Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PANDIT RAM NARAIN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ANDOTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/09/1956
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
MENON, P. GOVINDA
CITATION:
1957 AIR 18 1956 SCR 664
ACT:
Tax on circumstances and property--U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914
(U.P. Act II of 1914)-S 14(1)(f)-Nexus-Whether residence
within Town Area necessary condition for imposition of tax
-Tax imposed under clause (f) of s. 14(1) whether can be
justified under clause (d)-Rule 3 whether invalid.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was carrying on business, but was not residing
within the Town Area of Karhal. The Town Area Committee
imposed a tax of Rs. 25 on him under clause (f) of a. 14(1)
of the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914, being a tax on
’circumstances and property’. The appellant filed a writ
application in the High Court on the ground that there could
be no assessment under clause (f) because he resided outside
the jurisdiction of the Town Are& Committee. The High Court
dismissed the application taking the view that it was
unnecessary to consider whether the tax could be legally
imposed under clause (f) as the tax imposed could clearly be
justified under clause (d) of s. 14(1) which authorised the
imposition of a tax on trades, callings or professions.
Held, that residence was not a sine qua non for the
imposition of the tax under clause (f), that the carrying on
of ’business within the Town Area was a sufficient nexus for
the imposition of the tax under clause (f) and that the
assessment of the tax on the appellant under clause (f) was
legally valid.
The legality of the tax imposed must be considered with ref-
erence to the clause under which the assessment was actually
made and a different clause under which the assessment might
have fallen cannot be called in aid of the assessment.
Rule 3 of the ’Rules regarding the Limitations, Restrictions
and Rate subject to which the Circumstances and Property Tax
shall be levied by the Town Area Committees’ framed under s.
39(2) of the Act does not go beyond s. 14(1)(f) and is not
invalid.
JUDGMENT:
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 224 of 1955.
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Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
the 7th May 1954 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil
Miscellaneous Writ No. 133 of 1952.
Naunit Lal for the appellant.
G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal for respondents Nos. I & 2.
1956. September 20. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the
judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad dated the 7th of May 1954 by which the High Court
dismissed an application of the appellant for the issue of a
writ of certiorari under the provisions of article 226 of
the Constitution. The appeal raises the question of the
validity of the assessment of a tax on the appellant for the
year 1950-51 by the Town Area Committee of Karbal under the
provisions of clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 14 of
the United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914 (U. P. Act II of
1914), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The appellant resides in the town of Mainpuri and carries on
the business of plying a motor bus on hire. The appellant’s
bus plies on. alternate days between Etawah and. Mainpuri,
and the town of Karhal falls on the route between Etawah and
Mainpuri. . It is not now disputed that passengers
travelling in the appellant’s bus used to get down or get in
at a bus stand within the town area of Karhal; the appellant
had a booking office situate within the Town Area and
tickets were issued to passengers and an account of the
business was maintained in the said booking office. The
Town Area Committee of Karhal imposed a tax of Rs. 25 on the
appellant for the year 1950-51 under the provisions of
clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act,
being a tax on ’circumstances and property’ and assessing
the income of the appellant from his business within the
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Town Area of Karhal at a sum of Rs. 800 for the year. The
appellant preferred an appeal against the assessment of the
tax under section 18 of the Act, and the grounds taken by
the appellant were (1) that he did not reside within the
limits of the Town Area and (2) that he did not carry on any
trade or business within that Area. By his order dated the
20th October 1951’ the Appeal Officer held that the
appellant carried on his trade or business within the limits
of the Town Area and was therefore rightly assessed to tax
under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the
Act. He accordingly dismissed the appeal. It may be stated
here that the appellant was asked to submit an account of
his income, but no such account was submitted and the
assessing officer worked out the income of the appellant at
about Rs. 67 a month, that is, about Rs. 800 a year. No
question about the amount of the tax has been raised before
us, and it is not necessary to say anything further with
regard to the quantum of assessment.
The appellant then filed a writ application in the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the ground taken by him
was that there could be no assessment under clause (f) of
sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act, because he resided
outside the jurisdiction of the Town Area. The learned
Judge, who dealt with the. application of the appellant,
took the view that the tax imposed on the appellant could
clearly be imposed under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of
section 14 of the Act; therefore it was unnecessary to
consider whether the tax could be legally imposed under
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clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 14. The learned
Judge also expressed the view that residence within the Town
Area was not a pre-requisite condition for the imposition of
the tax under clause (d), and it was enough if the appellant
carried on a trade or business within the Town Area. On
these views, the learned Judge dismissed the writ
application.
The main point which has been urged before us by
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learned counsel for the appellant is that the assessment
of a tax under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 14
on the appellant was. not valid, because residence within
the Town Area was a necessary condition for the assessment
of a tax under clause (f). Learned counsel also argued
before us that the. assessing authority having assessed a
tax on the appellant under clause (f), it was not open to
the High Court to say that the tax was legally valid under a
’different clause, namely clause (d) of sub-section (1) of
section 14.
With regard to his second point, learned counsel has drawn
our attention to sections 15 to 17 of the Act. He has
pointed out that under section 15 of the Act a list of
persons liable to pay the tax imposed under section 14 and
of the amounts to be paid respectively by such persons, has
to be prepared; the list may be revised by the District
Magistrate and has to be submitted to him for confirmation.
When so confirmed., the list can only be altered under sub-
section (2) of section 15 by the District Magistrate or in
pursuance of an order passed in appeal under the provisions
of section 18. We think that learned counsel has rightly
submitted that, so far as the present appellant is
concerned, the list prepared under section 15 must have
shown him as assessed to a certain amount of tax under
clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 14 and the
assessment must have been confirmed on that basis by the
District Magistrate. Therefore, the legality of the tax
imposed on the appellant must be considered with reference
to the clause under which the assessment was actually made,
and a different clause under which the assessment might have
fallen cannot be called in aid of the assessment.
We proceed therefore to consider the legality of the tax
imposed on the appellant with reference to clause (f) of
sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. The short point
for consideration in that context is whether residence
within the Town Area is a necessary condition for the
imposition of the tax under clause
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(f). It is necessary -to read here section 14 of the Act so
far as it is relevant to the point in question.
"14 (1) Subject to any general rules or special orders of
the State Government in this behalf, the taxes which a
Committee may impose are the following:
(d) A tax on trades, callings or professions not exceeding
such rates as may be prescribed.
(f) A tax on persons assessed according to their
circumstances and property not exceeding such rate and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be
prescribed: ,
Provided that such a person is not already assessed under
clauses (a) to (e) above".
It will be noticed that the power of the Town Area Committee
to impose a tax under clause (f) is subject to,’ first, ’any
general rules or special orders of the State Government in
this behalf’ and, secondly, to (such limitations and
restrictions as may be prescribed’. These restrictions and
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limitations are to be found in the Rules made by the State
Government under section 39(2) of the Act, which are called
Rules regarding the Limitations, Restrictions and Rate sub-
ject to which the Circumstances and Property Tax shall be
levied by the Town Area Committee. These rules were
notified by Notification No. 681-T/IX-79T-50 dated July 20,
1950. Two of the rules are important for our purpose, viz.,
rules 2 and 3. They are in these terms:
"2. The tax shall be assessed on every person on whom it is
imposed, in two separate parts, namely (1) on his
circumstances and (2) on the property, if any, owned by him,
and the aggregate of the sums so determined on both the
counts shall constitute the total composite amount payable
by him as circumstances and property tax:
Provided that nothing shall render it irregular
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to assess a person on only one’ of the two ’counts
aforementioned if he does not fulfil the conditions for
liability in respect of that count on which he is not
assessed.
3. (1) The tax assessed on the circumstances of an
assessee may be imposed on any person residing or carrying
on business within the limits of the town area:
Provided that such person has so resided or carried on
business for a total period of at least six months in the
year of assessment.
(2) No tax shall be imposed on any person whose total
taxable income is less than Rs. 200 per annum.
(3) The rate of the tax shall not exceed one anna in a.
rupee on total taxable income.
(4) The total amount of tax assessed on any person shall
not, in any year, exceed a sum of s. 250.
Explanation.-(1) For purposes of this rule ’taxable income’
means gross income accruing within the limits of the town
area.
(ii) The words ’carrying on business’ mean the carrying on
of any trade, profession, calling or other practice or
activity which yields or is capable of yielding income but
do not include service under Government or a local body".
The important point which emerges out of these Rules is that
under Rule 3 the tax assessed on the circumstances of an
assessee may be imposed on any person residing or carrying
on business within the limits of the town area; in other
words, two, conditions in the alternative are laid down in
Rule 3, either the person must reside within the limits of
the town area or he must be carrying on business within the
limits of the said area. There is a third condition that
the residence or carrying on of business must be for a total
period of at least six months in the year of assessment. No
question regarding the third condition has been raised in
this case and it is not necessary to consider that condition
here. Therefore, it is
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clear that if Rule 3 is valid, then the imposition of the
tax on the appellant under clause (f) is also valid, because
on the finding not now in dispute the appellant carried on a
trade or business within the limits of the Town Area of
Karhal. It has been argued before us that Rule 3 is invalid
because, under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 14,
residence within the Town Area of the person to be taxed
under that clause is a necessary condition. We are unable
to accept this argument. Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of
section 14 does not say in express terms that residence
within the Town Area is a necessary condition for the
imposition of the tax. The Rules make it quite clear that
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for each of the clauses of sub-section (1) of section 14
there is a ’nexus’ between the territorial jurisdiction of
the Town Area Committee and the imposition of the tax. So
far as clause (d) is concerned, the ’nexus’ is that the
trade, calling or profession must be carried on within the
limits of the Town Area. So far as clause (f) is concerned,
Rule 3 makes it quite clear that the ’nexus’ is either resi-
dence within the limits of the Town Area or carrying on
business within the same limits. It is to be remembered
that clause (f) was inserted -by an Amending Act, namely,
the Uttar Pradesh Town Areas (Validation and Amendment) Act,
1950. Section 1(2) of the Amending Act gave retrospective
effect to the amendments. The proviso to clause (f) makes
it quite clear that a person who is already assessed under
clauses (a) to (e) cannot be assessed again under clause
(f). The proviso is intended to avoid multiple taxation,
but it is manifest from the proviso that ,there may be
overlapping of the different clauses in sub-section (1) of
section 14; for example, a person may come under clause (d)
as well as clause (f) if he carries on a trade within the
limits of the Town Area. Therefore, the proviso was
necessary to prevent the same person being taxed more than
once under the different clauses of sub-section (1) of
section 14. If residence within the limits of the Town Area
were a
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sine qua non for the imposition of a tax under clause (f),
no question of overlapping between clauses (d) and (f) would
arise unless the person to be taxed resided as well as
carried on a trade within the limits of the Town Area. If
the argument of learned counsel for the appellant is
correct, then the proviso to clause (f) is meaningless in so
far as it envisages an overlapping between clause (d) and
clause (f) in other cases. On a proper construction of
clause (f), read with the limitations and restrictions
embodied in the Rules made under section 39 of the Act, it
cannot be held that residence within the Town Area of Karbal
was a necessary condition for the imposition of the tax on
the appellant.
A reference, was made to sub.;section (4) of section 15-A of
the Act. Section 15-A provides for preliminary proposals
for the imposition of taxes under section 14, publication of
such proposals and the submission of draft rules. Sub-
section (4) states:
"(4) Any, inhabitant of the Town Area may, in the prescribed
manner, file an objection in writing on such proposals and
the committee shall take into consideration the objections
so filed and finally settle its proposals."
Under sub-section (4) any inhabitant of the Town Area may
file an objection to the preliminary proposals for the
imposition of taxes under section 14. The argument before
us was that if an inhabitant of the Town Area alone was
entitled to file an objection to preliminary proposals for
taxation, then in all the, clauses of sub-section (1) of
section 14 residence within the Town Area must be read as a
necessary condition for the imposition of the taxes under
section 14. This contention appears to us to be unsound.
Firstly, the objection as, to preliminary proposals for
taxation is not the same thing as objection to an
assessment, and it may well be that the legislature in their
wisdom thought fit to confine the filing of objections to
preliminary proposals for taxation to the inhabitants of the
Town Area. Secondly, there are several other
672
sections of the Act, such as section 20 and section 21,
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which show that the imposition of a tax on persons not
resident within the Town Area. but having some other nexus
within that Area, was permissible. Thirdly, the question of
the validity of sub-section (4) of section 15-A does not
arise in this case. The appellant was assessed to a tax and
he had a right to file an appeal which right he exercised.
No grievance was made of the failure to exercise the right
under subsection (4) of section 15-A. It is therefore un-
necessary for us to make any pronounce ment on the validity
or otherwise of sub-section (4) of section 15-A All that is
necessary for us to state is that by reason of sub-section
(4) of section 15-A, it cannot be held that residence within
the Town Area is a necessary condition for the imposition of
a tax in all the clauses of sub-section (1) of section 14 of
-the Act.
Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to two
decisions of ’the Allahabad High Court: District Board,
Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt(1) and District Board, Dehra Dun v.
Damodar Dutt(2). The second decision, which was earlier in
point of time, arose out of a suit for recovery of
’circumstances and property tax under the U. P. District
Boards Act (Local Act X of 1922). The question there was
whether the District Board of Dehra Dun could impose a tax
on the defendants who were not residents within the area of
the District Board. It is worthy of note that under section
114 of the U. P. District - Boards Act, the power of a Board
to impose a tax on circumstances and ’property is subject to
the condition that the tax may be imposed on any person
residing or carrying on business in the rural area within
the District Board. The only question in that Allahabad
case was whether the defendants resided within the rural
area of the District Board so as to make them liable for
the. tax. The finding Was that they did not reside within
the rural area and therefore the imposition of
(1) A.I.R. 1948 All. 382.
(2) I.L.R. [1944] All. 611.
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the tax was illegal, and section 131 of the U. P. District
Boards Act did not bar the suit. This decision does not
help the appellant. If it shows anything, it shows that it
was open to the District Board to impose a circumstances and
property’ tax on any person residing or carrying on business
in the rural area.
In the 1948 Allahabad decision, the main question was
whether the provisions of section 2, Professions Tax
Limitation Act (20 of 1941) affected the powers conferred
upon the District Board by section 108 of the U.P. District
Boards Act to levy a tax on circumstances and property’. A
subsidiary question was also raised, whether section 131 of
the U. P. District Boards Act barred the suit. With regard
to the main question, it was pointed out that the name given
to a tax did not matter; what had to be considered was the
pith and substance of it. It was held that in pith and
substance the tax was one which attracted the provisions of
section 2, Professions Tax Limitation Act (20 of 1941). A
tax on ’circumstances and property’ is a composite tax and
the word ’circumstances’. means a man’s financial position,
his status as a whole depending, among other things, on his
income from trade or business. From militating against the
principle that in considering the circumstances of a person
his income from trade or business within the Town Area may
be taken into consideration, the decision approves of the
principle. In the course of his judgment, Bind Basni Prasad
J. referred to section 128, U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916,
where ’taxes on circumstances and property’ appear as a head
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distinct from the ’taxes on trades, callings and vocations
and employments’ and the argument was that the taxes being
under different heads should be treated as being entirely
different, one from the other It was rightly pointed out
that it is no sound principle of construction to interpret
expressions used in one Act with reference to their- use in
another Act. The meanings of words and expressions used in
an Act must take their colour from the context in which
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they appear. It is true that in the Act under our
consideration the taxes which the Town Area Committee may
impose appear under different heads in Sub-section (1) of
section 14. We have already stated that though the clauses
are different, the words used in the section show that there
may be overlapping between the different clauses, and to
prevent the same person being subjected to multiple
taxation, a ’proviso was incorporated in clause (f). In
view of the words and expressions used in section 14 of the
Act, we cannot accept the argument that clause (f) should be
read as entirely independent of and unconnected with the
other clauses and a different condition, namely residence
within the-Town Area, must be read as a necessary part of
clause (f). To do so will be to read in clause (f) words
which do not occur there. The limitations for the
imposition of a tax under clause (f) are given in Rule 3 and
’residence’is only one of the alternative conditions for the
imposition of the tax-not a line qua non as is contended by
learned counsel for the appellant.
In the result, we hold that the assessment of the tax on the
appellant under clause (f) of subjection (1) of section 14
of the Act was legally valid. The appeal fails and is
dismissed with costs.
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