Full Judgment Text
1
2026 INSC 249
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2432 OF 2010
SUBRAMANI … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. The appellant - Subramani and the deceased Chennamma were
husband and wife. They were married for seventeen years before
the date of the incident. They had two daughters and two sons.
The eldest daughter was aged about sixteen years at the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
GEETA AHUJA
Date: 2026.03.17
17:00:36 IST
Reason:
relevant time. They had lived a happy married life for about
three years. Thereafter, their relations became strained, and it
2
is alleged that the appellant started ill-treating the deceased and
kept on raising demands for money, which the father of the
deceased fulfilled most of the time. The appellant had even
started treating her with cruelty.
2. On the night of 20.07.2000, the appellant and the deceased as
usual again picked up a quarrel. The appellant, in anger, went
out and fetched some kerosene. The kerosene was poured on
the deceased in a bathroom, the appellant lit a candle and threw
it upon her, causing serious burn injuries. The appellant, after
burning her, left the house. On the alarm raised by the
deceased, the neighbours came and tried to save her. They
doused the fire by pouring water. The deceased was taken to the
Victoria Hospital by the neighbours and the mother of the
appellant. She was admitted at around midnight and died after
three days on 24.07.2000 in the hospital due to severe burn
injuries received by her.
3. An FIR No. 194 of 2000 under Section 302 and Section 498A of
1
the Indian Penal Code was lodged by the father of the deceased
1
For short, ‘IPC’
3
on 24.07.2000 after she had died. The police inspector Shiva
Murthy, upon investigation submitted a chargesheet against the
appellant for committing offences punishable under Section
498A and 302 IPC.
4. The appellant was put to trial. The Trial Court acquitted him
primarily on the ground that the bathroom where the incident
took place was very small where two persons could not have
been accommodated. The testimonies of the family witnesses
were inconsistent and unreliable. The medical evidence
suggested that deceased had received more than 80 to 90
percent burn injuries and as such she may not be in a mental
state to depose or state anything either to the doctor or the
police. The dying declaration, if any, was therefore unreliable.
5. On an appeal by the State to the High Court, the Division Bench
reversed the judgment and order of the Trial Court. The
acquittal was set aside, and the appellant was convicted under
both the above provisions. He was sentenced to two years of
simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs.2,000/- and in
default in payment of the same, with a further three months of
4
simple imprisonment under Section 498A. He was also
convicted under Section 302 IPC for killing the deceased and
was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-,
and in default, to undergo a further one month of simple
imprisonment.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the
appellant preferred a Criminal Appeal under Section 379 of
Cr.P.C which was admitted on 13.12.2010 after the delay in
filing the same was condoned. Thus, the appeal is before us for
consideration as to whether the appellant is guilty of the
offences under Section 302 and 498A of IPC and whether the
sentence awarded to him is justified.
7. We have heard Shri Shekhar G. Devasa, learned senior counsel
for the appellant-Subramani and Shri Sanchit Garga, Advocate
on record for the respondent-State of Karnataka.
8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the High
Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court, more particularly when the acquittal
had been recorded on cogent and valid reasons after considering
5
every piece of the evidence on record. It was submitted that
apart from the inconsistencies in the statements of the material
witnesses, particularly PW-7 and PW-16, who categorically
stated that the deceased was unconscious and not in a position
to speak, there was no credible evidence to prove that the
appellant had committed the offence as alleged. It was also
submitted that the prosecution failed to prove any motive for
homicidal death. It was inherently improbable that the offence
could have been committed inside the small bathroom, and that
no independent neighbour was examined to prove the
commission of the offence. The alleged dying declaration was
unreliable, as it was unsupported by any medical certificate and
stood contradicted by hospital documents, which record a
history of self-inflicted burns. Furthermore, the deceased had
admittedly received more than 80 to 90 percent burn injuries
and was under heavy sedation. She was not in a position to
make any statement. Therefore, the conviction based upon the
alleged dying declaration of the deceased was wholly illegal.
6
9. There is no dispute as to the fact that the parties were married
17 years prior to the date of the incident and that there used to
be frequent quarrels between them with regard to money. It has
also come on record through evidence that the appellant used
to beat and treat the deceased with cruelty. There were regular
demands for money by him. The aforesaid facts and the
evidence clearly establish that the appellant was not a satisfied
man who suffered from frustration and as such had a motive to
kill the deceased.
10. The testimony of PW-3, Niresha, the eldest daughter of the
appellant and the deceased who was aged about 16 year is very
crucial and material. She had clearly deposed that on the fateful
night, she, her mother, sister and brothers were in their house.
Her father came and questioned the mother that when he had
sent her to her paternal home to get money, why she had sent
her father to counsel and advise him. Thus, they picked up a
quarrel and her father threatened her mother to wait and see
what he was going to do. He went out and brought kerosene,
poured it on her mother and set her on fire. This was done at
7
around 11:00 p.m. in the night and thereafter, he ran away from
the house. On the screams of her mother, the neighbours came
and extinguished the fire. Her grandmother and one another
person took her mother to the hospital in the burnt state. Her
mother remained in the hospital for three days, undergoing
treatment, and thereafter, she died.
11. The aforesaid witness PW-3 is an eyewitness. She has narrated
the incident as was seen by her. There is no inconsistency in
her statement and there is no reason to disbelieve her. There is
no material on record to show as to why she would falsely
depose against her father. Her evidence clinchingly proves that
the appellant brought kerosene, poured it on her mother and lit
the fire.
12. The other crucial witness in the case is PW-4, Dr. S.
Rudramurthy who had conducted the post-mortem upon the
deceased. He categorically stated that the death occurred due
to septicaemia as a result of burn injuries sustained by her. He
proved the postmortem report ‘Exhibit P-2’ and his signatures
on it. He further stated that the burn injuries were antemortem
8
and were to the extent of 85 to 90 percent. He reported that
septicaemia naturally occurs with such high burn injuries. He
opined that the burn injuries received by the deceased were
superficial in nature. He further opined that even if the
deceased was given proper and best treatment, her chances of
survival were minimal. Hence, the postmortem report and the
statement of PW-4 as such establish that the deceased died of
septicaemia as a result of 80-90% burn injuries which were
superficial.
13. There is another witness named Dr. Gurumurthy, whose
statement was recorded as PW-10. He was the doctor who had
treated the deceased after she was admitted in the Victoria
Hospital, Bangalore. He stated that he was the in-charge of
burns ward of the hospital. The deceased was brought to the
hospital on 20.07.2000 at around 11.15 p.m. with a history of
burns. She was admitted in the hospital at 12:00 midnight.
According to the deceased, as informed to him, her husband
used to quarrel with her frequently. On 20.07.2000, he came
home at around 11.00 p.m., assaulted her and then poured
9
diesel over her, set her on fire and ran away. He stated that
there is a note to the above effect in the case sheet as well. He
had examined the deceased on 23.07.2000 and she made the
said statement at around 12.30 p.m. on the same day. He even
proved ‘Exhibit P-11’, the statement of the deceased and his
signatures upon it. He further stated that the deceased was in
hospital up to 24.07.2000 and expired at 9.35 a.m. on the said
date.
14. One doctor named Dr. HC Ramanna, PW-11, also treated the
deceased when she was admitted to the Victoria Hospital. He
stated that on 20.07.2000 while he was working in the aforesaid
hospital, a patient by name Chennamma was brought to the
hospital in a burnt state. He had examined the patient and had
noticed that she had 9 per cent burns on the face and neck, 18
per cent burns on the chest and abdomen, 9 per cent on the
upper right and left limbs, 10 per cent on the lower right and
left limbs and that the total burns received by her were to the
extent of 80 per cent. The patient was conscious when he had
examined her. She was admitted by him to the burns ward. On
10
the morning of 21.07.2000 at about 02:45 am (i.e. in the night
itself), the police of S.R. Nagar came to the hospital and
requested him to give permission to record the statement of the
patient. Since the patient was conscious and in a position to
give the statement, he gave permission to the police to record
her statement. The statement was recorded as Exhibit P-12 and
he had made an endorsement on it under his signatures that
the patient was in a fit condition to give a statement. He even
proved the endorsement and his signatures on Exhibit P-12. In
his cross-examination, nothing material turned up except that
he admitted that in the OPD slip, it is mentioned that she herself
had poured kerosene and had set fire to herself, but he does not
know who recorded the said statement on the OPD slip/case
sheet (Exhibit P-11). He further admitted that though according
to his examination the burns were to the extent of 80 per cent
but he does not know why the burns were recorded to be 98 per
cent. He denied the suggestion that the endorsement on Exhibit
P-12 was made by him to support the prosecution under any
pressure.
11
15. The aforesaid evidence of the two doctors who examined the
deceased clearly proves that the deceased was admitted to the
hospital as alleged on 20.07.2000 and that despite serious
injuries, she was in a conscious state. The attending doctors
have certified that she was in a fit position to make a statement
and, therefore, permission was granted to the police to record
her statement which is Exhibit P-12 which bear the
endorsement and signature of the doctor. We see no reason to
disbelieve the evidence of PW-4, PW-10 and PW-11.
16. The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Head
Constable working in the SR Nagar Police Station. His statement
was recorded as PW-15. He categorically stated that he had
remained posted in the aforesaid police station from 1997 to
May, 2003 meaning thereby that he was posted at the aforesaid
police station at the time the alleged incident took place and the
deceased was taken and admitted to the hospital. He further
stated that on the said date he was on night duty and at about
01:30 am, the Station House Officer having received information
of the deceased being admitted in the hospital, had asked him
12
to go and record her statement. He as such reached the hospital
at 02:00 am and met the doctor of the burns ward of the
hospital. He informed him that he had come to record the
statement of the deceased. The doctor after talking to the
deceased for about two minutes informed him that the patient
was in a position to give the statement. He permitted him to
record the statement, whereupon he recorded her statement for
about half an hour. The deceased put her thumb (LTI) on the
statement recorded by him as she was not in a position to put
her signatures. The statement was endorsed by the doctor who
certified the condition of the deceased and signed the statement.
He proved the statement Exhibit P-12, the endorsement and the
certificate of the doctor and his signatures upon it.
17. The translated copy of the statement (Exhibit P-12) was not
placed before us, though the original in vernacular language
exists in the record. The same was proved by PW-15, as stated
earlier. He stated that the deceased told him that she was
married to the appellant and had lived happily with him for
about 2-3 years but thereafter the appellant had started
13
quarrelling with her demanding her to bring more money from
her parents. He started treating her cruelly by abusing and
beating her. On 20.07.2000, he quarrelled with her and forced
her to get more money from her parents. In the night, he again
picked up a quarrel with her and assaulted her. He then abused
her and even threatened to kill her. He poured kerosene on her
body and set her on fire. At that time her four children were
sleeping in the house and on hearing her cries, they went to
their grandmother’s house and called her.
18. Considering the circumstances and the evidence of PW-3, PW-
4, PW-10 and PW-11 coupled with the fact that there is no
adverse material to doubt the above dying declaration or to
suggest that it was not actually or properly recorded or that the
deceased was not in a state to make such a statement, there is
no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration.
19. The fact that the aforesaid PW-15 admitted that there was no
nurse present at the hospital when he recorded the statement,
is not enough to belie the above dying declaration. The same
was recorded in the night at about 02:00-02:30 am with the
14
permission of the doctor who has accepted having granted the
permission on being satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state
to make the statement. In the light of the above statements of
the doctors and the police officer, the oral evidence of PW-7 and
PW-16 that she was not conscious to give any statement, is not
reliable. The deceased, may have been momentarily in an
unconscious state due to the effect of sedatives, however, by
and large, as the burn injuries were superficial, though to great
extent, she was conscious most of the time and was in a fit state
of mind to get her dying declaration recorded.
20. This apart, the police had recovered a matchbox, a kerosene tin
and burnt cloth pieces from the site of the incident immediately.
The Recovery Memo was duly prepared in the form of Exhibit P-
1. The said exhibit was proved by the PW-6, D. Rangaswamy,
one of the neighbours who had visited the house of the deceased
immediately on the occurrence of the incident. He has stated
that the matchbox, kerosene tin and burnt cloths were lying at
the scene, a mahazar was prepared on the spot and the
aforesaid items were collected and seized by the police. He had
15
signed the mahazar prepared by the police which is before him
as Exhibit P-1 and bears his signatures. He denied the
suggestion that he was making a false statement.
21. The fact of recovery of the kerosene tin, matchbox and burnt
cloth pieces from the scene of the incident, the deposition of PW-
3, the daughter of the appellant and the deceased that she had
seen her father bringing kerosene tin, pouring it on her mother
and putting her on fire, coupled with the dying declaration and
the statements of the doctors PW-10, PW-11 who examined and
treated the deceased and PW-4 who conducted the post-
mortem, in unequivocal terms prove that the appellant alone is
responsible for the commission of the aforesaid offences. He is
the person who picked up quarrel with his deceased wife,
poured kerosene and burnt her and that his wife died due to the
burn injuries after consciously making a dying declaration and
naming the appellant as the main culprit.
22. In view of the above clinching pieces of evidence, there is hardly
any scope for the acquittal of the appellant.
16
23. The Trial Court was not justified in acquitting the appellant on
slight discrepancies in the statements of some of the witnesses,
particularly PW-7 and PW-16. PW-7 is a person who carried the
deceased to the hospital and his statement is not very
trustworthy. He has not deposed about her condition in the
hospital. PW-16 is the police inspector who conducted the
investigation. He might have deposed that the deceased was not
in a conscious state of mind but that would not override the
statement of the doctors who treated the deceased, especially
the one who was on duty and had permitted the police to record
the statement of the deceased on being satisfied that she was in
a fit condition to make a statement.
24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the
opinion that the High Court is perfectly justified in the facts and
circumstances of the case that the appellant is guilty of
commission of offences both under Sections 498A and 302 IPC
and has rightly been convicted and sentenced to the
imprisonment awarded.
17
25. The appeal, as such, is devoid of merit and is dismissed. The
appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender forthwith to
undergo the remaining part of the sentence.
26. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
……………………………………J.
[PANKAJ MITHAL]
……………………………………J.
[S.V.N. BHATTI]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 17, 2026.
2026 INSC 249
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2432 OF 2010
SUBRAMANI … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. The appellant - Subramani and the deceased Chennamma were
husband and wife. They were married for seventeen years before
the date of the incident. They had two daughters and two sons.
The eldest daughter was aged about sixteen years at the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
GEETA AHUJA
Date: 2026.03.17
17:00:36 IST
Reason:
relevant time. They had lived a happy married life for about
three years. Thereafter, their relations became strained, and it
2
is alleged that the appellant started ill-treating the deceased and
kept on raising demands for money, which the father of the
deceased fulfilled most of the time. The appellant had even
started treating her with cruelty.
2. On the night of 20.07.2000, the appellant and the deceased as
usual again picked up a quarrel. The appellant, in anger, went
out and fetched some kerosene. The kerosene was poured on
the deceased in a bathroom, the appellant lit a candle and threw
it upon her, causing serious burn injuries. The appellant, after
burning her, left the house. On the alarm raised by the
deceased, the neighbours came and tried to save her. They
doused the fire by pouring water. The deceased was taken to the
Victoria Hospital by the neighbours and the mother of the
appellant. She was admitted at around midnight and died after
three days on 24.07.2000 in the hospital due to severe burn
injuries received by her.
3. An FIR No. 194 of 2000 under Section 302 and Section 498A of
1
the Indian Penal Code was lodged by the father of the deceased
1
For short, ‘IPC’
3
on 24.07.2000 after she had died. The police inspector Shiva
Murthy, upon investigation submitted a chargesheet against the
appellant for committing offences punishable under Section
498A and 302 IPC.
4. The appellant was put to trial. The Trial Court acquitted him
primarily on the ground that the bathroom where the incident
took place was very small where two persons could not have
been accommodated. The testimonies of the family witnesses
were inconsistent and unreliable. The medical evidence
suggested that deceased had received more than 80 to 90
percent burn injuries and as such she may not be in a mental
state to depose or state anything either to the doctor or the
police. The dying declaration, if any, was therefore unreliable.
5. On an appeal by the State to the High Court, the Division Bench
reversed the judgment and order of the Trial Court. The
acquittal was set aside, and the appellant was convicted under
both the above provisions. He was sentenced to two years of
simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs.2,000/- and in
default in payment of the same, with a further three months of
4
simple imprisonment under Section 498A. He was also
convicted under Section 302 IPC for killing the deceased and
was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-,
and in default, to undergo a further one month of simple
imprisonment.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the
appellant preferred a Criminal Appeal under Section 379 of
Cr.P.C which was admitted on 13.12.2010 after the delay in
filing the same was condoned. Thus, the appeal is before us for
consideration as to whether the appellant is guilty of the
offences under Section 302 and 498A of IPC and whether the
sentence awarded to him is justified.
7. We have heard Shri Shekhar G. Devasa, learned senior counsel
for the appellant-Subramani and Shri Sanchit Garga, Advocate
on record for the respondent-State of Karnataka.
8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the High
Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court, more particularly when the acquittal
had been recorded on cogent and valid reasons after considering
5
every piece of the evidence on record. It was submitted that
apart from the inconsistencies in the statements of the material
witnesses, particularly PW-7 and PW-16, who categorically
stated that the deceased was unconscious and not in a position
to speak, there was no credible evidence to prove that the
appellant had committed the offence as alleged. It was also
submitted that the prosecution failed to prove any motive for
homicidal death. It was inherently improbable that the offence
could have been committed inside the small bathroom, and that
no independent neighbour was examined to prove the
commission of the offence. The alleged dying declaration was
unreliable, as it was unsupported by any medical certificate and
stood contradicted by hospital documents, which record a
history of self-inflicted burns. Furthermore, the deceased had
admittedly received more than 80 to 90 percent burn injuries
and was under heavy sedation. She was not in a position to
make any statement. Therefore, the conviction based upon the
alleged dying declaration of the deceased was wholly illegal.
6
9. There is no dispute as to the fact that the parties were married
17 years prior to the date of the incident and that there used to
be frequent quarrels between them with regard to money. It has
also come on record through evidence that the appellant used
to beat and treat the deceased with cruelty. There were regular
demands for money by him. The aforesaid facts and the
evidence clearly establish that the appellant was not a satisfied
man who suffered from frustration and as such had a motive to
kill the deceased.
10. The testimony of PW-3, Niresha, the eldest daughter of the
appellant and the deceased who was aged about 16 year is very
crucial and material. She had clearly deposed that on the fateful
night, she, her mother, sister and brothers were in their house.
Her father came and questioned the mother that when he had
sent her to her paternal home to get money, why she had sent
her father to counsel and advise him. Thus, they picked up a
quarrel and her father threatened her mother to wait and see
what he was going to do. He went out and brought kerosene,
poured it on her mother and set her on fire. This was done at
7
around 11:00 p.m. in the night and thereafter, he ran away from
the house. On the screams of her mother, the neighbours came
and extinguished the fire. Her grandmother and one another
person took her mother to the hospital in the burnt state. Her
mother remained in the hospital for three days, undergoing
treatment, and thereafter, she died.
11. The aforesaid witness PW-3 is an eyewitness. She has narrated
the incident as was seen by her. There is no inconsistency in
her statement and there is no reason to disbelieve her. There is
no material on record to show as to why she would falsely
depose against her father. Her evidence clinchingly proves that
the appellant brought kerosene, poured it on her mother and lit
the fire.
12. The other crucial witness in the case is PW-4, Dr. S.
Rudramurthy who had conducted the post-mortem upon the
deceased. He categorically stated that the death occurred due
to septicaemia as a result of burn injuries sustained by her. He
proved the postmortem report ‘Exhibit P-2’ and his signatures
on it. He further stated that the burn injuries were antemortem
8
and were to the extent of 85 to 90 percent. He reported that
septicaemia naturally occurs with such high burn injuries. He
opined that the burn injuries received by the deceased were
superficial in nature. He further opined that even if the
deceased was given proper and best treatment, her chances of
survival were minimal. Hence, the postmortem report and the
statement of PW-4 as such establish that the deceased died of
septicaemia as a result of 80-90% burn injuries which were
superficial.
13. There is another witness named Dr. Gurumurthy, whose
statement was recorded as PW-10. He was the doctor who had
treated the deceased after she was admitted in the Victoria
Hospital, Bangalore. He stated that he was the in-charge of
burns ward of the hospital. The deceased was brought to the
hospital on 20.07.2000 at around 11.15 p.m. with a history of
burns. She was admitted in the hospital at 12:00 midnight.
According to the deceased, as informed to him, her husband
used to quarrel with her frequently. On 20.07.2000, he came
home at around 11.00 p.m., assaulted her and then poured
9
diesel over her, set her on fire and ran away. He stated that
there is a note to the above effect in the case sheet as well. He
had examined the deceased on 23.07.2000 and she made the
said statement at around 12.30 p.m. on the same day. He even
proved ‘Exhibit P-11’, the statement of the deceased and his
signatures upon it. He further stated that the deceased was in
hospital up to 24.07.2000 and expired at 9.35 a.m. on the said
date.
14. One doctor named Dr. HC Ramanna, PW-11, also treated the
deceased when she was admitted to the Victoria Hospital. He
stated that on 20.07.2000 while he was working in the aforesaid
hospital, a patient by name Chennamma was brought to the
hospital in a burnt state. He had examined the patient and had
noticed that she had 9 per cent burns on the face and neck, 18
per cent burns on the chest and abdomen, 9 per cent on the
upper right and left limbs, 10 per cent on the lower right and
left limbs and that the total burns received by her were to the
extent of 80 per cent. The patient was conscious when he had
examined her. She was admitted by him to the burns ward. On
10
the morning of 21.07.2000 at about 02:45 am (i.e. in the night
itself), the police of S.R. Nagar came to the hospital and
requested him to give permission to record the statement of the
patient. Since the patient was conscious and in a position to
give the statement, he gave permission to the police to record
her statement. The statement was recorded as Exhibit P-12 and
he had made an endorsement on it under his signatures that
the patient was in a fit condition to give a statement. He even
proved the endorsement and his signatures on Exhibit P-12. In
his cross-examination, nothing material turned up except that
he admitted that in the OPD slip, it is mentioned that she herself
had poured kerosene and had set fire to herself, but he does not
know who recorded the said statement on the OPD slip/case
sheet (Exhibit P-11). He further admitted that though according
to his examination the burns were to the extent of 80 per cent
but he does not know why the burns were recorded to be 98 per
cent. He denied the suggestion that the endorsement on Exhibit
P-12 was made by him to support the prosecution under any
pressure.
11
15. The aforesaid evidence of the two doctors who examined the
deceased clearly proves that the deceased was admitted to the
hospital as alleged on 20.07.2000 and that despite serious
injuries, she was in a conscious state. The attending doctors
have certified that she was in a fit position to make a statement
and, therefore, permission was granted to the police to record
her statement which is Exhibit P-12 which bear the
endorsement and signature of the doctor. We see no reason to
disbelieve the evidence of PW-4, PW-10 and PW-11.
16. The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Head
Constable working in the SR Nagar Police Station. His statement
was recorded as PW-15. He categorically stated that he had
remained posted in the aforesaid police station from 1997 to
May, 2003 meaning thereby that he was posted at the aforesaid
police station at the time the alleged incident took place and the
deceased was taken and admitted to the hospital. He further
stated that on the said date he was on night duty and at about
01:30 am, the Station House Officer having received information
of the deceased being admitted in the hospital, had asked him
12
to go and record her statement. He as such reached the hospital
at 02:00 am and met the doctor of the burns ward of the
hospital. He informed him that he had come to record the
statement of the deceased. The doctor after talking to the
deceased for about two minutes informed him that the patient
was in a position to give the statement. He permitted him to
record the statement, whereupon he recorded her statement for
about half an hour. The deceased put her thumb (LTI) on the
statement recorded by him as she was not in a position to put
her signatures. The statement was endorsed by the doctor who
certified the condition of the deceased and signed the statement.
He proved the statement Exhibit P-12, the endorsement and the
certificate of the doctor and his signatures upon it.
17. The translated copy of the statement (Exhibit P-12) was not
placed before us, though the original in vernacular language
exists in the record. The same was proved by PW-15, as stated
earlier. He stated that the deceased told him that she was
married to the appellant and had lived happily with him for
about 2-3 years but thereafter the appellant had started
13
quarrelling with her demanding her to bring more money from
her parents. He started treating her cruelly by abusing and
beating her. On 20.07.2000, he quarrelled with her and forced
her to get more money from her parents. In the night, he again
picked up a quarrel with her and assaulted her. He then abused
her and even threatened to kill her. He poured kerosene on her
body and set her on fire. At that time her four children were
sleeping in the house and on hearing her cries, they went to
their grandmother’s house and called her.
18. Considering the circumstances and the evidence of PW-3, PW-
4, PW-10 and PW-11 coupled with the fact that there is no
adverse material to doubt the above dying declaration or to
suggest that it was not actually or properly recorded or that the
deceased was not in a state to make such a statement, there is
no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration.
19. The fact that the aforesaid PW-15 admitted that there was no
nurse present at the hospital when he recorded the statement,
is not enough to belie the above dying declaration. The same
was recorded in the night at about 02:00-02:30 am with the
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permission of the doctor who has accepted having granted the
permission on being satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state
to make the statement. In the light of the above statements of
the doctors and the police officer, the oral evidence of PW-7 and
PW-16 that she was not conscious to give any statement, is not
reliable. The deceased, may have been momentarily in an
unconscious state due to the effect of sedatives, however, by
and large, as the burn injuries were superficial, though to great
extent, she was conscious most of the time and was in a fit state
of mind to get her dying declaration recorded.
20. This apart, the police had recovered a matchbox, a kerosene tin
and burnt cloth pieces from the site of the incident immediately.
The Recovery Memo was duly prepared in the form of Exhibit P-
1. The said exhibit was proved by the PW-6, D. Rangaswamy,
one of the neighbours who had visited the house of the deceased
immediately on the occurrence of the incident. He has stated
that the matchbox, kerosene tin and burnt cloths were lying at
the scene, a mahazar was prepared on the spot and the
aforesaid items were collected and seized by the police. He had
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signed the mahazar prepared by the police which is before him
as Exhibit P-1 and bears his signatures. He denied the
suggestion that he was making a false statement.
21. The fact of recovery of the kerosene tin, matchbox and burnt
cloth pieces from the scene of the incident, the deposition of PW-
3, the daughter of the appellant and the deceased that she had
seen her father bringing kerosene tin, pouring it on her mother
and putting her on fire, coupled with the dying declaration and
the statements of the doctors PW-10, PW-11 who examined and
treated the deceased and PW-4 who conducted the post-
mortem, in unequivocal terms prove that the appellant alone is
responsible for the commission of the aforesaid offences. He is
the person who picked up quarrel with his deceased wife,
poured kerosene and burnt her and that his wife died due to the
burn injuries after consciously making a dying declaration and
naming the appellant as the main culprit.
22. In view of the above clinching pieces of evidence, there is hardly
any scope for the acquittal of the appellant.
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23. The Trial Court was not justified in acquitting the appellant on
slight discrepancies in the statements of some of the witnesses,
particularly PW-7 and PW-16. PW-7 is a person who carried the
deceased to the hospital and his statement is not very
trustworthy. He has not deposed about her condition in the
hospital. PW-16 is the police inspector who conducted the
investigation. He might have deposed that the deceased was not
in a conscious state of mind but that would not override the
statement of the doctors who treated the deceased, especially
the one who was on duty and had permitted the police to record
the statement of the deceased on being satisfied that she was in
a fit condition to make a statement.
24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the
opinion that the High Court is perfectly justified in the facts and
circumstances of the case that the appellant is guilty of
commission of offences both under Sections 498A and 302 IPC
and has rightly been convicted and sentenced to the
imprisonment awarded.
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25. The appeal, as such, is devoid of merit and is dismissed. The
appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender forthwith to
undergo the remaining part of the sentence.
26. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
……………………………………J.
[PANKAJ MITHAL]
……………………………………J.
[S.V.N. BHATTI]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 17, 2026.