Full Judgment Text
2026:BHC-NAG:1872-DB
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPLICATION APL NO.1146 OF 2023
1. Bhojraj Megheshyam Vaidya,
age: 23 years, occupation: Sarpanch,
r/o at post Mangli, Gandhi Ward,
tahsil, Pauni, district Bhandara.
2. Hiralal Dadaji Vaidya,
aged 32 years, occupation: Deputy
Sarpanch
r/o Vitthal Rukhmai Mandir
Ward, Mangli (Chauras),
Bhandara. ….. Applicants.
:: V E R S U S ::
1. State of Maharashtra,
through Police Station Officer,
Police Station: Pauni,
tahsil Pauni, district Bhandara.
2. Vimal Vijay Khobragade,
aged 58 years, occupation: housewife,
r/o Mangli, tahsil Pauni,
district Bhandara. ….. Non-applicants.
==============================
Ms Aparna Jha, Advocate h/f Shri A.A.Dhawas, Counsel
for the Applicants.
Shri A.M.Kadukar, APP for Non-applicant No.1/State.
==============================
.....2/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
2
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.
DATE : 27/01/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned counsel Ms Aparna Jha for the
applicants and learned APP Shri A.M.Kadukar for the NA
No.1/State. Despite service, none appears for the non-
applicant No.2 (the informant). Admit. Heard finally by
consent of learned counsel for the parties.
2. By this application, the applicants are seeking
quashing of the FIR in connection with Crime
No.0185/2023 registered for offences under Sections
294, 504, and 506 of the IPC and 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and consequent
proceeding arising out of the same bearing Special Case
No.80/2023.
.....3/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
3
3. The crime is registered on the basis of a report
lodged by the non-applicant No.2 (the informant) on
allegations that she is residing in village Pauni and she
belongs to “Mahar Community”. As per allegations on
26.4.2023, when she was at home, the applicants came to
her home and told her that they would not provide her
place for construction of “Gharkul” under the “Gharkul
Scheme” and also threatened that they would remove her
out of the village as well as she was abused in a filthy
language by saying that, “ ----- ek;jhus /ksMhus] lkyh eknjpksn rq>k
cka/kdke can] vls cksyyk----- ” On the basis of the said report,
the police have registered the crime against the
applicants.
4. After registration of the crime, investigation was
carried out and various statements are recorded and after
completion of the investigation, chargesheet is submitted.
.....4/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
4
5. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that
by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the words
uttered by the applicants attract either offence under
Section 294 of the IPC or under the provisions of Section
3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. She
submitted that the provisions of the Atrocities Act are not
applicable as the alleged incident has not taken place
“within the public view”. She submitted that recital of the
FIR and various statements of witnesses show that the
alleged incident has taken place in the house of the
informant and, therefore, this place is not “the public
view”.
In support of her contentions, she has placed
reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Karuppudayar vs. State, rep. by the Deputy
.....5/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
5
Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and ors, reported
in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215.
She further submitted that offences under Sections
504 and 506 of the IPC are also not made out as there is
nothing on record to show that there was any criminal
antecedents against the applicants. Thus, no prima facie
case is made out. In view of that, compelling the
applicants to face trial would be abuse of process of law.
In view of that, the application deserves to be allowed.
6. Per contra, learned APP for the State strongly
opposed the said contentions and submitted that
statement of the informant specifically shows that she was
abused in a filthy language which is sufficient to attract
Section 294 of the IPC. The threat given to her also
discloses that there was a “criminal intimidation”. The
applicants who are Sarpancha and Deputy Sarpanch of
.....6/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
6
the said village were aware about the fact that she
belongs to the “Scheduled Caste Community.” Despite
they were knowing the same, she was abused “within the
public view” and, therefore, a prima facie case is made
out against the applicants and, therefore, the application
deserves to be rejected.
7. After hearing both the sides and perusing the entire
investigation papers, it reveals that there was a dispute
between the applicants and the informant on account of
providing the informant a place in the village for
constructing a house under “Scheme of Pantapradhan
Awas Yojana”. As per allegation, on 26.4.2023, both the
applicants came to her house and abused her in a filthy
language as well as threatened her. During the
investigation, various statements of witnesses are
recorded and it revealed that all the witnesses are
relatives of the informant. The statements of witnesses
.....7/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
7
nowhere show that the said incident has taken place
“within the public view”.
8. Learned counsel for the applicants has rightly
placed reliance on the decision in the case of
Karuppudayar supra, wherein by referring the earlier
judgment in the case of as Swaran Singh vs. State,
reported in (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has held, as under:
“Another key ingredient of the provision is
insult or intimidation in “any place within
public view”. What is to be regarded as “place
in public view” had come up for consideration
before this Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh vs. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn
distinction between the expression “public
place” and “in any place within public view”. It
was held that if an offence is committed outside
the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and
.....8/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
8
the lawn can be seen by someone from the road
or lane outside the boundary wall, then the
lawn would certainly be a place within the
public view. On the contrary, if the remark is
made inside a building, but some members of
the public are there (not merely relatives or
friends) then it would not be an offence since it
is not in the public view.”
9. In the light of the above observations, if the
allegations are taken into consideration, admittedly,
except statements of witnesses, there is no statement of
any independent witnesses to show that the alleged
incident has taken place “within the public view.” On the
contrary, recital of the FIR shows that the applicants came
at her home and the alleged incident has taken place at
her house.
.....9/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
9
10. As far as offence under Section 294 of the IPC is
concerned, the allegation is that she was abused by the
applicants in a filthy language.
11.
Section 294 of the IPC talks about obscene acts
and songs. The said Section is reproduced as under for
reference:
“294. Obscene acts and songs.- Whoever, to the
annoyance of others – (a) does any obscene act
in any public place, or (b) sings, recites or utters
any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any
public place,shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend
to three months, or with fine, or with both”.
12. As far as “obscenity” is concerned, the
observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
N.S. Madhanagopal and anr vs. K.Lalitha, reported in
(2022), 17 SCC 818 are relevant wherein it is laid down
the test of “obscenity” under Section 294 of the IPC and
.....10/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
10
observed that, “whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences.”
It has been further observed that, “this test has
been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court
has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D.
Udeshi vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in MANU/SC/
0080/1964 that the test of “obscenity” is the ‘substantial
tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires’.” “In
order to be “obscene” the matter must “tend to sexually
impure thoughts. I do not think that the words uttered
in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the
words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not
think that the words are “obscene” and the utterance
would constitute an offence punishable under Section
294(b) of the IPC.”
.....11/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
11
13. Thus, to attract the offence under Section 294 of
the IPC, mere filthy language or mere abuses are not
sufficient, but there must be a further proof to establish
that it was to annoyance of others, which is lacking in
the case.
14. As far as offences under Sections 504 and 506 are
concerned, it is alleged that the informant was
threatened by the applicants.
15. Section 503 of the IPC deals with “criminal
intimidation” which states that, “whoever threatens
another with any injury to his person, reputation or
property, or to the person or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm
to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which
he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of
.....12/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
12
avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation”.
16. Section 506 of the IPC deals with “punishment for
criminal intimidation.”
17. Thus, ingredients required to attract Section 503 of
the IPC are; (i) threatening a person with any injury; (ii)
to his person, reputation or property; or (iii) to the person
or reputation of any one in whom that person is
interested.
18. Thus, Section 504 of the IPC contemplates
intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking
such person insulted to breach the peace and intentionally
insulting a person knowing it to be likely that a person
insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of public
peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may
not come within the purview of this Section.
.....13/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
13
19. In view of that, the application of Section 506 of
the IPC is also doubtful in the present case.
20. It is further alleged by the informant that she was
abused on caste though the applicants were knowing that
she belongs to the “Scheduled Caste Community”.
For that purpose, the observations of the Hon’ble
Apex Court, in Criminal Appeal No.2622/2024 (Shajan
Skaria vs. The State of Kerala and anr) are relevant to be
referred wherein it is held that to attract the offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act, basic
ingredients to constitute offence are; (a) accused person
must not be a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe; (b) accused must intentionally insult or
intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe; (c) accused must do so with the intent to
.....14/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
14
humiliate such a person; and (d) accused must do so at
any place within public view.
It has been further held that, “all insults or
intimidation to a member of the Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under
the Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on the
ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe”.
21.
This type of the allegations are absent in the
present case. In view of that, the allegations levelled
against the applicants to attract the offences alleged are
not sufficient and, therefore, forcing or compelling the
applicants to face trial would abuse of process of law.
22.
The law relating to quashing of FIRs was
explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State
of Haryana and ors vs. Bhajan Lal and ors, reported in
.....15/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
15
1992 Supplementary (1) SCC 335 wherein principles
have been laid down which are required to be
considered while considering applications for quashing
of the FIRs, which read as under:
“(a) where the allegations made in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused;
(b) where the allegations in the First
Information Report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investi-
gation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code;
.....16/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
16
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or 'complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
.....17/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
17
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due
to private and personal grudge”.
23. By applying the above said principles, and if the
facts and circumferences of the present case are taken
into consideration, admittedly, no prima facie case is
made out against the applicants. In view of that, the
application deserves to be allowed. Hence, I proceed to
pass following order:
.....18/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
18
ORDER
(1) The Criminal Application is allowed.
(2) T he FIR in connection with Crime No.0185/2023
registered for offences under Sections 294, 504, and 506
of the IPC and 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 and consequent proceeding arising out of the
same bearing Special Case No.80/2023 are hereby
quashed and set aside to the extent of the applicants.
Application stands disposed of.
(URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.)
!! BrWankhede !!
Signed by: Mr. B. R. Wankhede
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/02/2026 10:41:43
...../-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPLICATION APL NO.1146 OF 2023
1. Bhojraj Megheshyam Vaidya,
age: 23 years, occupation: Sarpanch,
r/o at post Mangli, Gandhi Ward,
tahsil, Pauni, district Bhandara.
2. Hiralal Dadaji Vaidya,
aged 32 years, occupation: Deputy
Sarpanch
r/o Vitthal Rukhmai Mandir
Ward, Mangli (Chauras),
Bhandara. ….. Applicants.
:: V E R S U S ::
1. State of Maharashtra,
through Police Station Officer,
Police Station: Pauni,
tahsil Pauni, district Bhandara.
2. Vimal Vijay Khobragade,
aged 58 years, occupation: housewife,
r/o Mangli, tahsil Pauni,
district Bhandara. ….. Non-applicants.
==============================
Ms Aparna Jha, Advocate h/f Shri A.A.Dhawas, Counsel
for the Applicants.
Shri A.M.Kadukar, APP for Non-applicant No.1/State.
==============================
.....2/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
2
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.
DATE : 27/01/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned counsel Ms Aparna Jha for the
applicants and learned APP Shri A.M.Kadukar for the NA
No.1/State. Despite service, none appears for the non-
applicant No.2 (the informant). Admit. Heard finally by
consent of learned counsel for the parties.
2. By this application, the applicants are seeking
quashing of the FIR in connection with Crime
No.0185/2023 registered for offences under Sections
294, 504, and 506 of the IPC and 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and consequent
proceeding arising out of the same bearing Special Case
No.80/2023.
.....3/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
3
3. The crime is registered on the basis of a report
lodged by the non-applicant No.2 (the informant) on
allegations that she is residing in village Pauni and she
belongs to “Mahar Community”. As per allegations on
26.4.2023, when she was at home, the applicants came to
her home and told her that they would not provide her
place for construction of “Gharkul” under the “Gharkul
Scheme” and also threatened that they would remove her
out of the village as well as she was abused in a filthy
language by saying that, “ ----- ek;jhus /ksMhus] lkyh eknjpksn rq>k
cka/kdke can] vls cksyyk----- ” On the basis of the said report,
the police have registered the crime against the
applicants.
4. After registration of the crime, investigation was
carried out and various statements are recorded and after
completion of the investigation, chargesheet is submitted.
.....4/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
4
5. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that
by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the words
uttered by the applicants attract either offence under
Section 294 of the IPC or under the provisions of Section
3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. She
submitted that the provisions of the Atrocities Act are not
applicable as the alleged incident has not taken place
“within the public view”. She submitted that recital of the
FIR and various statements of witnesses show that the
alleged incident has taken place in the house of the
informant and, therefore, this place is not “the public
view”.
In support of her contentions, she has placed
reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Karuppudayar vs. State, rep. by the Deputy
.....5/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
5
Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and ors, reported
in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215.
She further submitted that offences under Sections
504 and 506 of the IPC are also not made out as there is
nothing on record to show that there was any criminal
antecedents against the applicants. Thus, no prima facie
case is made out. In view of that, compelling the
applicants to face trial would be abuse of process of law.
In view of that, the application deserves to be allowed.
6. Per contra, learned APP for the State strongly
opposed the said contentions and submitted that
statement of the informant specifically shows that she was
abused in a filthy language which is sufficient to attract
Section 294 of the IPC. The threat given to her also
discloses that there was a “criminal intimidation”. The
applicants who are Sarpancha and Deputy Sarpanch of
.....6/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
6
the said village were aware about the fact that she
belongs to the “Scheduled Caste Community.” Despite
they were knowing the same, she was abused “within the
public view” and, therefore, a prima facie case is made
out against the applicants and, therefore, the application
deserves to be rejected.
7. After hearing both the sides and perusing the entire
investigation papers, it reveals that there was a dispute
between the applicants and the informant on account of
providing the informant a place in the village for
constructing a house under “Scheme of Pantapradhan
Awas Yojana”. As per allegation, on 26.4.2023, both the
applicants came to her house and abused her in a filthy
language as well as threatened her. During the
investigation, various statements of witnesses are
recorded and it revealed that all the witnesses are
relatives of the informant. The statements of witnesses
.....7/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
7
nowhere show that the said incident has taken place
“within the public view”.
8. Learned counsel for the applicants has rightly
placed reliance on the decision in the case of
Karuppudayar supra, wherein by referring the earlier
judgment in the case of as Swaran Singh vs. State,
reported in (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has held, as under:
“Another key ingredient of the provision is
insult or intimidation in “any place within
public view”. What is to be regarded as “place
in public view” had come up for consideration
before this Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh vs. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn
distinction between the expression “public
place” and “in any place within public view”. It
was held that if an offence is committed outside
the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and
.....8/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
8
the lawn can be seen by someone from the road
or lane outside the boundary wall, then the
lawn would certainly be a place within the
public view. On the contrary, if the remark is
made inside a building, but some members of
the public are there (not merely relatives or
friends) then it would not be an offence since it
is not in the public view.”
9. In the light of the above observations, if the
allegations are taken into consideration, admittedly,
except statements of witnesses, there is no statement of
any independent witnesses to show that the alleged
incident has taken place “within the public view.” On the
contrary, recital of the FIR shows that the applicants came
at her home and the alleged incident has taken place at
her house.
.....9/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
9
10. As far as offence under Section 294 of the IPC is
concerned, the allegation is that she was abused by the
applicants in a filthy language.
11.
Section 294 of the IPC talks about obscene acts
and songs. The said Section is reproduced as under for
reference:
“294. Obscene acts and songs.- Whoever, to the
annoyance of others – (a) does any obscene act
in any public place, or (b) sings, recites or utters
any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any
public place,shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend
to three months, or with fine, or with both”.
12. As far as “obscenity” is concerned, the
observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
N.S. Madhanagopal and anr vs. K.Lalitha, reported in
(2022), 17 SCC 818 are relevant wherein it is laid down
the test of “obscenity” under Section 294 of the IPC and
.....10/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
10
observed that, “whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences.”
It has been further observed that, “this test has
been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court
has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D.
Udeshi vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in MANU/SC/
0080/1964 that the test of “obscenity” is the ‘substantial
tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires’.” “In
order to be “obscene” the matter must “tend to sexually
impure thoughts. I do not think that the words uttered
in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the
words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not
think that the words are “obscene” and the utterance
would constitute an offence punishable under Section
294(b) of the IPC.”
.....11/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
11
13. Thus, to attract the offence under Section 294 of
the IPC, mere filthy language or mere abuses are not
sufficient, but there must be a further proof to establish
that it was to annoyance of others, which is lacking in
the case.
14. As far as offences under Sections 504 and 506 are
concerned, it is alleged that the informant was
threatened by the applicants.
15. Section 503 of the IPC deals with “criminal
intimidation” which states that, “whoever threatens
another with any injury to his person, reputation or
property, or to the person or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm
to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which
he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of
.....12/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
12
avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation”.
16. Section 506 of the IPC deals with “punishment for
criminal intimidation.”
17. Thus, ingredients required to attract Section 503 of
the IPC are; (i) threatening a person with any injury; (ii)
to his person, reputation or property; or (iii) to the person
or reputation of any one in whom that person is
interested.
18. Thus, Section 504 of the IPC contemplates
intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking
such person insulted to breach the peace and intentionally
insulting a person knowing it to be likely that a person
insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of public
peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may
not come within the purview of this Section.
.....13/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
13
19. In view of that, the application of Section 506 of
the IPC is also doubtful in the present case.
20. It is further alleged by the informant that she was
abused on caste though the applicants were knowing that
she belongs to the “Scheduled Caste Community”.
For that purpose, the observations of the Hon’ble
Apex Court, in Criminal Appeal No.2622/2024 (Shajan
Skaria vs. The State of Kerala and anr) are relevant to be
referred wherein it is held that to attract the offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act, basic
ingredients to constitute offence are; (a) accused person
must not be a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe; (b) accused must intentionally insult or
intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe; (c) accused must do so with the intent to
.....14/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
14
humiliate such a person; and (d) accused must do so at
any place within public view.
It has been further held that, “all insults or
intimidation to a member of the Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under
the Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on the
ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe”.
21.
This type of the allegations are absent in the
present case. In view of that, the allegations levelled
against the applicants to attract the offences alleged are
not sufficient and, therefore, forcing or compelling the
applicants to face trial would abuse of process of law.
22.
The law relating to quashing of FIRs was
explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State
of Haryana and ors vs. Bhajan Lal and ors, reported in
.....15/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
15
1992 Supplementary (1) SCC 335 wherein principles
have been laid down which are required to be
considered while considering applications for quashing
of the FIRs, which read as under:
“(a) where the allegations made in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused;
(b) where the allegations in the First
Information Report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investi-
gation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code;
.....16/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
16
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or 'complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
.....17/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
17
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due
to private and personal grudge”.
23. By applying the above said principles, and if the
facts and circumferences of the present case are taken
into consideration, admittedly, no prima facie case is
made out against the applicants. In view of that, the
application deserves to be allowed. Hence, I proceed to
pass following order:
.....18/-
Judgment
28 apl1146.23
18
ORDER
(1) The Criminal Application is allowed.
(2) T he FIR in connection with Crime No.0185/2023
registered for offences under Sections 294, 504, and 506
of the IPC and 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 and consequent proceeding arising out of the
same bearing Special Case No.80/2023 are hereby
quashed and set aside to the extent of the applicants.
Application stands disposed of.
(URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.)
!! BrWankhede !!
Signed by: Mr. B. R. Wankhede
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/02/2026 10:41:43
...../-