Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6238 OF2021
( ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 23856 OF 2014 )
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ...APPELLANTS
VERSUS
METHU MEDA …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
Leave granted.
2. Questioning the validity of the order passed in Writ
Appeal No. 1090 of 2013 on 20.12.2013 upholding the order of
the learned Single Judge passed on 27.09.2013 in Writ
Petition No. 3897 of 2013, this appeal has been preferred.
3. The facts unfolded in the present case are that the
respondent was found involved in an offence of kidnapping of
Signature Not Verified
Nilesh for demand of ransom. An FIR was registered against
Digitally signed by
SUNIL KUMAR
Date: 2021.10.06
16:33:12 IST
Reason:
him on 22.8.2009. After investigation challan was filed, and
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he was tried before the Sessions Court, Jhabua, Madhya
Pradesh in Sessions Case Serial No. 1 of 2010 for the charge
framed against him under Sections 347/327/323/506 (Part
II) and 364A IPC. The Sessions Court acquitted him for the
said charge because the complainant, who was abducted,
turned hostile in the Court. Thereafter, respondent applied for
the post of Constable in Central Industrial Security Force (for
short “CISF”) and got selected through the Staff Selection
Commission (for short “SSC”). An offer of appointment for
provisional selection to the post of Constable/GD was issued
to the respondent on 30.3.2012, subject to the conditions
given in the agreement form. The respondent was required to
furnish the documents including attestation forms, certificate
of character, character and antecedent certificate from local
Station House Officer. The respondent, while submitting the
attestation form, specified the registration of abovesaid
criminal case and acquittal from the charges in a trial by the
competent court.
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4 . As the offer of appointment was conditional, therefore,
in terms of the CISF Circular No. E
EG7023/TRG.SEC/ADM.I/CIRCULARS/20101157 dated
31.03.2010. he was not allowed to join training. The Ministry
of Home Affairs vide letter No. I45020/6/2010Pers.II
issued the guidelines on 01.02.2012 for consideration of the
cases of the candidates against whom criminal cases were
registered or tried by the courts.
5 . In furtherance to the said guidelines, the case of the
respondent was referred to AIG(L&R), CISF Hqrs, New Delhi
with an information to IG/TS, CISF(TS) NISA, Hyderabad vide
letter No. F37023/CISF/RTC(D)/Trg./CBG/2012/2656
dated
04.05.2012. The Standing Screening Committee assembled
on 27.07.2012 and examined the cases of 89 candidates
including the respondent and on 15.10.2012 passed an order
that respondent was not eligible for appointment.
6. Questioning the validity of the said action and asking for
consequential reliefs, Writ Petition No. 3897 of 2013 was filed
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench. The
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learned Single Judge, vide order dated 27.09.2013, allowed
the Writ Petition directing the respondents therein to issue an
order for sending the respondent herein on training
commencing with effect from 21.10.2013. The Court further
held that he would be entitled for all consequential benefits
including seniority, notional fixation of salary etc. but back
wages were denied. The said order was assailed before the
Division Bench by filing Writ Appeal, but it was also
dismissed, which led to filing the present appeal through the
department.
7 . The validity of the order passed by the learned Single
Judge and also by the Division Bench have been assailed,
inter alia, contending, until the respondent is honourably
acquitted from the charge involving moral turpitude and the
decision of the Screening Committee is not passed mala fide,
interference in such decision is not warranted. Reliance is
placed on the decision of this Court in
Inspector General of
Police & Another vs. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598 to
clarify the meaning of ‘honourable acquittal’.
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8. It is argued that merely making a disclosure of the
criminal case in the attestation form is not sufficient. As per
the Policy Guidelines dated 01.02.2012, in view of involvement
of the respondent in heinous offences including the offences
under Sections 327/347/364A IPC, he would not be entitled
for appointment until honourably acquitted. Even though,
the respondent has been provisionally selected vide letter
dated 30.03.2012, issued by the Chairman of the Recruitment
Board, but mere acquittal giving benefit of doubt, as the
witnesses have turned hostile, would not make the candidate
suitable for appointment. The impugned orders passed by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh are contrary to the law laid
down in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and
(2016)8 SCC 471,
Others Commissioner of Police, New
Delhi and Another vs. Mehar Singh (2013)7 SCC 685, State
of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Abhijit Singh Pawar
(2018) 18 SCC 733,
State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Love
Kush Meena 2021(4) SCALE 634 and Commissioner of
2021(9) SCALE 713. It is urged that
Police vs. Raj Kumar
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acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive for suitability of
the candidate for appointment. Thus, unless the respondent
is honourably acquitted in a criminal case, it would not
automatically entitle him for appointment to the post.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended
that the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh have considered the judgment of
Delhi High Court in the case of Rahul Yadav vs CISF and
, 178(2011) DLT 263, where the High Court observed
another
that the situation and background of the candidates hailing
from the rural areas were relevant factors for consideration.
Mere registration of a criminal case and acquittal from the
said charges, would not disentitle him from appointment. The
special leave petition preferred against the said judgment has
been dismissed by this Court on 05.10.2012. On the point of
defining the ‘acquittal’, the judgment in Panna Mehta vs.
(2002 4 M.P.H.T. 226 has been relied and urged
State of M.P. )
that if the respondent has not concealed the material fact and
specified details in the attestation form regarding the criminal
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case, trial and its result, it would not disentitle him from
appointment to the post, in particular when in Bombay High
Court, in the case of similarly situated person Ramesh has
been sent on training. It is urged that the impugned order
passed by the High Court is in conformity to law. The
judgment in Panna Mehta (supra) is, however,
distinguishable on facts in that a similarly situated person had
been sent on training.
10. After having heard learned counsel for the parties at
length, the question which arises in the present appeal is
whether the decision of the Screening Committee rejecting the
candidature of the respondent, when there was no allegation
of malice against the Screening Committee and the
respondentwrit petitioner had been acquitted of serious
charges, inter alia, of kidnapping for ransom as some
prosecution witnesses had turned hostile, ought to have been
interfered with.
11. While addressing the question, as argued the meaning of
expression ‘acquittal’ is required to be looked into. The
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expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and
‘fully acquitted’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal
Procedure or the Indian Penal Code. It has been developed by
judicial pronouncements. In the case of
State of Assam &
Another vs. Raghava Rajgopalachari , (1972) 7 SLR 44, the
effect of the word ‘honourably acquitted’ has been considered
in the context of the Assam Fundament Rules (FR) 54 (a) for
entitlement of full pay and allowance if the employee is not
dismissed. The Court has referred the judgment of Robert
reported in (1934) 61 ILR
Stuart Wauchope vs. Emperor
Cal. 168, in the context of expression ‘honourably acquitted’,
Lord Williams, J. observed as thus:
“The expression “honourably acquitted” is one
which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it
is a form of order used in courts martial and other
extra judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment
that we accepted the explanation given by the
Appellant believed it to be true and considered that it
ought to have been accepted by the Government
authorities and by the magistrate. Further we
decided that the Appellant had not misappropriated
the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear
that the effect of our judgment was that the
Appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it
was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably,
this is equivalent to what Government authorities
term “honourably acquitted”.
“
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12. In the case of R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India AIR 1964
SC 787, it is observed and held by Wanchoo, J., as thus:
“Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where
the acquittal is other than honourable.”
13 . In view of the above, if the acquittal is directed by the
court on consideration of facts and material evidence on
record with the finding of false implication or the finding that
the guilt had not been proved, accepting the explanation of
accused as just, it be treated as honourable acquittal. In
other words, if prosecution could not prove the guilt for other
reasons and not ‘honourably’ acquitted by the Court, it be
treated other than ‘honourable’, and proceedings may follow.
14 . The expression ‘honourable acquittal’ has been
considered in the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) after
considering the judgments of
Reserve Bank of India vs.
Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994)1 SCC 541 , R.P. Kapur (supra),
(supra); this Court observed that
Raghava Rajagopalachari
the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a
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criminal court and enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary
proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of
establishing guilt of the accused is on the prosecution, until
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In case, the prosecution
failed to take steps to examine crucial witnesses or the
witnesses turned hostile, such acquittal would fall within the
purview of giving benefit of doubt and the accused cannot be
treated as honourably acquitted by the criminal court. While,
in a case of departmental proceedings, the guilt may be
proved on the basis of preponderance and probabilities, it is
thus observed that acquittal giving benefit of doubt would not
automatically lead to reinstatement of candidate unless the
rules provide so.
15. Recently, this Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh
Administration and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr.
(2018) 1 SCC 797, relying upon the judgment of S.
Samuthiram (supra) said that acquittal in a criminal case is
not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates on the post
concerned. It is observed, acquittal or discharge of a person
10
cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or he
had no criminal antecedent. The said issue has further been
considered in (supra) holding nonexamination
Mehar Singh
of key witnesses leading to acquittal is not honourable
acquittal, in fact, it is by giving benefit of doubt. The Court
said nature of acquittal is necessary for core consideration. If
acquittal is not honourable, the candidates are not suitable for
government service and are to be avoided. The relevant factors
and the nature of offence, extent of his involvement,
propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in
future, are the relevant aspects for consideration by the
Screening Committee, which is competent to decide all these
issues.
16 . In the present case, the charges were framed against the
respondent for the offences punishable under Sections
347/327/323/506(PartII) and 364A IPC. He was acquitted
after trial vide judgment dated 19.03.2010 by the Sessions
Judge, Jhabua because the person kidnapped Nilesh and also
his wife have not supported the case of prosecution. As per
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prosecution, the complainant was beaten by the respondent
and the said fact found support from the evidence of doctor.
Therefore, it appears that the Committee was of the view that
acquittal of the respondent, in the facts of the present case,
cannot be termed as ‘honourable acquittal’ and the said
acquittal may be treated by giving benefit of doubt.
17.
The law with regard to the effect and consequence of the
acquittal, concealment of criminal case on appointments etc.
has been settled in the case of (supra), wherein a
Avtar Singh
threeJudge Bench of this Court decided, as thus:
“ . We have noticed various decisions and tried to
38
explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In
view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarize our
conclusion thus:
“ 38.1 Information given to the employer by a
candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or
pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after
entering into service must be true and there should
be no suppression or false mention of required
information.
. While passing order of termination of services
38.2
or cancellation of candidature for giving false
information, the employer may take notice of special
12
circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such
information.
. The employer shall take into consideration the
38.3
Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to
the employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false
information of involvement in a criminal case where
conviction or acquittal had already been recorded
before filling of the application/verification form and
such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any
of the following recourse appropriate to the case may
be adopted :
38.4.1 . In a case trivial in nature in which conviction
had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at
young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed
would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post
in question, the employer may, in its discretion,
ignore such suppression of fact or false information
by condoning the lapse.
38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in case
which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel
candidature or terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a
case involving moral turpitude or offence of
heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it
is not a 3 case of clean acquittal, or benefit of
reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may
consider all relevant facts available as to
antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to
the continuance of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made
declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case,
the employer still has the right to consider
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the
candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared
in character verification form regarding pendency of
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a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts
and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may
appoint the candidate subject to decision of such
case.
38.7 . In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with
respect to multiple pending cases such false
information by itself will assume significance and an
employer may pass appropriate order cancelling
candidature or terminating services as appointment
of a 4 person against whom multiple criminal cases
were pending may not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to
the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it
may have adverse impact and the appointing
authority would take decision after considering the
seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service,
holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary
before passing order of termination/removal or
dismissal on the ground of suppression or
submitting false information in verification form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false
information attestation/verification form has to be
specific, not vague. Only such information which was
required to be specifically mentioned has to be
disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant
comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be
considered in an objective manner while addressing
the question of fitness. However, in such cases action
cannot be taken on basis of suppression or 5
submitting false information as to a fact which was
not even asked for.
. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio
38.11
veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be
attributable to him.”
18 . In view of the above, in the facts of the present case, as
per paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5, it is clear that the employer is
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having right to consider the suitability of the candidate as per
government orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the
decision for induction of the candidate in employment.
Acquittal on technical ground in respect of the offences of
heinous/serious nature, which is not a clean acquittal, the
employer may have a right to consider all relevant facts
available as to the antecedents, and may take appropriate
decision as to the continuance of the employee. Even in case,
truthful declaration regarding concluded trial has been made
by the employee, still the employer has the right to consider
antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the
candidate.
19. If we look into the facts of the present case, the
instructions of the Home Department dated 1.02.2012,
prevalent at the time of selection and appointment specify
such candidate would not be considered for recruitment. In
Circular No. 2/2010 dated 31.03.2010, issued by the Office of
the Training Sector, National Industrial Security Academy,
Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), it
15
is clarified if a candidate is found involved in any criminal
case, whether it is finalized or pending, the candidate may not
be allowed to join without further instructions from the
headquarter. After seeking instructions from the headquarter,
the Standing Committee has taken the decision on 15.10.2012
that because of acquittal giving benefit of doubt, the
respondentwrit petitioner was not considered eligible for
appointment in CISF.
20. In the aforesaid fact, guidance can further be taken from
the judgment of (supra), in paras 23, 34, 35,
Mehar Singh
this Court observed, as thus:
23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to
conclude that the Screening Committee would be
entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of
moral turpitude out of the police force even if they
are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the
acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not
honourable. The Screening Committee will be within
its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if
it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious
flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the
result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is
only experienced officers of the Screening Committee
who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or
discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar
activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The
Screening Committee will have to consider the
nature and extent of such person’s involvement in
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the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause
for worsening the law and order situation rather
than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy
framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any
interference from this Court as its object appears to
be to ensure that only persons with impeccable
character enter the police force.
34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from
the fact that in their application and/or attestation
form they have disclosed their involvement in a
criminal case. We do not see how this fact improves
their case. Disclosure of these facts in the
application/attestation form is an essential
requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these
facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt
requirements of the police force. The respondents
should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie
points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has
no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition
to state that while deciding whether a person
against whom a criminal case was registered and
who was later acquitted or discharged should be
appointed to a post in the police force, what is
relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of
his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean
acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt
because the witnesses turned hostile or because of
some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the
propensity of such person to indulge in similar
activities in future. This decision, in our opinion,
can only be taken by the Screening Committee
created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the
Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or
actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it
cannot be questioned.
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It
shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law
and order and public order in the society. People
repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be
worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to
join the police force must be a person of utmost
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rectitude. He must have impeccable character and
integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will
not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or
discharge order will have to be examined to see
whether he has been completely exonerated in the
case because even a possibility of his taking to the
life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the
police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has
entrusted the task of taking decisions in these
matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of
the Screening Committee must be taken as final
unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of
the police force is tarnished. Instances of police
personnel behaving in a wayward manner by
misusing power are in public domain and are a
matter of concern. The reputation of the police force
has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would
not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a
mechanism like the Screening Committee created by
the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are
likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police
force. At the same time, the Screening Committee
must be alive to the importance of trust reposed in it
.
and must treat all candidates with even hand
21. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear the respondent who
wishes to join the police force must be a person of utmost
rectitude and have impeccable character and integrity. A
person having a criminal antecedents would not be fit in this
category. The employer is having right to consider the nature
of acquittal or decide until he is completely exonerated
because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes
poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The
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Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking
decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee and the
decision of the Committee would be final unless mala fide. In
the case of (supra), this Court has taken the
Pradeep Kumar
same view, as reiterated in the case of Mehar Singh (supra).
The same view has again been reiterated by this Court in the
case of (supra).
Raj Kumar
22. As discussed hereinabove, the law is wellsettled. If a
person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the
charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because the
witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle
him for the employment, that too in disciplined force. The
employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms
of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The mere
disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is
not sufficient. In the said situation, the employer cannot be
compelled to give appointment to the candidate. Both the
Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court have
not considered the said legal position, as discussed above in
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the orders impugned. Therefore, the impugned orders passed
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition
No. 3897 of 2013 and Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1090
of 2013 are not sustainable in law, as discussed hereinabove.
23. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby allowed and the
impugned orders are setaside. No order as to costs.
……………………………J.
[ INDIRA BANERJEE ]
……………………………J.
[ J.K. MAHESHWARI ]
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 6, 2021.
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