Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BEOHAR RAJENDRA SINHA & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
11/03/1969
BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMI, V.
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
MITTER, G.K.
CITATION:
1969 AIR 1256 1969 SCR (3) 955
1969 SCC (1) 796
ACT:
Civil Procedure Code 1908, S. 80-Karta of Hindu Joint Family
giving notice of suit under section 80-Thereafter members of
family dividing on partition-Divided members joining as
plaintiffs in suit Whether fresh notice necessary by divided
members or previous notice of Karta was in representative
capacity.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, who was at the time the Karta of a Hindu
Joint Family, gave notice in January, 1954, to the
respondent State under section 80 of the Civil Procedure
Code. Thereafter a suit was filed in July, 1954, by which
time a partition had taken place in the family. In view of
this the appellant’s three grand-sons were joined as
plaintiffs in the suit the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that three nazul plots in suit had been in the possession of
the plaintiffs and their ancestors from time immemorial and
their status was that of Raiyat Sarkar; so that an order of
the State Government in the Survey and Settlement Department
refusing to recognise their possession over the plots was
wrong and ultra vires. Apart from contesting the suit on
the merits, the respondent State contended that plaintiffs
2, 3 and 4 i.e. the appellant’s grand-sons had no right to
institute a suit because no notice under section 80 C.P.C.
was given on their behalf. The trial court dismissed the
suit. In an appeal, the High Court held that the appellant
had lost the right to represent the joint family as karta at
the time of institution of the suit because their had been
severence of joint status and the notice served by him could
not enure to the benefit of other plaintiffs. On the merits
the High Court found that the plaintiffs had shown their
possession for the statutory period of 6 years.
On appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The notice given by the appellant in January,
1954, was sufficient in law to sustain a suit brought by all
the divided coparceners who must be deemed to be as much the
authors of the notice as the Karta who was the actual
signatory of the notice. There was substantial identity
between the person giving the notice and the persons
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bringing the suit in the present case. [959 B]
At the time of giving notice the appellant was admittedly
the eldest member of the joint family and being a Karta he
was entitled to represent the joint family in all its
affairs. The cause of action had accrued at the time of
giving of the notice and it was not necessary to give a
second notice merely because there was a severance of the
joint family, before 20th July, 1954, when the suit was
actually instituted. [958 G-H]
Although the terms of section 80 C.P.C. must be strictly
complied with, that does not mean that the terms of the
notice ’should be scrutinised in an artificial or pedantic
manner. [960 A]
Dhian Singh Sobha Singh & Anr. v. The Union of India, [1958]
S.C.R. 781, referred to,
956
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayan
Garu, [1964] 4 S.C.R., 945; Vellayan Chettiar & Ors. v.
Government of the Province of Madras and Anr., A.I.R. 1947,
P.C. 197; Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji
Ardeshir Wadia & Ors., 76 I.A. 85, distinguished.
(2) On the merits, the appellants had failed to produce
reliable oral or documentary evidence to prove that their
ancestors had possession over the disputed land for many
years. On the contrary this land was always recognised as
Milkiat Sarkar and the respondent State Government was
justified in holding it as such.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 386 and 387
of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and_decree dated
April 16, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First
Appeal No. 217 of 1959.
S. V. Gupte, P. C. Bhartari and J. B. Dadachanji, for
the appellants (in C.A. No. 386 of 1966) and the respondents
(in C.A. No. 387 of 1966).
I. N. Shroff and Rama Gupta, for the State of Madhya
Pradesh.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by special leave
from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated
16th April, 1963 in’ First Appeal No. 217 of 1959, whereby
the High Court modified partly the judgment of the first
Additional District Judge, Jabalpur dismissing Civil Suit
No. 10-A of 1954.
The suit was instituted against the State of Madhya Pradesh
by Beohar Raghubir Singh and his three grand-sons. Beohar
Raghubir Singh’s son, Beohar Rajendra Sinha, was a pro-forma
defendant. A notice under section 80 of Civil Procedure
Code had been given by Raghubir Singh on 11th January, 1954.
Plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4, his grand-sons were joined as
plaintiffs because in a partition made subsequent to the
giving of the notice, they were each entitled to 1/5th share
along with the first plaintiff. Beohar, Rajendra Sinha was
joined as a defendant because he did not choose to join as
the plaintiff. The plaintiffs sought a declaration (1) that
the three nazul plots in suit had been in possession of the
plaintiffs and the predecessors in their own right from time
immemorial and their status was that of Raiyat Sarkar; and
(2) that the order of the State Government in the Survey and
Settlement Department refusing to recognise their possession
over the plots was wrong and ultra vires. The dispute
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relates to Phoota Tal a tank situated within the town of
Jabalpur. It was plot No. 282 in the settlement of 1863
A.D. Its area then was
957
5.24 acres. it was recorded as malkiat Sarkar and in the
last column there was an entry showing possession of Aman
Singh Thakur Prasad. The next settlement took place in
1890-91. The survey number of Phoota Tal was changed to
plot No. 325. Its area remained the same, it was recorded
as "water (pani)" and in the last column, the entry showed
the possession of Beohar Narpatsingh Raghubir Singh. , The
third settlement took placed in 1909-10. The plot number of
Phoota Tal was then , it was still recorded change to 327.
Its area remained the same it was still recorded as ’water",
but there was no entry in favour of any one showing
possession. The nazul settlement took place in 1922-23. In
this settlement, the tank was given numbers 33, 34, 35, 36,
37 and 171. Its area was recorded as 5.24 acres. In this
settlement about 2 acres of land was found to be occupied by
the Municipal Committee, Jabalpur. The land so found to be
occupied was recorded in the possession of the Muncipal
Committee, Jabalpur and the remaining land was again
recorded as "Milkiat Sarkar". There was no entry regarding
possession in the remarks column so far as the remaining
land was concerned. The plaintiffs alleged that Thakur
Prasad and Aman Singh were their ancestors, that they had
been in continuous possession of the disputed landand the
omission to record their possession in the last two settle-
ments of 1909-10 and 1922-23 was due to some oversight. In
1948 the first plaintiff made an application for correction
to the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur who made an order in
his favour Ex. P-5. The order of the Deputy Commissioner
was however set aside by the State Government on 28th May,
1953 and it was held that the plaintiffs had no title to the
disputed land. The plaintiff therefore prayed for a
declaration of the title to the disputed plots and for the
correction of the entry in the settlement record showing the
status of the plaintiff as that of "Raiyat Sarkar". The
suit was contested by the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was
urged that the plaintiff had no possession over the disputed
land and the order of the State Government dated 28th May,
1953 was correct. It was contended that plaintiffs 2, 3 and
4 had no right to institute the suit because no notice under
section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was given on their
behalf. The suit was not contested by the second defendant
Beohar Rajendra Sinha. By its judgment dated 24th January,
1959 the trial court held that there was no documentary
evidence from 1891 to 1932 to support the possession of the
ancestors of the plaintiffs regarding Phoota Tal. The trial
court also held that- in all the settlement entries, the
land was recorded as belonging to the Government "Milkiat
Sarkar". In any event, between 1891 to 1932 there was no
evidence regarding the user of the property by the
plaintiffs and in the subsequent years a part of the
property was found in possession of the Municipal Committee.
The trial court dismissed the suit. Against the judgment of
the trial court
958
the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court. The
High Court held in the first place the notice Ex. P-8 was
not in conformity with section 80 of the Civil Procedure
Code. The High Court held that Beohar Raghubir Singh had
lost the right to represent the joint family as karta at the
time of institution of the suit because there had been a
severence of joint status and the notice served by Beohar
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Raghubir Singh could not ensure to, the benefit of the other
plaintiffs. On the merits of the case, the High Court found
that the plaintiffs had established their possession for the
statutory period of 60 years. The High Court held that the
plaintiffs had acquired the right of Raiyat Sarkar and that
the order of the State Government refusing to correct the
revenue record was illegal. On these findings the High
Court modified the judgment of the trial court to the extent
that there was a declaration in favour of the plaintiffs
that they were entitled to 1/5th share of the property in
dispute and the claim regarding the 4/5th share was
dismissed The order of the State Government dated 28th May,
1953 refusing to recognise the possession of the plaintiffs
was held to be wrong and illegal.
The first question to be considered in these appeals is
whether the High Court was right in holding that the notice
given under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code by the
first plaintiff was effective only with regard to Raghubir
Singh and. the notice was ineffective with regard to the
other plaintiffs and therefore Raghubir Singh alone was
entitled to a declaration as regards the 1/5th share of the
dispute plot. On behalf of defendant No. 1 it was contended
by Mr. Shroff that at the time of giving notice the
plaintiffs and the second defendant were joint and plaintiff
No. 1 Raghubir Singh was karta of the joint family. The
notice was given on 11th January, 1954 and the suit was
instituted on 20th July, 1954. It was admitted that between
these two dates there was a disruption of the joint family
of which Raghubir Singh was a karta. It was argued that the
right of the first plaintiff to represent the family had
come to an end before the institution of the suit, and hence
plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 had to comply individually with the
provisions of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code before
appearing as plaintiffs in the suit, In our opinion, there
is no justification for this argument., We consider that
there is substantial identity between the person giving the
notice and the persons filing the suit in the present case.
At the time of giving notice the first plaintiff Beohar
Raghubir Singh was admittedly the eldest member of the joint
family and being a karta he was entitled to represent the
joint family in all its affairs. The cause of action had
accrued at the time of giving of the notice and it was not
necessary to give a second notice merely because there was a
severence of the joint family, before 20th July, 1954 when
the suit was actually instituted. It is obvious
959
that the notice was given by Beohar Raghubir Singh as a
representative of the joint family and in view of the
subsequent partition the suit had to be instituted by, all
the divided members of the joint family. We are of the
opinion that the notice given by Beohar Raghubir Singh on
11th January, 1954 was sufficient in law to sustain a suit
brought by all the divided coparceners who must be deemed to
be as much the authors of the notice as the karta who was
the actual signatory of the notice. There is substantial
identity between the person giving the notice and the
persons bringing the suit in the present case and the
argument of defendant No. 1 on this point must be rejected.
The object of the notice under section 80, Civil Procedure
Code is to give to the Government or the public servant
concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal
position and if that course is justified to make amends or
settle the claim out of court. The section is no doubt
imperative; failure to serve notice complying with the
requirements of the statute will entail dismissal of the
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suit. But the notice must be reasonably construed. Any
unimportant error or defect cannot-be permitted to be
treated as an excuse for defeating a just claim. In
considering whether the provisions of the statute are
complied with, the Court must take into account the
following matters in each case (1) whether the name,
description and residence of the plaintiff are given so as
to enable the authorities to identify the person serving the
notice; (2) whether the cause of action and the relief which
the plaintiff claims are set out with sufficient
particularity; (3) whether a notice in writing has been
delivered to or left at the office of the appropriate
authority mentioned in the section; and (4) whether the suit
is instituted after the expiration of two months next after
notice has been served, and the plaint contains a statement
that such a notice has been so delivered or left. In
construing the notice the Court cannot ignore the object of
the legislature, viz., to give to the Government or the
public servant concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or
his legal position. If on a reasonable reading of the
notice the plaintiff is shown to have given the information
which the statute requires him to give, any incidental
defects or irregularities should be ignored.
In the present case, the notice was served on 11th
January, 1954 by Beohar Raghubir Singh. The notice stated
the cause of action arising in favour of the joint family.
The requirements as to cause of action, the name,
description and residence of the plaintiff were complied
with and the reliefs which the plaintiff claimed were duly
set out in the notice. It is true that Beohar Raghubir
Singh did not expressly describe himself as the karta. But
reading the contents of the notice Ex. P-8 in a reasonable
manner it appears to us that the claim of Beohar Raghubir
Singh
960
was made on behalf of the joint family. It is true that the
term of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code must be
strictly complied but that does not mean that the terms of
the notice should be scrutinised in an artificial or
pedantic manner. In Dhian Singh Sobha , Singh & Anr. v. The
Union of India & Anr. (1) Bhagwati, J. observed in the
course of his judgment :-
"We are constrained to observe that the
approach of the High Court to this question
was not well-founded. The Privy Council no
doubt laid down in Bhagchand Dagadusa v.
Secretary of State (2) that the terms of this
section should be strictly complied with.
That does not however mean that the terms of
the notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic
manner or in a manner completely divorced from
common sense. As was stated by Pollock C. B.
in Jones v. Nicholls(3) We must impprt a
little common sense into notices of this
kind’. Beaumonth, C.J., also observed in
Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Government of Bombay(4)
"One must construe section 80 with some regard
to common sense and to the object with which
it appears to have been passed......."
As already pointed out, the suit was instituted in the
present case by the divided members of Hindu joint family on
20th July, 1954. The notice had been given on 11th January,
1954 by Beohar Raghubir Singh who was the karta of the
undivided joint family. In our opinion there was identity
between the person giving a notice and the persons filing
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the suit because it must be deemed in law that each of the
plaintiffs had given the notice under s. 80 of the Civil
Procedure Code through the karta Beohar Raghubir Singh. It
is not disputed that the cause of action set out in the
notice remained unchanged in the suit. It is also not said
that the relief set out in the plaint is different from the
relief set out in the notice. We are accordingly of the
opinion that the notice given by the karta was sufficient to
sustain the suit brought by the divided coparceners and the
decision of the High Court on this point must be over-ruled.
The view that we have expressed is borne out by the
judgment of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayan Garu(5).. In that case, the
Government of Madras applied the provisions of the Madras
Estates Rent Reduction Act, 1947 to the lands in the village
Mallindhapuram on the ground that the grant was of the whole
village and hence an estate within the meaning of s. 3 (2)
(d)of the Madras Estates
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 781. (2) [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 338.
(3) [1844] 13 M & W 361, 363; 153 E.R. 149,150.(4) I.L.R.
[1943] Bom. 128.
(5) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 945.
961
Land Act, 1908. The respondent and another person served a
notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the
Government of the State of Madras in which they challenged
the above mentioned notification and asked the Government
not to act upon it. Out of the two persons who gave the
notice, the respondent alone filed the suit. The trial
court held that the original grant was not of the entire
village and was not so confirmed or recognised by the
Government of Madras and as it was not an "Estate" within
the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act,
the Madras Rent Reduction Act, 1947 did not apply to it.
But the suit was dismissed on the ground that although two
persons had given notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, only one person had filed the suit. The High
Court agreed with the trial court that the grant was not of
an entire village but it also held that the notice was not
defective and the suit was maintainable as it was a
representative suit and the permission of the Court under
0.1, r. 8 had been obtained in this case. The High Court
granted the respondent the relief prayed for ’by him.
Against the order of the High Court the appellant appealed
to this Court which dismissed the appeal holding that in the
circumstances of the case there was no illegality even
though the notice was given by two persons and the suit was
filed by only one. If the Court grants permission to one
person to institute a representative suit and if the person
had served the notice under s. 80, the circumstance that
another person had joined him in serving the notice but did
not join him in the suit, was not a sufficient ground for
regarding the suit as defective. At page 953 of the Report
Shah, J. observed as follows :-
"The notice in the, present suit was served by
the plaintiff and Yegneswara Sastri. They
raised a grievance about the notification
issued by the Government of Madras on May 16,
1950; it was not an individual grievance of
the two persons who served the notice but of
all the Inamdars or agrahamdars. The relief
for which the suit was intended to be filed
was also not restricted to their personal
claim. The notice stated the cause of action
arising in favour of all the Inamdars, and it
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is not disputed that the notice set out the
relief which would be claimable by all the
Inamdars or on their behalf in default of
compliance with the requisition. The
plaintiff it is true alone filed the suit, but
he was permitted to sue for and on behalf of’
all the Inamdars by an order of the Court
unuder O. 1, r. 8 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The requirements as to the cause
of action, the name, description and place of
residence of the plaintiff was therefore
962
complied with and the relief which the
plaintiff claimed was duly set out in the
notice. The only departure from the notice
was that two persons served a notice under s.
80 informing the Government that proceedings
would be started, in default of compliance
with the requisition, for violation of the
rights of the Inamdars, and one person only
out of the two instituted the suit. That in
our judgment is not a defect which brings the
case within the terms of s. 80".
On behalf of respondent No. 1 reference was made, to the two
decisions of the Judicial Committee in Vellayan Chettiar &
Ors. v. Government of the Province of Madras and Anr.(1) and
Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir
Wadia & Ors.(2) But the ’principle of these decisions has no
bearing on the question presented for determination in the
present case. In Vellayan Chettiar’s case(1) a notice was
given by one plaintiff stating the cause of action, his
name, description and place of his residence and the relief
which he claimed although the suit was instituted by him and
another. It was observed by the Judicial Committee:
"The section according to its plain meaning
requires that there should be in the language
of the High Court of Madras ’identity of the
person who issues the notice with the person
who brings the suit’ : See Venkata Rangiah
Appa Rao v. Secretary of State(3) and on
appeal Venkata Rangiah Appa Rao v. Secretary
of State (4). To hold otherwise would be to
admit an implication or exception for which
there is no jurisdiction"
Two persons had sued for a declaration that certain lands
belonged to them, and for an order setting aside the
decision of the Appellate Survey Officer in regard to those
lands. It was found that one alone out of the two persons
had served the notice. The relief claimed by the two
persons was personal to them and the right thereto arose out
of their title to the land claimed by them. It was held by
the Judicial Committee that without a proper notice under s.
80 the suit could not be instituted for to hold otherwise
would be to admit an, implication or exception for which
there was no justification. In the other case, in Pestonji
Ardeshir Wadia’s case(2) two trustees of a trust served a
notice in October, 1933 upon the Government of Bombay under
S. 80 intimating that the trustees intended to institute a
suit against the Government on the cause of action and for
the relief set out
(1) A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 197.
(2) 76 I.A. 85.
(3) I.L.R. Mad 416.
(4) A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 389.
963
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therein. One of the trustees died before the plaint was
lodged in court, and two more trustees were appointed in the
place of the deceased trustee. Thereafter the two now
trustees and the surviving trustee filed the suit out of
which the appeal arose which was decided by the Judicial
Committee. No notice was served on the Government on behalf
of the two new trustees. The Judicial Committee accepted
the view of the High Court that where there were three
plaintiffs, the names and addresses of all of them must be
given in the notice. Their Lordships observed that :
"the provisions of s. 80 of the Code are
imperative and should be strictly complied
with before it can be said that a notice valid
in law has been served on the Government. In
the present case it is not contended that any
notice on behalf of plaintiffs 2 and 3 was
served on the Government before the filing of
the suit".
It is clear that the principle of these two decisions of the
Judicial Committee has no application in the present case
because the material facts are different.
We proceed to consider the next question arising in these
appeals viz., whether the High Court was right in holding
that the plaintiffs had established their title as raiyat
sarkar with regard to 1/5th share in nazul plots Nos. 34/3,
33 and 171/1 mentioned in the Deputy Commissioner’s order
dated 7th May, 1948 in Revenue Case No. 9/45-46. It was
argued on behalf of defendant No. 1 that there was no
evidence to show that the plaintiffs were in possession of
the land from 1909 to 1932, and the plaintiffs had not
established their title by prescription for the statutory
period of 60 years. It was contended that the High Court
had no justification for holding that the plaintiffs had
established the title of "Raiyat Sarkar" and the finding of
the High Court was not based upon any evidence. In our
opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of defendant No.
1 is wellfounded and must be accepted as correct. In the
settlement of 1863-64 Ex. P-1 the names of Amansingh and
Thakurprasad were noted in the remarks column. But the
column regarding tenancy right is definitely blank. The
owner is shown in the Khasra as the State "Milkiat Sarkar".
In the settlement of 189091 Amansingh Narpatsingh is again
shown in the remarks column of the khata. But the column
regarding any kind of tenancy right is again blank. It is
clear that in the settlements of 1860 and 1890-91 the
ownership of the land is recorded as that of the Government.
The possession of the plaintiffs or of their ancestors could
not be attributed to ownership or tenancy right of the
property. In the settlement of 1909-10, Ex.P-3 there is no
entry in the remarks column showing the possession of the
ancestors of the plaintiffs. It was said on behalf of the
plaintiffs that no
(1) 76 I.A. 85.
L11 Sup. C.I./69-12
96 4
notice was given to them of the proceedings of the.
settlement of 1909-10. Even assuming that this allegation
is correct, the entries of the khasra P-3 cannot be treated
to be a nullity and of no effect. In any event, it was open
to the plaintiffs to adduce other reliable evidence to prove
their possession between the years 1909 to 1932. But the
plaintiffs have failed to produce any such evidence. ln the
nazul settlement of 1922-23 the tank was given new plot
numbers 33, 34, 35,36, 37 and 171 and its area was recorded
as 5.24 acres. In this settlement about 2 acres of land was
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found to be occupied by the Municipal Committee, Jabalpur.
The land so found to be occupied was recorded in the
possession of the Municipal Committee, Jabalpur and the
remaining land was again recorded as "Milkiat Sarkar".
There is no entry as regards the remaining land recording
anybody’s possession in the. remarks column. Actually
proclamations were made during this settlement and
objections were invited as per Ex.ID-14. A date was fixed
upto 31-8-1924 but no one came forward. The proclamation
clearly recited that the vacant sites which were not in
possession of anybody were not recognised as belonging to
any person. It is impossible to believe that the plaintiffs
or their ancestors were unaware of such a proclamation. Had
they been in possession they would not have failed to make a
claim. For the period after 1933-34 the plaintiffs produced
account books to show that they exercised certain rights.
Certain receipts were also proved but they also relate to a
period after 1939. We have gone through the oral evidence
produced by the plaintiffs and it appears to be unreliable.
The result is that for the period 1891 till 1932 there is no
reliable oral or documentary evidence to prove that the
plaintiffs or their ancestors had any possession over the
disputed land. On the contrary the disputed land i.e.
Phoota Tal was always recognised as Milkiat Sarkar and the
State Government was justified in holding that the order of
the Deputy Commissioner dated 7th May, 1948 should be set
aside.
In the course of the argument reference was made by Mr.
Gupte to the following passage in the Central Provinces
Settlement Instructions (Reprint of 1953) page 213
"In dealing with proposed method of the
settlement of titles it will be convenient in
order to remove all causes for misapprehension
among residents, to lay emphasis on the policy
of Government in making these settlements.
That policy was defined in the Chief
Commissioner’s Resolution No. 502-B-X dated
the 19th October, 1917, in the Revenue &
Scarcity Department, but its main principles
will bear repetition.
As it is not the intention of Government in
making the settlement to disturb long
possession, but only to
965
obtain an accurate record of the lands which
are its property and to secure its right to
any land revenue to which it may be entitled,
long possession even without clear proof of a
definite grant from Government will be
recognised as entitled the holder to
possession. In deciding what constitutes long
possession in any individual town, regard will
be had to the special circumstances of the
place, and while this point will be dealt with
more particularly in the Deputy Commissioner’s
report, the following general principles will
ordinarily be observed :
(1) all occupants who are able to prove
possession to any land prior to 1891 or such
later date as may be fixed for each town,
either by themselves or by a valid title from
a previous holder, and all occupants who can
prove a definite grant or lease from
Government will be recorded as entitled to
hold such land as against Government
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(paragraph 6 of the Resolution)
On the basis of this passage it was argued that it was the
duty of the settlement officer to treat the plaintiffs as
having established their title because they were shown to be
in possession in the settlement of the year 1890-91. We are
unable to accept this argument as correct. The passage
quoted above only applies to a case where the ownership of
the land was unknown i.e. where possession is proved for a
long time, but its original title could not be traced, and
not to a case where the land is recorded as Government land.
For the reasons expressed, we hold that the suit brought by
the plaintiffs being Civil Suit No. 10-A of 1954 should be
dismissed. Civil Appeal 386 of 1966 is accordingly
dismissed and Civil Appeal 387 of 1966 is allowed with costs
in favour of defendant No. 1 i.e. State of Madhya Pradesh.
There will be one hearing fee.
R.K.P.S. Civil Appeal 386/66 dismissed.
Civil Appeal 387/66 allowed.
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