Full Judgment Text
INDU JAIN
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1683 of 2008 and Ors)
OCTOBER 23, 2008
[Altamas Kabir and Markandey Katju, JJ.]
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. This Special Leave Petition and four
other Special Leave Petitions have been filed against the judgment
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and order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 11 September,
2006, whereby the order of the Sessions Judge, Bhopal, framing
charges against the accused under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. in
Sessions Trial No. 212 of 2005 was set aside and directions were
given to frame charge only under Section 323/34 I.P.C. As all the
Special Leave Petitions arise out of the common judgment of the
High Court, the same are being heard together. Leave is accordingly
granted in all the five Special Leave Petitions (Crl.) Nos. 6010 and
5473 of 2006, filed by Mrs. Indu Jain, No. 2132 of 2007 filed by the
State of Madhya Pradesh, No. 2584 and 2588 of 2007 filed by the
accused.
2. In order to appreciate the different stands taken by the
different appellants in the matter, some relevant facts are reproduced
hereinbelow which will have a bearing on the final decision in these
appeals.
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3. On 14 July, 2004, officers of the Special Police
Establishment (Lokayukta), Bhopal, headed by Shri B.P. Singh and
Shri Mokham Singh Nain, who are the appellants in the appeals
arising out of S.L.P. (Crl) No. 2584 and 2588 of 2007 and accused in
the complaint filed by Ms. Indu Jain, the appellant in the appeals
arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 6010 of 5473 of 2006, set a trap for
one Shri R.K. Jain, Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Bhopal,
and arrested him for taking a bribe of Rs.2,000/- from one of Mr.
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Chhajed, Tax Consultant, at 5.30 p.m. On 15 July, 2004, prior to 9
a.m. Shri Jain was found unconscious in the bathroom of the office of
the Lokayukta, Bhopal, and was taken to Hamidiya Hospital, Bhopal,
for treatment. The records of the hospital show that when Shri Jain
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was brought to the hospital at 9 a.m. on 15 July, 2004, his body
had neither any pulse nor respiration and recordable blood pressure
and even heart sounds were absent. Though resuscitation measures
were undertaken, including cardiac pulmonary resuscitation (C.P.R.),
there was little response and Shri Jain was declared dead at 1.30
p.m. on the same day.
4. The Post Mortem examination of the deceased, which was
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conducted on 15 July, 2004, itself, at about 4 p.m. revealed certain
injuries on the body, which included broken ribs, but the cause of
death was shown to be on account of asphyxia within six hours of the
post mortem examination.
5. On completion of investigation, the investigating agency filed a
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charge-sheet before the trial court on 12 May, 2004, and on 15
July, 2005, the learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the
five accused persons, namely, B.P. Singh, Mokham Singh Nain,
Badri Nihale, Ramashish and Silvanus Tirki under Section 304 Part-II
I.P.C., but dropped the charge under Section 330 I.P.C.
6. Aggrieved by the framing of charge under Section 304 Part II
I.P.C., accused Mokham Singh Nain filed Criminal Revision No. 1203
of 2005, while the other four accused filed Criminal Revision No.
1204 of 2005, before the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur.
On the other hand, on account of the dropping of charges under
Section 330 I.P.C. Mrs. Indu Jain, widow of the deceased, filed
Criminal Revision No. 1114 of 2005. All the revisional applications
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were heard together by the High Court which by its order dated 11
September, 2006, set aside the charge framed by the learned
Sessions Judge and directed that charge could only be framed under
Section 323/34 I.P.C.
7. As mentioned hereinbefore, these five appeals have been filed
against the said judgment and order of the High Court.
8. Appearing in these appeals on behalf of Mrs. Indu Jain, the
widow of the deceased, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior counsel
submitted that the order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
impugned in these appeals, was quite clearly against the Police
Report submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. It was submitted that from the arrest memo of the
deceased in connection with Crime No. 97 of 2004 it would be very
clear that accused B.P. Singh while arresting the deceased
recovered two inhalers from his person, but allowed the deceased to
retain them as he was suffering from Asthma. However, during his
overnight custody in the office of the Lokayukta, Bhopal, he was kept
in a room, which was wholly unsuitable to a person suffering from
asthma.
9. Over the condition of the deceased while in the custody of the
Special Police Establishment (Lokayukta) who had arrested and
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detained him in the office of the Lokayukta on 14 July, 2004, and
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his discovery in an unconscious condition in the morning of 15 July,
2004, a report was lodged by the Station House Officer of Kohefiza
Police Station on the basis whereof a First Information Report under
Section 330 I.P.C. was registered. In addition to the above, a written
report was also made by Shri Akhilesh Jain, brother of the deceased
to Kohefiza Police Station in which it was alleged that the accused
persons had arrested the deceased and had taken him to an
unknown destination from where he was brought to Hamidiya
Hospital in a serious condition, and, ultimately, succumbed to his
injuries. It was alleged that the accused persons had tortured the
deceased on account of which he had died.
10. Mr. Patwalia submitted that once R.K. Jain was declared to
be dead, as part of the investigation into the offence complained of,
Shri O.P. Dixit, the Senior Scientist of the mobile unit of the District
Police Force, made a physical inspection of the room in the office of
the Lokayukta where the accused had kept the deceased in custody
before his death and submitted a report of his inspection. In his
report Shri Dixit categorically mentioned the fact that the condition of
the room was not at all suitable for detaining a person suffering from
a respiratory disease such as asthma, in custody. He plainly
indicated that the room in question was completely unsuitable for
such a patient as it was filled with dust and cobwebs and the
deceased was treated unhumanly and against the principles of
ethical human conduct. Shri Dixit also observed from the report of the
Forensic Science Laboratory, that it is evident that the conduct of the
accused was one of gross negligence and misdemeanor. It was
further observed that for a person who was suffering from asthma,
the deceased ought not to have been left alone inside the unhygienic
room and at least someone, such as a family member or a friend,
should have been allowed to remain present with him. Shri Dixit
recommended appropriate action to be taken against the accused for
dereliction of duty, which was duly supported by the report of the
Forensic Science Laboratory.
11 Mr. Patwalia submitted that having regard to the fact that the
accused persons were police officers belonging to the Special
Establishment of the Lokayukta and also having regard to the nature
of the offence, the investigation of the case was handed over from
the local police to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and
upon completion of the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted
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before the trial court on 12 May, 2005, and, as mentioned
hereinbefore, on perusal of the material on record, the learned
Sessions Judge on 15h July, 2005, framed charges against all the
five accused under Section 304 Part II IPC but dropped the charge
under Section 330 IPC.
12. Mr. Patwalia submitted that when the materials on record
clearly indicated that R.K. Jain had died because of deliberate ill-
treatment and negligence at the hands of the appellants, while in
their custody, the High Court had erred in coming to the conclusion
that the said materials did not disclose an offence under Section 330
IPC. Mr. Patwalia submitted that apart from the evidence of physical
torture of the deceased, which would be supported by the post-
mortem report, the opinion of Dr. Satpathi, who conducted the post-
mortem examination is that R.K. Jain’s death was on account of
asphyxia, namely, oxygen hunger on account of choking. According
to Mr. Patwalia the cause of death fitted in with the report submitted
by Mr. Dixit on the basis of which the First Information Report came
to be recorded.
13. Mr. Patwalia urged that in spite of the evidence available at
the stage of framing charge, the High Court turned a blind eye to the
physical condition of the deceased and the indifferent manner in
which he was treated and kept in custody in the office of the
Lokayukta in conditions which triggered the asthmatic attack which
ultimately led to the death of R.K. Jain in custody. Mr. Patwalia urged
that although sufficient material was available before the High Court
for framing charge under Section 304 Part II IPC, along with the
charge under Section 330 IPC, the High Court quite erroneously
dropped the charge under Section 304 Part II and also Section 330
IPC and observed that only a charge under Section 323/34 IPC had
been established under the aforesaid report. Mr. Patwalia submitted
that the order of the High court impugned in the appeal was liable to
be set aside with a direction to the trial court to consider afresh the
framing of charges under Sections 304 Part II and 330 IPC, along
with the charge under Section 323/34 IPC.
14. As far as the other appeal filed by Ms. Indu Jain is
concerned, the arguments made in this appeal will also cover the
points raised in the said appeal.
15. In the appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh, Ms.
Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned counsel, contended that this was not
only a case for framing of charge under Sections 323 with Section 34
thereof, but this is fit a case where charges ought to have been
framed against the accused under Sections 302 and 330 IPC as well.
Repeating the manner in which the deceased R.K. Jain had been
arrested and thereafter kept in custody of the Special Police
Establishment attached to the Lokayukta office, Ms. Makhija
reiterated the findings of Mr. Dixit which pointed to the direct
involvement of all the accused persons in the commission of the
offence.
16. According to Ms. Makhija the bare facts of the incident which
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occurred with the arrest of R.K. Jain on 14 July, 2004, establish the
fact that Shri Jain died while in the custody of the Special Police
Establishment and it was yet to be proved on evidence as to how
R.K. Jain died on account of asphyxia when he was detained in the
office of the Lokayukta. Ms. Makhija also pointed out that when the
deceased had been brought to the Hamidiya Hospital in Bhopal at 9
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a.m. on 15 July, 2004, his body did not record any pulse or
respiration or blood pressure and there was no heart sound either.
Ms. Makhija submitted that although he remained in such condition
till he was declared to be dead at 1.30 p.m., there was almost no
response from R.K. Jain even after being administered cardiac
pulmonary resuscitation. He continued to remain in such condition till
he was formally declared to be dead. Ms. Makhija submitted that by
keeping the deceased, who suffered from respiratory problems, in a
closed room without windows which was clearly uninhabited for a
long time on account of the dust and cobwebs collected therein
which triggered an asthmatic attack which led to R.K. Jain’s death, a
clear case of an offence under Sections 302 and 330 IPC had been
made out against the appellants. Counsel’s submissions were fully
supported by the report, which showed six injuries on the person of
the deceased. Injury No.1 was a contusion on the scalp. Injury Nos. 2
and 3 were lacerations on the lip and mouth. Injury Nos. 4 and 5
were broken ribs, while injury No.6 was a laceration on the neck of
the deceased.
17. Ms. Makhija contended that this being a clear case of
custodial death on account of the treatment meted out to the
deceased by detaining him in wholly unhygienic conditions
completely unfit for a patient of asthma, both the trial court as well as
the High Court erred in not framing charge against the appellant and
the other accused persons under Section 330 IPC. The matter was
further confounded by the order of the High Court quashing the
charge against the accused persons under Section 304 Part II IPC.
18. On legal submissions, Ms. Makhija submitted that the
opinion of the doctor at the time of framing charges cannot be
conclusive and the same would have to be considered at its face
value during the trial itself. Ms. Makhija submitted that at the stage of
framing charge, the Court is not required to go into a detailed
examination of the material filed by the Investigating agency under
Section 173 Cr.P.C. At the said stage, the Court, on perusal of the
materials before it, is only required to find out whether a prima-facie
case is made out to proceed against the accused. Ms. Makhija
submitted that it is settled law that the High Court should not
ordinarily interfere with the framing of charges by the trial court,
unless some glaring injustice is noticed.
19. Ms. Makhija referred to the decision of this Court in Om Wati
(Smt.) and Anr. Vs. State, [2001 (4) SCC 333] in support of her
aforesaid submissions. She also referred to the decision of this Court
in State of Maharashtra vs. Salman Salim Khan, [2004 (1) SCC 525]
wherein this Court cautioned the trial court as well as the High Court
regarding arriving at a decision as to the sufficiency or otherwise of
the material to frame charge, as the prosecution case gets pre-
empted to that extent since during the course of trial, even if the
Magistrate comes to a different conclusion, it may not be possible for
him to pass orders accordingly. The learned Judges observed that
there was limitation to the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. and though it is open to the High Court to quash
charges framed by the trial Court the same could not be done by
weighing the correctness or sufficiency of the evidence. It was further
observed by this Court that it is only at the stage of trial that the
truthfulness, sufficiency and acceptability of the evidence, can be
adjudged.
20. Ms. Makhija lastly referred to the three-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi,
[2005 (1) SCC 568] in which the question decided differently in the
case of Satish Mehra vs. Delhi Administration, [1996 (9) SCC 766]
was referred to. In Satish Mehra’s case, a two Judge Bench of this
Court had decided that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial
Judge was competent to look into the material produced on behalf of
defence at the time of framing of charge in order to come to a
decision as to whether it was at all necessary to frame charges on
the material produced on behalf of the prosecution as well as the
defence. Answering the reference in the negative, the three-Judge
Bench overruled the view expressed in Satish Mehra’s case and held
that at the said stage of framing charge, the Court was only required
to look into the material produced on behalf of the prosecution in
deciding whether a particular case was fit to go to trial.
21. Ms. Makhija, while questioning the decision of the learned
Sessions Judge to drop charges against the accused persons under
Section 330 IPC, submitted that neither the Sessions Court nor the
High Court even thought of framing charge under Section 302 IPC
against the accused persons.
22. Appearing for the accused in the appeal filed by Indu Jain,
who are also the appellants in the appeals arising out of SLP(C) No.
2584 and 2588 of 2007, Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel,
submitted that the order of the High Court did not call for any
interference since the charge-sheet does not disclose the ingredients
of the charge framed against the accused persons under Section
323/34 IPC. Mr. Tulsi submitted that there is no direct evidence that
the accused persons had ever assaulted the deceased and the First
Information Report shows that R.K. Jain died due to asphyxia.
Referring to the statement of Dr. Satpathi who had examined the
deceased, and was also one of the doctors who conducted the Post
Mortem examination Mr. Tulsi submitted that the broken ribs and the
laceration marks on both sides of the lower lips were the result of
attempts made in the Hospital to resuscitate the deceased. It was
submitted that the opinion of the Medical Experts and the Post-
Mortem Report established that R.K. Jain died on account of
asphyxia and that he had obstructive lung disease which block the
airways and his death was, therefore, natural and not on account of
any violence while in custody.
23. Mr. Tulsi submitted that apart from the above, Dr. V.K.
Sharma, Professor and Head of the Department of Medicine, Gandhi
Medical College, Bhopal, whose opinion was sought for by the CID,
Police Head Quarters, Bhopal had indicated that the fracture of the
ribs could have been caused while external cardiac massage or CPR
was being administered to R.K. Jain in an attempt to revive him. Dr.
Sharma also stated that the fracture of ribs can also be caused while
external cardiac massage, with artificial respiration and chest
compression, was being undertaken. He also opined in his Report
that a severe attack of asthma could result in the condition in which
R.K.Jain was found and such attack could have been triggered by
heavy mental tension, dust, cobwebs cold weather or the presence of
allergens in the atmosphere and pollution.
24. Mr. Tulsi submitted that in view of the circumstances in which
R.K. Jain was arrested and thereafter kept detained in the office of
the Lokayukta, the constable who formed part of the raiding party
had been suspended for dereliction of duty but was ultimately
reinstated, as in the preliminary inquiry the charge of negligence and
dereliction of duty was held not to have been proved. Mr. Tulsi
referred to the Judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions
Judge on 28h July, 2005, while deciding the question as to whether
there was sufficient ground for framing charge against them under
Section 330, 323/34 and 304(2) Indian Penal Code. Referring to
paragraph 14 of the order, Mr. Tulsi pointed out that the learned
Sessions Judge had himself held that it could not be definitely said
that no cause of death had been indicated in the Post-mortem
Report. In fact, on behalf of the Investigating Authorities, a letter was
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written on 16 July, 2004 to the Director, Gandhi Medical College,
Bhopal, asking for information as to whether nature of the injuries on
deceased R.K.Jain were simple or grievous in nature or whether in
ordinary circumstances, the death of the deceased could have been
on account of injuries found on the deceased. The most pertinent
question that was asked was as to what was the cause of death. In
the reply sent by Dr. Satpathi, Director of the Medical Legal Unit of
the Hospital, it was mentioned that the injuries found on the body of
the deceased were simple in nature which were not sufficient to
cause death. It was stated that death was due to asphyxia. In fact, in
the said letter, Dr. Satpathi by way of a footnote indicated that injury
Nos. 2,3,4 and 5 on the lips and ribs on both sides of the body had
been caused in the Hospital during treatment and it had no relation
with the death of R.K. Jain.
25. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Tulsi referred to
the well-known Bhopal Gas Tragedy case, namely, Keshub Mahindra
vs. State of M.P., [1996 (6) SCC 129], in which while considering the
provisions of Section 299 and 304 Part II IPC, it was observed that
the accused must have done an act which caused the death of a
person with the knowledge that by such act he would likely to cause
death. While considering the width of the powers that could be
exercised by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in relation to
Sections 227 and 228 thereof, it was held that at the stage of framing
of charge the Court had no jurisdiction to go into the merits of the
allegations, which could be gone into at the time of the trial, but at
the same time before any charge could be framed under Section 304
Part II, the materials on record must at least prima-facie show that
the accused is guilty of culpable homicide and that the act which had
caused the death of the victim had been caused at least with the
knowledge that such act was likely to cause death.
26. Mr. Tulsi submitted that though there was no definite
conclusion as to the manner in which R.K. Jain had died, at least it
was established that he died due to asphyxia which is the
consequence of respiratory breathing problems which the deceased
suffered from and had nothing to do with an offence under Section
323 IPC under which provision charge had been framed against the
accused persons.
27. Mr. S.K. Gambhir, learned senior advocate appearing for the
respondent Nos. 5 and 6, while adopting the submissions made by
Mr. Tulsi, added that from the sheet of Progress and Treatment given
by the Hospital it will be revealed that R.K. Jain was brought to the
Hospital at 9 a.m. in a comatose condition and that cardio respiratory
resuscitation was started immediately and cardiac activity was
regained after 15 or 20 minutes. It was pointed out that the Progress
and Treatment Given sheet also indicated that as part of the
resuscitation attempts an endotracheal intubation was done, after
which the deceased was placed on a mechanical ventilator at about
10.15 a.m. However, inspite of the attempts made to revive R.K.Jain,
he ultimately died because of choking of breath caused by
respiratory breathing failure. Mr. Gambhir submitted that there was
no material on record to indicate that R.K. Jain died a homicidal
death so as to attract the provisions of Section 304 IPC. In short, Mr.
Gambhir submitted that there was no material before the learned
Trial Judge for framing charge under Section 323/34 IPC against the
respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6.
28. Relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Kewal
Krishan vs. Suraj Bhan & Anr., [AIR 1980 SC 1780] Mr. Gambhir
claimed that Section 227 of the Code was meant to prevent
prolonged harassment to an accused and if the Judge was not
convinced that there was sufficient ground to proceed against the
accused, he was required to discharge the accused and to record his
reasons for doing so. In the said decision it was observed that at the
stage of framing of charge, the Magistrate was not required to weigh
the evidence as if he was the trial court. He was only required to see
whether the complaint made out a prima facie case triable by the
Court of Session, which would be sufficient for issuing process to the
accused and committing them for trial to the Court of Session.
29. Mr. Gambhir concluded his submissions by urging that in the
absence of any reliable material regarding the involvement of the
respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in respect of the charge under Section
323/34 IPC, the charge framed against the respondents was liable to
be quashed.
30. We have carefully considered the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties, having particular regard to the fact
that R.K.Jain had died while in the custody of the Officers of the
Special Police Establishment (Lokayakuta), Bhopal, in the office of
the Lokayukta, Bhopal.
31. It has been sufficiently established that the deceased was a
patient of asthma which could cause asphyxia which was ultimately
said to be the cause of R.K. Jain’s death. It is also clear that
notwithstanding his serious respiratory problem, the deceased was
kept in a windowless room which was full of dust and cobwebs which
are known allergens for triggering an asthma attack, which can be
fatal, as in this case. The injuries found on the body of the deceased
may have been caused during attempts at resuscitation, but all the
said circumstances can only be considered during a proper trial and
not on the basis of surmises at the time of framing charge where on
the strength of the charge sheet only a prima facie satisfaction about
the commission of an offence has to be arrived at by the trial court.
Therefore, while rejecting the submissions made by Mr. Tulsi and Mr.
Gambhir that there were no materials on record to frame charge
against the accused persons even under Section 323/34 IPC, we
cannot but observe that on a prima facie view of the matter, there is
ground to proceed against the accused persons even under Section
304 Part II IPC. On that score, we are inclined to agree both with Mr.
Patwalia and Ms. Makhija that the High Court had erred in quashing
the charge framed against the accused persons under Section 304
Part II and observing that in view of the materials on record only a
charge under Section 323 could be brought against the accused
persons.
32. Although, Ms. Makhija has strenuously urged that charge
under Section 302 IPC should also have been framed against the
accused persons, we are not inclined to accept the same as at this
stage there is little to establish an intention on the part of the
accused to willfully cause the death of R.K. Jain.
33. As has been observed in Kewal Krishan’s case (supra), at
the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not required to go into the
details of the investigation but to only arrive at a prima facie finding
on the materials made available as to whether a charge could be
sustained as recommended in the charge sheet. The same view has
been subsequently reiterated in Devendra Padhi’s case (Supra) and
in the case of Bharat Parikh vs. Union of India, [2008 (1) Scale page
86] wherein the holding of a mini trial at the time of framing of charge
has been deprecated.
34. This brings us to the next question as to whether the Trial
court as well as the High court was justified in dropping the charge
under Section 330 IPC since R.K. Jain’s death took place while he
was in custody. The important question is whether a prima facie case
can be said to have been made out for a charge to be framed under
Section 330 IPC. Since the cause of death has been shown to be
asphyxia on account of detention of the deceased in unhygienic
conditions despite his respiratory problems and the injuries to the ribs
and mouth of the deceased could possibly have been caused by the
attempts made by the doctor at the Hospital to resuscitate the
deceased, who had been brought to the Hospital in a comatose
condition, with the body showing no signs of pulse, respiration or
blood pressure, prima facie a case is made out for framing of charge
under Section 330 IPC. The sheet showing the progress and
treatment of the accused on arrival at the Hospital, also corroborates
the same and it also mentions the fact that cardiac pulmonary
resuscitation was immediately started and the patient was also put
on mechanical ventilator as part of the attempts at resuscitation.
Apart from indicating that the patient had died of asphyxia, the
medical opinion does not give any reason for such asphyxia and
even in reply to the queries made on behalf of the investigating
authorities the reply received from Dr. Satpathi, as to the cause of
death, was that it had occurred due to asphyxia, but as to how it had
occurred was under investigation.
35. In this regard, the materials submitted by the Investigating
Authority in its Final Report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. does establish
the fact that the deceased had been kept in a room which was highly
unsuitable for a person suffering from respiratory problems. In fact,
as was indicated by Shri O.P. Dixit, the Senior Scientist of the Mobile
Unit of the District Police Force the condition of the room where the
deceased had been detained was completely unsuitable for a patient
of asthma as it was filled with dust and cobwebs which was sufficient
to trigger an asthmatic attack which could have caused asphyxia
which ultimately led to R.K. Jain’s death.
36. We are, therefore, convinced that the appeals filed by Indu
Jain and that filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh must be allowed
in part. We, accordingly, allow the same and set aside the order of
the High Court impugned in these appeals. While restoring the order
of the learned Sessions Judge framing charge against the accused
persons under Section 304 Part II IPC, we also direct that charges
also be framed against the accused persons under Section 330
Indian Penal Code.
37. The three appeals filed by Ms. Indu Jain and the State of
Madhya Pradesh are allowed to the aforesaid extent.
38. As far as the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2584 and
2588 of 2007 filed by the accused are concerned, the same are
dismissed.