Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 674
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.3472 OF 2018)
P. SHANTHI PUGAZHENTHI …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
SPE/CBI/ACB/ CHENNAI …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant before this Court, who was working as an
Assistant Superintendent in the Chennai Port Trust assails
the judgment and order dated 10.01.2018 passed by the High
Court of Madras (hereinafter ‘High Court’) which has sustained
her conviction and sentence under section 109 of the Indian
Penal Code (hereinafter ‘IPC’) read with Section 13(2) and
Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988
Signature Not Verified
(hereinafter ‘1988 Act’). The co-accused (husband of the
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2025.05.13
17:54:38 IST
Reason:
appellant, at the time) was also convicted and sentenced by
1
the same order under section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988
Act.
3. In June 2009, an FIR was registered against the appellant’s
husband alleging that he had illegally demanded and received
Rs. 3000 for handing over a cheque relating to a motor
accident claim. While investigating the FIR, certain raids were
conducted at the appellant’s husband’s house and on
31.12.2009 another FIR under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act was registered against the appellant’s
husband, while he was serving as a public servant on the post
of Divisional Manager in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. When
the search was conducted on the residential premise of the
appellant’s husband, various incriminating documents
relating to movable and immovable property in the name of the
appellant and her husband were found. Primarily, it was
alleged that during the check period between 1.09.2002 and
16.06.2009, the appellant’s husband had acquired movable
and immovable properties which were disproportionate to his
income. The properties were in the appellant’s name, as well
as of her husband.
2
4. On 18.12.2010, a chargesheet was filed and the appellant was
charged under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of
the 1988 Act, while her husband was charged under section
13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, with details of the
various movable and immovable assets acquired by them
during the check period. It was alleged that disproportionate
assets amounting to Rs. 60,99,216 have been acquired by the
accused.
5. After perusing the evidence on record, the Trial Court vide
order dated 27.05.2013 found the appellant and her husband
guilty and held that the appellant’s husband has acquired
disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs. 37,98,752 during
the check period beyond his known sources of income. The
appellant was held guilty of abetting her husband in acquiring
such disproportionate assets. The appellant’s husband was
convicted under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988
Act and sentenced to 2 years of R.I. Whereas the appellant was
sentenced under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act and sentenced to 1 year of R.I.
6. Both the appellant and her husband preferred their criminal
appeal against the above order of conviction and sentence. On
3
10.01.2018, the High Court dismissed the appeal and found
no ground to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court.
While dismissing the appeal, the High Court observed that
although there are minor discrepancies in the calculation of
known sources of income of the accused, the
disproportionality of assets is hugely excessive. Specifically the
High Court observed that there is no material to show that the
assets acquired during the check period, were acquired from
their known source or sources of income, and even if the
explanations provided by the accused is accepted it does not
still remove the disproportionality. Now the appellant is before
this Court.
7. The case of the appellant is that the courts below have grossly
erred in convicting her for abetting her husband (the main
accused) in acquiring disproportionate assets during the
check period, and that any property disproportionately
purchased by her husband in her name during the check
period, cannot be held to be disproportionate in the hands of
the appellant. Further, the appellant would argue that the co-
accused is no longer her husband and he has subsequently
re-married. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that
4
the appellant was hand in glove with her husband in
commission of the crime and she abetted the commission of
offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
8. We have heard both the sides and perused the material on
record.
9. The only question that comes up for our consideration is
whether the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of
offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
10. Section 107 of IPC defines and illustrates as to what is
abetment. Section 107 of IPC reads as follows:
“ 107. Abetment of a thing.— A person abets the
doing of a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person
or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that
thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful
misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a
material fact which he is bound to disclose,
voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause
or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate
the doing of that thing.
Illustration
A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from
a Court of Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that
fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to
A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to
5
apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the
apprehension of C.
Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the
time of the commission of an act, does anything in
order to facilitate the commission of that act, and
thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said
to aid the doing of that act.”
Section 108 of IPC defines ‘Abettor’ as follows:
“ 108. Abettor— A person abets an offence,
who abets either the commission of an offence, or
the commission of an act which would be an
offence, if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence with the same intention or
knowledge as that of the abettor.
Explanation 1.—The abetment of the illegal
omission of an act may amount to an offence
although the abettor may not himself be bound to
do that act.
Explanation 2.—To constitute the offence of
abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted
should be committed, or that the effect requisite to
constitute the offence should be caused.
Illustrations
(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A
is guilty of abetting B to commit murder.
(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of
the instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound.
A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.
Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person
abetted should be capable by law of committing an
offence, or that he should have the same guilty
intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any
guilty intention or knowledge.
Illustrations
(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a
lunatic to commit an act which would be an offence,
if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence, and having the same
6
intention as A. Here A, whether the act be
committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.
(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates
B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act
which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the
abetment, does the act in the absence of A and
thereby causes Z's death. Here, though B was not
capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable
to be punished in the same manner as if B had been
capable by law of committing an offence, and had
committed murder, and he is therefore subject to
the punishment of death.
(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B,
in consequence of the unsoundness of his mind,
being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or
that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law,
sets fire to the house in consequence of A's
instigation. B has committed no offence, but A is
guilty of abetting the offence of setting fire to a
dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment
provided for that offence.
(d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed,
instigates B to take property belonging to Z out of
Z's possession. A induces B to believe that the
property belongs to A. B takes the property out of
Z's possession, in good faith, believing it to be A's
property. B, acting under this misconception, does
not take dishonestly, and therefore does not
commit theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and
is liable to the same punishment as if B had
committed theft.
Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being
an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is
also an offence.
Illustration
A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B
accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and C
commits that offence in consequence of B's
instigation. B is liable to be punished for his offence
with the punishment for murder; and, as A
7
instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable
to the same punishment.
Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the
commission of the offence of abetment by
conspiracy that the abettor should concert the
offence with the person who commits it. It is
sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in
pursuance of which the offence is committed.
Illustration
A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed
that A shall administer the poison. B then explains
the plan to C mentioning that a third person is to
administer the poison, but without mentioning A's
name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures
and delivers it to B for the purpose of its being used
in the manner explained. A administers the poison;
Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and C have
not conspired together, yet C has been engaged in
the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been
murdered. C has therefore committed the offence
defined in this section and is liable to the
punishment for murder.”
11. The law was laid down by this Court with respect to offences
under section 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, in P.
Nallammal & Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of
Police (1999) 6 SCC 559, where this court was considering
whether the appellants therein are liable to be convicted of
abetting crime under 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
12. In P. Nallamal (Supra) , it was contended before this Court
that an offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act cannot
be abetted by a non-public servant. Further, that there is no
8
provision in the 1988 Act which provides punishment for
abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) whereas it provides
punishment for abetment of some other offences under the
1988 Act. However, after discussing the history of Section 13
of the 1988 Act which was a substitute for some of the
provisions of Chapter-IX of IPC which deals with offences by
or relating to public servants, this Court held that an offence
under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act can be abetted by any
other person. After reading Section 107 of IPC and accepting
suggestions of Counsel, this Court gave illustrations that how
even a person who is not a public servant can abet the offence
under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The relevant
paragraphs are as follows:
“24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain
illustrations which, according to us, would
amplify the cases of abetments fitting with
each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the
Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC
Act.
The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells
him of how other public servants have become
more wealthy by receiving bribes
and A persuades the public servant to do the
same in order to become rich and the public
servant acts accordingly. If it is a proved
position there cannot be any doubt that A has
abetted the offence by instigation.
Next illustration is this:
9
Four persons including the public servant
decide to raise a bulk amount through bribery
and the remaining persons prompt the public
servant to keep such money in their names. If
this is a proved position then all the said
persons are guilty of abetment through
conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his,
that he has acquired considerable wealth
through bribery but he cannot keep them as he
has no known source of income to account, he
requests A to keep the said wealth in A's
name, and A obliges the public servant in
doing so. If it is a proved position A is guilty of
abetment falling under the “Thirdly” clause of
Section 107 of the Penal Code.
25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how
the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act
can be abetted by non-public servants. The
only mode of prosecuting such offender is
through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.”
(Emphasis Provided)
13. In other words, any person who persuades a public servant to
take bribes, decides to raise money through bribes along with
a public servant and prompts such public servant to keep the
wealth with him/her or keeps the amassed wealth of a public
servant in his/her own name is guilty of committing the
offence of abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) of the
1988 Act. We must also note that the 2018 Amendment to the
1988 Act has substituted Section 12 of 1988 Act and made all
10
offences under the 1988 Act abettable. This Section 12 of 1988
Act reads as follows:
“ 12. Punishment for abetment of
offences.— Whoever abets any offence
punishable under this Act, whether or not that
offence is committed in consequence of that
abetment, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than three years, but which may extend to
seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
In any case, there is no doubt that offence under section
13(1)(e) was abettable even prior to the 2018 Amendment.
14. In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the
appellant’s husband has acquired assets (disproportionate to
his income), during the check period, in appellant’s name.
Both the courts below have given concurrent findings on this
aspect, and it is not required for us to deal with that aspect in
detail.
15. If we apply the principles laid down in the P. Nallammal case
(supra) , the present appellant’s case would definitely fall either
nd rd
in the 2 or 3 illustration. It is not clear from the record
whether the appellant and her husband entered into a prior
conspiracy to amass a huge bulk of wealth through bribery,
but there is no doubt that after such disproportionate wealth
was amassed, the appellant has been actively involved in
11
concealing such wealth by keeping assets in her name. By
doing so, the appellant is undoubtedly guilty of offence of
abetment falling under section109 IPC read with 13(2) and
13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
Moreover, we would like to note that even the appellant
was a public servant at the time of commission of the offence,
as she was holding the post of Assistant Superintendent in the
Chennai Port Trust, though she has been prosecuted here in
her capacity as the wife of the main accused. We would also
like to note that the appellant’s argument that she is no longer
the wife of co-accused as the co-accused has remarried, has
no force because at the time of commission of offence, she was
the wife of the co-accused. Even if we assume that she was not
the wife at the time of commission of crime, then also it is
immaterial since it is proven that she had allowed the co-
accused to accumulate assets in her name and thus, assisted
the co-accused in accumulation of assets disproportionate to
the known sources of income. It is a well settled law that even
a non-public servant can be convicted under section 109 IPC
read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We, therefore, find no reason
12
to hold that the appellant could not have been convicted under
section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
16. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are
of the opinion that the finding of both the courts below does
not require any interference. The appeal is accordingly
dismissed.
17. The appellant, who is on bail, is directed to surrender within
four weeks from today.
18. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. Pending
application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
…......………………………….J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
….....………………………….J.
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
NEW DELHI,
MAY 13, 2025.
13
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.3472 OF 2018)
P. SHANTHI PUGAZHENTHI …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE REPRESENTED BY THE
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
SPE/CBI/ACB/ CHENNAI …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant before this Court, who was working as an
Assistant Superintendent in the Chennai Port Trust assails
the judgment and order dated 10.01.2018 passed by the High
Court of Madras (hereinafter ‘High Court’) which has sustained
her conviction and sentence under section 109 of the Indian
Penal Code (hereinafter ‘IPC’) read with Section 13(2) and
Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988
Signature Not Verified
(hereinafter ‘1988 Act’). The co-accused (husband of the
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2025.05.13
17:54:38 IST
Reason:
appellant, at the time) was also convicted and sentenced by
1
the same order under section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988
Act.
3. In June 2009, an FIR was registered against the appellant’s
husband alleging that he had illegally demanded and received
Rs. 3000 for handing over a cheque relating to a motor
accident claim. While investigating the FIR, certain raids were
conducted at the appellant’s husband’s house and on
31.12.2009 another FIR under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act was registered against the appellant’s
husband, while he was serving as a public servant on the post
of Divisional Manager in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. When
the search was conducted on the residential premise of the
appellant’s husband, various incriminating documents
relating to movable and immovable property in the name of the
appellant and her husband were found. Primarily, it was
alleged that during the check period between 1.09.2002 and
16.06.2009, the appellant’s husband had acquired movable
and immovable properties which were disproportionate to his
income. The properties were in the appellant’s name, as well
as of her husband.
2
4. On 18.12.2010, a chargesheet was filed and the appellant was
charged under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of
the 1988 Act, while her husband was charged under section
13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, with details of the
various movable and immovable assets acquired by them
during the check period. It was alleged that disproportionate
assets amounting to Rs. 60,99,216 have been acquired by the
accused.
5. After perusing the evidence on record, the Trial Court vide
order dated 27.05.2013 found the appellant and her husband
guilty and held that the appellant’s husband has acquired
disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs. 37,98,752 during
the check period beyond his known sources of income. The
appellant was held guilty of abetting her husband in acquiring
such disproportionate assets. The appellant’s husband was
convicted under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988
Act and sentenced to 2 years of R.I. Whereas the appellant was
sentenced under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act and sentenced to 1 year of R.I.
6. Both the appellant and her husband preferred their criminal
appeal against the above order of conviction and sentence. On
3
10.01.2018, the High Court dismissed the appeal and found
no ground to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court.
While dismissing the appeal, the High Court observed that
although there are minor discrepancies in the calculation of
known sources of income of the accused, the
disproportionality of assets is hugely excessive. Specifically the
High Court observed that there is no material to show that the
assets acquired during the check period, were acquired from
their known source or sources of income, and even if the
explanations provided by the accused is accepted it does not
still remove the disproportionality. Now the appellant is before
this Court.
7. The case of the appellant is that the courts below have grossly
erred in convicting her for abetting her husband (the main
accused) in acquiring disproportionate assets during the
check period, and that any property disproportionately
purchased by her husband in her name during the check
period, cannot be held to be disproportionate in the hands of
the appellant. Further, the appellant would argue that the co-
accused is no longer her husband and he has subsequently
re-married. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that
4
the appellant was hand in glove with her husband in
commission of the crime and she abetted the commission of
offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
8. We have heard both the sides and perused the material on
record.
9. The only question that comes up for our consideration is
whether the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of
offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
10. Section 107 of IPC defines and illustrates as to what is
abetment. Section 107 of IPC reads as follows:
“ 107. Abetment of a thing.— A person abets the
doing of a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person
or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that
thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful
misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a
material fact which he is bound to disclose,
voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause
or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate
the doing of that thing.
Illustration
A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from
a Court of Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that
fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to
A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to
5
apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the
apprehension of C.
Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the
time of the commission of an act, does anything in
order to facilitate the commission of that act, and
thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said
to aid the doing of that act.”
Section 108 of IPC defines ‘Abettor’ as follows:
“ 108. Abettor— A person abets an offence,
who abets either the commission of an offence, or
the commission of an act which would be an
offence, if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence with the same intention or
knowledge as that of the abettor.
Explanation 1.—The abetment of the illegal
omission of an act may amount to an offence
although the abettor may not himself be bound to
do that act.
Explanation 2.—To constitute the offence of
abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted
should be committed, or that the effect requisite to
constitute the offence should be caused.
Illustrations
(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A
is guilty of abetting B to commit murder.
(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of
the instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound.
A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.
Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person
abetted should be capable by law of committing an
offence, or that he should have the same guilty
intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any
guilty intention or knowledge.
Illustrations
(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a
lunatic to commit an act which would be an offence,
if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence, and having the same
6
intention as A. Here A, whether the act be
committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.
(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates
B, a child under seven years of age, to do an act
which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the
abetment, does the act in the absence of A and
thereby causes Z's death. Here, though B was not
capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable
to be punished in the same manner as if B had been
capable by law of committing an offence, and had
committed murder, and he is therefore subject to
the punishment of death.
(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B,
in consequence of the unsoundness of his mind,
being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or
that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law,
sets fire to the house in consequence of A's
instigation. B has committed no offence, but A is
guilty of abetting the offence of setting fire to a
dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment
provided for that offence.
(d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed,
instigates B to take property belonging to Z out of
Z's possession. A induces B to believe that the
property belongs to A. B takes the property out of
Z's possession, in good faith, believing it to be A's
property. B, acting under this misconception, does
not take dishonestly, and therefore does not
commit theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and
is liable to the same punishment as if B had
committed theft.
Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being
an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is
also an offence.
Illustration
A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B
accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and C
commits that offence in consequence of B's
instigation. B is liable to be punished for his offence
with the punishment for murder; and, as A
7
instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable
to the same punishment.
Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the
commission of the offence of abetment by
conspiracy that the abettor should concert the
offence with the person who commits it. It is
sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in
pursuance of which the offence is committed.
Illustration
A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed
that A shall administer the poison. B then explains
the plan to C mentioning that a third person is to
administer the poison, but without mentioning A's
name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures
and delivers it to B for the purpose of its being used
in the manner explained. A administers the poison;
Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and C have
not conspired together, yet C has been engaged in
the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been
murdered. C has therefore committed the offence
defined in this section and is liable to the
punishment for murder.”
11. The law was laid down by this Court with respect to offences
under section 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, in P.
Nallammal & Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of
Police (1999) 6 SCC 559, where this court was considering
whether the appellants therein are liable to be convicted of
abetting crime under 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
12. In P. Nallamal (Supra) , it was contended before this Court
that an offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act cannot
be abetted by a non-public servant. Further, that there is no
8
provision in the 1988 Act which provides punishment for
abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) whereas it provides
punishment for abetment of some other offences under the
1988 Act. However, after discussing the history of Section 13
of the 1988 Act which was a substitute for some of the
provisions of Chapter-IX of IPC which deals with offences by
or relating to public servants, this Court held that an offence
under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act can be abetted by any
other person. After reading Section 107 of IPC and accepting
suggestions of Counsel, this Court gave illustrations that how
even a person who is not a public servant can abet the offence
under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The relevant
paragraphs are as follows:
“24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain
illustrations which, according to us, would
amplify the cases of abetments fitting with
each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the
Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC
Act.
The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells
him of how other public servants have become
more wealthy by receiving bribes
and A persuades the public servant to do the
same in order to become rich and the public
servant acts accordingly. If it is a proved
position there cannot be any doubt that A has
abetted the offence by instigation.
Next illustration is this:
9
Four persons including the public servant
decide to raise a bulk amount through bribery
and the remaining persons prompt the public
servant to keep such money in their names. If
this is a proved position then all the said
persons are guilty of abetment through
conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his,
that he has acquired considerable wealth
through bribery but he cannot keep them as he
has no known source of income to account, he
requests A to keep the said wealth in A's
name, and A obliges the public servant in
doing so. If it is a proved position A is guilty of
abetment falling under the “Thirdly” clause of
Section 107 of the Penal Code.
25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how
the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act
can be abetted by non-public servants. The
only mode of prosecuting such offender is
through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.”
(Emphasis Provided)
13. In other words, any person who persuades a public servant to
take bribes, decides to raise money through bribes along with
a public servant and prompts such public servant to keep the
wealth with him/her or keeps the amassed wealth of a public
servant in his/her own name is guilty of committing the
offence of abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) of the
1988 Act. We must also note that the 2018 Amendment to the
1988 Act has substituted Section 12 of 1988 Act and made all
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offences under the 1988 Act abettable. This Section 12 of 1988
Act reads as follows:
“ 12. Punishment for abetment of
offences.— Whoever abets any offence
punishable under this Act, whether or not that
offence is committed in consequence of that
abetment, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than three years, but which may extend to
seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
In any case, there is no doubt that offence under section
13(1)(e) was abettable even prior to the 2018 Amendment.
14. In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the
appellant’s husband has acquired assets (disproportionate to
his income), during the check period, in appellant’s name.
Both the courts below have given concurrent findings on this
aspect, and it is not required for us to deal with that aspect in
detail.
15. If we apply the principles laid down in the P. Nallammal case
(supra) , the present appellant’s case would definitely fall either
nd rd
in the 2 or 3 illustration. It is not clear from the record
whether the appellant and her husband entered into a prior
conspiracy to amass a huge bulk of wealth through bribery,
but there is no doubt that after such disproportionate wealth
was amassed, the appellant has been actively involved in
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concealing such wealth by keeping assets in her name. By
doing so, the appellant is undoubtedly guilty of offence of
abetment falling under section109 IPC read with 13(2) and
13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
Moreover, we would like to note that even the appellant
was a public servant at the time of commission of the offence,
as she was holding the post of Assistant Superintendent in the
Chennai Port Trust, though she has been prosecuted here in
her capacity as the wife of the main accused. We would also
like to note that the appellant’s argument that she is no longer
the wife of co-accused as the co-accused has remarried, has
no force because at the time of commission of offence, she was
the wife of the co-accused. Even if we assume that she was not
the wife at the time of commission of crime, then also it is
immaterial since it is proven that she had allowed the co-
accused to accumulate assets in her name and thus, assisted
the co-accused in accumulation of assets disproportionate to
the known sources of income. It is a well settled law that even
a non-public servant can be convicted under section 109 IPC
read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We, therefore, find no reason
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to hold that the appellant could not have been convicted under
section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
16. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are
of the opinion that the finding of both the courts below does
not require any interference. The appeal is accordingly
dismissed.
17. The appellant, who is on bail, is directed to surrender within
four weeks from today.
18. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. Pending
application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
…......………………………….J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
….....………………………….J.
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
NEW DELHI,
MAY 13, 2025.
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