Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 6495 of 2005
PETITIONER:
UMED SINGH
RESPONDENT:
ARYA SAMAJ SEWA SADAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/07/2006
BENCH:
Dr.AR. Lakshmanan & Altamas Kabir
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
WITH
CIVIL APPEALS NOs. 6496 & 6497 OF 2005
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
The appellant, Umed Singh, was inducted as a tenant of
the suit premises by one Sewa Ram at a monthly rent of
Rs.100/- for residential purposes. One Mohan Lal was also a
tenant of a portion of the building. The said Sewa Ram
executed a Will in favour of the respondent-society, Arya Samaj
Sewa Sadan, on 15th March, 1984. Soon thereafter, on 5th
June, 1984, Sewa Ram died.
On 25th March, 1994, the respondent filed ejectment suit
against the appellant herein under Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent) & Eviction Act, 1973 (hereafter
referred to as ’the Act’) for non-payment of rent from 1st
December, 1989 to 31st March, 1994 and also on the ground of
bona fide requirement for starting a library in the suit
premises. It may be indicated that the respondent-society also
filed a suit against the other tenant, Mohan Lal, but the same
was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the ground that
running of a library could not be equated with the expression
"use or occupation by the landlord for purposes of residence".
An appeal preferred by the society against Mohan Lal was
allowed and the judgment of the trial court was set aside.
Ultimately, however, the High Court set aside the judgment of
the Appellate Authority and restored the decision of the Rent
Controller.
In the meantime, by its judgment and order dated 31st
January, 2000, the Rent Controller decreed the eviction
petition filed by the society against Umed Singh on the ground
of bona fide requirement and an appeal preferred therefrom by
Umed Singh was dismissed by the appellate authority on 24th
August, 2000. Umed Singh filed a Revision Petition before the
High Court on 7th November, 2000 against the said judgment of
the appellate authority dated 24th August, 2000. The said
Revision Petition was dismissed by the High Court on 22nd
November, 2000. Subsequently, having regard to the decision
of the High Court in the case of Mohan Lal, the other tenant,
whereby the society’s eviction petition had been dismissed,
Umed Singh filed a Review Petition before the High Court on
21st December, 2000 relying on the decision in Mohan Lal’s
case. In view of the High Court’s decision in Mohan Lal’s case,
the order dated 22nd November, 2000 dismissing Umed Singh’s
Revision Petition was recalled and upon further consideration of
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the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act and its
different interpretations by two Division Benches of the
expression "for his own use and occupation" as used in the
said section, the learned Judge referred the matter to the Chief
Justice for the following question to be examined by a larger
Bench, namely,
"’Whether his own occupation’ and
the ’residential purpose’ in relation to
a corporate body/juristic person can
be read in wider perspective or in
stricto senso of the dictionary
meaning?"
The aforesaid reference was placed before the Full Bench
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which considered the
question referred to it in great detail in its judgment dated 23rd
August, 2002, in the context of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act.
While considering the Reference, the attention of the Full
Bench was drawn to the observations made by the learned
Single Judge in Mohan Lal’s case in C.R.No.1217/2000,
wherein reference was made to a decision of this Court in the
case of Attar Singh vs. Inder Kumar, reported in (1967) 2 SCR
50, which was a decision rendered under the provisions of the
East Punjab Urban Restrictions Act, No.III of 1949 (hereinafter
referred to as "the 1949 Act"). The learned Single Judge relied
on the finding in the said decision that as the respondent-
landlord required the land not for business or trade but only for
constructing a house for himself, he was not entitled to eject the
appellant under Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the 1949 Act from the
rented land. After considering the decision of this Court in the
aforesaid case, the Full Bench made a distinction between the
facts of Attar Singh’s case and those of the case before it upon
holding that the expression "his own occupation" had been
restricted by virtue of the restraints provided in Section 13 (3)
(a) (ii) of the 1949 Act. Upon considering the submissions
made, the Full Bench held that all buildings which were not
"non-residential buildings" would be "residential buildings".
Furthermore, the expression "business or trade" are so
intertwined that they are complementary to each other and it is
imperative to be seen in each case as to whether activities
which are to be carried out in the building are attended with
business and/or trade or not. If such element is missing in the
activity which is to be carried on or is to be carried out in the
building, such buildings would not be defined as "non-
residential building".
Upon holding as aforesaid, the Full Bench answered the
question referred to it, as extracted hereinabove, in the
following manner:-
"Any activity, whether it is to be carried
out or is being carried on in a building by
a juristic person or an individual but is
not tainted with business or trade and is
essentially not connected with profit and
loss, such activity would not render the
usage of the building as "non residential
building". Unless the user has been
defined under a statute to be commercial
dehors of element of profit and loss, such
building shall be termed as "non-
residential building". Thus, in each case it
shall have to be examined whether the
element of business or trade has crept in
with the necessary element of profit and
loss and as a sequel thereto, the purpose
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and object of occupation by the landlord
shall stand defined accordingly."
In view of the above, the interpretation of Section 13 (3) (a)
(i) of the Act in Mohan Lal’s case was overruled. Subsequently,
the Review Petition which was pending was also dismissed by
virtue of the decision rendered in the Reference.
These three appeals which were filed by the tenant, Umed
Singh against the initial judgment of the High Court in the
Civil Revision filed by the tenant and the judgment rendered by
the Full Bench and the subsequent dismissal of the Review
Petition, have been heard together and are being disposed of by
this common judgment.
On behalf of the appellant, it was sought to be argued
that the decision of the Full Bench was erroneous, inasmuch as
Section 13 (3) (a) of the Act referred to residential buildings and
clause (i) thereof could only be interpreted in respect of such
residential building. It was urged that running a library could
by no stretch of imagination be said to be for residential
purposes and the expression "own occupation" could only be in
relation to use and occupation for residential purpose. It was
submitted that the Full Bench of the High Court had failed to
consider the fact that the aforesaid provisions would have to be
interpreted in the context of residential use and not for any
other purpose. It was urged that the view taken by the Full
Bench was erroneous and was liable to be set aside and both
the Civil Revision Application and the Review Petition filed by
the appellant before the High Court were liable to be allowed.
Such submissions were vehemently opposed on behalf of
the respondent-society and it was submitted that all non-
residential purposes need not be connected with commercial
activity as had been provided for in clause (ii) of Section 13 (3)
(a) which contemplates a form of commercial activity but has
also been included in the expression "own occupation" in case
of a "residential building".
Reference was made to the decision of this Court in Atul
Castings Ltd. vs. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, 2001 (5) SCC 133,
wherein it was observed that when a premises had been leased
for residence only, and there was no specific clause in the
agreement that not even one room could be used as a study
room for the members of the family for doing office work at
home, such activity could still be undertaken in the leased
premises, particularly in the days of computer, internet and
other like facilities which are kept at home for convenience and
use.
Since we have been called upon to consider the provisions
of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Act in the background of
the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court, the same is reproduced hereinbelow for
the sake of reference:-
"13.Eviction of tenants.\027 (3) A
landlord may apply to the Controller
for an order directing the tenant to
put the landlord in possession \026
(a) in the case of a residential
building, if,--
(i) he requires it for his own occupation, is
not occupying another residential building
in the urban area concerned and has not
vacated such building without sufficient
cause after the commencement of the
1949 Act in the said urban area:
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(ii) he requires it for use as an office
or consulting room by his son who
intends to start practice as a lawyer,
qualified architect or chartered
accountant or as a "registered
practitioner" within the meaning of
that expression used in the Punjab
Medical Registration Act, 1916, the
Punjab Ayurvedic and Unani
Practitioners Act, 1963, or the Punjab
Homoeopathic Practitioners Act,
1965, or for the residence of his son
who is married:
Provided that such son is not occupying in
the urban area concerned any other
building for use as office; consulting room
or residence, as the case may be, and has
not vacated it without sufficient cause
after the commencement of the 1949 Act."
There is no ambiguity that the provisions referred to are
to be considered in the case of a residential building. In other
words, we will have to consider whether Sub-clause (i) makes
it obligatory on the part of the landlord to use the premises
purely for residential purposes only or whether the expression
"own occupation" also connotes use of the premises for non-
commercial purposes, i.e. for purposes unconnected with
business or trade.
The respondent-society intends to use the premises in
question for running a public library without any profit which
would bring the same within the ambit of non-commercial
use. The Full Bench of the High Court was, therefore, fully
justified in arriving at the conclusion that the suit premises
would be covered by the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the
aforesaid Act. The respondent being a society, cannot have
any residential requirement in respect of a premises and its
activities will have to determine the nature of its use of a
premises. A juristic person cannot have need of residence but
may use a premises for non-commercial purposes. Since the
society intends to use the premises for itself for a non-
commercial purpose, unconnected with any business or trade,
it must, in our view, come within the ambit of Section 13 (3) (a)
(i) of the Act and more particularly so having regard to Clause
(ii) which contemplates use of the residential premises even for
purposes such as a consulting room for a lawyer or other
professionals.
We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the reasoning
of the Full Bench while considering the provisions of Section 13
(3) (a) (i) of the Act and, in our view, the appeals before us are
devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.