THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU vs. DR. VASANTHI VEERASEKARAN

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8626 OF 2009 The State of Tamil Nadu    ..…Appellant  Versus Dr. Vasanthi Veerasekaran  ….Respondent WITH  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8625, 8627 and 8630 of 2009 J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. These   appeals   emanate   from   the   common   judgment   and th order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 28  April, 2006 disposing of the concerned writ petitions instituted by the private respondent(s)  in   the   respective   appeals.   Although   four Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ARJUN BISHT Date: 2019.07.01 16:11:45 IST Reason: separate writ petitions were filed, one common factum noticed 2 from the factual narration in the impugned judgment is that the property owned and possessed by the private respondents in the concerned   appeals   came   to   be   acquired   for   the   purpose   of implementing   the   “Mass   Rapid   Transport   System”   (for   short “ MRTS ”)   Railway   Project,   under   the   provisions   of   the   Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “ 1894 Act ”). After following due process, the acquisition proceedings culminated with the passing of the award  and   taking  over  of   possession  of   the   concerned property. After possession was taken, the subject property was made over to the appropriate authority for implementation of the Railway Project.  The   private   respondent(s)   in   the   respective   appeals   had, 2. however, unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings by filing writ petitions in the  High Court. While rejecting the th challenge, the High Court vide order dated 12  December, 2003 observed that the appropriate authority of the State Government ought   to   consider   the   representation   made   by   the   private respondents in the concerned appeals for allotment of a housing site by way of rehabilitation as a special category of displaced 3 persons, in view of the dictum presumably in  Hansraj H. Jain 1 (incorrectly mentioned as Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors.   Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab­1993 AIR SCW 2938 which is a   decision in a criminal matter). The operative part of the  said order reads thus:  “5. The   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   while relying upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 SC 2025, AIR 1988 SC 2181, AIR 1991 SC 90 and AIR SCW 1993 @ 2923, persuasively contended that there could be direction to the State Government to allot lands from any one of the Housing schemes in the city. There is forece and substance in this contention.  6. In the circumstances, the present applications taken   out   by   the   petitioners   do   deserve   further consideration and the petitioners request for housing site deserves to be considered by the State by way of rehabilitation.  7. Hence, it is made clear that in the event of the petitioners   applying   to   the   State   Government   and Tamil Nadu Housing Board for allotment of house sites in any one of the housing projects promoted by the Tamil   Nadu   Housing   Board,   their   request   shall   be considered for allotment of lands, as a special category of displaced persons by the acquisition of lands for the railways as has been held by the Supreme Court in Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2938.  8. With   the   above   observations,   the   above miscellaneous petitions are ordered accordingly.” 1  (1993) 3 SCC 634 4 3. In furtherance of the direction given by the High Court, the private   respondent(s)   pursued   representation   before   the   State Government. Eventually, the State Government declined to grant any   relief   to   the   private   respondent(s)   and   communicated   its th decision to them vide letter dated 26   May, 2005. It may be apposite to reproduce one such communication, issued to the private respondent in Civil Appeal No.8625 of 2009 and Civil Appeal No.8630 of 2009. The same reads thus:  “GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU Housing and Urban  Development Department  Secretariat, Chennai­9 From  Thiru Lal Rawana Sailo, I.A.S., Secretary to Government  Letter No.41629/UD3(2)/2003­13 Dated: 26.05.2005 To Thiru P. Arivudainambi,  MIG No.3, Santhome High Road,  Foreshre Estate,  TNH Board,  Chennai­600028. Tmt. S. Sulochana, 19, Leith Castle Street,  Sea View Apartments, Santhome,  Chennai­600028  Sir/Madam, 5 Sub: Land   Acquisition­Mass   Rapid   Transit   System­ Lands acquired for Mass Rapid Transmit Syste, S.No.300/12 measuring 5445 sq.ft. belonging to Tmt. S. Sulochna­S.No.300/13 measuring 5554 sq.ft.   belonging   to   Thiru   P.   Arivudainambi­ Request for allotment of plots­requested. Ref: 1. High   Court   order   dated   01.12.2003   in WPMP No.23077/2003 and W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.  2. High   Court   of   Madras   order   dated 12.12.2003   in   W.P.M.P.   No.28883/2003 in W.P. No.3372/2003 etc.  3. Your lawyer Notice dated 10.11.2004. 4. Your   petition   dated   01.08.2004, 21.02.2005 and 21.04.2005.  5. High   Court   order   dated   04.03.2005   and 18.03.2005 in W.P. No.7469/2005.  In the High Court order first cited, the Hon’ble Court has   dismissed   your   W.P.M.P.23078/2003   and 11290/2003.  2. In the High Court order second cited it has been observed by the Hon’ble Court that in the event of petitioners   applying   to   the   State   Government   and Tamil   Nadu   Housing   Board   for   allotment   of   House sites in any one of the Housing projects formulated by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, their request shall be considered. Therefore in pursuance of the orders of the Hon’ble Court your representation has been examined by   the   Government   in   consultation   with   the   Tamil Nadu Housing Board.  3. I am, accordingly, directed to inform you that during the land acquisition process you were informed of the procedural formalities by the Land Acquisition Officer   and   as   per   statutory   requirements   award No.1/2003 was also passed on 08.01.2003 on land acquisition   proceedings.   As   ordered   in W.P.No.16929/99  the   land   in  question   for   a   public purpose. The Hon’ble Court had also on 10.10.2002 on your submission directed in W.P.No.141183/2000 and W.P.No.15974/2000 alongwith W.P.No.36980/2002 to deposit the compensation amount in the High Court which was also complied with. Therefore, the land in 6 question   was   already   taken   over   by   the   Land Acquisition   Officer   and   handed   over   to   the Metropolitan   Transport   Project   (Railways)   for   Mass Rapid   Transit   System   scheme   after   observing   all statutory provisions and Hon’ble Court orders.  4. You have again submitted a lawyer notice in the rd reference 3   cited and sent petitions in the reference th 4  cited to the Government for reconsideration of your request.   Therefore,   your   request   was   once   again examined by the Government in the light of the High th Court orders in the reference 5   cited. The Hon’ble High Court, in the said order dated 04.03.2005 and modified on 18.03.2005, has ordered that, instead of the   Housing   Board,   the   Government   would   pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Hence the whole issue was again re­examined by the Government afresh.  5. As   already   submitted   by   the   Government before the High Court on more than one occasion, I am directed to inform you that your request for allotment of land in any one of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board/Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority scheme will not arise as the lands were not   acquired   for   the   purpose   of   Tamil   Nadu Housing   Board   of   Chennai   Metropolitan Development   Authority   schemes   but   they   were acquired   for   Mass   Rapid   Transit   System   and handed over to the Metropolitan Transport Project (Railways) which come under Government of India for their railway scheme.   Hence acquisition of your land in S.No.300/12 measuring 5445 and 5554 sq.ft. respectively was not arbitrary or illegal in any way as all procedural formalities were gone thro’ by the Land Acquisition Officer  as per the Land Acquisition Act. The   lands   were   already   vested   with   the Metropolitan Transport Project (Railways) for Mass Rapid Transit System and, therefore, there is no justification for allotment of land to you in any scheme   area   when   the   lands   were   not   acquired either by  Tamil  Nadu Housing  Board  or  Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority .  7 6. I am, therefore, directed to inform you that in view of the foregoing valid reasons your request is not feasible of compliance.     Your faithfully Sd/­ For Secretary to Government.  Copy to: The   Member­Secretary,   Chennai   Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai­8. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai­35.  The Collector of Chennai, Singaravelar Maaligai, Rajaji Salai, Chennai­I.  The   Special   Tahsildar   (Land   Acquisition)   MRTS, Tiurmailai Railway Station, Mylapore, Chennai­4.  The   Special   Tahsildar,   (Land   Acquisition),   Chennai Metropolitan   Development   Authority,   Chennai­8   (for guidance and information).”   (emphasis supplied) The representation made by the private respondents in the other appeals, however, were not replied to, as a result of which they filed fresh writ petition(s) which were heard analogously with the writ   petition(s)   filed   by   the   private   respondent(s)   in   the aforementioned   two   appeals   questioning   the   communication th dated 26  May, 2005, rejecting their representation.  4. All   connected   writ   petitions   were   accordingly   heard   and decided together by the impugned judgment. The reason which 8 weighed with the High Court to allow the writ petitions filed by the concerned private respondent(s) can be discerned from the discussion in paragraph Nos.6 and 7 of the impugned judgment. We   deem   it   apposite   to   reproduce   the   same   along   with   the operative   order   contained   in   paragraph   Nos.8   and   9   of   the impugned judgment. The same read thus:  “6. We have already referred to the fact that this order has become final. Though it is stated that the petitioners/land owners deposited, the fact remains, even   without   resorting   to   acquisition   proceeding, possession of the lands was forcibly taken from the petitioners. It is also not in dispute that, in order to implement   the   project,   namely,   M.R.T.S.   Scheme, possession of the lands was taken forcibly and the construction work was started without awaiting for the completion of the acquisition proceedings. That was that   reason   for   the   learned   Judge   to   pass   the directions in the order dated 12.12.2003. In fact, the learned Judge heavily   relied  on  the  Supreme Court decision reported in 1993 AIR SCW 2923 (cited supra) while passing the positive direction to the Government. As rightly observed by the learned Judge in the order   dated   12.12.2003,   the   petitioners   are entitled   to   alternate   site   under   the   Special Category   of   displaced   persons   due   to   the acquisition   of   their   lands   for   the   Railways. Unfortunately, in W.P. No.39279 of 2005, the second respondent, in spite of the reasoned positive direction dated 12.12.2003 of the learned Judge of this Court, rejected the request of the petitioner. Likewise, in the other two cases, though the order was passed even as early as on 12.12.2003 and representations were made on   18.4.2005,   no   order   has   been   passed   by   the Government till this date.  7. In view of the peculiar factual position, viz, that the   land   of   the   petitioners   were   taken   possession forcibly   even   before   initiation   of   the   acquisition 9 proceedings; and of the stand taken by the petitioners that they lost their respective housing plots;  and also taking note of the positive direction of this Court, dated 12.12.2003, to provide equivalent alternate site   under   the   special   category   of   displaced persons;   we are of the view that the rejection order dated 26.5.2005 passed by the Government in respect of the petitioner in W.P. No.39279 of 2005 is liable to be   quashed.   As   far   as   the   petitioners   in   W.P. Nos.11907 and 11908 of 2006 are concerned, they are also entitled to similar allotment as directed in the order dated 12.12.2003.  8. In these circumstances, we issue the following directions:­ (i) The   Secretary   to   Government, Housing   and   Urban   Land   Development Department, Fort St. George, Chennai­9 is directed   to   allot   alternate   land   to   the petitioners, approximate in extent to the acquired   land,   within   the Corporation/City limits, within a period of eight   weeks   from   the   date   of   receipt   of copy of this order.  (ii) the petitioners are liable to pay the cost of the land as fixed by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.  9. Writ   petitions   are   allowed   with   the   above directions.   No   costs.   Connected   Miscellaneous Petitions stand closed.”     (emphasis supplied) 5. By these appeals, the State Government has assailed the aforementioned judgment. According to the appellant, the lands in   question   were   acquired   in   accordance   with   law   and,   after following due process, possession thereof was taken over and thereafter made over to the appropriate authority of the MRTS 10 Project (Railways). In other words, the land was not acquired for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board as such. It is urged that the direction issued by the High Court vide the impugned judgment is on an erroneous assumption that the State Government was obliged   to   provide   an   alternative   housing   site   to   the   private respondent(s) in the concerned appeals, in terms of the direction th given by the High Court vide order dated 12  December, 2003. It is then contended that the direction given by the High Court in the impugned judgment is in the nature of granting an extra­legal concession by way of allotment of an alternative site in lieu of acquired lands  sans  any such legal obligation on the State under the 1894 Act or any policy in force pertaining to the project of MRTS (Railways) to be implemented by the Ministry of Railway, Government of India. The appellant has relied on the decisions of this   Court   to   buttress   the   proposition   that   the   private respondent(s) had no legal right to get an alternative housing site in such a situation. The appellant has also distinguished the reported   judgments   referred   to   by   the   High   Court   in   the impugned   judgment   as   being   inapplicable   to   the   facts   of   the present case.  11 6. The   private   respondent(s),   on   the   other   hand,   have supported the view expressed by the High Court in the impugned judgment and would submit that the direction was in furtherance th of the obligation of the State flowing from the order dated 12 December,   2003.   Further,   in   light   of   the   reported   decisions adverted to by the High Court in the impugned judgment, it is not open to the appellant­State to deny the relief of allotment of an   alternative   housing   site   to   them   as   a   special   category   of displaced   persons   due   to   the   stated   project.   In   addition,   the private respondent(s), during the pendency of these appeals, had filed an affidavit to place on record that in the past, the State Government   exercised   discretionary   power   to   allot   alternative housing site to the affected persons due to the acquisition of their land for public purposes. The private respondent(s) would submit that no interference in the fact situation of the present case is warranted and the appeals be dismissed.  12 7. We have heard Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, for the appellant and Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned Senior Counsel, for the private respondent(s).     8.  The foremost reason which weighed with the High Court is, th the   direction   issued   by   the   High   Court   vide   order   dated   12 December, 2003 had attained finality. Indubitably, that order has not been challenged by the State or any other State Authority. Nevertheless, the purport of the order is nothing more than a direction to the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board “to consider” the  representation(s) made by  the private respondent(s) for allotment of an alternative housing site in any one of the housing projects promoted by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board,   as   a   special   category   of   displaced   persons.   Thus,   the direction is not in the nature of a peremptory direction to allot an alternative   housing   site   despite   absence   of   any   policy   with reference to the project under consideration or obligation flowing from   the   provisions   of   1894   Act.   This   is   the   first   fallacy committed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.  13 9. As regards the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by the High Court, we must agree with the appellant that the same have no application to the fact situation of the present case. 2 For,   in   State   of   U.P.   Vs.   Smt.   Pista   Devi   and   Ors. ,   the direction  was  issued  to  the   development  authority   which  had acquired the land for the public purpose of developing housing schemes with a view to provide housing accommodation to the residents   of   Meerut   City.   Reliance   has   been   placed   upon paragraph Nos.9 and 10, which read thus:  “9. It is, however, argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that many of the persons from whom lands   have   been   acquired   are   also   persons  without houses or shop sites and if they are to be thrown out of   their   land   they   would   be   exposed   to   serious prejudice.   Since   the   land   is   being   acquired   for providing residential accommodation to the people of Meerut those who are being expropriated on account of the acquisition proceedings would also be eligible for some relief at the hands of the Meerut Development Authority. We may at this stage refer to the provision contained in Section 21(2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 which reads as follows: “21. (2) The powers of the Authority or, as the   case   may   be,   the   local   authority concerned with respect to the disposal of land   under   sub­section   1   shall   be   so exercised   as   to   secure,   so   far   as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the   land   shall,   if   they   desire   to   obtain accommodation on land belonging to the Authority or the local authority concerned 2  (1986) 4 SCC 251 14 and   are   willing   to   comply   with   any requirements of the Authority or the local authority concerned as to its development and   use,   have   an   opportunity   to  obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonable requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them: Provided that where the Authority or the local   authority   concerned   proposes   to dispose of by sale any land without any development   having   been   undertaken   or carried out thereon, it shall offer the land in the first instance to the persons from whom  it  was acquired,  if  they  desire  to purchase it subject to such requirements as   to   its   development   and   use   as   the Authority or the local authority concerned may think fit to impose.” 10.   Although   the   said   section   is   not   in   terms applicable to the present acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the above provision in the Delhi Development   Act   contains   a   wholesome   principle which   should   be   followed   by   all   Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire large   tracts   of   land   for   the   purposes   of   land development in urban areas. We hope and trust that the Meerut Development Authority, for whose benefit the land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicable   provide   a   house   site   or   shop   site   of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated   persons   who   have   no   houses   or   shop buildings in the urban area in question.” The dictum in this judgment concerns the acquisition of large tracts of land, for the purposes of land development, in urban areas. The acquisition in the present case is certainly not for the purpose of development of urban area or for providing a housing 15 scheme to the residents of the urban area in which the acquired lands are situated. The acquisition, as aforementioned, is for a project of MRTS (Railways) on behalf of the Ministry of Railway, Government of India and not for the State Government or State Authority.   Furthermore,   admittedly,   no   scheme   has   been formulated in relation to the stated railway project implemented by the Central Government for providing alternative housing sites to project affected persons. In the absence of such a scheme, it is unfathomable that the High Court could still issue a direction to the   State   Government   and   Tamil   Nadu   Housing   Board,   in exercise of writ jurisdiction, to provide alternative land to the private respondent(s) as a special category of displaced persons. Such   a   direction   cannot   be   countenanced   in   law.   This   is reinforced from the principle underlying the dictum in the case of New   Reviera   Coop.   Housing   Society   and   Anr.   Vs.   Special 3 Land Acquisition Officer and Ors.  In paragraph 9 of the said decision, the Court noted that it would be a different matter if the State had come forward with a proposal to provide an alternative site but that principle cannot be extended as a condition in all 3  (1996) 1 SCC 731 16 cases of acquisition of the land that the owner must be given an alternative site or flat. The Court unambiguously rejected the contention of the affected persons that acquisition of their land without providing them an alternative site would impinge upon their right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.   10. Again, in the case of   State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. M. 4 Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr. ,   the Court negatived the claim of the land owners that the unused acquired land for construction of national highway should be returned to them. Instead, the Court held that since the acquisition had been completed and the land had vested in the State Government, the unutilised acquired land could be disposed of only through public auction so that the public would benefit by getting a higher value. In another case,   Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran (dead) by 5 Lrs. And Ors. , the Court restated the doctrine of public trust disabling   the   State   from   giving   back   the   property   for   a consideration less than the market value, if it could not be used for any other public purpose by the State in cases where the 4  (1997) 5 SCC 432 5  (2010) 2 SCC 786 17 acquisition process had been completed under the 1894 Act. A similar view has been expressed in   V. Chandrasekaran and 6 Anr. Vs. Administrative Officer and Ors. .   In paragraph 31, the Court observed thus:  “31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallised to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any   other   purpose.   He   becomes   persona   non   grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive   compensation   for   the   same,   unless   the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person interested nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect.” 11. The private respondents, however, would urge that the State Government had initiated the acquisition proceedings and was intently concerned with the stated project within the State and, for which reason, it could not be extricated from its obligation flowing   from   the   existing   State   policy   at   the   relevant   time enabling the State Government to exercise discretionary quota. The private respondent(s) have relied on instances where such 6  (2012) 12 SCC 133 18 allotments   have   been   made,   as   is   evident   from   the communications annexed at R4, R5 and R6 to the additional th affidavit filed on 15   April, 2019, as per the liberty granted by this Court.  12. We  have  perused  the  said  communications.  It is  evident that, in these cases, the acquisition was made for construction of houses   under   LIG/MIG   scheme   in   respect   of   which   a   policy existed   for   grant   of   alternative   housing   site   to   the   affected persons. Those schemes were implemented by the State Housing Board.   These   instances   will   be   of   no   avail   to   the   private respondents whose lands have been acquired for implementation of   MRTS   Project   implemented   by   the   Government   of   India (Railways).   The   private   respondent(s)   have   been   duly compensated in conformity with the mandate of the Act of 1894. Therefore, they cannot expect any further relief much less from the   State   Government   or,   for   that   matter,   the   Tamil   Nadu Housing Board.  13. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to dilate on the plea taken by the appellant that the policy regarding grant 19 of alternative housing site as a discretionary power of the State Government has been discontinued from the year 2011. For the completion of record, however, we must note the argument of the private respondent(s) that their claim must be decided only on the basis of policy as it existed at the relevant time and at least at the time of direction issued by the High Court vide the impugned judgment   in   the   year   2006.   As   aforementioned,   it   is   not necessary for us to take this argument any further as we have held   that   the   schemes   applicable   to   the   acquisition   for development   of   houses   have   no   application   to   the   project  for which the lands owned by the private respondent(s) came to be acquired for implementation of a project by the Government of India (Railways).  14. The other decision which commended to the High Court also has no application to the present case. For, in   Bharat Singh 7 , the   land   was and   Ors.   Vs.   State   of   Haryana   and   Ors.   acquired for development and utilization for industrial purpose. The dictum in paragraph No.18 of the said decision, in no way, 7  (1988) 4 SCC 534 20 can be construed to mean that even if no policy for allotment of alternative housing site in connection with the stated project to be executed by the Railways is in force, yet the project affected land owners should be provided an alternative housing site that too by the State. On the other hand, the observation therein is merely to direct that the land owners who had become landless by the acquisition of their land should make an application for allotment of alternative land and that they may be given priority in the matter of allotment provided they fulfill the conditions for such   allotment   and   if   land   is   available.   In   the   case   of   S.B. 8 Kishore Vs. Union of India , the acquisition was for the purpose of development of the urban area and the relief given to the land owner was in the peculiar facts of that case. More importantly, the relief was with reference to the existing policy of allotting alternative housing sites to the affected land owners. Even in the case of  Hansraj H. Jain  (supra), the acquisition was for setting up a new township and a policy decision of the Government to offer   alternative   housing   site   to   the   affected   land   owner   was 8  AIR 1991 SC 90 21 applicable   to   such   acquisition,   as   can   be   discerned   from paragraph 33 of the said judgment.  15. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in setting aside the   impugned   judgment   and,   resultantly,   dismissing   the   writ petitions filed by the private respondent(s). 16. Accordingly,   these   appeals   are   allowed.   The   impugned th common judgment and order of the High Court dated 28  April, 2006 in writ petition Nos.39279 of 2005, 11907 of 2006, 11908 of 2006 and 19029 of 2006, respectively, is set aside. Resultantly, the   aforementioned   writ   petitions   are   dismissed.   All   pending interim applications are disposed of. No order as to costs.        ……………………………..J       (A.M. Khanwilkar)       ……………………………..J       (Ajay Rastogi) New Delhi; July 01, 2019.