DEVI LAL vs. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 08-01-2019

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 148 OF 2010 DEVI LAL         ……..Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN              …….Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 149 OF 2010 BABU LAL              ………..Appellant(s)      VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN             .…….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. Both the appellants, Babu Lal and Devi Lal are aggrieved by the affirmation of their conviction under Section 302 and other with the  aid  of  Section 120  B  of  the  Indian Penal Code  and sentenced to life imprisonment under the impugned Judgment Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2019.01.09 10:09:28 IST Reason: th dated 30  January, 2009, seek this Court’s intervention. 1 2. Brief facts of the case, as per prosecution, post­incident, are th that on 8  February 1999 at 7.15 p.m. complainant Vijay Singh (PW­2) submitted a written report (Exhibit P­1) at Police Station, Nimbahera, informing that he and his cousin brother Dharam Chand(deceased)   were   living   with   their   families   in   separate th houses in village Binota.  In the evening of 7  February, 1999 at 6.00 p.m., daughter of the deceased Dharam Chand informed him on telephone that her father, who had gone to Bhagwanpura on Motor Cycle, had not returned.  The complainant, along with th other neighbours, went to search deceased Dharam Chand on 8 February, 1999 and at village Bhagwanpura, outside the godown of brother deceased Dharam Chand, found his motorcycle but his whereabouts were not made known.  On his written complaint, a missing person report (Exh. P­75) was lodged.  The Investigating Officer, in the  course of enquiry, made from Shambhu Singh th (PW­3), revealed that on 7   February, 1999, accused Babu Lal had   hired   his   jeep.     Babu   Lal   and   his   labourers   Logar   and Bagdiram carried drum which contained wheat.  The drum was alighted   from   the   jeep   on   way   near   field   of   Logar,   making Shambhu Singh to sit at the house of Logar and on excuse of responding to call of nature, Babu Lal, Logar and Bagdiram got 2 away for about 1.30 hours.  When they came back, the drum was not there.  On inquiry by Shambhu Singh (PW­3), Babu Lal told that Logar and Bagdiram shall deliver it afterwards.  On further th inquiry, it revealed that on 5   February, 1999, hot altercations had taken place between Babu Lal and deceased Dharam Chand for some money transactions and on carrying such drum, Babu Lal caused some suspicion.  During the course of search, it was found that from a dry well, bad odour was emitting. When freshly cut branches and leaves of the teak tree were removed, the dead body of the deceased Dharam Chand was found.  On the basis of th Exhibit P­73, formal FIR came to be registered on 11  February, 1999 at Police Station, Nimbahera. 3. After the investigation, charge­sheet was filed against the four accused persons namely, Babu Lal, Devi Lal, Keshu Ram @ Panchiya Meena and Logar Rawat.  All the four faced trial.  The learned   trial   Judge   by   its   impugned   judgment   acquitted   the accused persons Keshu Ram @ Panchiya Meena and Logar Rawat holding accused Babu Lal guilty for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and 120­B IPC and appellant Devi Lal 3 for the offence of Section 120­B IPC, of hatching a conspiracy to commit murder. 4. The   appeals   preferred   by   both   the   appellants   before   the High Court came to be dismissed affirming their conviction and th sentence vide judgment impugned dated 30  January, 2009.   5. Before   adverting   to   the   rival   submissions,   it   would   be apposite to first take analysis of the evidence on record. 6. The   case   of   the   prosecution   is   based   on   circumstantial evidence.  The circumstances which lead the trial Judge to held the   appellants   guilty   under   Section   302   and   120B   IPC   and confirmed by the High Court is primarily based on the evidence of complainant Vijay Singh (PW­2), Vandna (PW­5) and Uma Devi (PW­10), daughter and wife of the deceased and also relied upon the extra judicial confession made by the co­accused Babu Lal to Shambhu Singh (PW­3).  7. At the outset, it may be noticed that neither in the initial complaint on which the missing report was lodged nor at the stage after inquiry, when the FIR came to be registered (Exh. P­ 73),   the   name   of   appellant   Devi   Lal   surfaced.     Even   in   the 4 statement   of   Vandna(PW­5),   while   recording   statement   under Section 164 CrPC, (Exh. D­5), no such reference was made of any conspiracy   having   been   hatched   by   Devi   Lal,   the   accused appellant.   In the testimony of PW­5 Vandna and PW­10 Uma Devi, it was deposed that accused Devi Lal came to the house on th 5   February 1999 and wanted to purchase the half portion of Bada   from   the   deceased   Dharam   Chand   for   a   sum   of   Rs. 10,000/­.   Devi Lal threatened the deceased to sell his   Bada which he refused.   8. As regards appellant Babu Lal, it was deposed by Vandna (PW­5) and Uma Devi (PW­10) that he was known to their family as Babu Lal used to take money from the deceased and to return the   same.     Deceased   Dharam   Chand   lended   Rs.   50,000/­   to accused Babu Lal, which had been reduced into writing in the ledger book.  When deceased Dharam Chand went to take money from   Babu   Lal,   he   refused   to   return   the   same   and   started quarrelling.   The deceased had informed this to Vandna (PW­5) and   Uma   Devi   (PW­10).     The   money   as   demanded   by   the deceased led to suspicion of the commission of crime.  But both the witnesses Vandna (PW­ 5) and Uma Devi (PW­10), in their 5 cross­examination,   stated   that   they   did   not   know   when   the accused Babu Lal had borrowed money from the deceased. 9. It is true that an extra judicial confession is used against its maker but as a matter of caution, advisable for the Court to look for a corroboration with the other evidence on record.  In  Gopal Sah   v.   State   of   Bihar   2008(17)   SCC   128,   this   court   while dealing   with   extra   judicial   confession   held   that   extra   judicial confession is, on the face of it, a weak evidence and the Court is reluctant, in the absence of a chain of cogent circumstances, to rely  on   it,   for   the   purpose   of   recording   a  conviction.     In  the instant   case,   it   may   be   noticed   that   there   are   no   additional cogent circumstances on record to rely on it.  At the same time, Shambhu   Singh   (PW­3),   while   recording   his   statement   under Section 164 CrPC, has not made such statement of extra judicial confession(Exh. D­5) made by accused Babu Lal.   In addition, there are no other circumstances on record to support it. 10. The other connecting evidence on which reliance was placed by   the   prosecution   was   that   accused   Babu   Lal   had   given information   of   handing   over   the   torn   leaf   of   Bahi   obtaining 6 signatures   of   deceased   Dharam   Chand   to   accused   Devi   Lal. Accused Devi Lal got the said leaf recovered by giving information to the Investigating Officer.   There is no justifiable explanation available which came on record as to how the torn leaf came in the possession of Devi Lal as the said paper was torn from the Bahi (Article 27) which was recovered from the accused Babu Lal, which has   been  matched   by   FSL  report.     There   was   also  no justification which came forward from the prosecution as to how the torn   Bahi   paper of Babu Lal containing the signatures of deceased Dharam Chand with black ink came to him.  Pen was recovered   on   the   information   of   accused   Babu   Lal,   by   which handwriting found on the leaf recovered from accused Devi Lal. The further circumstance was recovery of Rs. 11,200/­ on the information given by the accused Babu Lal but from where this money   had   come   to   Babu   Lal,   was   not   clarified   by   the prosecution.  The other circumstances completing the chain was that accused Devi Lal had not given any clarification with regard to the fact that by which information Devi Lal had come to Babu Lal which had been indicated in the diary recovered from accused Devi Lal under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.  Accused Babu Lal th was arrested on 13   February, 1999 and accused Devi Lal was 7 th th arrested on 15   February, 1999 for the alleged incident of 7 th February, 1999 which came to knowledge of informant on 8 th February, 1999 and report was lodged on 11   February, 1999 and the alleged recovery of torn page of     which obtained Bahi, signature of the deceased along with the diary of 1999(Exhibit P­ th 79), under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was made on 24 February, 1999.  The  Bahi , as such, was never produced.  Apart from non­production of  Bahi,  to prove the provonance of the torn piece of blank paper, the similarity of the ink on this torn piece of paper and ledger was extremely doubtful in view of the objection by   the   FSL   and   response   lead   to   it   which   the   Investigating Officer(PW­33) has also admitted in the cross examination.   11. What was relied upon by the High Court was that paper Article   7   recovered   on   disclosure   of   appellant   accused   Devi Lal(from “Darraj” to Barsot”) was one which was torn away from Bahi   recovered on information at the instance of the appellant Babu Lal.  Secondly, that piece of paper had lower portion which had signatures of deceased Dharam Chand and other than that, the paper was blank. 8 12. Summarily,   the   circumstances   in   totality   apart   from   the extra judicial confession which has been noticed by the High Court are referred to as under:­ “1. Appellant­Devilal   wanted   to   purchase   half   portion   of ‘ Bara ’ from deceased for which he actively pursued. th 2. On February 7 , in morning, around 9­10, deceased left for Bhagwanpura­not a very distant village. 3. Around   10­10.20   AM,   he   telling   of   going   to   house   of Babulal   for   receiving   money­went   towards   and   to house(‘Nohra’) of Babulal. Going to house of Babulal­than never seen alive. th 4. Jeep of Shambhu hired by Babulal on February 6   for th use in evening of 7  for going village Dhikiya. th Then in evening of 7   around 8 p.m., Babulal and two other carried weighty drum which left at isolated site­ body of deceased found in a dry well like pit­near the place drum was left. 5. On  information  of  Babulal,  his  own concealed  clothes recovered   from   his   house­also   were   blood   stains   on compound wall and soil of his ‘Nohra’.   On clothes of Babulal and clothes of deceased blood ‘A’ group. Stains found on the floor of ‘Nohra’ of ‘A’ group. Stains on wall of ‘Nohra’ of human blood. 6. On information of Babulal­that is from his possession, recovered a ‘ Bahi ’ – of the ‘ Bahi ’ a leaf about 7­8” X 6­7” was torn away. 7.  Babulal   informed   that   above   half   torn   leaf   is   with Babulal. 8. On information and at the instance of Devilal, that is from his possession, found above half torn leaf of ‘ Bahi ’­ recovered from “Darraj”, that is a narrow space between frame of door and surrounding wall. 9 9. On this torn away leaf at lower side, are signatures of Dharam Chand­otherwise blank is the paper.” 13. Without going into detailed scrutiny of the facts on record under   consideration,   the   circumstances   which   emerged   and taken note  of   under  the   impugned  judgment  in  itself  gives  a suspicion in completing the chain of commission of crime beyond doubt, being committed by the accused appellants. 14. The classic enunciation of law pertaining to circumstantial evidence, its relevance and decisiveness, as a proof of charge of a criminal   offence,   is   amongst   others   traceable   decision   of   the Court   in   Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   Vs.   State   of  1984(4) SCC 116.  The relevant excerpts from para Maharashtra 153 of the decision is assuredly apposite:­ “153.  A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: ( 1 )  the   circumstances   from   which  the  conclusion   of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances   concerned   “must   or   should”   and   not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Vs.     Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade  & Anr.  State  [(1973)   2   SCC   793   where   the of   Maharashtra observations were made: 10
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that<br>the accused must be and not<br>merely may be guilty before a court can<br>convict and the mental distance between<br>‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides<br>vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only<br>with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is<br>to say, they should not be explainable on any other<br>hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature<br>and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis<br>except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as<br>not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion<br>consistent with the innocence of the accused and must<br>show that in all human probability the act must have<br>been done by the accused.”
15. It   has   further   been   considered   by   this   Court   in   Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam  2013(12) SCC 406 and  Raja alias 2015(11) SCC 43.  It has been Rajinder Vs. State of Haryana  propounded that while scrutinising the circumstantial evidence, a   Court   has   to   evaluate   it   to   ensure   the   chain   of   events   is established clearly and completely to rule out any reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused.  The underlying principle is whether the chain is complete or not, indeed it would depend on the facts of each case emanating from the evidence and there cannot be a straight jacket formula which can be laid down for 11 the purpose.   But the circumstances adduced when considered collectively, it must lead only to the conclusion that there cannot be a person other than the accused who alone is the perpetrator of the crime alleged and the circumstances must establish the conclusive nature consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. 16. On an analysis of the overall fact situation in the instant case, and considering the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution and noticed by the High Court in the impugned judgment, to prove the charge is visibly incomplete and   incoherent   to   permit   conviction   of   the   appellants   on   the basis thereof without any trace of doubt.  Though the materials on   record   hold   some   suspicion   towards   them,   but   the prosecution has failed to elevate its case from the realm of “may be   true”   to   the   plane   of   “must   be   true”   as   is   indispensably required in law for conviction on a criminal charge. It is trite to state that in a criminal trial, suspicion, howsoever grave, cannot substitute proof. 17. That apart, in the case of circumstantial evidence, two views are possible on the case of record, one pointing to the guilt of the 12 accused and the other his innocence.   The accused is indeed entitled to have the benefit of one which is favourable to him.  All the judicially laid parameters, defining the quality and content of the circumstantial evidence, bring home the guilt of the accused on   a   criminal   charge,   we   find   no   difficulty   to   hold   that   the prosecution, in the case in hand, has failed to meet the same. 18. In   the   given   facts   and   circumstances,   we   are   unable   to sustain their conviction.  The appellants are thus entitled to the benefit of doubt.  Both the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed.  Appellant Devi Lal is already on bail. His bail bonds are discharged.  Appellant Babu Lal who is in custody is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.    …..………………………CJI. (RANJAN GOGOI) ……………………………..J. (K.M. JOSEPH) ……………………………..J. (AJAY RASTOGI) NEW DELHI January 8, 2019. 13