Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3108 of 1983
PETITIONER:
BHANU PRAKASH SINGH AND ORS.
RESPONDENT:
HARYANA AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/08/1994
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY & S.C. AGRAWAL
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
1994 SUPPL. (2) SCR 712
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
The 28 appellants while working as Lecturers in Haryana Agriculture
University were selected to undergo Ph.D. Course in the year 1978. They
joined in July and November, 1978. They were permitted as in-service
candidates to undergo the course according to the leave of the Kind due to
them. They pursued the course of study upto 1980-81. They were not paid the
leave salary and that, therefore, they filed the Civil Writ petition no.
702 of 1980. The Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana by
its order dated May 10, 1992 dismissed the writ petition holding that
during the relevant period due to financial stringency the University had
prohibited the in-service candidates to pursue their course of study and
they are not in a position to pay the full pay etc. to them. Thereafter,
the said conditions was withdrawn on January 10, 1979. Since the appellants
had joined during the period of prohibition, they are not eligible to get
their full pay except in accordance with the leave of the kind due to them.
2. Shri Govind Mukhoty, the learned senior counsel for the appellants had
contended that statute 21(3) of the Haryana & Punjab Agriculture University
Act, 1970 Act No. 16 of 1970 entitles the in-service candidates who have
been granted admission to undergo higher course of study in a specialised
subject full pay and allowances on admission into the course. Under section
16(11) the salary and allowances payable to the teacher cannot be
determined and with held by the Vice Chancellor except With the approval of
the Board. Since no such approval was given, the prohibition made by the
Vice Chancellor is without authority of law. By operation of Statute 21(3),
they are entitled to full pay and allowances. It is also further contended
that after the prohibition from January 10, 1979, the University had paid
full pay to the teachers permitted to undergo the Ph.D. Course. Non payment
to the appellants constitute discrimination offending Art. 14. We find no
force in the contention.
3. It is true that the appellants have been permitted to undergo Ph.D.
Coarse as in-service candidates during the relevant period. The Vice
Chancellor in his proceedings dated October 27, 1972 had stated that the
director of research informed the Vice Chancellor that there are financial
stringency for admission of the teacher to Ph.D. programme and that,
therefore, he requested not to recommend the candidates to undergo the
Ph.D. Course. The Vice Chancellor accepting the recommendation has ordered,
"Deans/directors should please made sure that no in-service can-didates are
recommended for admission to Ph.D. in any subject during the current year."
It would appear that the same prohibition continue upto January 10,1979,
the date of which the prohibition was lifted as indicated hereinbefore. It
is seen that the order which was produced before the High Court and marked
as annexure 1 permitting them to undergo the course of study clearly
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mentioned that they ate entitled to the leave of the kind due them. When
the appellants were permitted to undergo the course of study subject to the
condition, then they cannot have any right higher than what were permitted
to avail of. It is not in dispute that by virtue thereof, they are not
eligible to draw the salary and full allowances during the period from
1978-79 upto 1980-81 during which period they have undergone the course of
study. It is also stated in the counter affidavit filed in this Court that
after the relieving of the appellants to undergo the course of study, they
have employed new teachers in place of the appellants. No doubt, the
appellants sought to explain that some of the teachers appointed had not
worked during the full course or worked only a partial time as indicated in
the rejoinder affidavit. But since the appellants have come forward only in
the rejoinder affidavit, the State had no opportunity to controvert it. It
is clear that the appellants having gone to the course of study for the
relevant period according to the leave of the kind due to them, they cannot
have higher right then what was permitted to avail of.
4. It is true that the Statute 21(3) provides the eligibility to seek
admission and on making such an admission they became eligible for full
salary and allowances but it would be subject to the conditions that may be
imposed by the University. Statute 16(11) is inapplicable to the facts in
this case. There in it would appear that in fixation or determination of
the salary and allowances, the Vice Chancellor has to discharge that
function with the approval of the Board. That would be relatable to the
initial fixation of the pay and allowances but it has not relation to the
payment of full salary and allowances when the teachers were admitted to
undergo the course of Ph.D. and that, therefore, the Statute 16(11) is
inapplicable.
5. Art. 14 also has no application to the facts in this case. It is seen
that after the lifting of the prohibition on January 10, 1979, teachers
sent thereafter were paid full salary and allowances. It is true that few
teachers who were found to be ineligible and were selected along with the
appellants but were not admitted to the course of study in the later year
had been paid the full salary and allowances. It is not the case of the
appellants that any one of the teachers though were prohibited to draw the
full salary and allowances except in accordance with the leave of the kind
due to them, were made payment of the full salary and allowances. They are
not entitled to salary and allowances though other teachers after lifting
the prohibition were permitted to undergo the course of study with full pay
and allowances. Under these circumstances, there is not invidious
discrimination or arbitrary or unjust action violating equality enshrined
in Art. 14.
6. The appeal is accordingly dismissed without costs.