NATHU SINGH vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.522 OF 2021 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2096 of 2021]

 AND CRIMINAL APPEAL No.523 OF 2021 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2271 of 2021]

    J U D G M E N T   N.V. RAMANA, CJI.   Leave granted. 1. 2. The present Criminal Appeals, by way of Special Leave, raise   common   question   of   law   and   are   therefore   being Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2021.05.28 18:03:04 IST Reason: disposed of together.  1 3. In   both   the   impugned   orders,   the   High   Court   of Judicature   at   Allahabad,   while   dismissing   the   anticipatory bail application of the respondents­accused, granted them 90 days to surrender before the Trial Court to seek regular bail and granted them protection from coercive action for the said period. Aggrieved by the grant of such relief, the complainants in both the matters are currently in appeal before us. 4. As   only   a   question   of   law   is   being   raised,   it   is   not necessary for this Court to advert to the facts of both the matters extensively. It is sufficient to point out that in the first case, pertaining to Nathu Singh, the appellant’s daughter was married to respondent no. 2 in that case on 14.02.2014. As   she   died   under   suspicious   circumstances   in   her matrimonial home on 02.01.2021, the complainant registered FIR No. 07/2021 at police station Masuri, Ghaziabad under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the respondents nos. 2 to 5. 5. In   the   second   case,   the   allegations   are   that   the appellant’s brother and the latter’s two sons were attacked by 2 the respondents in that case, due to a dispute between the parties relating to encroachment of land. The two sons were attacked on their vital parts, with one of them suffering a skull fracture as a result of which he was in a coma for one week. The other had lacerations on his head. The complainant registered FIR No. 371/20 at police station Thana Bhawan, Shamili under Sections 307, 504 and 34, IPC. 6. The respondents in both the cases approached the High Court   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   during   ongoing investigation,   and   sought   protection   from   arrest.   Vide   the impugned orders dated 08.02.2021 and 28.01.2021, the High Court   dismissed   the   applications   of   the   respondents   but granted them the aforementioned relief in identically worded orders. The relevant portion of the order, as extracted from the impugned order dated 08.02.2021, is as follows:  “…. Having heard learned counsel for the parties   and   upon   perusal   of   material brought on record as well as complicity of   accused   and   also   judgement   of   the Apex   Court   in   the   case   of   P. Chidambaram   v.   Directorate   of AIR 2019 SC 4198, this Enforcement,   Court   does   not   find   any   exceptional ground   to   exercise   its   discretionary jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C. 3 However, in view of the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case and on the   request   of   learned   counsel   for   the applicants, it is directed that in case the applicants appear and surrender before the   court   below   within   90   days   from today and apply for bail, their prayer for bail shall be considered and decided as per the settled law laid by this   Court in the case of   Amrawati and another v. State of U.P . r eported in 2004 (57) ALR 290   as   well   as   judgement   passed   by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of   Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of   reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC). U.P. Till   then,   no   coercive   action   shall   be taken against the applicants....”  ( emphasis supplied ) 7. Aggrieved  by  the  impugned orders,  the  complainants­ appellants have filed the present appeals by way of special leave. 8. Heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants,   the respondent­State and the respondents­accused at length.  The learned counsel for the appellants, supported by the 9. learned   State   counsel,   urged   that   once   the   High   Court declined the final relief of pre­arrest to the respondents, it could   not   grant   them   any   further   protection.   The   learned counsel   submitted   that   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   does   not 4 contemplate the grant of any such protection on the dismissal of the application filed by an accused. Rather, the proviso to Setion 438(1), Cr.P.C. specifically provides for the arrest of the accused on a rejection of the relief sought in their application. The   impugned   orders,   wherein   the   High   Court   granted protection to the respondents subsequent to the dismissal of their application, was therefore passed in excess of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 438, Cr.P.C. The learned State counsel further submitted that the High Court’s orders have hampered the ongoing investigation as the police have been   denied   custodial   interrogation   of   the   accused, notwithstanding the fact that the nature of offences in both cases is grave and heinous. 10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents­ accused justified the discretion exercised by the High Court and submitted that the High Court has the power to pass such orders, in the interest of justice. 11. The sole question to be answered by the Court in the present   appeals   relates   to   whether   the   High   Court,   while dismissing   the   anticipatory   bail   applications   of   the 5 respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest. 12. The considerations on the basis of which the Court is to exercise   its   discretion   to   grant   relief   under   Section   438, Cr.P.C.   have   been   decided   by   this   Court   in   a   catena   of judgments and needs no restatement. 13. A recent Constitution Bench judgment of this Court, in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2020) 5 SCC 1 has clarified the extent of power exercisable by Courts under Section 438, Cr.P.C. The Court ultimately held as follows: “ 91.1.   Regarding  Question 1,  this Court   holds   that   the  protection granted to a person under Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it should enure   in   favour   of   the   accused without   any   restriction   on   time. Normal   conditions   under   Section 437(3)   read   with   Section   438(2) should   be   imposed;  if   there   are specific facts or features in regard to   any   offence,   it   is   open   for   the court   to   impose   any   appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event),   etc.     91.2.   As   regards   the   second question referred to this Court, it is 6 held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally   at   the   time   and   stage when the accused is summoned by the   court,   or   when   charges   are framed,   but   can   continue   till   the end of the trial.  Again, if there are any   special   or   peculiar   features necessitating the court to limit the tenure   of   anticipatory   bail,   it   is   open for it to do so.”     ( emphasis supplied ) 14. The Constitution Bench in   ( supra ) Sushila Aggarwal   has authoritatively held that when a Court grants anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C., the same is ordinarily not limited to a fixed period and would subsist till the end of the trial. However, it was clarified by the Court that if the facts and   circumstances   so   warranted,   the   Court   could   impose special conditions, including limiting the relief to a certain period.  15. It is therefore clear that a Court, be it a Sessions Court or a High Court, in certain special facts and circumstances may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a limited period of time. The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so, which would be assailable before a superior Court. To do so without 7 giving reasons, would be contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in   Sushila Aggarwal   ( supra ). If the High Court had   therefore   decided   to   allow   the   anticipatory   bail application of  the respondents­accused herein, albeit  for a limited period of 90 days, the task before this Court would have   been   somewhat   easier.   We   would   only   have   had   to assess   the   reasons   assigned   by   the   Court,   if   any,   for   the imposition of such special condition in terms of the judgment in ( supra ).   Sushila Aggarwal    16.  However, in the present appeals, the High Court, after considering   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case, particularly the gravity and severity of the accusations against the respondents, rejected the application of the respondents­ accused. It is after rejecting the application that the  High Court chose fit to grant some relief to the respondents while directing them to surrender before the Trial Court to file a regular bail application within 90 days, by protecting them from any coercive action during that period. The appellants­ complainants are aggrieved by the same and are challenging the power of the Court to pass such a protective order after 8 the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application. 17. To determine whether the Court can pass such orders, it is   necessary   to   first   analyze   the   relevant   provision,   viz ., Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   The   relevant   portion   of   Section   438, Cr.P.C. is extracted below: 438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest (1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a   non­bailable   offence,   he   may apply   to   the   High   Court   or   the Court   of   Session   for   a   direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration,  inter alia, the following factors, namely:­ xxx either   reject   the   application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: Provided   that,  where   the   High Court or, as the case may be, the Court   of   Session,   has   not   passed any interim order under this sub­ Section   or   has   rejected   the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer incharge   of   a   police   station   to arrest,   without   warrant,   the applicant   on   the   basis   of   the 9 accusation   apprehended   in   such application. xxx (2)   When   the   High   Court   or   the Court of Session makes a direction under   sub­section   (1),   it   may include   such   conditions   in   such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including ­ xxx (3)   If   such   person   is   thereafter arrested   without   warrant   by   an officer in charge of a police station on   such   accusation,   and   is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be   released   on   bail;   and   if   a Magistrate   taking   cognizance   of such offence decides that a warrant should   issue   in   the   first   instance against that person, he shall issue a   bailable   warrant   in   conformity with   the   direction   of   the   Court under sub­section (1). ( emphasis supplied ) The   focus   of   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   when   read   in   its 18. entirety, clearly relates to the grant of anticipatory bail by the Court. Section 438(1) explicitly lays down certain factors that need to be considered by the Court before granting the relief sought. Section 438(2) lays down the conditions that may be 10 imposed by the Court while granting the relief. Section 438(3) dictates   the   consequences  of   the   grant  of   relief  under  the Section. The only guidance relating to what is to take place once 19. an application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is rejected is found in the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which specifically provides that once an application is rejected, or the Court seized with the matter refuses to issue an interim order, it is open to the police to arrest the applicant. It is this proviso that the present appellants have relied upon to argue that the High Court, once it rejected the anticipatory bail applications of the respondents­accused, did not have the power to grant any further relief.  20. At   first   blush,   while   this   submission   appears   to   be attractive, we are of the opinion that such an analysis of the provision is incomplete. It is no longer   res integra   that any interpretation of the provisions of Section 438, Cr.P.C. has to take into consideration the fact that the grant or rejection of an application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. has a direct bearing on the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual. 11 The   genesis   of   this   jurisdiction   lies   in   Article   21   of   the Constitution, as an effective medium to protect the life and liberty of an individual.   The provision therefore needs to be read   liberally,   and   considering   its   beneficial   nature,   the Courts must not read in limitations or restrictions that the legislature have not explicitly provided for. Any ambiguity in the   language   must   be   resolved   in   favour   of   the   applicant seeking relief. In this context, this Court, in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in   Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. ,  (1980)  2  SCC   565 ,  which  was   recently State  of   Punjab upheld   and   followed   by   this   Court   in   Sushila   Aggarwal ( ), held as follows: supra “26.   We   find   a   great   deal   of substance   in   Mr   Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty,  the   court   should   lean against   the   imposition   of unnecessary   restrictions   on   the scope   of   Section   438,   especially when   no   such   restrictions   have been imposed by the legislature in the  terms of that  section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is   concerned   with   the   personal liberty   of   the   individual,   who   is entitled   to   the   benefit   of   the presumption of innocence since he 12 is not, on the date of his application for   anticipatory   bail,   convicted   of the offence in respect of which he seeks   bail.   An   over­generous infusion   of   constraints   and conditions   which   are   not   to   be found in Section 438 can make its provisions   constitutionally vulnerable   since   the   right   to personal freedom cannot be made to   depend   on   compliance   with unreasonable   restrictions.  The beneficent   provision   contained   in Section   438   must   be   saved,   not jettisoned…” ( emphasis supplied )   21. When the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. is analyzed in line with the above dictum, it is clear that the proviso does not create any rights or restrictions. Rather, the sole purpose of the proviso appears to be clarificatory in nature. It only restates,   inter alia , the obvious proposition that unless an individual has obtained some protection from the Court, the police may arrest them. In line with the ruling in  Gurbaksh Singh   Sibbia   ( supra ),   the   proviso   cannot   be   read   as constituting a bar on the power of the Court.  22. If the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. does not act as a bar to the grant of additional protection to the applicant, the 13 question still remains as to under what provision of law the Court may issue relief to an applicant after dismissing their anticipatory bail application.  Without going into the question of whether Section 438, 23. Cr.P.C. itself allows for such a power, as it is not necessary to undertake such an exercise in the present case, it is clear that when it comes to the High Court, such a power does exist.   Section   482,   Cr.P.C   explicitly   recognizes   the   High Court’s inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of justice. This provision reflects the reality that no law or rule can   possibly   account   for   the   complexities   of   life,   and   the infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future.  24. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that Courts are   faced   with   day   in   and   day   out,   while   dealing   with anticipatory bail applications. Even when the Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be circumstances where the High Court is of the opinion that it is necessary to protect the  person apprehending arrest for some   time,   due   to   exceptional   circumstances,   until   they surrender before the Trial Court. For example, the applicant 14 may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary caregiver   or   breadwinner   of   his/her   family   members,   and needs to make arrangements for them. In such extraordinary circumstances, when a strict case for grant of anticipatory bail is not made out, and rather the investigating authority has made out a case for custodial investigation, it cannot be stated that the High Court has no power to ensure justice. It needs no mentioning, but this Court may also exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an order.  However, such discretionary power cannot be exercised 25. in   an   untrammeled   manner.   The   Court   must   take   into account   the   statutory   scheme   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C., particularly,   the   proviso   to   Section   438(1),   Cr.P.C.,   and balance the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant and the   society   at  large   with   the   concerns/interest  of   the applicant.   Therefore,   such   an   order   must   necessarily   be narrowly   tailored   to   protect   the   interests   of   the   applicant while   taking   into   consideration   the   concerns   of   the investigating authority. Such an order must be a reasoned one. 15 26. The impugned orders passed by the High Court, in the present appeals, do not meet any of the standards as laid out above.  We say so for the following reasons:   firstly , after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application, on the basis of the nature and gravity of the offence, the High Court has granted   the   impugned   relief   to   the   respondents   without assigning any reasons.   Secondly,   in granting the relief for a period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not considered the concerns   of   the   investigating   agency,   complainant   or   the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which necessitates that the Court pass such an exceptional discretionary protection order for the shortest duration that is reasonably required. A period of 90 days, or three months, cannot in any way be considered to be a reasonable one in the present facts and circumstances.  The impugned orders therefore do not withstand legal 27. scrutiny. The resultant effect of the High Court’s orders is that neither are the respondents found entitled to pre­arrest bail, nor can they be arrested for a long duration. During the said duration they can roam freely without being apprehensive of 16 coercive action. We are thus of the view that the High Court committed   a  grave   error   in  passing  such   protection  to  the respondents­accused.   Such   a   direction   by   the   High   Court exceeds   its   judicial   discretion   and   amounts   to   judicial largesse, which the Courts do not possess. 28. For   the   aforestated   reasons,   the   present   appeals   are allowed.   The   impugned   order   of   the   High   Court   dated 08.02.2021   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Anticipatory   Bail Application No. 2219 of 2021, and order dated 28.01.2021 in Criminal Miscellaneous Anticipatory Bail Application No. 1700 of 2021, to the extent of granting protection for 90 days to the respondents­accused   are   set   aside,   leaving   it   open   to   the Investigating Agency to proceed in the matters in accordance with law and complete the investigation. If the respondents­ accused have been meanwhile sent to judicial custody, their application(s) for regular bail or any request for their police remand made by the Investigating Officer shall be decided by the competent Court, uninfluenced by the observations made hereinabove. 17 29. Ordered accordingly. ………………………..CJI. (N.V. RAMANA)      ………………………… J. (SURYA KANT) …………………………. J. (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) NEW DELHI; MAY 28, 2021 18