SUMITHA PRADEEP vs. ARUN KUMAR C.K

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1834/2022 (@Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)  No.7188/2022) SUMITHA PRADEEP                                    Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS ARUN KUMAR C.K & ANR.                              Respondent(s) O R D E R   Leave granted. The appellant is the mother of the victim who is a 12 years old girl child. The appellant is aggrieved by the Order dated 25­7­2022 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, whereby Respondent No.1 has been granted protection of anticipatory bail in Crime No.442 of 2022   dated   27­5­2022   registered   at   Police   Station   Meenangadi District Wayanad under Sections 354A(1)(i),(ii) & (iv),  354 A­(2) and 354­A(3) of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 7, 8, 9 and 11 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’). The occurrence allegedly took place on 14­12­2021   when   Respondent   No.1   is   alleged   to   have   sexually assaulted   his   12   years   old   niece.   The   allegations   are   that Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2022.11.05 12:10:19 IST Reason: Respondent No.1 asked the victim to sit on his lap and thereafter he hugged her and kissed her on the cheeks and tried to kiss her on her lips. He further attempted to disrobe the victim and made lewd 2 comments.   The   victim   was   an   excellent   student   giving   good performances both in curricular and co­curricular activities but the incident traumatized her to an extent that she slumped down in her course and performance. She was taken to counselling but did not open up. The victim was taken for second counselling session and at that time, she disclosed the unfortunate incident, she had faced   from     her   maternal   uncle,   namely,   Respondent   No.1. Thereafter, the subject First Information Report was immediately registered; medical examination was conducted and Statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded. Apprehending his arrest, Respondent No.1 approached the learned Sessions Court but was declined anticipatory bail. Thereafter, Respondent No.1 approached the High Court and vide impugned   Order   dated   25­7­2022,   the   said   Court   granted   him conditional anticipatory bail on the following terms:­ “12.   Accordingly,   I   allow   this   application   subject   to   the following conditions: (a)  Petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer from 9 am to 6 pm on 29.07.2022, 30.07.2022, 01.08.2022  and  02.08.2022  and   shall  subject    himself     to interrogation.  .      (b) If after interrogation, the investigating Officer proposes to arrest the petitioner, then he shall be released on  bail  on   him   executing  a  bond  for  Rs.5O,OOO/­   (Rupees fifty thousand only) with two solvent sureties   each for the like sum before the Investigating Officer. (c) Petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer  as and when required and shall also co­operate with the      investigation. (d) Petitioner shall not intimidate or attempt to influence   the witnesses; nor shall he tamper with the evidence or 3 xx xx xx xx; (e)  xx xx xx xx (f) xx xx xx” The mother of the victim child being aggrieved has approached this Court. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The Special Judge, Sessions Division, Kalpetta, Wayanad, while declining   to   grant   anticipatory   bail   as   prayed   for   by   the th respondent No 1 herein (original accused) vide order dated 4   of July, 2022 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 512 of 2022, observed as under:­ “7. A careful perusal of the case diary shows that there are sufficient reasons to suspect that the sexual abuse as   alleged   by   the   prosecution   has   taken   place   at   the instance of the petitioner. The perpetrator is none other than a close relative of the victim, i.e., her maternal uncle. Statements of the victim given to the police as well as to the learned Magistrate disclose the fact that the incident took place in the house of the petitioner while the victim and her mother paid a visit and stayed there for some days. The statements also show that the incident occurred in the bedroom of the petitioner while none   else   was   there.   Bedroom   of   the   petitioner   is situated up the stairs of the house. All other inmates were   in   the   down   stair   portion   of   the   house   at   the relevant time. Statements also show that the petitioner attempted to disrobe the victim, made her to sit on his lap, touched her breasts, kissed her by hugging and also attempted to kiss on her lips. It is further seen that when   the   petitioner   attempted   to   remove   her   top,   she started to raise cry and then, he released her. It is further seen that by making some kind of sexual comments, he   tried   to   stimulate   sexual   feelings   in   the   child. Taking into account the relationship between the victim and the petitioner and the manner in which the acts were committed, it is to be said that they are grievous in nature. 4 8.   As   rightly   argued   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the petitioner,   there   was   delay   of   about   6   months   in reporting the crime. But, mere delay is not a factor to disbelieve   the   prosecution   case.   In   Joy   v.   State   of Kerala   (2019(1)   KLT   935),   it   has   been   held   that   mere delay   in   reporting   the   matter   to   the   authorities concerned, especially sexual assault on a minor girl is immaterial and it would not be fatal to the prosecution case.   Moreover,   the   case   diary   clearly   shows   a   good reason   for   the   delay.   Materials   show   that   after   the incident,   the   victim   fell   aback   in   her   studies   and appeared   gloomy.   A   copy   of   her   educational   report   has been made available. It shows that in her 6th standard, she secured Grade A1 or Grade A2 in all the subjects. But,   in   7th   standard,   her   performance   had   fallen   down drastically. She secured C1 or C2 Grade in most of the subjects   and   in   one   subject,   she   secured   B1   and   in another subject, secured B2 Grade. The incident occurred while she was studying in 7th standard. Worried about her educational fall down, her parents consulted a counselor at Eranakulam. Statement of the counselor shows that the child   was   continuously   weeping   and   was   not   ready   to disclose the reason for the same in the first session. She was also found gloomy. Only in the second session of the counseling, she opened up and disclosed the incident. Because of fear, she did not disclose the incidents even to her mother. It is quite natural, since the perpetrator is the brother of her mother. Therefore, on the ground of delay, it cannot be said that the prosecution story is false. 9.   An   attempt   is   made   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the petitioner to show that this case is a retaliatory step taken by the mother of the victim in view of the property disputes between them. He relies on a crime registered as No.454/2022   of   Meenangadi   Police   Station,   wherein,   the mother   and   stepfather   of   the   child   are   accused.   That F.I.R. was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 323, 324, 354A(1)(i), 354A(1)(ii), 307 and 211 r/w 34 of IPC. But, that crime was registered only on 09.06.2022. i.e., after the registration of this crime. Moreover, the printout of "Watsapp" chats produced by the petitioner containing the chats between himself and the stepfather of the victim would go to show that there was no such discordiality between them even after the date of incident   alleged   in   F.I.R.   No.442/2022.   So,   there   is every   reason   to   believe   that   F.I.R.   No.442/2022   might have been initiated by the petitioner as an afterthought to shield the prosecution in this crime. 5 x x x x x 13. From the case diary I find prima facie materials in support of the prosecution case. If so, as held in Joy v. State of Kerala (2019 (1) KLT 935) presumption under Sec. 29   of   the   PoCSO   Act   is   also   to   be   taken   into consideration   by   the   courts   while   dealing   with   an application for bail. I have also considered the question as to whether custodial detention of the petitioner is necessary. According to the petitioner, there is nothing to   be   recovered   and   so   custodial   interrogation   is   not required. But learned counsel for the victim submits that the victim has not gained normalcy even now and granting of bail would adversely affect her mental condition and may feel helpless. Learned counsel also points out that the petitioner being an advocate has high influence and hold in the society and in the police and he is likely to interfere with smooth investigation. I find enough force in these submissions. If granting of bail is not in the interest of the victim, court has to refuse bail since the well being of the victim is also a relevant factor in PoCSO cases.”    From the aforesaid, it is pertinent to note that the Special Judge relied upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of  Joy v. State Of Kerala ,(2019) 1 KLT 935, wherein the Kerala High Court   has   taken   the   view   that   the   courts   shall   take   into consideration the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act while dealing with an application for bail filed by a person who is accused of the offence under the Act. In the case of  Joy  (supra), the Kerala High Court observed as under:­ “ 10. This court is not oblivious to Section 29 of the Act   which   contains   a   legislative   mandate   that   the court shall presume commission of the offences by the accused unless the contrary is proved. Section 29 of the Act states that where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any of­ 6 fence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, the Special Court shall presume, that such person has com­ mitted or abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved. The court   shall   take   into   consideration   the   presumption under Section 29 of the Act while dealing with an ap­ plication for bail filed by a person who is accused of the aforesaid offences under the Act (See State of Bi­ har v. Rajballav Prasad, (2017) 2 SCC 178 : AIR 2017 SC 630). 11. However,   the   statutory   presumption   under   Section 29 of the Act does not mean that the prosecution ver­ sion has to be accepted as gospel truth in every case. The presumption does not mean that the court cannot take into consideration the special features of a par­ ticular case. Patent absurdities or inherent infirmi­ ties or improbabilities in the prosecution version may lead to an irresistible inference of falsehood in the prosecution case. The presumption would come into play only when the prosecution is able to bring on record facts that would form the foundation for the presump­ tion. Otherwise, all that the prosecution would be re­ quired to do is to raise some allegations against the accused and to claim that the case projected by it is true. The courts must be on guard to see that the ap­ plication of the presumption, without adverting to es­ sential facts, shall not lead to any injustice. The presumption under Section 29 of the Act is not abso­ lute. The statutory presumption would get activated or triggered only if the prosecution proves the essential basic facts. If the accused is able to create serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case or the accused brings on record materials which would render the   prosecution   version   highly   improbable,   the   pre­ sumption would get weakened. As held by the Apex Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharash­ tra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : AIR 2011 SC 312, frivolity in prosecution   should   always   be   considered   and   in   the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of anticipatory bail. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. It should necessarily depend on facts and cir­ cumstances of each case in consonance with the  leg­ islative intention.” 7 The   High   Court,   while   granting   anticipatory   bail   to   the respondent No. 1 herein (original accused), observed in para 9 of the impugned order something which has really disturbed us. Para 9 reads thus:­ “9. With the above principle in mind, when the facts of   the   case   are   noticed,   it   is   revealed   that   the petitioner   is   the   maternal   uncle   of   the   victim   to whose   house   the   victim   went   in   December,   2021.   On 14.12.2021, the victim is alleged to have been asked to sit on the lap of the petitioner, who thereafter is alleged to have hugged and kissed the victim on her cheeks. Though on the one side, there is a possibility of   such   hugs   and   kisses   being   manifestations   of affection   by   an   uncle,   one   cannot   ignore   the possibility   of   such   show   of   'affections'   being coloured by sexual overtones. However, those are all matters   for   investigation.”   In our considered opinion, the observations made in Para 9 of the   impugned   order   are   totally   unwarranted   and   have   been   made overlooking   the   specific   allegations   contained   in   the   FIR,   duly supported   with   the   Statement   of   the   victim   –   girl   child   under Section 164 of the Code. In a case containing such serious allegations, the High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction in granting protection against arrest, as the Investigating Officer deserves free­hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion. It goes without saying that appearance before the Investigating Officer who, has been   prevented   from   subjecting   Respondent   No.1   to   custodial interrogation, can hardly be fruitful to find out the  prima facie substance   in   the   allegations,   which   are   of   extreme   serious   in nature. 8 The fact that the victim – girl is traumatized to such a high degree   that   her   academic   pursuits   have   been   adversely   impacted alone,   coupled   with   the   legislative   intent   especially   reflected through Section 29 of the POCSO Act, are sufficient to dissuade a Court from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in granting pre­arrest bail.  It may be true, as pointed out by learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1, that charge­sheet has already been filed. It will   be   unfair   to   presume   on   our   part   that   the   Investigating Officer   does   not   require   Respondent   No.1   for   custodial interrogation for the purpose of further investigation.  Be that as it may, even assuming it a case where Respondent No.1 is not required for custodial interrogation, we are satisfied that the High Court ought not to have granted discretionary relief of anticipatory bail. We are dealing with a matter wherein the original complainant (appellant   herein)   has   come   before   this   Court   praying   that   the anticipatory bail granted by the High Court to the accused should be cancelled. To put it in other words, the complainant says that the   High   Court   wrongly   exercised   its   discretion   while   granting anticipatory bail to the accused in a very serious crime like POCSO and,   therefore,   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   granting anticipatory bail to the accused should be quashed and set aside. In   many   anticipatory   bail   matters,   we   have   noticed   one   common argument   being   canvassed   that   no   custodial   interrogation   is 9 required and, therefore, anticipatory bail may be granted.  There appears to be a serious misconception of law that if no case for custodial interrogation is made out by the prosecution, then that alone would be a good ground to grant anticipatory bail. Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along   with   other   grounds   while   deciding   an   application   seeking anticipatory bail. There may be many cases in which the custodial interrogation of the accused may not be required, but that does not mean   that   the   prima   facie   case   against   the   accused   should   be ignored or overlooked and he should be granted anticipatory bail. The first and foremost thing that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the   prima facie   case put up against the accused. Thereafter, the nature of the offence should be looked into along with the severity of the punishment. Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail. However, even if custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail.  Before   we   close   this   matter   one   more   clarification   is necessary.   We   have   referred   to   the   decision   of   the   Kerala   High Court rendered in the case of  Joy  (supra).  The case of  Joy  (supra) deals with Section 29 of the POCSO Act. When the learned Judge decided   the   anticipatory   bail   application,   the   decision   of   the coordinate Bench in the case of  Joy  (supra) was binding to him. He could not have ignored a binding decision. It is a different thing 10 to say that if he may disagree with the view taken and accordingly refer   it   to   a   larger   Bench.   However,   without   looking   into   the dictum as laid in   Joy   (supra), the observations made by the High Court in para 9 of its impugned order referred to above could be said   to   be   absolutely   unwarranted   and   not   one   befitting   a   High Court. We are not going into the issue of Section 29 of the POCSO Act in the present case. Even without the aid of Section 29 of the POCSO Act, we are convinced that the High Court committed a serious error in exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent No. 1 herein (original accused) while granting anticipatory bail. For the reasons afore­stated, and without expressing any views on merits of the case, we allow this appeal; set aside the impugned Judgment   and   Order   dated   25­7­2022   passed   by   the   High   Court granting anticipatory bail to Respondent No.1.  Investigating Officer is granted liberty to proceed further in accordance with law. Suffice to say that law will take its own course. ..................J (SURYA KANT) ...................J      (J.B. PARDIWALA) NEW DELHI; 21ST OCTOBER, 2022.