Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2958 of 2008
PETITIONER:
Afaq Husain
RESPONDENT:
UPSRTC & Anr
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/04/2008
BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
REPORTABLE
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2958 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.1972 of 2004)
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant was appointed as a Conductor on an ad hoc basis as a daily
wager. He used to be appointed on a need basis. On or about 1.1.1976, he
was appointed for a period of three months, i.e., up to 31.3.1976, inter alia,
on the premise that if his services were no longer required, the same could
be terminated. Allegedly, he was paid one month’s notice pay before his
services were terminated.
An industrial dispute was raised by him in the year 1982 questioning
the validity of the said order of termination. The said industrial dispute was
referred to by the State for adjudication by the Labour Court, Allahabad.
Respondent herein in its written statement contended :
"That Shri Afaq Hussain has been appointed
temporarily in the U.P. State Road Transport
Corporation on 2.1.1976. It was among the terms
of his appointment that his service may be
terminated without assigning any reasons by
giving one month’s notice. Shri Afaq Hussain has
started working in the U.P. State Road Transport
Corporation by binding himself with the terms of
his appointment.
That shri Afaq Hussain has worked contrary to the
rules of the department and the employers have
lost their confidence in Shri Afaq Hussain.
Therefore, by order dated 24.2.76, his services
have been terminated by giving him one month’s
salary in lieu of one month’s notice. He has no
right to raise any dispute."
3. Before the Labour Court, the respondent examined one witness, Shri
K. Bal, who admitted that no amount towards compensation for
retrenchment as required under the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act) had been paid.
4. Appellant also examined himself as a witness. He, however, accepted
that he had been given one month’s notice pay.
According to him, no offer of appointment was issued. He
furthermore admitted that he had been given duty on a need basis only.
The learned Labour Court, however, on the premise that the appellant
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had worked continuously from July 1972 to 24.2.1976, held that the
provision of Section 6N of the Act had not been complied with and
consequently directed his reinstatement with back wages. His services were
directed to be treated as uninterrupted. Appellant was reinstated in service
pursuant to the said award.
5. Respondent, however, filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High
Court questioning the validity of the said award.
By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ petition of the
respondent was allowed by the High Court, opining :
"As already stated above, since the termination
have taken place in the year 1976, the matter has
been referred to the Labour Court in the year 1982
and the Labour Court has given the award in the
year 1984, I do not think it expedient in the interest
of justice that the matter now should be remanded
back to the Labour Court.
It is not disputed as held by the labour court,
that the workman concerned was a temporary
hand. It is also not disputed, nor a finding has
held, been recorded to the contrary by the Labour
Court that the workman concerned has become a
workman on whose employers have lost their
confidence. In this view of the matter, the award
of the labour Court requires to be upheld except
after modification that the workman concerned
shall not be entitled for any back wages,
particularly in view of the recent pronouncement
by the apex Court, wherein the apex Court tries to
make the distinction between the regular
employees and the daily wagers, which says that
the daily wagers were entitled to minimum wages
but not the full wages, like the regular staff, as the
daily wagers could not be held to hold the post. In
this view of the matter, except for what has already
been paid under the modified interim order by this
Court, the workman concerned shall not be entitled
for any back wages and so far as the reinstatement
is concerned, since the employers have lost their
confidence against the workman concerned, the
employers are hereby directed to pay a sum of
Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) only, apart
from as already been paid under the interim order
as compensation in lieu of the reinstatement."
6. Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, would submit that the High Court committed a manifest error
in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into
consideration that except raising the said plea in the written statement, the
respondent could not establish its plea of purported loss of confidence. It
was furthermore urged that the appellant, having been reinstated in service
pursuant to the award, the High Court committed a serious error insofar as it
failed to take into consideration the fact that he had been working for a
period of 18 years and only after the impugned judgment the services of the
appellant had been terminated. In any event, the High Court should not have
quantified the amount of compensation at Rs.50,000/- only in termining the
question as the principles for grant of compensation had not been taken into
consideration.
7. Ms. Garima Prashad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-Corporation, on the other hand, would submit :
(i) Labour Court has committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis
that the appellant has been working for a long time as he was
appointed only for a limited period in January 1976.
(ii) As one month’s salary has been paid to him, the requirements of
Section 6N of the Act stood satisfied.
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(iii) In view of the delay in raising the industrial dispute on the part of the
appellant, the respondent was not in a position to produce the relevant
documents and, thus, was gravely prejudiced.
(iv) In any event, the award of reinstatement in service was wholly
unwarranted.
8. Appellant was appointed as a Conductor from time to time. The
Labour Court, in its award, proceeded on the basis that he had been working
continuously from 1972 to 1976. It failed to notice the admission of the
appellant that his appointment used to be a need based one. The Labour
Court did not arrive at a finding of fact that periodical appointment and
termination of the services of the appellant was either mala fide or the same
was being resorted to by way of unfair labour practice so as to deprive the
workman from obtaining his legal dues.
9. If the contention of the respondent that the appellant was appointed on
2.1.1976 for a period of three months only and he had been given one
month’s notice before terminating his services, in our opinion, the labour
court was wholly incorrect in awarding his reinstatement with back wages
and continuity of service.
Section 6N of the Act reads thus :
"6-N.Conditions precedent to retrenchment of
workmen.\027No workman employed in any
industry who has been in continuous service for
not less than one year under an employer shall be
retrenched by that employer until\027
(a) the workman has been given one month’s
notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has
expired or the workman has been paid in
lieu of such notice wages for the period of
notice :
Provided that no such notice shall be
necessary if the retrenchment is under an
agreement which specifies a date for the
termination of service;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of
retrenchment, compensation which shall be
equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for
every completed year of service or any part
thereof in excess of six months, and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on
the State Government."
The pre-condition for applicability of the said provision is working for
a continuous period of not less than one year.
10. It was contended by the respondent in its written statement that there
was a specified date for termination of service. The question as to whether
the appellant had been continuing to work for a period of one year has not
been determined by the Labour Court.
Only when the services of an employee continues for a period of more
than one year, apart from the notice pay, he becomes entitled to be paid
compensation equivalent to 15 days’ wage for every completed year of
service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
11. The award of the Labour Court that he should be reinstated in service
cannot, therefore, be upheld, particularly in view of the fact that the
respondent-Corporation, being a ’State’ within the meaning Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, was obligated to follow the constitutional
requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as also the
recruitment rules, if any, framed by it. The appointment of the appellant did
not satisfy the constitutional requirements. He was not and could not have
been appointed on substantive basis
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12. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court to pass an award of reinstatement
is not disputed but the same would not mean that a workman would be
directed to be reinstated in service without taking all relevant factors into
consideration. This Court, times without number, has laid down that some
factors as indicated play significant role.
13. It is true that the High Court was not correct in relying upon an
unproved statement made in the written statement. Pleadings are not proof.
The witness examined on behalf of the respondent did not disclose as to
which rule was violated by the appellant or why he had lost the confidence
of his the Management. Such a contention was required to be established by
adduction of proper evidence.
13. Mr. Dwivedi, however, is not correct in contending that the
respondent cannot raise before us any point other than the loss of
confidence. Respondent, in our opinion, having regard to the principles akin
to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is
entitled to support the judgment on the basis of the materials on record.
{See Swedish Match AB and Anr. v. Securities and Exchange Board, India
& Anr. [(2004) 11 SCC 641 and UCO Bank & Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor
[(2007) 6 SCC 694].}
Before the High Court, it had raised a large number of contentions.
The High Court, however, thought that only if a few contentions were
determined, the same would subserve the ends of justice.
Respondent need not question the judgment of the High Court that the
appellant is entitled to payment of compensation for a sum of Rs.50,000/-
but it can certainly contend that having regard to the materials on record, he
would be entitled only thereto and not an order of reinstatement of service
and/or continuity of service only on the ground that the award of the Labour
Court was implemented.
Reliance has been placed by Mr. Dwivedi on Workmen of Bharat
Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. & Anr. [AIR 1990 SC
1054]. Therein six months’ wages for loss of future employment had been
awarded keeping in view the fact that the workmen were skilled and they
might not find it difficult to get alternate employment.
Appellant has not disclosed as to what was his salary and a sum of
Rs.50,00/-, in our opinion, would be more than his six months’ wages.
14. In Ram Piari v. Bhagwant & Ors. [AIR 1990 SC 1742], this Court,
having regard to the fact that the workman was entitled to back wages from
1975 to 1985, was of the opinion that a portion of the back wages should be
paid to the employee by way of compensation which was assessed at
Rs.2,50,000/-.
15. In this case, Appellant was appointed for a limited period, namely,
three months. We will assume that the requirements of Section 6N of the
Act had not been complied with. Even then, in our opinion, the appellant
has been awarded a just compensation, particularly, in view of the fact that
he, without any right, worked in the Corporation for a period of 18 years.
16. The question that he had been put back in service in terms of the
award by itself was not a ground which stood in the way of the High Court
in declining a relief to him to which he was not otherwise entitled to.
17. In the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the appellant was
not even entitled to any compensation as envisaged under Section 6N of the
Act, particularly, as he was appointed for a period three months only. His
services had been terminated on the expiry of the fixed period. Furthermore
he has raised the industrial dispute after a long time.
19. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal. It is
dismissed accordingly. No costs.