuary mortgage, for
rendition of accounts and for recovery of surplus profits.
The appellant, successor of M, contended that the suit for
redemption was not maintainable as the transaction was not a
mortgage but a lease, and that even if it was a mortgage
there was no statutory liability to render accounts as the
document provided that the receipts were to be taken in lieu
of interest and the case was governed by S. 77, Transfer of
Property Act :
Held, that the transaction was a mortgage and not a lease.
The guiding rule of construction is that the intention of
the parties must be looked into and that once there is debt
with security of land for its redemption the arrangement is
a mortgage by whatever name it is called.
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Held, further, that there was a contract between the mort-
gagor and the mortgagee within the meaning Of S. 77,
Transfer of Property Act to the effect that the receipts
from the mortgaged property be taken in lieu of interest and
consequently the mortgagee was not liable to render
accounts. The stipulation
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in the document for payment of Rs. 435-4-0 to the mortgagor
was a personal obligation of the mortgagee and he had a
right to take the entire receipts from the land in lieu of
interest. Though the rate of interest is stated as per
cent. per month it was mentioned to enable the parties to
approximately fix the amount to be appropriated by the
mortgagee from and out of the rent received from the
thikadar. The mere fact of the mention of the rate of
interest could not make s. 77 inapplicable in view of the
clearly expressed intention of the parties.
Pandit Bachchu Lal v. Chaudhri Syed Mohammad Mah, (1033) 37
C. W. N. 457, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal -No. 239 of 1954.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 12, 1950,
of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.
188 of 1945 arising out of the judgment and decree dated
December 18, 1945, of the Court of the Additional
Subordinate Judge, IV Class, Gaya, in Title Suit No. 4 of
1945.
Purshottam Tricumdas and S. P. Varma, for the appellant.
S.P. Sinha and R. C. Prasad, for respondents Nos. 1-4, 8-
10, 13 and 14.
1958. May 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SUBBA RAO J.-This appeal by certificate tinder Art. 133 (1)
(a) of the Constitution of India is directed against the
judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna
setting aside those of the Subordinate Judge, Gaya, in a
suit for redemption of an usufructuary mortgage.
Deokinand, the common ancestor of plaintiff-respondents 1 to
4 and proforma respondents 6 to 12, executed a document
dated August 20, 1923, in favour of Mahant Tokhnarain Puri
of Nadra, the predecessor-ininterest of defendant 1,
hypothecating eight annas milkiat share in mauza Lodipur,
Mahimabigha, Tauze No. 4246 for the purpose of discharging a
debt of Rs. 31,701 payable by him to the Mahanth. There are
conflicting versions in regard to the nature of this
transaction-respondents claim it to be a usufructuary
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mortgage, while the appellant asserts it to be a lease.. The
plaintiff-respondents instituted Title Suit No. 4 of 1945 in
the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge 1V, Gaya, for
redemption of the said document on the basis that it was a
usufructuary mortgage, for rendition of accounts and for the
recovery of surplus profits due to them. The appellant
pleaded, inter alia, that the suit for redemption was not
maintainable as the document was not a mortgage but lease,
that on the assumption that it was a mortgage it would only
be an anomalous mortgage in respect where of there was no
statutory liability to render accounts to the plaintiff,
that even if it was a usufructuary mortgage, it was governed
by the provisions of s. 77 of the Transfer of Property Act
taking the mortgage out of the purview of s. 76 (d) and (g)
of the said Act.
It is not necessary to particularize other defences as
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nothing turns upon them in the appeal. The learned
Subordinate Judge held that the document created a
usufructuary mortgage and not a lease and that s. 77 of the
Transfer of Property Act applied to the document exonerating
the appellant from any liability to render accounts. In the
result, the learned Subordinate Judge gave a conditional
decree in favour of respondents I to 4 for possession on
their depositing in Court a sum of Rs. 26,839-7-0 within six
months from the date of the decree. The plaintiff-
respondents preferred an appeal against that decree to the
High Court at Patna. The High Court agreed with the learned
Subordinate Judge that the document was a sufructuary
mortgage but differed from him on the question of
applicability of s. 77 of the Transfer of Property Act. The
High Court set aside the decree of the learned Subordinate
Judge and passed instead a preliminary decree for redemption
and sale on default of payment: the decree also directed the
rendition of accounts between the parties in the light of
the directions given in the judgment. The second defendant
against whom the decree was passed preferred the above
appeal.
The point to be first decided is whether the transaction is
a lease as contended by the contesting respondents. The
only guiding rule that can be extracted
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from the cases on the subject is that the intention of the
parties must be looked into and that ’once you get a debt
with security of land for its redemption, then the
arrangement is a mortgage by whatever name it is called’
(See Ghosh on Mortgages, V Edn., Vol. 1, p. 102). Let us
now examine the terms of the document Exhibit A (3) to
ascertain the intention of the parties. The document was
obviously not drafted by a trained mind. It appears to be a
confused product of one of those village document-writers.
We shall read the document, omitting the recitals not
material to the question raised: The first part of the
document recited that the executant was heavily indebted to
the other party under mortgage bonds and also otherwise and
that common friends settled that a part of the properties
mortgaged should be let out in ijara with possession at a
lower rate of interest so that ’the increment of interest
may be checked and the present necessities may be met ". It
was also stated in the document that in respect of the said
property there was a pre-existing thika (lease) dated April
21, 1922, in favour of Munshi Dodraj Lal alias Munshi
Jatadhari Lal, for a period of 9 years and that under the
said lease, Rs. 2,205 was taken by the executant as peshgi
money without interest and the rent was fixed at a sum of
Rs. 2,205. Then the document proceeds to state thus:
" In respect of Rs. 29,496 the total sum of peshgi money, he
should, for the satisfaction of interest thereon, get
executed a usufructuary mortgage deed bearing a lower rate
of interest in respect of 8 annas share i. e., half share in
mauza Lodipur Mahima Bigha, principal with dependencies,
together known and unknown tola and
totals ..................................for term of 15
years on fixing Rs. 2,205 as the annual rental and by
getting mortgaged there. under 8 annas proprietary interest,
thikadari interest together with peshgi money and the right
to receive thikadari rent from the said thikadars.
Accordingly, at the request and entreaty of me, the
executant, the said Mahanthji took pity at my condition and
agreed to my request and got ready to get usufructuary
mortgage deed executed. Therefore, 1, the executant,
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".................. have voluntarily let out in ijara with
possession the whole and entire 8 annas i. e., half of Mauza
Lodipur Mahima Bigha.....for a peshgi money of Rs.
31,701that Rs. 29,496, the peshgi money bearing interest at
1/2 per cent. per month and Rs. 2,205, tile peshgi money
without interest, at an annual rental of Rs. 2,205 including
revenue and cesses, for a term of 15 years, commencing from
1331 Fasli to 1345 Fasli ............... and have put him in
possession and occupation of the ijiara property as my
representative. It is desired that the said ijaradar should
enter into and remain in possession and occupation of the
ijara property and so long as the thika of’ Munshi Dodraj
Lal alias Jatadhari Lal .................................is
intact and in force, he should realize the rent from the
above-named thikadars and their heirs and representatives in
accordance with the stipulations made in the thika patta and
kabuliat as representative of me, the executant, and bring
it into his possession and use, that is to say, on his own
authority he should set off Rs. 1,769-12-0 on account of the
interest on the peshgi money bearing interest mentioned in
this deed, year after year, and pay the remaining sum of Rs.
435-4-0, the amount of rent due by the ijaradar, i.e., the
reserved rent, to me, the executant, and my heirs and
representatives The ijaradar should not make any default.
If he does so, he and his heirs and representatives shall be
held liable to pay interest at 1/2 per cent. per month."
Then the document proceeds to incorporate the terms agreed
upon by the parties, to take effect after the termination of
the thikadari interest. It is stated:
" The ijaradar of this ijara deed or his heirs and
representatives on his own authority shall be competent to
bring the thika property into his sir possession as ijara
property as a representative of me, the executant, in
accordance with the stipulations made in the patta and
kabuliats after setting off Rs. 2,205 the peshgi money due
to the thikadars by me, the executant, against the annual
thikadari rent. The said ijaradar should make his own
arrangement for the cultivation of the ijara property, get
it cultivated
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by others, realise the nakdi and jinsi income of the ijara
property from the tenants and appropriate the produce of
both the shares thereof. 1, the executant, and my heirs and
representatives neither have nor shall have any right, claim
and. demand in respect of tile produce or the income of the
ijara property so long as the ijara deed is intact except
getting Rs. 435-4-0, the rent after the payment and
deduction of interest on the peshgi money bearing interest."
The document then allocates the liability in respect of
improvements and sums spent in regard to boundary disputes
to one or other of the parties to the document and then it
continues to state:
" The peshgi money amounting to Rs. 31,701 with and without
interest as mentioned in this ijara deed has been realized
from the ijaradar in this manner that I allowed Rs. 28,246,
the amount of loan principal with simple and compound
interest as per account given below after remission of the
interest due to the ijaradar under all the three mortgage
bonds to be set off against the peshgi money by getting a
note made to that effect on the back of the said mortgage
bonds which I allowed to remain with the ijaradar as a proof
of pavnient of the peshgi money covered by this deed The
term of this ijara deed with possession shall terminate in
the month of Jeth, 1345 Fasli, when 1, the executant, or my
heirs and representatives shall repay Rs. 31,701 being the
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peshgi money with and without interest mentioned in this
deed in cash and in one lump sum to the said ijaradar or his
heirs and representatives, 1 shall bring the ijara property
into my sir possession. If I do not repay the peshgi money
with and without interest on the expiry of the term of this
ijara deed with possession, then, till the repayment of the
whole and entire peshgi money with and without interest,
this ijara deed with possession shall precisely with all the
stipulations remain in force and intact. 1, the executant,
or my heirs and representatives shall not put forward any
sort of claim or demand in respect of an increase in the
produce save and except the claim
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for getting rent as fixed and the mentioned
above...... ................................................
in security of the payment of the peshgi money with or
without interest mentioned in this ijara deed I, the
executant, have mortgaged, hypothecated, encumbered and made
liable the ijara property. I do hereby make a trustworthy
declaration that till the repayment of the entire peshgi
money of the ijaradar I shall not in any way directly or
indirectly on any allegation mortgage, hypothecate. encumber
and transfer the ijara property."
The gist of the aforesaid transaction may be stated thus:
The executant was indebted to the other party in a large
amount under mortgage bonds ’and otherwise. Through the
intervention of common friends, with a view to salvage some
property, the amount due from the executant to the other
party was fixed in the sum of Rs. 29,496 and it was settled
that half share in mauza should be given as security to the
other party. At the time of the execution of the document
there was an outstanding thika document in favour of a third
party, whereunder the said party advanced a sum of Rs. 2,205
to the executant and agreed to pay Rs. 2,205 as annual rent.
As the other party agreed to discharge the advance paid by
the third party to the executant, the right to collect the
rent from him was also agreed to be given as security to the
other party. With the result, the executant received Rs.
31,701 under the document, out of which Rs. 29,496 bore
interest at i per cent. per month and Rs. 2,205 did not
carry interest, presumably because the other party did not
actually pay the amount to the executant. The document
divided the transaction into two parts. The first part
dealt with the terms governing the parties during the
subsistence of the thikadari interest; the second part
mentioned the terms binding on the parties after the expiry
of the said interest. During the first period, the other
party would receive the annual rent of Rs. 2,205 from the
thikadars, set off Rs. 1,769-12-0 on account of interest on
the peshgi money bearing interest and pay the
139
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remaining sum of Rs. 435-4-0 as reserved rent to the
executant. After the expiry of the thikadari interest in
1338 Fasli, the other party would take actual possession by
setting off Rs. 2,205 the peshgi money due to the thikadars
by the executant, against the annual thikadari rent. After
getting possession of the ijara property, the other party
would make arrangements for its cultivation and appropriate
the produce towards interest, paying the executant only a
sum of Rs. 435-4-0 as rent. The previous deeds were dis-
charged and endorsements to that effect made on the back of
the documents. If the debt was not discharged within 1345
Fasli, it was agreed that till the repayment of the entire
peshgi money, the ijara deed with possession would precisely
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with all stipulations remain in force and intact. The
executant, in express terms, undertook not to put forward
any sort of claim or demand in respect of the increase in
the produce except and save to get rent as fixed in the
document.
From the aforesaid summary of the recitals in the document,
the following facts emerge: (1) The executant owed large
sums of money to the other party; (2) interest at i per
cent. per month was agreed to be paid on the sum of Rs.
29,496, i.e., on the entire consideration excluding that
amount which was advanced by the thikadars to the executant;
(3) the manner of discharging the debt was prescribed in the
document, namely, that during the subsistence of the
thikadari interest, the other party would receive the rent
from the thikadars and appropriate Rs. 1,769-12-0 on account
of interest and pay a sum of Rs. 435-4-0 as rent to the
executant and that after the expiry of the thikadari
interest, the other party would take physical possession of
the land and appropriate the produce towards interest and
pay only a sum of Rs. 435-4-0 as rent to the executant; (4)
on the expiry of 15 years period or after the extended
period, the executant would pay the entire principal amount
to the other party; (5) 8 annas share in the mauza was
specifically given as security for the amount payable by the
executant. Under the document, there was a relationship of
creditor and debtor between the
1093
parties and the property was given as security for the
payment of the amount advanced with interest. Though the
document is described as a cowle, the parties, who have had
earlier transactions, must be deemed to have known the
nature of the transaction they were entering into. In clear
and express terms the nature of the transaction has been
stated in more than one place. The executant, requested the
other party, in respect of the advance amount and interest
to get executed by him a usufructuary mortgage deed bearing
a lower rate of interest in respect of the 8 annas share.
After mentioning the various terms, the executant restated
the intention of the parties in the following terms:
"In security of the payment of the peshgi money with or
without interest mentioned in this ijara deed, I, the
executant, have mortgaged, hypothecated, encumbered and made
liable the ijara property."
Therefore, whatever ambiguity there might be in the recitals
that was dispelled by the unambiguous declaration made by
the parties that the property was given as security for the
loan and the document was executed as a mortgage. The gist
of the document was not a letting of the premises, with a
rent reserved, but a mortgage of the premises with a small
portion of the income of it made payable to the plaintiff.
There is, therefore, no scope for the argument in this case
that the document is a lease and not a mortgage. We hold,
agreeing with the High Court, that the document is a
mortgage and not a lease.
Even so, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the
appellant that the document did not create an usufructuary
mortgage but only an anomalous mortgage. This contention
was raised as a foundation to the argument that if the
document was an anomalous mortgage, the rights and
liabilities of the parties would be governed by the terms of
the contract between them and not by the provisions of s. 76
of the Transfer of Property Act. The question does not
really fall to be decided in this case. Whether the
transaction is a usufructuary mortgage or an anomalous
mortgage, in the circumstances of the case, there will
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1094
not be any difference in the matter of rendition of
accounts, for in the ultimate analysis, as we would
presently show, the true construction of the relevant terms
of the document would afford an answer to the question
raised. We shall, therefore, proceed to consider the
question on the alternative basis.
If it was a usufructuary mortgage, it is contended by the
appellant that he was not liable to render accounts to the
mortgagor, as, Linder the mortgage deed, he was authorized
to take the receipts in lieu of interest within the meaning
of s. 77 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are as follows:
"Section 76: When during the continuance of the mortgage,
the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property,-
(g)he must keep clear, full and accurate accounts of all
sums received and spent by him as mortgagee, and, at any
time during the continuance of the mortgage, give the
mortgagor, at his request and cost, true copies of such
accounts and of the vouchers by which they are supported;
(h)his receipts from the mortgaged property, or, where
such property is personally occupied by him, a fair
occupation-rent in respect thereof, shall, after deducting
the expenses properly incurred for the management of the
property and the collection of rents and profits and the
other expenses mentioned in clauses (c) and (d), and
interest thereon, be debited against him in reduction of the
amount (if any) from time to time due to him on account of
interest and, so far as such receipts exceed any interest
due, in reduction or discharge of the mortgage-money the
surplus, if any, shall be paid to the mortgagor;
" Section 77: Nothing in section 76, clauses (b), (d), (g)
and (h), applies to cases where there is a contract between
the mortgagee and the mortgagor that the receipts from the
mortgaged property shall, so long as the mortgagee is in
possession of the property, be taken in lieu of interest on
the principal money, or in lieu of such interest and defined
portions of the principal."
1095
Section 76(g) of the Transfer of Property Act imposes a
liability on a mortgagee to keep, full and accurate accounts
supported by vouchers. So too, he is under a statutory
liability under cl. ’h’ to debit the nett receipts of the
mortgaged property in deduction of the amount due to him
from time to time on account of interest and where such
receipts exceed any interest due, in reduction and discharge
of the mortgagemoney and to pay the surplus, if any, to the
mortgagor. Therefore, every mortgagee in possession is
bound to keep clear, full and accurate accounts and to
render the accounts to the mortgagor in the manner
prescribed in cl. ’h’. But s. 77 enacts an exception to
the mortgagee’s liability under cls. (g) and (h) of s. 76.
Under that section (s. 77), if there is a contract between
the mortgagor and the mortgagee, whereunder it is agreed
that the receipts of the mortgaged property should, so long
as the mortgagee is in possession of the property, be taken
in lieu of interest and a defined portion of the principal,
the mortgagee is freed from the statutory liability to keep
accounts or to render accounts to the mortgagor in the
manner prescribed under cls. (g) and (h) of s. 76 of the
Act. This is so because, the receipts are set off against
the interest, and there is nothing to account for.
Therefore, to insist upon the mortgagee to keep accounts or
render accounts to the mortgagor would be an empty forma-
lity. The essential condition for the application of this
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section is that the receipts of the property should be taken
in lieu of interest or in lieu of interest and a defined
portion of the principal. The contention of the learned
counsel for the respondents is that unless the contract
authorizes the mortgagee to take the entire receipts in lieu
of interest or in lieu of interest and defined portions of
principal, this section cannot be invoked; for it is said
that the principle behind the section is that one is set off
against the other, with the result, there is nothing to be
accounted for, whereas if only a part of the receipts is
agreed to be paid towards interest or in lieu of such
interest and defined portions of the"-principal, there would
be surplus in the hands of the mortgagee, which would have
to be
1096
accounted for. On the basis of that distinction, an
argument is advanced to the effect that, as in the present
case, the mortgagee had to pay a sum of ]Is. 435-4-0 to the
mortgagor, he was not authorized by the mortgagor tinder the
agreement to take the entire receipts in lieu of interest,
etc., within the meaning of s. 77 of the Transfer of
Property Act. To put it differently, the argument is that
out of the receipts from the mortgaged property a portion
was paid to the mortgagor and the mortgagee was authorized
to take only the balance in lieu of interest and, therefore,
there was no contract between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee for the latter taking the entire receipts in lieu
of interest. We find it difficult to accept this argument.
Under Exhibit A(3), the mortgagee undertook an unconditional
obligation to pay a sum of Rs. 435-4-0 in respect of the
property mortgaged to him. This obligation was not made to
depend upon the receipts from the property in the possession
of the mortgagee. Whether there was yield from the land or
not, he had to make the payment to the mortgagor. Though he
had to pay the rent as a consideration for his enjoyment of
the land as a mortgagee, his liability did not depend upon
the receipts from the land-he had to pay, receipts or no
receipts. His liability was also not confined to the
receipts, for he was under a personal obligation to pay the
amount to the mortgagor. On the other hand, the mortgagee
was expressly authorized to take the entire income from the
land and appropriate the same towards interest and the
mortgagor agreed not to put forward any claim or demand in
respect of any increase in the produce. Shortly stated, the
mortgagee was under a personal obligation to pay Rs. 435-4-0
to the mortgagor and had a right to take the entire receipts
from the land in lieu of interest. It is not a case,
therefore, where receipts from the mortgaged property are
divided between mortgagor and mortgagee, but one where the
mortgagee pays a specified amount to the mortgagor and
appropriates the entire receipts in lieu of interest. We,
therefore, hold that, under the mortgage deed, Exhibit A(3),
there is a contract between the
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mortgagee and the mortgagor within the meaning of s. 77 of
the Transfer of Property Act, to the effect that the
receipts from the mortgaged property should be taken in lieu
of interest.
Relying upon the judgment of the High Court, a further
attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the respondents
to contend that the mention of a specified rate of interest
in the document is indicative of the fact that under the
document the mortgagee, would have to take only such part of
the nett receipts sufficient to discharge the interest and
credit the balance to the mortgagor. The mere mention of a
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rate of interest does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion. The rate of interest may be stipulated for estimating
the amount payable towards interest so that the parties may
visualize whether the nett receipts could reasonably be set
off against the interest. The rate may also be given for
other reasons.
The Judicial Committee, in Pandit Bachchu Lal v. Chaudhri
Syed Mohammad Mah (1), held that notwithstanding the fact
that a particular rate of interest was mentioned in the
mortgage deed, there was a contract within the meaning of s.
77 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was a case of a
mortgage with possession and a particular rate of interest
was mentioned in the mortgage deed. There was a provision
for repayment of the principal either in whole or in part
before the stipulated period, but it was otherwise provided
that the mortgagee should appropriate the surplus profits
towards interest, he having no claim to interest and the
mortgagors having no claim to the profits. The Privy
Council held, on a construction of the mortgage deed, that
the said deed contained a contract within the meaning of s.
77 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
In Exhibit A-3, though the rate of interest is stated at i
per cent. per month, it was obviously mentioned to enable
the parties to approximately fix the amount to be
appropriated by the mortgagee from and out of the rent
received from the thikadar. No doubt, the same rate of
interest is also mentioned when the
(1) (1933) 37 C.W.N. 457.
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parties are dealing with their rights after the expiry of
the thikadari interest, but in more than one place they have
stated in clear and unambiguous terms that the mortgagee
could appropriate the produce towards interest and that the
mortgagor would not put forward any sort of claim or demand
in respect of any increase in the produce. In view of the
clearly expressed intention of the parties, we cannot hold
from the mere fact that the rate of interest is mentioned
that the document does not come under the purview of s. 77
of the Transfer of Property Act. We hold that s. 77 of the
Transfer of Property Act applies to the document and
therefore the mortgagee is not liable to render any account
to the mortgagor.
On the footing that the mortgage is an anomalous mortgage,
we arrive at the same result. The learned Counsel for the
appellant contends that if the mortgage is an anomalous
mortgage, the parties are only governed by the provisions of
s. 98 of the Transfer of Property Act and not by the
provisions of s. 77 of the Act. Section 98 says:
" In the case of an anomalous mortgage, the rights and
liabilities of the parties shall be determined by their
contract as evidenced in the mortgage-deed, and, so far as
such contract does not extend, by local usage.
The question whether this section excludes the operation of
other relevant provisions of the Act, including s.77, need
not be considered in this case, for, whether s.77 applies,
as the learned Counsel for the respondents contends, or the
terms of the contract would govern the rights of the
parties, as the learned counsel for the appellant argues,
the result would be the same for the question to be decided
is whether under the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagee
has the right to appropriate the entire nett receipts in
lieu of interest,. We have already held that in Exhibit
A(3) not only there is such a recital but there is a
specific term whereunder the mortgagor expressly agreed not
to claim any produce received by the mortgagee. Whether s.
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77 applies or not, under the express terms of the contract,
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the appellant is not liable to render accounts for the
excess receipts.
No other point is raised before us. In the result, the
decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the
Subordinate Judge is restored. The appellant will have his
costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.