Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 956 OF 2012
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NIRMAL KAUR @ NIMMO AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. A coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated
th
14 August 2018, has framed the following questions for
consideration:
(i) Whether it is necessary to particularize
the species of the contraband recovered –
poppy husk, poppy straw etc.?
(ii) So long as the prosecution proves that
what was recovered was the sample of
poppy straw and whether it is necessary
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SNEHA
Date: 2022.10.20
14:21:54 IST
Reason:
for the prosecution to bring in materials
1
to show as to what was the species of the
contraband recovered?”
2. Since the answer to the aforesaid questions have a
bearing on a number of cases under the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as
th
the “1985 Act”), this Court, vide its order dated 14 August
2018, had requested Shri P.S. Narasimha, learned Senior
Counsel (as he then was) to assist the court as amicus curiae .
Shri K. Parameshwar, learned counsel was requested to
assist Shri P.S. Narasimha. On the elevation of Hon’ble Mr.
Justice P.S. Narasimha, Shri Parameshwar continued to
assist this Court as amicus curiae .
Factual Background:
th
3. On 25 July 2003, when Sarbjeet Singh (PW-12)
along with some other police officials were on patrolling duty
at Haroli in Una District, he was informed by Constable
Upnesh Kumar (PW-1) that the respondent-accused was
indulging in the illicit trading of ‘poppy straw’ and that she
had kept huge quantity of ‘poppy straw’ in the room where
fodder for the cattle had been stacked.
2
4. After complying with the formalities as prescribed
under the 1985 Act, a raiding party was formed and the
premises of the respondent was searched. During the search,
a bag containing 20 Kgs. of ‘poppy husk’ was found in the
room meant for stacking fodder. Two samples each weighing
250 grams were separated and sealed. The respondent was
arrested. While in police custody, the respondent made a
disclosure statement that she had concealed nine more
gunny bags of ‘poppy husk’ on the side of khad near
Gurudwara Girgirga Sahib. Accordingly, eight gunny bags
each containing 40 Kgs. of ‘poppy husk’ and one bag
containing 30 Kgs. of ‘poppy husk’ were recovered. From
each of these nine bags, two samples, each weighing 250
grams, were separated and sealed in separate parcels.
5. The samples were sent to the Chemical Examiner,
who opined that the samples contained contents of ‘poppy
husk’. After completion of the investigation, the respondent
was charged with the offence punishable under Section 15(c)
of the 1985 Act for possessing commercial quantity of ‘poppy
straw’. The respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found the
3
respondent guilty and convicted and sentenced her to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a
fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, and, in default of payment of fine, to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two
years.
6. The respondent filed an appeal being Criminal
Appeal No. 525 of 2004 before the High Court. During the
course of hearing, the High Court was of the opinion that the
tests conducted by the Chemical Examiner to ascertain
whether ‘meconic acid’ and ‘morphine’ were present in the
sample stuff, were not enough to reach the conclusion that
the stuff was, in fact, ‘poppy straw’. Therefore, the High
Court summoned the Chemical Examiner as a court witness.
The High Court came to a conclusion that the two tests
conducted by the Chemical Examiner to ascertain whether
the samples contained ‘meconic acid’ and ‘morphine’ did not
indicate that the stuff examined consisted of the parts of
either the plant of the species of the ‘papaver somniferum L’
or a plant of any other pieces of ‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’
or any other ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ can be extracted and
which the Central Government had notified to be ‘opium
4
poppy’ for the purposes of the 1985 Act. The High Court
therefore held that the two tests cannot be sufficient evidence
to hold that the stuff recovered from the respondent, the
sample of which was analysed by the Chemical Examiner,
was ‘poppy straw’. The High Court further held that the
prosecution had failed to prove the sample to be of ‘poppy
straw’ within the meaning of the 1985 Act and therefore, the
respondent was not liable to conviction and punishment for
the offence described in and made punishable under Section
15 of the 1985 Act. Accordingly, the High Court, vide
nd
impugned judgment dated 2 November 2007, allowed the
appeal and set aside the judgment and order of conviction
th
and sentence dated 29 November 2004 passed by the trial
court. Being aggrieved thereby, the State preferred an appeal
before this Court.
7. During the pendency of the appeal, this Court found
that important questions of law arose for consideration on
the aforesaid issue. Vide a subsequent order of this Court
th
dated 6 February 2019, the Union of India through its
Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, New
5
Delhi was directed to be impleaded as the second
respondent.
Submissions:
8. We have accordingly heard Shri Abhinav Mukerji,
learned Additional Advocate General (for short, “AAG”) for the
State of Himachal Pradesh and Shri Neeraj Jain, learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
9. We have also heard Shri K. Parameshwar, learned
amicus curiae and Shri K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional
Solicitor General (for short, “ASG”) for the Union of India.
10. Shri Mukerji submitted that the view taken by the
High Court is totally incorrect. The learned AAG submitted
that under Article 47 of the Constitution of India, the State is
duty bound to bring about prohibition of the consumption
except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of
drugs which are injurious to health. He submitted that the
1985 Act has been enacted not only to honour the
constitutional commitments but also to honour the
International Conventions.
6
11. The learned AAG submitted that different definitions
have been given for ‘opium’, ‘opium derivative’, ‘opium poppy’
and ‘poppy straw’ under Clauses (xv), (xvi), (xvii) and (xviii) of
Section 2 of the 1985 Act. He submitted that, as per Section
15 of the 1985 Act, when a person, in contravention of any
provisions of the said Act or any rule or order made or
condition of a licence granted thereunder, produces,
possesses, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-
State, sells, purchases, uses or omits to warehouse poppy
straw, he shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one year or with fine which may
extend to ten thousand rupees or with both, or for a term up
to ten years and with fine which may extend to one lakh
rupees, or for a term which shall not be less than ten years
but may extend to twenty years and a fine which shall not be
less than one lakh rupees but may extend to two lakh
rupees, depending upon the quantity of ‘poppy straw’. He
submitted that, similarly, Sections 17 and 18 of the 1985 Act
deal with punishment for contravention in relation to
‘prepared opium’, ‘opium poppy’ and ‘opium’ respectively.
The learned AAG submitted that the High Court has wrongly
7
relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of
1
Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot v. State of Gujarat
. He
submitted that the issue involved in the said case was totally
different.
12. Shri Mukerji submitted that the National Institute of
Science and Communication, CSIR, New Delhi, in its first re-
print of the Book titled “Wealth of India”, which is a
dictionary of Indian Raw Materials and Industrial Products,
1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1966 Dictionary”),
mentions six species of ‘papaver’. He submitted that a
perusal of the said authority would reveal that ‘papaver
somniferum L’ is cultivated as the chief source of ‘opium’. He
submitted that it is only ‘papaver somniferum L’ which
contains the alkaloids ‘morphine’ and ‘codeine’. Shri Mukerji
submitted that the United Nations International Drug
Control Programme has recommended methods for testing
‘opium’, ‘morphine’ and ‘heroin’ in its Manual for use by the
National Drug Testing Laboratories, 1998 (hereinafter
referred to as the “1998 Manual”). He submitted that the two
tests which are conducted by the appellant are the only tests
1
(2005) 7 SCC 550
8
which are recommended by the United Nations. The learned
AAG further submitted that the Directorate of Forensic
Science Services, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
India, New Delhi has issued “Working Procedure Manual :
Narcotics” in the year 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the
“2021 Manual”). He submitted that the said Manual
contains the tests which are required to be conducted for
finding out the presence of ‘opium/crude morphine’ and
‘meconic acid’. The learned AAG submitted that ‘papaver
somniferum L’ is the only species which contains ‘morphine’
and ‘meconic acid’. It is therefore submitted that the finding
of the High Court that these two tests are not sufficient to
reach to a conclusion that the species belong to ‘papaver
somniferum L’ and as such, is not punishable under Section
15 of the 1985 Act, does not lay down a correct proposition of
law.
13. Shri Mukerji relies on the judgments of this Court in
2
the cases of State of M.P. and Others v. Ram Singh ,
3
Swantraj and Others v. State of Maharashtra and NEPC
2
(2000) 5 SCC 88
3
(1975) 3 SCC 322
9
4
Micon Limited and Others v. Magma Leasing Limited in
support of the proposition that the interpretation which
advances the purpose of the Act has to be preferred as
against the one which defeats the purpose of the Act.
14. Shri Jain submitted that since the provisions of the
1985 Act are very stringent in nature, the Court will have to
prefer an approach of strict interpretation of the statute. He
submitted that the High Court has rightly held that the
definition of ‘opium poppy’ as given under Clause (xvii) of
Section 2 of the 1985 Act is in two parts. He submitted that,
as per sub-clause (a) of Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of the 1985
Act, ‘opium poppy’ means “the plant of the species ‘papaver
somniferum L”, whereas sub-clause (b) thereof empowers the
Central Government to notify any other species of ‘papaver’
from which ‘opium’ or any ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ can be
extracted. It is therefore submitted that, unless any other
species of ‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’ or any ‘phenanthrene
alkaloid’ can be extracted is notified by the Central
Government, the same cannot be considered to be ‘opium’ for
the purpose of the 1985 Act. It is submitted that, as such,
4
(1999) 4 SCC 253
10
unless the prosecution proves that the genus of the material
seized was a species of ‘papaver somniferum L’, the
conviction could not be sustained. He, therefore, submitted
that no interference would be warranted with the judgment of
the High Court. The other counsel have adopted the
submissions advanced by Shri Jain.
15. Shri Nataraj, learned ASG also submitted that since
the 1985 Act is both penal and beneficial, the interpretation
which advances the purpose of the Act will have to be
preferred. The learned ASG relies on the judgment of this
Court in the case of NEPC Micon Limited (supra).
16. Shri Parameshwar, learned amicus curiae submitted
that the following three issues arise for consideration in the
present matter:
(i) When the statute identifies only one species as
contraband material and when the legislature
leaves it open to the Central Government to
notify any other species, it will not be
permissible for the State to argue that a test
which will prove that the contraband material
11
belongs to the species of ‘papaver somniferum
L’ is not necessary;
(ii) What is the appropriate test to identify that the
contraband belongs to the species of ‘papaver
somniferum L’; and
(iii) Whether the first question is relevant only for
‘poppy husk’ or ‘poppy straw’ or for all other
forms of ‘poppies’?
17. Shri Parameshwar submitted that there are three
families of narcotic drugs which are dealt with by the statute,
namely, ‘opium’, ‘cannabis (hemp)’ and ‘coca leaf’. He
submitted that it is only the plant of ‘papaver somniferum L’
which contains ‘opium’. He fairly submitted that the earlier
enactments only recognized ‘papaver somniferum L’ as a
source for ‘opium’. It is only the 1985 Act which has also
included sub-clause (b) in Clause (xvii) of Section 2 which
provides for any other species of ‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’
or any ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ can be extracted. However,
such a species, to come under the provisions of the 1985 Act,
is required to be notified by the Central Government. He
fairly submitted that no such notification recognizing any
12
other species of ‘papaver’ has been notified by the Central
Government.
18. Shri Parameshwar also agrees with the submissions
made by Shri Mukerji that India is also obligated to honour
its obligations as per the decisions taken in various
International Conventions. Shri Parameshwar has also taken
us through different statutes, enacted by different countries
to highlight the relevant provisions with regard to ‘opium’.
Shri Parameshwar has also taken us to the judgment
rendered by Justice Hidayatullah in the case of Baidyanath
5
Mishra and Another v. The State of Orissa , wherein this
Court held that when evidence shows that it could be
‘opium’, it will not be necessary to conduct any further
analysis. However, he submitted that the said position
would no longer be valid in view of the subsequent judgment
of this Court in the case of Harjit Singh v. State of
6
Punjab , wherein this Court considered the provisions of the
1985 Act and held that chemical analysis of the contraband
material is essential to prove a case against the accused
under the 1985 Act. Shri Parameshwar submitted that the
5
1968 (XXXIV) Cuttack Law Times-I
6
(2011) 4 SCC 441
13
Gujarat High Court in the case of Hathi @ Mangalsinh
7
Ramdayalji v. State of Gujarat
as well as the Himachal
Pradesh High Court in the cases of Rajiv Kumar alias
8 9
Guglu v. State of H.P. and State of H.P. v. Des Raj have
taken a similar view. Shri Parameshwar fairly submitted
that, as amicus curiae , he has placed both the sides before
this Court and it is for this Court to take a view in the
interest of justice.
Legislative History:
19. For appreciating the controversy, it will be relevant
to refer to the legislative history prior to the present
enactment, i.e., the 1985 Act coming into force.
20. The first of such enactments was the Opium Act,
1857 (for short, “1857 Act”), which was enacted for
preventing illicit cultivation of ‘poppy’ and for regulating the
cultivation of ‘poppy’ and the manufacture of ‘opium’ on
account of Government. However, the 1857 Act does not
define ‘opium’. Thereafter in the year 1878, the Opium Act,
7
1992 SCC OnLine Guj 311
8
2007 SCC OnLinee HP 120
9
2013 SCC OnLine HP 371
14
1878 (for short, “1878 Act”) was enacted to amend the laws
relating to ‘opium’, wherein ‘opium’ was defined as under:
“ 3. Interpretation clause. - ………….
‘Opium’ means-
(i) the capsules of the poppy (papaver
somniferum, L), whether in their original form
or cut, rushed or powdered, and whether or
not juice has been extracted therefrom;
(ii) the spontaneously coagulated juice of such
capsules which has not been submitted to any
manipulations other than those necessary for
packing and transport; and
(iii) any mixture with or without natural
materials, of any of the above forms of opium;
but does not include any preparation
containing not more than 0.2 per cent of
morphine, or a manufactured drug as defined
in Section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
1930;”
21. Thereafter, the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 (for
short, “1930 Act”) came to be enacted. The 1930 Act came to
be enacted in pursuance to the Second International Opium
Conference (Geneva Convention). The preamble of the 1930
Act would reveal that the Contracting Parties to the said
Geneva Convention resolved to take further measures to
suppress the contraband trafficking and abuse of dangerous
drugs, especially those derived from ‘opium’, ‘Indian hemp’
15
and ‘coca leaf’. It defined ‘opium’ in Clause (e) of Section 2 as
under:
“ 2. Definitions. ………….
(e) “opium” means
(i) the capsules of the poppy (Papaver
somniferum L.);
(ii) the spontaneously coagulated juice of
such capsules which has not been
submitted to any manipulations other
than those necessary for packing and
transport; and
(iii) any mixture, with or without neutral
materials, of any of the above forms of
opium; but does not include any
preparation containing not more than 0.2
per cent of morphine;”
22. It would also be relevant to refer to the definition of
‘opium’ as found in the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949
(for short, “1949 Act”), which reads thus:
“(30) “opium” means –
(a) The capsules of the poppy (Papaver
Somaniforum L), [whether in their original
form or cut, or crushed or powdered and
whether or not the juice has been extracted
therefrom;
(b) The spontaneously coagulated juice of such
capsules which has not been submitted to any
manipulation other than those necessary for
packing and transport; and
(c) Any mixture with or without neutral
materials of any of the above forms of opium;
16
but does not include any preparations
containing not more than 0.2 percent of
morphine, or a manufactured drug as defined
in section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs of Act,
1930.”
23. Thereafter, the present Act, i.e., the 1985 Act came
to be enacted in the year 1985. It will be relevant to refer to
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1985 Act, which
reads thus:
“ STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The statutory control over narcotic drugs
is exercised in India through a number of
Central and State enactments. The principal
Central Acts, namely, the Opium Act, 1857,
the Opium Act, 1878 and the Dangerous
Drugs Act, 1930 were enacted a long time ago.
With the passage of time and the developments
in the field of illicit drug traffic and drug abuse
at national and international level, many
deficiencies in the existing laws have come to
notice, some of which are indicated below:
(i) The scheme of penalties under the present
Acts is not sufficiently deterrent to meet the
challenge of well organized gangs of smugglers.
The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 provides for a
maximum term of imprisonment of 3 years
with or without fine and 4 years imprisonment
with or without fine for repeat offences.
Further, no minimum punishment is
prescribed in the present laws, as a result of
which drug traffickers have been some times
let off by the courts with nominal punishment.
The country has for the last few years been
increasingly facing the problem of transit
traffic of drugs coming mainly from some of
17
our neighboring countries and destined mainly
to Western countries.
(ii) The existing Central laws do not provide for
investing the officers of a number of important
Central enforcement agencies like Narcotics,
Customs, Central Excise, etc., with the power
of investigation of offences under the said
laws.
(iii) Since the enactment of the aforesaid three
Central Acts a vast body of international law in
the field of narcotics control has evolved
through various international treaties and
protocols. The Government of India has been a
party to these treaties and conventions which
entails several obligations which are not
covered or are only partly covered by the
present Acts.
(iv) During recent years new drugs of addiction
which have come to be known as psychotropic
substances have appeared on the scene and
posed serious problems to national
governments. There is no comprehensive law
to enable exercise of control over psychotropic
substances in India in the manner as
envisaged in the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, 1971 to which India has also
acceded.”
24. It could thus be seen that the 1985 Act came to be
enacted since the three earlier enactments, i.e., the 1857 Act,
the 1878 Act and the 1930 Act were enacted a long time ago.
It was also noticed that there were developments in the field
of illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse at the national and
international level. Many deficiencies had come to notice in
18
the three earlier enactments including the inadequacy of
penalties. It was also noticed that the existing central laws
did not provide for vesting a number of important Central
enforcement agencies with the power of investigation of
offences under the said laws. It was also noticed that, since
the earlier three enactments came into existence, various
international treaties and protocols were evolved. The
Government of India was a party to these treaties and
conventions which entail several obligations which are not
covered under the earlier three enactments. Thus, it was felt
that there was an urgent need for the enactment of a
comprehensive legislation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances.
25. The 1985 Act defined ‘opium’, ‘opium derivative’,
‘opium poppy’, ‘poppy straw’ and ‘poppy straw concentrate’
under Clauses (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii) and (xix) of Section 2,
which read thus:
“ 2. Definitions . –
(xv) "opium" means-
(a) the coagulated juice of the
opium poppv; and
19
(b) any mixture, with or without any
neutral material, of the coagulated
juice of the opium poppy,
but does not include any preparation
containing not more than 0.2 per cent. of
morphine:
(xvi) "opium derivative" means-
(a) medicinal opium, that is, opium
which has undergone the processes
necessary to adapt it for medicinal
use in accordance with the
requirements of the Indian
Pharmacopoeia or any other
pharmacopeia notified in this behalf
by the Central Government, whether
in powder form or granulated or
otherwise or mixed with neutral
materials;
(b) prepared opium, that is, any
product of opium by any series of
operations designed to transform
opium into an extract suitable for
smoking and the dross or other
residue remaining after opium is
smoked;
(c) phenanthrene alkaloids, namely,
morphine, codeine, thebaine and
their salts:
(d) diacetylmorphine, that is, the
alkaloid also known as diamorphine
or heroin and its salts; and
(e) all preparations containing more
than 0.2 per cent. of morphine or
containing any diacetylmorphine;
(xvii) “opium poppy” means-
(a) the plant of the species Papaver
somriferum L.; and
20
(b) the plant of any other species of
Papaver from which opium or any
phenanthrene alkaloid can be
extracted and which the Central
Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, declare to be
opium poppy-for the purposes of
this Act;
(xviii) "poppy straw" means all parts (except
the seeds) of the opium poppy after harvesting
whether in their original form or cut, crushed
or powdered and whether or not juice has been
extracted therefrom;
(xix) "poppy straw concentrate" means the
material arising when poppy straw" has
entered into a process for the concentration of
its alkaloids;”
26. In the present case, we are concerned with the
conviction in relation to ‘poppy straw’. ‘Poppy straw’ has
been defined to mean all parts of ‘opium poppy’ after
harvesting, whether in their original form or cut, crushed or
powdered and whether or not juice has been extracted
therefrom. However, the said definition excludes the seeds.
As such, ‘poppy straw’ would mean all parts of ‘opium poppy’
except the seeds. Therefore, for bringing home the guilt of
the accused for contravention in relation to ‘poppy straw’, it
will be relevant to refer to the definition of ‘opium poppy’.
‘Opium poppy’ has been defined under Clause (xvii) of
21
Section 2 of the 1985 Act which has been reproduced
hereinabove. As per sub-clause (a) of Clause (xvii) of Section
2 of the 1985 Act, ‘opium poppy’ means the plant of the
species ‘papaver somniferum L’. As per sub-clause (b)
thereof, ‘opium poppy’ would also mean the plant of any
other species of ‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’ or any
‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ can be extracted and which the
Central Government, by notification in the official gazette,
has declared to be ‘opium poppy’ for the purposes of the
1985 Act.
27. Section 15 of the 1985 Act which provides for
punishment for contravention in relation to ‘poppy straw’
reads thus:
“ 15. Punishment for contravention in
relation to poppy straw.- Whoever, in
contravention of any provisions of this Act or
any rule or order made or condition of a
licence granted thereunder, produces,
possesses, transports, imports inter-State,
exports inter-State, sells, purchases, uses or
omits to warehouse poppy straw or removes or
does any act in respect of warehoused poppy
straw shall be punishable,-
(a) where the contravention involves small
quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for
a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine which may extend to then
thousand rupees or with both; or
22
(b) where the contravention involves quantity
lesser than commercial quantity but
greater than small quantity, with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may
extend to ten years and with fine which
may extend to one lakh rupees; or
(c) where the contravention involves
commercial quantity, with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than ten years but which may
extend to twenty years and shall also be
liable to fine which shall not be less than
one lakh rupees but which may extend to
two lakh rupees:
Provided that the court may, for reasons to be
recorded in the judgment, impose a fine
exceeding two lakh rupees.
28. A perusal of Section 15 of the 1985 Act would reveal
that, whoever, in contravention of any provisions of this Act
or any rule or order made or condition of a licence granted
thereunder, produces, possesses, transports, imports inter-
State, exports inter-State, sells, purchases, uses or omits to
warehouse poppy straw or removes or does any act in respect
of warehoused poppy straw shall be punishable with rigorous
imprisonment of minimum one year up to twenty years
depending on the quantity and also a fine which may extend
to minimum ten thousand rupees up to two lakh rupees.
23
29. It could thus be seen that, for bringing home the
guilt of the accused within the ambit of Section 15 of the
1985 Act, it is necessary to establish that the contravention
is in relation to ‘poppy straw’. A combined reading of the
definition given under Clauses (xvii) and (xviii) of Section 2,
and Section 15 of the 1985 Act would reveal that, for
bringing home the guilt of the accused, it will be necessary to
establish that the seized material collected is any part of
‘opium poppy’ except the seeds. As such, what would be
required to establish is that the genus of the seized material
is ‘opium poppy’ as defined under Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of
the 1985 Act.
30. The question that requires to be considered is as to
whether it is sufficient for the prosecution to establish that
the raw material contains ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’ to
bring it under sub-clause (a) of Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of
the 1985 Act or is it necessary for the prosecution to further
establish that, though the seized material contains
‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’, the genus of the seized
material is ‘papaver somniferum L’ or any other species of
‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’ or any ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’
24
can be extracted and which is notified in the Official Gazette
by the Central Government to be ‘opium poppy’ for the
purposes of the 1985 Act.
31. It will be relevant to note that, though the 1857 Act
and the 1930 Act only defined ‘opium’, for the first time in
the 1985 Act, separate definitions have been provided for
‘opium’, ‘opium poppy’, ‘poppy straw’ and ‘poppy straw
concentrate’.
32. We have already referred to the legislative history.
The first of the enactments to deal with is the 1878 Act and
the second one is the 1930 Act. Both these enactments
defined ‘opium’ to mean the capsules of the ‘poppy’ (papaver
somniferum L), and the spontaneously coagulated juice of
such capsules which has not been submitted to any
manipulation other than those necessary for packing and
transport. The said definitions also included any mixture
with or without neutral materials of any of the above forms of
‘opium’. However, if any such preparations contained less
than 0.2% of ‘morphine’, it was excluded from the definition
of ‘opium’. The 1949 Act also provided a similar definition.
25
International Developments:
33. While we notice the developments on the legislative
side in India in enacting various legislations till the 1985 Act
came into existence, it will also be pertinent to note that
there was a development in the last century at the
international level so as to make a combined effort in
controlling and prohibiting the menace of drugs and
psychotropic substances.
34. The International Opium Convention was signed at
rd
The Hague on 23 January 1912 (hereinafter referred to as
“the 1912 Convention”). As per the agreement, in the 1912
Convention, ‘raw opium’ was defined as under:
“ Definition. – By “raw opium” is understood :
The spontaneously coagulated juice obtained
from the capsules of the papaver somniferum
which has only been submitted to the
necessary manipulations for packing and
transport.”
35. In order to further the determination to continue the
efforts to combat drug addiction and illicit trafficking in
narcotic substances and being aware about the fact that the
desired results could be achieved only by close collaboration
between the contracting parties, at the United Nations
26
Opium Conference of 1953, the “Protocol for Limiting and
Regulating the Cultivation of the ‘poppy plant’, the
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and use
of Opium” (hereinafter referred to as “the 1953 Protocol)
came to be resolved. It will be relevant to refer to the
definitions of ‘poppy’, ‘poppy straw’ and ‘opium’ provided in
the said Protocol, which read thus:
“Poppy” means the plant Papaver somniferum
L., and any other species of Papaver which
may be used for the production of opium;
“Poppy straw” means all parts of the poppy
after mowing (except the seeds) from which
narcotics can be extracted;
“Opium” means the coagulated juice of the
poppy in whatever form including raw opium,
medicinal opium, and prepared opium, but
excluding galenical preparations;”
36. The efforts to combat the menace of drugs at the
international level continued. Recognizing that addiction to
narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual
and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,
and conscious of the duty to prevent and combat this evil
and understanding that such a universal action calls for an
international co-operation, the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1961
27
Convention”) was resolved. It was further amended by the
1972 Protocol. It will be relevant to refer to the definitions of
‘medicinal opium’, ‘opium’, ‘opium poppy’ and ‘poppy straw’,
as found in the 1961 Convention:
“o) “Medicinal opium” means opium which has
undergone the processes necessary to adapt it
for medicinal use.
p) “Opium” means the coagulated juice of the
opium poppy.
q) “Opium poppy” means the plant of the
species Papaver somniferum L.
r) “Poppy straw” means all parts (except the
seeds) of the opium poppy, after mowing.”
37. It could thus be seen that the 1912 Convention as
well as the 1961 Convention, as amended by the 1972
Protocol, recognized even at the international level that it was
the plant ‘papaver somniferum L’ which was used for
manufacture of ‘opium’. In the 1953 Protocol, it was for the
first time noticed that there could be other species of
‘papaver’ which may be used for the production of ‘opium’.
As such, though the definition in the 1953 Protocol included
the plant of ‘papaver somniferum L’, it also included any
other species of ‘papaver’ which may be used for the
production of ‘opium’.
28
38. It will also be relevant to refer to the following
extracts from the “Commentary on the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961” (for short, “the said Commentary”),
which reads thus:
“1. It is sometimes difficult to decide, and
therefore a difference of opinion exists whether
different forms of a plant constitute different
varieties of the same species or different
species of the same genus, e.g. “ Papaver
setigerum ” is by some considered to be a
variety of the species Papaver somniferum L.
and by others a separate species. It appears
that some, albeit insignificant, quantities of
morphine can be obtained from Papaver
setigerum.
2. The authors of the Single Convention
appear to have assumed that all plants from
which opium can be obtained in significant
quantities are only varieties of a single species,
Papaver somniferum L. They therefore defined
“opium poppy” as the plant of the species
Papaver somniferum L. The 1953 Protocol, on
the other hand, defines “Poppy” to mean “the
plant Papaver somniferum L., and any other
species of Papaver which may be used for the
production of opium”.
3. Should any plant which is considered not
to be a variety of the species Papaver
somniferum L., but another species of the
genus Papaver, be found to yield opium, the
plant itself and its product would not be
covered by the control provisions of the Single
Convention, but only by those of the Protocol.
The coagulated juice of the plant would for the
purposes of the Single Convention not be
“opium” but could by the operation of article 3
of the Single Convention be listed in Schedule I
29
and become a “drug” of Schedule I – like the
“opium” obtained from the species “Papaver
somniferum L.” – and thus be placed under
the regime provided by the Single Convention
for drugs in this Schedule. Its separation from
the plant, not being “opium poppy” within the
meaning of the Single Convention, would also
not be “production”, but “manufacture”.
Another way of handling such a situation
would be an amendment of the definition of
opium poppy so as to cover the additional
species found to yield opium. It might in such
a case be possible to obtain for such a revision
the consensus of the Parties to the Single
Convention required for the application of the
simplified procedure foreseen in article 47.”
39. The said Commentary would show that, it was at
times difficult to consider as to whether different varieties of
the same species or different species of the same genus, i.e.,
‘papaver setigerum’ could be considered to be a variety of the
species ‘papaver somniferum L’ or a separate species. It
noted that the authors of the Single Convention appeared to
have assumed that all plants from which opium can be
obtained in significant quantities are only varieties of a single
species, i.e., Papaver somniferum L . As such, ‘opium poppy’
was defined as the plant of the species ‘papaver somniferum
L’. It also noted that though the 1953 Protocol included the
plant ‘papaver somniferum L’ within the definition of ‘poppy’,
30
it also included any other species of ‘papaver’ which may be
used for the production of ‘opium’. The authors of the said
Commentary therefore opined that, if a plant which is
considered not to be a variety of the species ‘papaver
somniferum L’ but of another species of the genus ‘papaver’,
be found to yield opium, the plant itself and its product
would not be covered by the controlling provisions of the
Single Convention, but only by those of the Protocol. The
coagulated juice of the plant would, for the purpose of the
Single Convention, not be ‘opium’ but could, by the operation
of Article 3 of the Single Convention be listed in Schedule I
and become a ‘drug’ of Schedule I like the ‘opium’ obtained
from the species ‘papaver somniferum L’. The authors of the
said Commentary, therefore, recommended that, for handling
such a situation, the definition of ‘opium poppy’ be amended
so as to cover the additional species found to yield ‘opium’.
40. We find that all these international developments
need to be taken into consideration while interpreting the
1985 Act inasmuch as the Statement of Objects and Reasons
itself mentioned that there had been developments at the
international level with regard to control of any drugs and
31
psychotropic substances and the 1985 Act is enacted to give
effect to the commitments in the international conventions.
Scientific Studies:
41. A lot of research has undertaken with regard to the
exact definition of ‘opium poppy’. In the 1966 Dictionary,
‘papaver somniferum L' is defined as ‘opium poppy’. The said
dictionary would reveal that ‘opium poppy’ was cultivated for
the production of ‘opium’ and for ‘poppy seeds’. In India,
cultivation of ‘poppy’ for ‘opium’ was established by the early
sixteenth century and was a considerable source of revenue
for successive governments. It also noted that ‘opium’ was
freely sold as an intoxicant within the country and exported
for the same purpose to the far-eastern countries,
particularly China. This resulted in the high acreage under
‘opium poppy’ cultivation in the early part of the present
century. The flagrant misuse of ‘opium’ and its deleterious
effects physically, mentally and morally became so
widespread that it became a serious social problem in many
countries. As a result of an agreement with China to
progressively reduce the export of ‘opium’ to that country,
the total area under ‘poppy’ cultivation substantially declined
32
in 1960-1961. Further, the Government of India decided in
the year 1949 to stop ‘opium’ consumption for non-medical
and quasi-medical uses in the country completely by 1958-
1959.
42. It will be apposite to reproduce the relevant extracts
from the 1966 Dictionary as under:
“CHEMICAL COMPOSITION
Fresh opium is a brownish, somewhat plastic
solid, becoming tough and occasionally brittle
on keeping and has a characteristic fruity
odour. Opium is valued for the alkaloids it
contains, the total alkaloid content varying
from 5 to 25% (generally 20%). A large number
of alkaloids have been isolated from opium, of
which at present 25 are known (Table 3).
Morphine, codeine thebaine, narcotine,
narceine and papaverine are the chief opium
alkaloids, and of these morphine is the most
abundant and by far the most important.
Morphine exists in combination with meconic
and sulphuric acids in the form of salts readily
soluble in water. Other alkaloids occur in
opium partly in the free state and partly as
salts (Thrope, IX, 99; Annett et al., Mem Dep.
Agric India, Chem, 1921-23, 6-1; Merck Index,
756, Chopra et al., 169; Henry, 178; U.S.D.,
1955, 927)
The valuation of opium depends upon its
morphine-content which varies markedly in
commercial samples.”
43. A perusal of the aforesaid would reveal that ‘papaver
somniferum L’ contains five major alkaloids, viz., ‘Morphine’,
33
‘Narcotine’, ‘Papaverine’, ‘Thebaine’ and ‘Codeine’. It would
also reveal that ‘morphine’ exists in combination with
‘meconic’ and ‘sulphuric’ acids. The valuation of ‘opium’
depends upon its ‘morphine-content’ which varies markedly
in commercial samples.
44. It will also be relevant to refer to the 1998 Manual,
which recommended methods for the testing of ‘opium’,
‘morphine’ and ‘heroin’. The 1998 Manual deals with
production of illicit ‘opium’. The relevant extracts from the
1998 Manual reads thus:
“The immediate precursor of heroin is
morphine, and morphine is obtained from
opium. Opium is the dried milky juice (latex)
obtained from the unripe seed pods of Papaver
somniferum L. , more commonly referred to as
the opium or oil poppy. Morphine has also
been reported to be present in Papaver
setigerum , and as a minor alkaloid in Papaver
decaisnei and Papaver rhoeas . However, there
is no known instance of these poppies being
used for opium production, and more recent
work has cast considerable doubt as to the
presence of morphine in Papaver rhoeas . A
major review by Kapoor on the botany and
chemistry of the opium poppy is recommended
additional reading.”
45. It is thus seen that the 1998 Manual also
emphasizes that the immediate precursor of ‘heroin’ is
34
‘morphine’, and ‘morphine’ is obtained from ‘opium’. It
further states that ‘opium’ is the dried milky juice obtained
from the unripe seed pods of ‘papaver somniferum L’. It also
notices that ‘morphine’ has also been reported to be present
in ‘papaver setigerum’, and as a minor alkaloid in ‘papaver
decaisnei’ and ‘papaver rhoeas’. It further notices that there
is no known instance of these poppies being used for ‘opium’
production. It also notices that a recent work has cast
considerable doubt as to the presence of ‘morphine’ in
‘papaver rhoeas’. The 1998 Manual also shows that the
following major alkaloids are found in ‘raw opium’:
| MAJOR ALKALOIDS FOUND IN RAW OPIUM | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| alkaloids | min% | avg% | max% |
| MORPHINE | 3.1 | 11.4 | 19.2 |
| CODEINE | 0.7 | 3.5 | 6.6 |
| THEBAINE | 0.2 | 3.1 | 10.6 |
| PAPAVERINE | <0.1 | 3.2 | 9.0 |
| NOSCAPINE | 1.4 | 8.1 | 15.8 |
46. The 1998 Manual, on research, shows six major
constituents in ‘opium’ and ‘crude morphine’ samples, viz.,
‘morphine’, ‘codeine’, ‘thebaine’, ‘papaverine’, ‘noscapine’,
and ‘meconic acid’.
35
47. Another publication titled as “Analysis of Plant
Poisons” authored by Dr. M.P. Goutam and Smt. Shubhra
Goutam establishes that, apart from the six major alkaloids
found in ‘opium’, ‘meconic acid’ is easily detectible in
‘papaver somniferum L’. The study states that ‘meconic
acid’ is invariably found in ‘opium’ and its presence has long
been used to indicate ‘opium’. The study shows that some
species of ‘papaver’ which produces no morphine but other
morphinanes may also contain this acid. However, the
study shows that, insofar as ‘papaver somniferum L’ is
concerned, ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’ are found in it.
48. A publication published by the International
Narcotics Control Board namely “Narcotic Drugs Stupefiants
Estupefacientes – Estimated World Requirements for 2022”,
also states thus:
“3. Opium and poppy straw are the raw
materials obtained from the opium poppy plant
(Papaver somniferum), from which alkaloids
such as morphine, thebaine, codeine and
oripavine are extracted. Concentrate of poppy
straw is a product obtained in the process of
extracting alkaloids from poppy straw. It is
controlled under the 1961 Convention.
Detailed information on the supply of opiate
raw material and demand for opiates for
medical and scientific purposes is provided in
part three of the present publication.”
36
49. It will further be relevant to note that Section 3 of
the 2021 Manual deals with ‘opium’, ‘opium alkaloids’ and
‘poppy straw’. It will be relevant to refer to Section 3.7 of the
2021 Manual, which reads thus:
“3.7 Methods:
3.7.1 Colour Tests:
Positive results of these tests are only
presumptive indication for the presence of
opium alkaloids. It is mandatory for analyst to
confirm such results by use of any alternate
technique.
a) Marquis test [1]: Take a small amount of
suspected sample in a test tube and add about
10 drops of water, crush the sample with a
glass rod. Place a few drops of water solution
through filter paper/supernatant liquid on a
spotting plate and add few drops of Marquis
reagent. The development of purple violet color
indicates the presence of opium/crude
morphine.
Preparation of Marquis Reagent: 8-10 drops
of 40% formaldehyde solution is added to 10
ml of Con. Sulphuric acid.
b) Ferric Salt Test [1]: Take small aount of
suspected material on a spot plate and add
about 2 drops of water, triturate the sample
until the water becomes brown colour. Take a
drop of brown liquid to another part of the spot
plate, add one drop of reagent. Appearance of
brown purple colour indicates the positive test
for the presence of meconic acid. This meconic
acid is present in raw and prepared opium, but
it will not be detected in crude morphine.
37
Preparation of Ferric Salt Reagent: Dissolve
1 g of ferric sulphate in 20 ml of water.
Alternate Test of Meconic Acid [2] :
c) Ferric Chloride Test : Dissolve appropriate
sample of opium in water and add a drop of
dilute hydrochloric acid by few drops of 10%
solution of ferric chloride. A red colour is
appeared. Divide this solution into two parts.
Take first part and add dilute hydrochloric
acid to it in excess and warm. The red colour
of the solution remains there. Take the second
part and add a solution of mercuric chloride.
The colour of the solution does not affect.
Preparation of Mercuric Chloride Reagent:
Dissolve 5 gms. mercuric chloride in 100 ml of
water.
Dilute Hydrochloric Acid [3]: About 10%
W/W of HC1 in water
Porphyroxine Test [1]: Take a small amount
of suspected material on a spot plate and add
two drops of water. Triturate it with glass rod.
Take one drop of brown liquid from this
mixture to another part of the plate, add one
drop of 2 N hydrochloric acid and heat gently.
Appearance of red colour indicates the
presence of porphyroxine.”
50. It could thus be seen that, though the positive
results in the colour tests are only an indication for the
presence of ‘opium alkaloids’, it is mandatory to confirm
such results by the use of an alternate technique. It would
further reveal that the Marquis Test indicates the presence of
38
‘opium/crude morphine’. The Ferric Salt Test would reveal
the presence of ‘meconic acid’. It could thus be seen that,
though colour test is positive, the same is required to be
confirmed to establish the presence of ‘opium/crude
morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’.
51. In this background, we will have to consider the
present issue.
52. We find that two principles of interpretation of
statutes would govern the present case. The first one being
the Mischief Rule of interpretation.
Heydon’s/Mischief Rule:
53. As early as in the year 1955, the Constitution Bench
of this Court in the case of The Bengal Immunity Company
10
Limited v. The State of Bihar and Others , has observed
thus:
“ 23. It is a sound rule of construction of a
statute firmly established in England as far
back as 1584 when Heydon's case [3 Co. Rep
7a : 76 ER 637] was decided that—
“… for the sure and true
interpretation of all statutes in
general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the
10
[1955] 2 SCR 603
39
common law) four things are to be
discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law
before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief
and defect for which the
common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the
Parliament hath resolved and
appointed to cure the disease
of the Commonwealth., and
4th. The true reason of the
remedy; and then the office of
all the Judges is always to
make such construction as
shall suppress the mischief,
and advance the remedy, and
to suppress subtle inventions
and evasions for continuance
of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo , and to add force and
life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of
the makers of the Act, pro bona
publico .”
In In re Mayfair Property Company [LR (1898) 2
Ch 28 at p. 35] Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found
the rule “as necessary now as it was when
Lord Coke reported Heydon case ”. In Eastman
Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller
General of Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks [LR (1898) AC 571 at 576] Earl of
Halsbury reaffirmed the Rule as follows:
“My Lords, it appears to me that to
construe the Statute in question, it
is not only legitimate but highly
convenient to refer both to the
former Act and to the ascertained
evils to which the former Act had
given rise, and to the later Act which
40
provided the remedy. These three
being compared I cannot doubt the
conclusion.”
It appears to us that this rule is equally
applicable to the construction of Article 286 of
our Constitution. In order to properly interpret
the provisions of that article it is, therefore,
necessary to consider how the matter stood
immediately before the Constitution came into
force, what the mischief was for which the old
law did not provide and the remedy which has
been provided by the Constitution to cure that
mischief.”
54. The law laid down in the case of The Bengal
Immunity Company Limited (supra) has been consistently
followed by this Court. We will therefore have to examine the
following four factors:
(i) What was the position before the enactment of
the 1985 Act?
(ii) What was the mischief and defect for which
the earlier enactments did not provide?
(iii) What remedy had the Parliament resolved to
cure the mischief and defect?
(iv) The true reason for the remedy.
55. As already discussed hereinabove, the International
Conventions consistently recognized that the ‘papaver
41
somniferum L’ was used for the production of ‘opium’. The
1878 Act as well as the 1930 Act also clearly recognized that
‘opium’ was derived from ‘papaver somniferum L’. The
voluminous scientific study has also recognized that the
‘papaver somniferum L’ contains ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic
acid’.
56. The 1953 Protocol first noticed that there are other
species of ‘papaver’ which may be used for the production of
‘opium’. The said Commentary again noticed this position.
It also noticed the difficulty in deciding whether different
forms of a plant constitute different varieties of the same
species or different species of the same genus, for example,
‘papaver setigerum’. It noticed that some considered it to be
a variety of the species ‘papaver somniferum L’ and others
considered it a separate species. It also noticed that
insignificant quantities of ‘morphine’ can be obtained from
‘papaver setigerum’. The said Commentary noticed that the
authors of the Single Convention appeared to have assumed
that all plants from which ‘opium’ can be obtained in
significant quantities are only varieties of a single species
‘papaver somniferum L’. It noted that they, therefore, defined
42
‘opium poppy’ as the plant of the species ‘papaver
somniferum L’. It also noted that the 1953 Protocol, on the
other hand, defined ‘poppy’ to mean the plant ‘papaver
somniferum L’ and any other species of ‘papaver’ which may
be used for the production of ‘opium’. To overcome this
difficulty, the said Commentary recommended amendment in
the definition of ‘opium poppy’ so as to cover the additional
species found to yield ‘opium’.
57. It is to be noted that, the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the 1985 Act would reveal that the 1985 Act was
enacted since it was found that the earlier three enactments
were not found sufficient to meet the challenges thereunder.
It is also noticed that, after the enactment of the earlier three
Acts, a vast body of international law in the field of narcotics
control has evolved through various international treaties
and protocols and as such, it was found necessary to bring
out a consolidated enactment.
58. Viewed from this angle, it is clear that the legislature
was aware that the plant of species ‘papaver somniferum L’
which contained ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’ was used for
the production of ‘opium’. However, it was also noticed that
43
there could be some other species of ‘papaver’ from which
‘opium’ or any other ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ could be
extracted. In this background, Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of
the 1985 Act was divided into two parts. In view of sub-
clause (a) of Clause (xvii) thereof, the plant of the species
‘papaver somniferum L’, which was already known to be used
for production of ‘opium’ was meant to be ‘opium poppy’ for
the purpose of the 1985 Act. However, in view of sub-clause
(b) of Clause (xvii) thereof, the legislature provided discretion
with the Central Government to declare the plant of any
other species of ‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’ or any
‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ could be extracted to be ‘opium
poppy’ for the purpose of the 1985 Act.
59. The legislature, being aware that scientific studies
undisputedly establish that ‘papaver somniferum L’ contains
‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’ and as such, it may be used
for the production of ‘opium’, by virtue of sub-clause (a) of
Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of the 1985 Act, defined it to mean
‘opium’ for the purpose of the 1985 Act. Whereas, since it
was noticed that some other species of ‘papaver somniferum
L’ could also be used for the production of ‘opium’ which
44
contains ‘opium’ or any ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’, it vested a
discretion with the Central Government to issue a
notification in the Official Gazette to declare such a plant to
be ‘opium poppy’ for the purpose of the 1985 Act.
60. Since it is recognized by the earlier three enactments
as well as the International Conventions and scientific
studies that ‘papaver somniferum L’ contains ‘morphine’ and
‘meconic acid’, in our view, after the two tests positively
indicate the sample of ‘poppy straw’ to contain ‘morphine’
and ‘meconic acid’, a further requirement to establish that
the contraband species belong to the species of only ‘papaver
somniferum L’ would be contrary to the legislative intent.
61. It is further to be noted that the United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (for short, “1988
Convention”), has again defined ‘opium’, which reads thus:
“Opium poppy” means the plant of the species
“papaver sominferum L”;
62. It is to be noticed that, though the 1953 Protocol for
the first time included any other species of ‘papaver’, which
was being used for the production of ‘opium’, the subsequent
45
Conventions of 1961 and 1988 restricted the definition of
‘opium poppy’ to be a plant of the species of ‘papaver
somniferum L’. It is thus clear that, the legislature by
incorporating sub-clause (a) in Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of
the 1985 Act, intended to continue ‘papaver somniferum L’ in
the definition of ‘opium poppy’. However, by taking abundant
precautions and to take care of a situation where any other
species of ‘papaver’ was found to be used for the production
of ‘opium’, the legislature vested the Central Government
with a power to include such a variety to mean ‘opium poppy’
for the purpose of the 1985 Act.
63. In our view, the defect that was noticed by the
legislature was that, though ‘papaver somniferum L’, which
contained ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’ and was used for the
production of ‘opium’, was already included in the definition
of ‘opium’ in the earlier enactments, there was also a
possibility of other variety of ‘papaver’ being used for ‘opium’
production, but could not be brought under the prohibitory
and regulatory measures. This position would also be
clarified by the observations made in the said Commentary
referred to hereinabove.
46
64. The remedy, in our view, which the Parliament has
provided is by way of incorporating sub-clause (b) in Clause
(xvii) of Section 2 of the 1985 Act thereby empowering the
Central Government to notify any other species of ‘papaver’
from which ‘opium’ or any other ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’
could be extracted, to be declared as ‘opium poppy’ for the
purpose of the 1985 Act.
65. The true reason for the remedy, in our view, is to
empower the Central Government to include any other
species of ‘papaver’ which may be used for the production of
‘opium’ and bring the same under the purview of the 1985
Act. The reason is that, if it is found that any species of
‘papaver’ is being used for the production of ‘opium’, the
production of such a variety should not be permitted and the
same be brought under the prohibitory and regulatory
measures as provided under the 1985 Act.
Purposive Interpretation:
66. That leaves us to deal with the next principle of
interpretation which would govern the case. By now, it is a
settled principle of law that an enactment has to be
incorporated in such a manner which advances the purpose
47
of the Act rather than interpretating in such a manner which
defeats the purpose of the Act.
67. In the case of State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese
11
and Others , the High Court of Kerala has held that, for
appreciating the provisions of Section 489-A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 for possession of contraband notes, it was
necessary to establish that the said currency notes would
mean only Indian currency notes. This Court, reversing the
judgment of the Kerala High Court, held thus:
“ 6. …….It is not for the court to reframe the
legislation for the very good reason that the
powers to “legislate” have not been conferred
on the court. When the expression “currency
note” is interpreted to mean “Indian currency
note”, the width of the expression is being
narrowed down or cut down. Apart from the
fact that the court does not possess any such
power, what is the purpose to be achieved by
doing so? A court can make a purposeful
interpretation so as to ‘effectuate’ the
intention of the legislature and not a
purposeless one in order to “defeat” the
intention of the legislators wholly or in
part. When the court (apparently in the course
of an exercise in interpretation) shrinks the
content of the expression “currency note”, to
make it referable to only “Indian currency
note”, it is defeating the intention of the
legislature partly inasmuch as the court makes
it lawful to counterfeit notes other than Indian
currency notes. The manifest purpose of the
11
(1986) 4 SCC 746
48
| provision is that the citizens should be | |
|---|---|
| protected from being deceived or cheated. | |
| The citizens deal with and transact business | |
| with each other through the medium of | |
| currency [ Currency n. 1 a metal or paper | |
| medium of exchange that is in current use. | |
| (Collins English Dictionary)] (which expression | |
| includes coins as also paper currency that is | |
| to say currency notes). It is inconceivable | |
| why the legislature should be anxious to | |
| protect citizens from being deceived or | |
| cheated only in respect of Indian currency | |
| notes and not in respect of currency notes | |
| issued by other sovereign powers. The | |
| purpose of the legislation appears to be to | |
| ensure that a person accepting a currency | |
| note is given a genuine currency which can | |
| be exchanged for goods or services and not | |
| a worthless piece of paper which will bring | |
| him nothing in return, it being a | |
| counterfeit or a forged currency note. | |
| Would the legislature in its wisdom and | |
| anxiety to protect the unwary citizens | |
| extend immunity from being cheated in | |
| relation to Indian currency notes but show | |
| total unconcern in regard to their being | |
| cheated in respect of currency notes issued | |
| by any foreign State or sovereign power? | |
| …….” |
provision was that the citizens should be protected from
being deceived or cheated. It was also held that the court
can make a purposive interpretation so as to effectuate the
intention of the legislature and not a purposeless one in
49
order to defeat the intention of the legislators wholly or in
part. It held that, if the court restricts the expression
‘currency note’ only to ‘Indian currency note’, it would defeat
the intention of the legislature inasmuch as the court makes
it lawful to possess counterfeit notes other than Indian
currency notes.
69. In the case of Baldev Krishna Sahi v. Shipping
12
Corporation of India Limited and Another , the
provisions of Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 fell for
consideration before this Court. It was argued before the
court that, the term “officer” or “employee” used in the said
Section would apply to the existing officers or employees and
not past officers and employees. Negating the said
contention, this Court observed thus:
“ 7. The beneficent provision contained in
Section 630 no doubt penal, has been
purposely enacted by the legislature with the
object of providing a summary procedure for
retrieving the property of the company ( a )
where an officer or employee of a company
wrongfully obtains possession of property of
the company, or ( b ) where having been placed
in possession of any such property during the
course of his employment, wrongfully
withholds possession of it after the termination
of his employment. It is the duty of the court
12
(1987) 4 SCC 361
50
| to place a broad and liberal construction | |
|---|---|
| on the provision in furtherance of the | |
| object and purpose of the legislation which | |
| would suppress the mischief and advance | |
| the remedy. |
51
it an offence if any officer or employee of a
company having any property of the company
in his possession knowingly applies it to
purposes other than those expressed or
directed in the articles and authorised by the
Act. That would primarily apply to the present
officers and employees and may also include
past officers and employees. There is therefore
no warrant to give a restrictive meaning to the
term “officer or employee” appearing in sub-
section (1) of Section 630 of the Act. It is quite
evident that clauses ( a ) and ( b ) are separated
by the word “or” and therefore are clearly
disjunctive.”
[emphasis supplied]
70. It is thus clear that this Court held that there was no
reason to restrict the meaning of the term “officer or
employee” to the existing officers or employees. It held that a
situation where an officer or employee, though having
lawfully obtained the possession of such property during the
course of his employment, wrongfully withholds possession
of it after the termination of the employment, would squarely
be covered by the said Section. The Court also held that it is
the duty of the court to place a broad and liberal
construction on the provision in furtherance of the object
and purpose of the legislation. The interpretation which
suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy has to be
preferred.
52
71. Though this Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt v.
13
State through C.B.I., Bombay (II)
, has held that in case of
a penal statute, when two reasonable and possible
constructions are possible, one which leans in favour of the
accused could be preferred, it will still be relevant to refer to
the following observations of the Constitution Bench in the
said case:
“ 13. The TADA Act was enacted to make
special provisions for the prevention of, and for
coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities
and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto in the background of
escalation of the terrorist and disruptive
activities in the country. There is also material
available for a reasonable belief that such
activities are encouraged even by hostile
foreign agencies which are assisting influx of
lethal and hazardous weapons and substances
into the country to promote escalation of these
activities. The felt need of the times is,
therefore, proper balancing of the interest of
the nation vis-a-vis the rights of a person
accused of an offence under this Act. The
rights of a person found in unauthorised
possession of such a weapon or substance in
this context, to prove his innocence of
involvement in a terrorist or disruptive activity,
is to be determined.
14. The construction made of any provision
of this Act must, therefore, be to promote
the object of its enactment to enable the
machinery to deal effectively with persons
involved in, and associated with, terrorist
13
(1994) 5 SCC 410
53
and disruptive activities while ensuring
that any person not in that category
should not be subjected to the rigours of
the stringent provisions of the TADA Act. It
must, therefore, be borne in mind that any
person who is being dealt with and prosecuted
in accordance with the provisions of the TADA
Act must ordinarily have the opportunity to
show that he does not belong to the category of
persons governed by the TADA Act. Such a
course would permit exclusion from its ambit
of the persons not intended to be covered by it
while ensuring that any person meant to be
governed by its provisions, will not escape the
provisions of the TADA Act, which is the true
object of the enactment. Such a course while
promoting the object of the enactment would
also prevent its misuse or abuse. Such a
danger is not hypothetical but real in view of
serious allegations supported by statistics of
the misuse of provisions of the TADA Act and
the concern to this effect voiced even by the
National Human Rights Commission.
15. It is the duty of courts to accept a
construction which promotes the object of
the legislation and also prevents its
possible abuse even though the mere
possibility of abuse of a provision does not
affect its constitutionality or construction.
Abuse has to be checked by constant vigilance
and monitoring of individual cases and this
can be done by screening of the cases by a
suitable machinery at a high level. It is
reported that in some States, after the decision
of this Court in Kartar Singh [(1994) 3 SCC
569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , high-powered
committees have been constituted for
screening all such cases. It is hoped that this
action will be taken in all the States
throughout the country. Persons aware of
instances of abuse, including the National
Human Rights Commission, can assist by
54
reporting such instances with particulars to
that machinery for prompt and effective cure.
However, that is no reason, in law, to doubt its
constitutionality or to alter the proper
construction when there is a felt need by
Parliament for enacting such a law to cope
with, and prevent terrorist and disruptive
activities threatening the unity and integrity of
the country.”
[emphasis supplied]
72. It could thus be seen that the Constitution Bench
held that it is the duty of the courts to accept a construction
which promotes the object of the legislation. It was held that
the construction made of any provision of the Act must be to
promote the object of the enactment to enable the machinery
to deal effectively with the persons involved in the crime.
73. In the case of State of M.P. and Others v. Ram
Singh (supra), this Court held thus:
“ 10. The Act was intended to make effective
provisions for the prevention of bribery and
corruption rampant amongst the public
servants. It is a social legislation intended to
curb illegal activities of the public servants
and is designed to be liberally construed so as
to advance its object. Dealing with the object
underlying the Act this Court in R.S.
Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [(1984) 2 SCC 183 :
1984 SCC (Cri) 172] held: (SCC p. 200, para
18)
55
“ 18 . The 1947 Act was enacted, as
its long title shows, to make more
effective provision for the prevention
of bribery and corruption.
Indisputably, therefore, the
provisions of the Act must receive
such construction at the hands of
the court as would advance the
object and purpose underlying the
Act and at any rate not defeat it. If
the words of the statute are clear
and unambiguous, it is the plainest
duty of the court to give effect to the
natural meaning of the words used
in the provision. The question of
construction arises only in the event
of an ambiguity or the plain
meaning of the words used in the
statute would be self-defeating. The
court is entitled to ascertain the
intention of the legislature to remove
the ambiguity by construing the
provision of the statute as a whole
keeping in view what was the
mischief when the statute was
enacted and to remove which the
legislature enacted the statute. This
rule of construction is so universally
accepted that it need not be
supported by precedents. Adopting
this rule of construction, whenever a
question of construction arises upon
ambiguity or where two views are
possible of a provision, it would be
the duty of the court to adopt that
construction which would advance
the object underlying the Act,
namely, to make effective provision
for the prevention of bribery and
corruption and at any rate not
defeat it.”
56
11. Procedural delays and technicalities of law
should not be permitted to defeat the object
sought to be achieved by the Act. The overall
public interest and the social object is required
to be kept in mind while interpreting various
provisions of the Act and deciding cases under
it.”
74. It could be seen that this Court held that a social
legislation like the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
intended to curb the illegal activities of the public servants,
should be liberally construed so as to advance its object. It
was held that the overall public interest and the social object
is required to be kept in mind while interpreting various
provisions of the Act and deciding cases under it.
75. In the case of Balram Kumawat v. Union of India
14
and Others , this Court had an occasion to consider the
meaning of the word ‘ivory’ used in the Wild Life (Protection)
Act, 1972. The court observed thus:
“ 23. Furthermore, even in relation to a penal
statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and
lexical construction may not always be given
effect to. The law would have to be interpreted
having regard to the subject-matter of the
offence and the object of the law it seeks to
achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow
14
(2003) 7 SCC 628
57
the offender to sneak out of the meshes of law.
Criminal jurisprudence does not say so.
24. ……..
25. A statute must be construed as a workable
instrument. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat is
a well-known principle of law. In Tinsukhia
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of
Assam [(1989) 3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123]
this Court stated the law thus : (SCC p. 754,
paras 118-120)
“ 118 . The courts strongly lean
against any construction which
tends to reduce a statute to futility.
The provision of a statute must be
so construed as to make it effective
and operative, on the principle ‘ ut
res magis valeat quam pereat ’. It is,
no doubt, true that if a statute is
absolutely vague and its language
wholly intractable and absolutely
meaningless, the statute could be
declared void for vagueness. This is
not in judicial review by testing the
law for arbitrariness or
unreasonableness under Article 14;
but what a court of construction,
dealing with the language of a
statute, does in order to ascertain
from, and accord to, the statute the
meaning and purpose which the
legislature intended for it.
In Manchester Ship Canal
Co. v. Manchester Racecourse
Co. [(1900) 2 Ch 352 : 69 LJCh 850
: 83 LT 274 (CA)] Farwell, J. said :
(pp. 360-61)
‘Unless the words were so
absolutely senseless that I
could do nothing at all with
them, I should be bound to
58
find some meaning and not to
declare them void for
uncertainty.’
119 . In Fawcett Properties
Ltd. v. Buckingham County
Council [(1960) 3 All ER 503 : (1960)
3 WLR 831 (HL)] Lord Denning
approving the dictum of Farwell, J.
said : (All ER p. 516)
‘But when a statute has some
meaning, even though it is
obscure, or several meanings,
even though there is little to
choose between them, the
courts have to say what
meaning the statute is to bear,
rather than reject it as a
nullity.’
120 . It is, therefore, the court's duty
to make what it can of the statute,
knowing that the statutes are meant
to be operative and not inept and
that nothing short of impossibility
should allow a court to declare a
statute unworkable.
In Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 95
LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] Lord
Dunedin said : (AC p. 52)
‘A statute is designed to be workable, and the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to
secure that object, unless crucial omission or
clear direction makes that end unattainable.’ ”
26. The courts will therefore reject that
construction which will defeat the plain
intention of the legislature even though there
may be some inexactitude in the language
used. [See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC
627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] (AC at p.
634).] Reducing the legislation futility shall be
avoided and in a case where the intention of
59
the legislature cannot be given effect to, the
courts would accept the bolder construction
for the purpose of bringing about an effective
result. ……”
76. A perusal of the aforesaid observations would reveal
that this Court held that, even in relation to a penal statute,
any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction
may not always be given direct effect and the interpretation
has to be preferred with regard to the subject matter of the
offence and the object of law it seeks to achieve. The
interpretation that defeats the plain intention of the
legislature, even though there may be some inexactitude in
the language used, will have to be rejected. It has been held
that the golden construction for the purpose of bringing out
an effective result will have to be accepted.
77. In the case of Standard Chartered Bank and
15
Others v. Directorate of Enforcement and Others , it was
contended before the Constitution Bench of this Court that
no criminal proceedings can be initiated against the
Company under Section 56(1) of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA), 1973 since under the FERA Act, the
15
(2005) 4 SCC 530
60
minimum punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than six months with fine. The
argument on behalf of the appellant therein that the penal
provision of the statute is required to be construed strictly,
was considered in the majority view as under:
“ 23. The counsel for the appellant contended
that the penal provision in the statute is to be
strictly construed. Reference was made
to Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay [(1955)
1 SCR 158 : 1954 Cri LJ 1333] , SCR at p. 164
and Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3
SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279] . It is true that
all penal statutes are to be strictly construed
in the sense that the court must see that the
thing charged as an offence is within the plain
meaning of the words used and must not
strain the words on any notion that there has
been a slip that the thing is so clearly within
the mischief that it must have been intended
to be included and would have been included if
thought of. All penal provisions like all
other statutes are to be fairly construed
according to the legislative intent as
expressed in the enactment. Here, the
legislative intent to prosecute corporate bodies
for the offence committed by them is clear and
explicit and the statute never intended to
exonerate them from being prosecuted. It is
sheer violence to common sense that the
legislature intended to punish the corporate
bodies for minor and silly offences and
extended immunity of prosecution to major
and grave economic crimes.
24. The distinction between a strict
construction and a more free one has
disappeared in modern times and now mostly
the question is “what is true construction of
61
the statute?” A passage in Craies on Statute
Law , 7th Edn. reads to the following effect:
“The distinction between a strict and
a liberal construction has almost
disappeared with regard to all
classes of statutes, so that all
statutes, whether penal or not, are
now construed by substantially the
same rules. ‘All modern Acts are
framed with regard to equitable as
well as legal principles.’ ‘A hundred
years ago,’ said the court in Lyons'
case [ Lyons v. Lyons , 1858 Bell CC
38 : 169 ER 1158] , ‘statutes were
required to be perfectly precise and
resort was not had to a reasonable
construction of the Act, and thereby
criminals were often allowed to
escape. This is not the present mode
of construing Acts of Parliament.
They are construed now with
reference to the true meaning and
real intention of the legislature.”
At p. 532 of the same book, observations of
Sedgwick are quoted as under:
“The more correct version of the
doctrine appears to be that statutes
of this class are to be fairly
construed and faithfully applied
according to the intent of the
legislature, without unwarrantable
severity on the one hand or
unjustifiable lenity on the other, in
cases of doubt the courts inclining
to mercy.”
25. The question, therefore, is what is the
intention of the legislature. It is an undisputed
fact that for all the statutory offences,
company also could be prosecuted as the
“person” defined in these Acts includes
62
“company, or corporation or other incorporated
body”.”
[emphasis supplied]
78. It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has
reiterated that penal provisions like all other provisions of
other statutes are to be construed according to the legislative
intent as expressed in the enactment.
79. Recently, a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the
case of Hira Singh and Another v. Union of India and
16
Another , while answering a reference with regard to the
correctness of the view taken by this Court in the case of E.
17
Micheal Raj v. Narcotics Control Bureau , to the effect
that, when any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance is
found mixed with one or more neutral substance for the
purpose of imposition of punishment, it is the content of
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance which would be
taken into consideration, the Court held thus:
“ 10.1. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak
Mahajan [ Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak
Mahajan , (1994) 3 SCC 440 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
785] , it is observed by this Court that every
law is designed to further ends of justice but
not to frustrate on the mere technicalities. It is
16
(2020) 20 SCC 272
17
(2008) 5 SCC 161
63
further observed that though the intention of
the Court is only to expound the law and not
to legislate, nonetheless the legislature cannot
be asked to sit to resolve the difficulties in the
implementation of its intention and the spirit
of the law. It is the duty of the Court to mould
or creatively interpret the legislation by
liberally interpreting the statute. In the said
decision this Court has also quoted (at SCC
pp. 453-54, para 25) the following passage
in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes , 10th
Edn. p. 229:
“ 25 . … ‘Where the language of a
statute, in its ordinary meaning and
grammatical construction, leads to a
manifest contradiction of the
apparent purpose of the enactment,
or to some inconvenience or
absurdity, hardship or injustice,
presumably not intended, a
construction may be put upon it
which modifies the meaning of the
words, and even the structure of the
sentence. … Where the main object
and intention of a statute are clear,
it must not be reduced to a nullity
by the draftsman's unskilfulness or
ignorance of the law, except in a
case of necessity, or the absolute
intractability of the language used.’ ”
Thereafter, it is further observed that to
winch up the legislative intent, it is
permissible for courts to take into account
the ostensible purpose and object and the
real legislative intent. Otherwise, a bare
mechanical interpretation of the words
and application of the legislative intent
devoid of concept of purpose and object
will render the legislature inane. It is
further observed that in given
circumstances, it is permissible for courts
64
to have functional approaches and look
into the legislative intention and
sometimes it may be even necessary to go
behind the words and enactment and take
other factors into consideration to give
effect to the legislative intention and to
the purpose and spirit of the enactment so
that no absurdity or practical
inconvenience may result and the
legislative exercise and its scope and
object may not become futile .”
[emphasis supplied]
80. It could thus be seen that it is more than a settled
principle of law that, while interpreting the provisions of the
statute, the court has to prefer an interpretation which
advances the purpose of the statute.
Conclusion:
81. As already discussed hereinabove, since many
deficiencies were found in the earlier enactments and the
provisions therein were not found sufficient to deal with the
problems of drug trafficking, it was found necessary to enact
a new law since after passing of the earlier three Acts, there
were tremendous developments on an international platform
and a vast body of international law in the field of narcotics
control had evolved through various international treaties
and protocols. The Government of India had been a party to
65
these treaties and conventions which entailed several
obligations which were not covered or were only partly
covered under the old Acts. It was further noticed that the
scheme of the earlier Acts was not a sufficient deterrent to
meet the challenge of well-organized gangs of smugglers. It
was further noticed that the penalty provided under the old
Acts was inadequate. Taking into consideration that the
country had, for the last many years, been increasingly faced
with the problem of trafficking of drugs, which had posed
serious problems to governments at the State and Centre, it
was found necessary to enact a comprehensive law. It is thus
clear that the dominant purpose of the new enactment was to
curb the menace of trafficking of drugs and psychotropic
substances. Therefore, the interpretation which advances
the purpose of the Act has to be preferred rather than
adopting a pedantic and a mechanical approach.
82. As already discussed hereinabove, it was well
recognized under the earlier enactments, International
Conventions and scientific studies that ‘papaver somniferum
L’ plant was the main source for the production of ‘opium’.
The 1878 Act so also the 1930 Act had recognized this
66
position. In the International Conventions also, this was
recognized. Though for the first time in the 1953 Protocol, in
addition to “papaver somniferum L’, any other species of
‘papaver’, which may be used for the production of ‘opium’
was included in the definition of ‘opium’, the subsequent
conventions of 1961 and 1988 again defined ‘opium poppy’
as a plant of ‘papaver somniferum L’. The scientific study
conducted at the national as well as the global level
establishes that ‘papaver somniferum L’ consists of
‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’. If the construction as adopted
in the impugned judgment is to be accepted, then, even if it
is found that the Chemical Examiner’s report establishes
that the contraband article contains ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic
acid’, a person cannot be convicted unless it is further
established that the contraband material has a genesis in
‘papaver somniferum L’.
83. Shri Kapil Sharma, Chemical Examiner was present
in the Court. He reiterated that the ‘morphine test’ and the
‘meconic test’ are the only two tests available worldwide to
establish that the contraband material is derived from
‘papaver somniferum L’. As already discussed hereinabove,
67
prior to enactment of the 1985 Act, it was only the plant
‘papaver somniferum L’ which was included in the definition
of 1878 and 1930 enactments. By virtue of sub-clause (a) of
Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of the 1985 Act, the same has been
retained. However, noticing that there was some material to
show that some other species of ‘papaver’ may also be used
for the production of ‘opium’, the legislature, by an abundant
precaution, also added sub-clause (b) in Clause (xvii) of
Section 2 of the 1985 Act so as to enable the Central
Government to notify such a species from which ‘opium’ or
any ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ can be extracted. The legislative
intent is clear that the 1985 Act, in addition to retaining the
species of ‘papaver somniferum L’ in the definition of ‘opium
poppy’, enabled the Central Government to include any other
species of ‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’ or any ‘phenanthrene
alkaloid’ could be extracted. This declaration has to be done
by a notification published in the official gazette. The
legislative intent is to bring any other species of ‘papaver’
which can be used for manufacture of ‘opium’ within the
prohibitory and regulatory provisions of the 1985 Act.
68
84. If the view as taken by the High Court is to be
accepted, a person who has been found contravening the
provisions of the 1985 Act and dealing with a contraband
material which has been found in the Chemical Examiner’s
report to contain ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic acid’, would escape
the stringent provisions of the 1985 Act. The said could
never have been the intention of the legislature. In our view,
if the view as taken by the High Court is to be accepted, the
same would frustrate the object of the Act and defeat its very
purpose.
85. In light of the view that we have taken, we do not
find it necessary to refer to other judgments of the Gujarat
High Court as well as the Himachal Pradesh High Court.
86. Insofar as the reliance placed by the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh on the judgment of this Court in the case
of Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot (supra) is concerned, the
only question for consideration before this Court was, as to
whether the High Court was justified in taking the total
quantity of the offending substances recovered from the two
accused jointly and holding that the said quantity was more
69
than the commercial quantity, warranting punishment under
Section 21(c) of the 1985 Act. In the said case, the opinion
given by the FSL was that it was ‘opium’ as described in the
1985 Act. The court from the evidence found that the
substance recovered from the appellant therein had 2.8%
anhydride morphine. The court therefore held that it would
amount to ‘opium derivative’ within the meaning of Section
2(xvi)(e) of the 1985 Act. It was therefore held that, what was
recovered from the appellant therein was ‘manufactured
drug’ within the meaning of Section 2(xi) of the 1985 Act.
The Court therefore held that the offence proved against the
appellant therein clearly fell within Section 21 of the 1985
Act for illicit possession of a ‘manufactured drug’. We fail to
understand as to how the said judgment could be said to be
a proposition for holding that, unless the Chemical
Examiner’s report establishes that the contraband material
was derived from the species of ‘papaver somniferum L’,
conviction under Section 15 of the 1985 Act would not be
tenable.
87. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of
Baidyanath Mishra (supra), to which a reference has been
70
made by Shri Parameshwar, is concerned, this Court, in the
Harjit Singh
case of (supra), has itself held that the said
case was decided under the Opium Act and not under the
1985 Act. It has been held that the chemical analysis of the
contraband material is essential to prove a case against the
accused under the 1985 Act.
88. We are therefore of the considered view that the High
Court was not justified in holding that, even after the
Chemical Examiner’s report establishes that the contraband
contains ‘meconic acid’ and ‘morphine’, unless it was
established that the same was derived from the species of
‘papaver somniferum L’, conviction under Section 15 of the
1985 Act could not be sustained.
89. As already discussed hereinabove, once it is
established that the seized material contains ‘meconic acid’
and ‘morphine’, it will be sufficient to establish that it is
derived from the plant ‘papaver somniferum L’ as defined in
sub-clause (a) of Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of the 1985 Act.
90. We further find that the High Court was also not
justified in observing that the Chemical Examiner’s report, in
71
the alternative, should establish that the seized material is a
part of any other species of ‘papaver’ from which ‘opium’ or
any ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ could be extracted and which
has been notified by the Central Government as ‘opium’ for
the purpose of the 1985 Act. We fail to understand as to how
a Chemical Examiner could be asked whether the seized
material was a part of any other species of ‘papaver’ from
which ‘opium’ or any other ‘phenanthrene alkaloid’ could be
extracted when there is no such species of ‘papaver’ which
has been notified by the Central Government to be ‘opium
poppy’ for the purpose of the 1985 Act.
91. In the result, we hold that, once a Chemical
Examiner establishes that the seized ‘poppy straw’ indicates
a positive test for the contents of ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic
acid’, it is sufficient to establish that it is covered by sub-
clause (a) of Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of the 1985 Act and no
further test would be necessary for establishing that the
seized material is a part of ‘papaver somniferum L’. In other
words, once it is established that the seized ‘poppy straw’
tests positive for the contents of ‘morphine’ and ‘meconic
acid’, no other test would be necessary for bringing home the
72
guilt of the accused under the provisions of Section 15 of the
1985 Act.
92. Before we part with the judgment, we must place on
record that Shri Parameshwar, learned amicus curiae and
Shri Mukerji, learned AAG have taken great pains in
researching various scientific study as well as the relevant
material at the national and international level. We place on
record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance
rendered by both Shri Parameshwar and Shri Mukerji. We
must also place on record that Shri Parameshwar has ably
placed before us both the sides of the present issue, one from
the perspective of the accused and the other from the
perspective of the prosecution.
93. Insofar as the present appeal is concerned, since the
appeal is allowed by the High Court only on the aforesaid
ground without considering any other material, we remand
the matter to the High Court for consideration afresh in
accordance with what has been held by us hereinabove.
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94. Mr. Neeraj Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent(s) submits that since the judgment and order
of the High Court has been set aside, the respondent(s)-
accused would be required to surrender.
95. We suspend the sentence till the matter is decided
on merits by the High Court.
96. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
97. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of
in the above terms. No order as to costs.
…..….......................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
…….......................J.
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 20, 2022.
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