Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2662 of 2002
PETITIONER:
STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/S ASHIT SHIPPING SERVICES P. LTD. & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/04/2002
BENCH:
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri & S.N. Variava
JUDGMENT:
S. N. VARIAVA, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) Heard parties.
3) Briefly stated the facts are as follows:
The 1st Respondent is working as an agent for one M/s Palm Oil
Transportation Pvt. Ltd., C/o M/s Samta Shiping Agency P. Ltd.,
Singapore for their vessel MV Hec Ann which arrived at Kandla port on
20th June, 1995. The said ship was carrying logs of timber consigned
to various parties under the following documents:
"a) Bills of lading No. HA/9504/47 to 49 dated 30.5.95.
b) Invoice Nos VB 95003 dated 30.5.95 for US$ 10,566.43
-do- Nos. VB 95003/Int of -do- for US $ 312.65
-do- Nos. VB 95002 of -do- for US $ 5,029.23
-do- Nos. VB 95002/Int of -do- for US $ 148.81
-do- Nos. VB 95001 of -do- for US $ 44,539.65
-do- Nos. VB 95001/Int of -do- for US $ 1,317.89
$ 61,914.66"
It appears that the 2nd Respondent sent to the 1st Respondent a Bond
which, inter alia, provided as follows:
"The above goods were shipped on the above vessel by
M/s. Matsui and company (Hong Kong) Limited Hong Kong
59 pieces (and consign to the order) but relevant bills of
lading has not yet arrived.
We hereby request you to deliver such goods to M/s.
(Vasani Bros) Bhavnagar in accordance with our request.
1. To indemnify you and held harmless in respect of
any liability loss or damage or whatsoever nature which
you may sustain by reason of delivering the goods of M/s.
Vasani Brothers, Bhavnagar in accordance with our
request.
2. To pay you on demand the amount of any loss on
which the Master / agent of the vessel or any other of your
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6
services or agents whatsoever may incur as a result of
delivering the goods aforesaid.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
6. To produce and deliver to you the Bills of lading for
the above goods duly endorsed as such as documents shall
have arrived.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx"
On the said Bond the following notation appears with the stamp of the
Appellant Bank and the signature of their Manager:
"We the undersigned hereby join in the above indemnity
and jointly and severally guarantee due performance of
the above contract and accept all the formalities expressed
therein.
Sd/-
Stamp and Signature of Bank."
4. The 1st Respondent claim that on the basis of this Bond they
issued a Delivery Memo dated 14th June, 1995 to the 2nd Respondent.
2nd Respondent thereafter took delivery of the cargo. It further
appears that the 2nd Respondent never delivered to the 1st Respondent
the duly discharged bills of lading.
5. The 1st Respondent therefore wrote a letter dated 31st August,
1995 to the Appellants, terming the document as an indemnify
guarantee. The 1st Respondent stated, in the latter, that if the bills of
lading were not delivered they would invoke the guarantee. The
Appellant replied to the said letter by the letter dated 16th September,
1995 and asked for copy of the Bond and delivery Orders. Further
correspondence thereafter took place between the parties. The 1st
Respondent then filed a summary Suit under Order 37 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. They claimed a sum of Rs. 21,08,813.32 with interest
of Rs. 1,62,450.02 upto filing of the suit and further interest from date
of Suit till payment.
6. The Appellants and the 2nd Respondent filed applications for
leave to defend. The 2nd Respondent has not come up in Appeal to
this Court. We are thus only concerned with the application for leave
to defend filed by the Appellants.
7. In the application for leave to defend the Appellant, inter alia,
contended that the suit was for recovery of the price of the goods and
the interest on the said amount. They contended that the Court at
Gandhidham had no jurisdiction. They also contended that the
document was an indemnity bond and the 1st Respondent should thus
prove that they had suffered a loss. They pointed out that in the
Plaint the 1st Respondent had not averred that they had suffered any
loss or damage. It was, inter alia, averred as follows:
"In this connection it is submitted that the so called and
alleged bond is not Bank Guarantee or Guarantee Bond
and it is only Indemnity Bond. The said Bond purported to
have been signed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the
plaintiff and countersigned by the Manager of the
defendant No. 1 of Bhavnagar Station Branch which is in
flagrant violation of the Bank’s Procedure as it was never
entered in the Bank’s record nor Controller’s permission or
sanction was obtained. It is submitted that the Branch
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6
Manager has exceeded his powers and alleged indemnity
bond is not binding on the defendant No. 1. It therefore
leads to the suspicion that the same is fraudulently
obtained by the plaintiff in collusion with the defendant No.
2 and also with assistance of the then Branch Manager of
the said Branch.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Without prejudice to the averments made hereinbefore and
hereinafter and making no admission of what so ever
nature it is submitted that the Bhavnagar (main) Branch
had received an inquiry from the negotiating Bank about
certain discrepancies noticed in the Bank documents
submitted by the beneficiary M/s. Mstui & Co., and
therefore, they sought the confirmation of the said Branch
whether the bill with those discrepancies could be
negotiated. As this defendant/opener of the I/C was not
accepting the discrepancies, the said negotiating Bank was
advised not to negotiate the bills under the L/C. Thought
the L/C was established by the defendant No. 1 the
negotiating Bank was advised not to negotiate the
documents. Therefore, there is no liability arises of this
defendant of whatsoever nature."
Thus it is to be seen that the Appellant had, amongst other
contentions, averred that a fraud had been made on them by the 1st
Respondent in collusion with the 2nd Respondent and their Manager.
They also averred that they had refused to negotiate L/C as there were
discrepancies. No rejoinder was filed by the 1st Respondent. Thus
there was no denial of these averments.
8. The trial Court by an Order dated 30th October, 1996 refused
leave to defend. The trial Court held that the Appellant had not raised
any triable issue. It, inter alia, held as follows:
"that facts clearly show that bank has categorically given a
guarantee and so no triable issue is arising, and therefore,
provisions of Order 37 of CPC specifically applies to the
suit of the plaintiff and these facts are supported by the
decision reported in AIR 1990 Patna Page-221. Further, it
is not the say of the Defendant that the plaintiff has
committed fraud and for that reason it cannot also stop the
payment under the Bank Guarantee and that this fact has
also been denied by Defendant No. 2 and has stated that
the plaintiff has not colluded with Defendant No. 2 and as
only on the imaginary facts, it cannot be said that the
fraud has been committed."
9. Both the Appellants and the 2nd Respondent then filed Revisions
before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. Both those Revisions
came to be dismissed by the impugned Order dated 18th April, 2002.
The High Court also held that no triable issue had been raised. The
High Court held that the defence sought to be raised was "nothing but
a sham".
10. The law on the subject is well settled. In the case of Mechalec
Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basis Equipment Corporation reported in
AIR (1977) SC 577, it has been held that the question of granting
leave to defence has to be considered in the light of following
principles:
a) If the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good
defence to the claim on its merits the plaintiff is not
entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6
entitled to unconditional leave to defend.
b) If the defendant raised a triable issue indicating that
he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence although
not a positively good defence the plaintiff is not entitled to
sign judgment and the defendant is entitled to
unconditional leave to defend.
c) If the defendant discloses such facts as may be
deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, that is to say,
although the affidavit does not positively and immediately
make it clear that he has a defence, yet, shows such a
state of facts as leads to the inference that at the trial of
the action he may be able to establish a defence to the
plaintiff’s claim the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment and
the defendant is entitled to leave to defend but in such a
case the Court may in its discretion impose conditions as
to the time or mode of trial but not as to payment into
Court or furnishing security.
d) If the defendant has no defence or the defence set
up is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then
ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment
and the defendant is not entitled to leave to defend.
e) If the defendant has no defence or the defence is
illusory or sham or practically moonshine then although
ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment,
the Court may protect the plaintiff by only allowing the
defence to proceed if the amount claimed is paid into Court
or otherwise secured and give leave to the defendant on
such condition, and thereby show mercy to the defendant
by enabling him to try to prove a defence.
11. In the case of Raj Duggal v. Ramesh Kumar Bansal reported in
AIR (1990) SC page 2218, it has been held that leave to defend must
be declined where the Court is of the opinion that grant of leave would
merely enable the defendant to prolong the litigation by raising
untenable and frivolous defences. It has been held that the test is to
see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one. It
has been held that when there is a plausible defence leave to defend
must be granted. It has been held that if there is a dispute as to the
meaning of a document or uncertainty as to the amount actually due
or the facts are of such a nature as to entitle the defendant to
interrogate the plaintiff or to cross-examine his witness leave should
not be denied.
12. In this case, as already set out hereinabove, there is a dispute
as to whether the document is a guarantee or merely an Indemnity.
The 1st Respondent termed the document to be an
indemnity/guarantee. The Appellants denied that the document was a
Guarantee. On the face of it the document appears to be an
Indemnity and not a Guarantee. The Court was therefore required to
consider the nature and meaning of the document. This by itself
necessitated granting of leave to defend.
13. Further this is a document given by the 2nd Respondent to the 1st
Respondent. On this document, contrary to the normal practice, the
Manager of the Appellant Bank has merely affixed the stamp of the
Appellants and signed under a paragraph which states that they had
joined in the indemnity. The Appellants had also set out in their
application for leave to defend that the documents submitted to the
negotiating Bank were not negotiated as there were discrepancies in
those documents. To this averment there was no reply or denial by
the 1st Respondent. The Appellants have made serious allegations of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6
fraud and collusion. They had stated that such a document did not
exist in their records. This was not a defence which could be
characterised, at this stage, as sham or illusory or practically
moonshine. These triable issues should not have been summarily
rejected by the trial Court and/or the High Court.
14. As stated above, prima facie, the document appears to be an
Indemnity Bond. In cases of Indemnities the question of making good
the loss arises only when there is proof that loss is suffered. In this
behalf the wording of Order 37 are relevant. Rule 1 of Order 37 reads
as follows:
"1. Courts and classes of suits to which the Order is
to apply.- (1) This order shall apply to the following
Courts, namely:-
(a) High Courts, City Civil Courts and Courts of
Small Causes; and
(b) Other Courts:
Provided that in respect of the Courts referred to in
clause (b), the High Court may, by notification in the
Official Gazette restrict the operation of this Order only to
such categories of suits as it deems proper, and may also,
from time to time, as the circumstances of the case may
require, by subsequent notification in the Official Gazette,
further restrict, enlarge or vary, the categories of suits to
be brought under the operation of this Order as it deems
proper.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1), the Order
applies to the following classes of suits, namely:-
(a) suits upon bill of exchange, hundies and
promissory notes;
(b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to
recover a debt or liquidated demand in money
payable by the defendant, with or without
interest, arising,-
(i) on a written contract; or
(ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought
to be recovered is a fixed sum of money
or in the nature of a debt other than an
penalty; or
(iii) on a guarantee, where the claim against
the principal is in respect of a debt or
liquidated demand only."
It is to be seen that under sub-rule (2)(iii) of Rule (1) of Order 37 a
claim could be made on the basis of a guarantee. Significantly Order
37 CPC does not provide for a claim based on an Indemnity Bond.
The reason is obvious. In cases of claims on Indemnity Bonds the loss
would first have to be proved. Thus a summary procedure cannot be
adopted in such cases.
15. Mr. Chidambaram relied upon the case of Oil & Natural Gas
Corpn. Ltd. v. SBI, Overseas Branch reported in (2000) 6 SCC 385. In
this case the question was whether leave to defend could have been
granted in a summary suit based on an unconditional bank guarantee.
This Court held that such bank guarantees must be honoured unless
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6
fraud had been played. This Court held that in the absence of any
fraud leave to defend should not be granted in cases of unconditional
bank guarantees. There can be no dispute with the above proposition.
However, this decision is based on the law regarding unconditional
bank guarantees. Courts have consistently held that unconditional
bank guarantees must be honoured by the banks. In the present
case, it is not clear whether the document is an indemnity or a
guarantee. In any event, there is no unconditional bank guarantee.
Even if the document is held to be a guarantee it is only on proof of
loss. Also in this case fraud has been alleged. Thus the authority is
of no assistance to the 1st Respondent.
16. In our view, for the aforesaid reasons, leave to defend could not
have been refused to the Appellants. We therefore set aside the
impugned Judgment dated 18th April, 2001 and the trial Court Order
dated 30th October, 1996 and grant the Appellants leave to defend the
suit. They shall file their written statement within a period of 8 weeks
from today. The parties are at liberty to disclose documents within 4
weeks thereafter. The parties are at liberty to apply to the trial Court
for expeditious hearing of the suit.
17. Mr. Chidambaram also relied upon the authority in the case of
Kamlesh Kohli v. Escortrac Finance & Investment Ltd. reported in
(2000) 1 SCC 324. In this case it has been held that leave to defend
could be granted to one of the defendants and not the others. It was
held that the Court was not obliged to grant leave to defend to other
defendants merely because leave to defend is granted to one of the
defendants. We clarify that the leave to defend has been granted only
to the Appellants. The 2nd Respondent is not before this Court. We
have not considered the case of the 2nd Respondent. Merely because
leave to defend is granted to the Appellant does not necessarily mean
that the 2nd Respondent is also to be entitled as of right to leave to
defend. We also clarify that all observations made herein are prima
facie and that they shall not be taken into account at the final hearing
of the Suit.
18. The Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There shall be no
order as to costs.
....J.
(SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI)
J.
(S. N. VARIAVA)
April 12, 2002