Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SRI BHAGWAN SAMARDHA SREEPADA V.VENKATA VISHWANDADHA MAHARAJ
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/07/1999
BENCH:
M.B.Shah, K.T.Thomas
JUDGMENT:
THOMAS,J.
Leave granted.
A godman is now in the dock. One who was initiated by
him as his devotee has later turned to be his betenoire, and
the godman is facing a prosecution for the offence of
cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. When
he moved the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings
pending against him, the motion was dismissed as per the
impugned order against which the present appeal has been
filed by special leave. Facts, thus far developed, are
stated below: An FIR happned to be registered on the
complaint lodged by one Venkatakrishna Reddy with the Town
Police Station, Nellore, containing the following
allegations. Appellant (Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada
Vallabha Venkata Vishanandha Maharaj) who is a youngman, son
of a teacher of Gummaluru Village (A.P.) claimed to possess
occult faculties and attracted a number of devotees. He
represented to have divine healing powers through his
touches, particularly of chronic diseases. Complainant
approached him for healing his 15 year old daughter who is
congenitally a dumb child. Appellant assured the
complainant that the little girl would be cured of her
impairment through his divine powers. He demanded a sum of
Rs.1 lac as consideration to be paid in instalments. The
first instalment demanded was Rs.10,000/- which, after some
bargaining, was fixed at Rs.5,000/-. Complainant paid that
amount and later he paid a further amount of Rs.1,000/-
towards incidental expenses. He waited eagerly for
improvement of his dump child till 1994 which was the time
limit indicated by the appellant for the girl to start
speaking. As the child remained the same, complainant began
to entertain doubts. Appellant postponed the time limit
till August 1994 for the girl to develop speech capacity. A
little more amount of Rs.516/- was collected for performance
of a yagyan. But unfortunately nothing of such thing
brought about any change in the girl. In the meanwhile,
news of some other persons defrauded by the appellant
reached the ears of the complainant as newspapers started
publishing such other activities indulged in by the
appellant. In one such publication it was mentioned that
the appellant had mobilised more than a crore of rupees from
different devotees. It was then that the complainant
realised the fraud committed by the appellant, according to
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the complainant. Hence a complaint was lodged with the
police for cheating.
The police conducted investigation and on 15-12-1994
laid final report before the Magistrate concerned by
referring the case as mistake of fact mainly on the ground
that this is a kind of religious belief prevalent in India
among devotees of God. According to the appellant, this was
not a case of cheating or breach of trust. But the
Magistrate was not prepared to give accord to the said
report. On 2-8-1995 he ordered for reinvestigation of the
case. Pursuant to the said order, the police
reinvestigated and filed a report on 15-9-1997 holding that
appellant has committed the offence under Section 420 of the
IPC. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on
receipt of the said report and issued warrant of arrest
against the appellant. Appellant moved the High Court for
quashing the proceedings on two grounds. First is that the
Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order reinvestigation
after receipt of the first report of the police, without
affording an opportunity to the appellant. Second is that
allegations of the complainant would not constitute an
offence of cheating. But the High Court dismissed the
petition for which the impugned order was passed. Learned
counsel contended that no offence of cheating can be
discerned from the allegations, particularly in view of the
admitted fact that the complainant reposed faith only in the
divine powers which appellant would only have offered to
invoke through rituals and prayers. If somebody offers his
prayers to God for healing the sick, there cannot normally
be any element of fraud. But if he represents to another
that he has divine powers and either directly or indirectly
makes that another person believe that he has such divine
powers, it is inducement referred to Section 415 of the IPC.
Anybody who responds to such inducement pursuant to it and
gives the inducer money or any other article and does not
get the desired result is a victim of the fraudulent
representation. Court can in such a situation presume that
the offence of cheating falling within the ambit of Section
420 of the IPC has been committed. It is for the accused,
in such a situation, to rebut the presumption. So the
contention that the allegations do not disclose an offence
under Section 420 of the IPC has to be repelled and we are
of the opinion that the Magistrate has rightly taken
cognizance of the said offence. Power of the police to
conduct further investigation, after laying final report, is
recognised under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Even after the court took cognizance of any
offence on the strength of the police report first
submitted, it is open to the police to conduct further
investigation. This has been so stated by this Court in Ram
Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1979 SC 1791). The
only rider provided by the aforesaid decision is that it
would be desirable that the police should inform the court
and seek formal permission to make further investigation.
In such a situation the power of the court to direct the
police to conduct further investigation cannot have any
inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest
that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any
such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on
the court would only result in encumbering the court with
the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be
afforded with the opportunity of being heard. As law does
not require it, we would not burden the magistrate with such
an obligation.
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For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to interfere
with the order passed by the magistrate. Appeal is
accordingly dismissed.