Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ODURU CHENCHULAKSHMAMMA AND ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DUVVURU SUBRAMANYA REDDY
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/10/1979
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION:
1980 AIR 133 1980 SCR (1)1006
1980 SCC (3) 130
CITATOR INFO :
F 1984 SC1726 (7)
D 1986 SC 794 (15)
ACT:
Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act, 1948-Scope of section 56 of the Act-Determination of
dispute between the rival claimants to ryotwari patta-Civil
Court jurisdiction is barred.
HEADNOTE:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 53 of the Andhra
State Act, 1953, the district of Chittoor was made part of
Andhra State but continued to be governed by all the laws
which were in force in the State of Madras immediately
before the 1st of October 1953. One P. K. Reddy, Challamma,
sister’s daughter of the respondent-plaintiff and her son
Srinivasalu Reddy were the owners of the land in dispute
which are situated in Chittoor district. Some of the lands
were sold by Challamma and Srinivasalu Reddy and the rest by
P. K. Reddy and Srinivasalu Reddy by means of two sale deeds
dated the 25th September 1947 (Exhibits A-8 and A-9
respectively) in favour of Pocha Subba Reddy who was
Challamma’s brother and maternal uncle of Srinivasalu Reddy.
Although both the sale deeds were supported by valid
consideration, possession was not delivered to the vendee
under either of them and continued to be with Challamma.
Consequent upon the promulgation of the Madras Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, a
dispute arose between Challamma and Pocha Subba Reddy as to
who of them was entitled to the patta under the Act in
respect of the lands covered by Exhibits A-8 and A-9. The
Additional Assistant Settlement Officer resolved the dispute
by means of an order dated 14th September 1957 holding that
Challamma was entitled to the patta on the ground that she
had throughout been in possession of the lands in question
to the exclusion of Pocha Subba Reddy. On the same date
Pocha Subba Reddy sold the lands in dispute by means of a
registered sale deed (Exhibit A-7) to Subramanya Reddy who
was the maternal uncle of both Challamma and Pocha Subba
Reddy and in the year 1960; Subramanya Reddy filed a suit
(O.S. 169/60) claiming declaration of title thereto and
possession thereof. The Trial Court declared the suit over-
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ruling the objection that the Civil Court had no
jurisdiction to set aside the decision of the Settlement
Officer under the 1948 Madras Act. The Additional District
Judge of Chittoor, in appeal by the legal representatives of
Challamma and Srinivasalu Reddy (who had died during the
pendency of the suit) reversed the decree of the Trial Court
and dismissed the suit, holding that the rights of the
plaintiff under Ex. A-7 were dislodged by the grant of a
patta to Challamma.
In second appeal, the High Court was of the view that
it was competent to a Civil Court to adjudicate upon the
title of the parties notwithstanding the grant of a patta
under the Act to one of them, accepted the appeal and
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granted the plaintiff the relief claimed by him. Hence the
appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
^
HELD : 1. Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain a suit by reason of the provisions of section 56
of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act 1948. The order of the Additional Settlement
Officer dated the 14th September 1957 is final and no liable
to be questioned in any court of law in so far as the
dispute between the rival claimants to the ryotwari patta is
concerned. [1015 D-E]
2. Sub-section 2 of the Section 56 of the 1948 Madras
Act categorically declares that the decision of the Tribunal
deciding the appeal shall be final and not liable to be
questioned in any court of law, in so far as it relates to
any of the matters covered by sub-section (1). It goes
without saying that if no appeal is filed, a similar
finality shall attach to the decision of the Settlement
Officer. One of such matters is covered by clause (c) of
subsection (1) and embraces the determination of the
question as to who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding
is. Questions which a Settlement Officer may be called upon
to decide under the said clause (c) would certainly include
such as may have resulted from a dispute between two or more
persons as to who of them is the lawful ryot; and once a
dispute of that type has been adjudicated upon by the
Settlement Officer, his decision becomes final unless an
appeal is filed before the Tribunal, in which event it is
the decision of the Tribunal to which finality attaches. In
either case the decision is not liable to be questioned in
any Court of law. [1013 B-E]
Muddada Chayanna v. Karnam Narayana & Anr. [1979] 3
S.C.R. 201, followed.
3. Section 56 was a part of the 1948 Madras Act on the
1st of October 1953, and by virtue of Section 53 of the
Andhra State Act, it continues to be so in so far as its
application to the district of Chittoor in Andhra Pradesh is
concerned, the repeal of that section by the Madras
Legislature being wholly ineffective in relation to the
territories forming part of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
[1015 A-B]
Krishnaveni Thevar v. Perumal Konar, [1961] 1 MLJ 168,
A.R. Sanjeevi Naicker v. P.M. Shanmugham Udayar, [1965] 2
MLJ 204, Pinninty Peda Govindayya v. Pinninty Subbarao
[1969] II And. Weekly Report (NORC) p. 1; distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2136 of
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1969.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 24-1-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S.A. No.
552/66.
P. Govindan Nair, V.V. Rao and G.N. Rao for the
Appellants.
A.V. Nair for the Respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KOSHAL, J.-The facts giving rise to this appeal by
special leave are concluded by concurrent findings of fact
arrived at by the trial court and the first appellate court
and may be briefly stated here with reference to the
following pedigree-table:
Krishna Reddy
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_______________________________________
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Subramanyam Reddy Daughter(name not Venkatarama
(plaintiff) Known) Reddy
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___________________________________
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Pocha Subba Reddy Krishna Challamma
(defendant No. 6) Reddy = (defendent
No. 1)
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Srinivasan Reddy
(defendant no.2)
Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and one P.K. Reddy were the owners
of the lands in dispute which are situated in village
Makhamambavilasam forming part of Chittoor district. Some of
the lands were sold by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and the rest
by P.K. Reddy and defendant No. 2 by means of two sale deeds
dated the 25th of September, 1947 (exhibits A-8 and A-9
respectively) in favour of defendant No. 6 who was the
brother of defendant No. 1 and therefore the maternal uncle
of defendant No. 2. Although both the sale deeds were
supported by valid consideration, possession was not
delivered to the vendee under either of them and continued
to be with defendant No. 1.
In 1948 was promulgated the Madras Estates (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (hereinafter called the
’Madras Act’) section 3 of which reads thus:
"3. With effect on and from the notified date and
save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act-
(a) the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent)
Act, 1947 (Madras Act XXX of 1947) in so far as it
relates to matters other than the reduction of rents
and the collection of arrears of rent and the Madras
Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802 (Madras
Regulation XXV of 1802), the Madras Estates Land Act,
1908 (Madras Act 1 of 1908),
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and all other enactments applicable to the estate as
such shall be deemed to have been repealed in their
application to the estate;
(b) the entire estate (including all communal
lands; porambokes; other non-ryoti lands; waste lands;
pasture lands, lanka lands, forests; mines and
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minerals; quarries; rivers and streams; tanks and
irrigation works; fisheries and ferries), shall stand
transferred to the Government and vest in them, free of
all encumbrances and the Madras Revenue Recovery Act,
1864, the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865, and all
other enactments applicable to ryotwari areas shall
apply to the estate;
(c) all rights and interests created in or over
the estate before the notified date by the principal or
any other landholder, shall as against the Government
cease and determine;
(d) the Government may, after removing any
obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take
possession of the estate, and all accounts, registers,
pattas, muchilikas, maps, plans and other documents
relating to the estate which the Government may require
for the administration thereof;
Provided that the Government shall not dispossess
any person of any land in the estate in respect of
which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to
a ryotwari patta-
(i) if such person is a ryot, pending the
decision of the Settlement Officer as to
whether he is actually entitled to such
patta;
(ii) if such person is a landholder, pending the
decision of the Settlement Officer and the
Tribunal on appeal, if any, to it, as to
whether he is actually entitled to such
patta;
(e) the principal or any other landholder and any
other person, whose rights stand transferred under
clause (b) or cease and determine under clause (c),
shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as
are recognized or conferred on him by or under this
Act;
(f) the relationship of landholder and ryot,
shall, as between them, be extinguished;
(g) any rights and privileges which may have
accrued in the estate, to any person before the
notified date, against
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the principal or any other landholder thereof, shall
cease and determine, and shall not be enforceable
against the Government or such landholder, and every
such person shall be entitled only to such rights and
privileges as are recognized or conferred on him by or
under this Act."
The term ’estate’ is defined in clause (3) of section 2
of the Madras Act as meaning a zamindari or an under-tenure
or an inam estate.
Section 11 declares that every ryot in an estate would
be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of all ryoti and
lanka lands in his occupation before the "notified" date
which meant, under clause (10) of section 2, the date
appointed by a notification issued by the Government.
Sections 12 to 15 deal with the determination of lands in
zamindari, inam and under-tenure estates in which the
landholder is declared to be entitled to a ryotwari patta.
On the 1st of October, 1953, came into being the State
of Andhra through an Act of Parliament known as the Andhra
State Act, by virtue of section 3 contained in Part II of
which the entire Chittoor District forming part of the State
of Madras prior to the said date was transferred, along with
other areas, to the State of Andhra. Section 53 of the Act
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last mentioned provided as follows:
"53. The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed
to have effected any change in the territories to which
any law in force immediately before the appointed day
extends or applies, and territorial references in any
such law to the State of Madras or of Mysore shall,
until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or
other competent authority, continue to have the same
meaning."
As a result of this provision the district of Chittoor
continued to be governed by all the laws, including the Act,
which were in force in the State of Madras immediately
before the 1st of October, 1953.
A dispute arose between defendant No. 1 and defendant
No. 6 as to who of them was entitled to a patta under the
Act in respect of the lands covered by exhibits A-8 and A-9.
The Additional Assistant Settlement Officer resolved the
dispute by means of an order dated the 14th of September,
1957 (exhibits B-3 and B-4) holding that defendant No. 1 was
entitled to the patta on the ground that she had throughout
been in possession of the lands in question to the exclusion
of defendant No. 6
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On the same date, i.e., 14th of September, 1957,
defendant No. 6 sold the lands in dispute by means of a
registered sale deed (exhibit A-7) to the plaintiff who was
his maternal uncle and who, about three years later, filed
the suit (suit No. 169 of 1960) which has given rise to this
appeal, against six persons, claiming declaration of title
to the said lands and possession thereof. Defendants Nos.
1 and 2 were alleged by the plaintiff to have taken
possession of part of the land while defendants Nos. 3 to 5
were accused of having trespassed into some other parts
thereof. No relief was claimed against defendant No. 6 and
the suit was based on sale-deed exhibits A-7, A-8 and A-9,
all three of which were claimed to be genuine documents
under which, it was pleaded by the plaintiff, possession had
passed to defendant No. 6 in the first instance and to
himself (the plaintiff) on the 14th of September, 1957.
Another plea taken was that the grant of the patta in favour
of defendant No. 1 under the order evidenced by exhibits B-3
and B-4 did not confer any title on her and was obtained
fraudulently on the basis of her ’unlawful possession’.
The trial court held that the sale deeds exhibits A-8
and A-9 were genuine but that the possession of the lands in
dispute had throughout remained with defendants Nos. 1 and
2. It was further of the opinion, however, that by virtue of
sale deed exhibit A-7 the plaintiff had become entitled to
the lands. The contention raised on behalf of defendant No.
1 that the civil courts could not take cognizance of the
suit in view of the provisions of the Act was overruled on
the strength of Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar wherein
it was held that a Settlement Officer had no jurisdiction
under the Act to adjudicate upon rival claims for the grant
of a patta and that such disputes fell within the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. The suit was found to be
within limitation and in view of the other findings above
detailed was decreed against defendants Nos. 7 and 8 who had
by then been substituted for defendants 1 and 2 as the
latter’s legal representatives, defendants Nos. 1 and 2
having died during the pendency of the suit. No relief was
granted against defendants 3 to 5 as they did not claim nor
were found to be in possession of any part of the lands in
dispute.
The learned Additional District Judge of Chittoor who
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decided the first appeal preferred by defendants Nos. 7 and
8 concurred with the findings of fact arrived at by the
trial court but reversed its decree and dismissed the suit
holding, on the authority of Guddiradu v. Murugappa Modali
that by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of the Act,
with effect from the notified date all rights in the lands
in dispute vested in
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the Government except those recognised under the Act as
vesting in others so that after the notified date the only
right which a landholder, under-tenure holder or a ryot
could claim was the right to obtain a patta. The rights of
the plaintiff under exhibit A-7 were thus held to have been
dislodged by the grant of a patta to defendant No. 1.
In second appeal the High Court observed that the only
question requiring determination by it was whether the
plaintiff, who was admittedly the owner of the property,
lost his right by reason of the patta having been granted to
defendant No. 1. It relied upon Krishnaswami Thevar’s case
and A. R. Sanjeevi Naicker v. P. M. Shanmuga Udayar in
support of its view that it was competent to a civil court
to adjudicate upon the title of the parties notwithstanding
the grant of a patta under the Act to one of hem. It was in
this view of the matter that the High Court accepted the
appeal before it and restored the decree of the trial court,
thus granting to the plaintiff the relief claimed by him;
and it is the judgment of the High Court which is challenged
before us by defendants Nos. 7 and 8.
2. The case was argued before us by learned counsel for
the contending parties on the assumption that it was
governed by the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra
Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Andhra Act’), the
provisions enacted by which, except for necessary changes,
were practically the same as those of the Madras Act. That
assumption, however, is not well-founded. As already pointed
out, Chittoor district (in which lie the lands in dispute)
continued to be governed by the provisions of the Madras Act
as they stood on the 1st of October, 1953, even after its
transfer to the State of Andhra, by reason of the mandate of
section 53 above extracted. After that date the Madras Act
could be amended or repealed by the Andhra Pradesh
legislature but till that was done, the district of Chittoor
would continue to be governed by the Madras Act in its
unamended form and as it stood on that date. We make it
clear, however, that the correction of the error on which
the assumption was based would not really make any
difference to the decision of the case inasmuch as the
relevant provisions of the Madras Act, as they stood on the
1st of October, 1953, are practically the same as the
corresponding provisions of the Andhra Act. Apart from
sections 3 and 11 to 15, it is section 56 of the Madras Act
which clinches the matter. It reads thus:
"56. (1) Where after an estate is notified, a
dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a
ryot for any
1013
fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is
in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any
holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the
Settlement Officer.
(2) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any
decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section
(1) may, within two months from the date of the
decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in
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its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its
decision shall be final and not be liable to be
questioned in any court of law."
Sub-section (2) of the section categorically declares
that the decision of the Tribunal deciding the appeal shall
be final and not liable to be questioned in any court of
law, in so far as it relates to any of the matters covered
by sub-section (1). It goes without saying that if no appeal
is filed, a similar finality shall attach to the decision of
the Settlement Officer. One of such matters is covered by
clause (c) of sub-section (1) and embraces the determination
of the question as to who the lawful ryot in respect of any
holding is. Questions which a Settlement Officer may be
called upon to decide under the said clause (c) would
certainly include such as may have resulted from a dispute
between two or more persons as to who of them is the lawful
ryot; and once a dispute of that type has been adjudicated
upon by the Settlement Officer, his decision becomes final
unless an appeal is filed before the Tribunal, in which
event it is the decision of the Tribunal to which finality
attaches. In either case the decision is not liable to be
called into question in any Court of law. We need not go
into further details on the question of interpretation of
section 56 of the Madras Act inasmuch as our view is fully
supported by another decision of this Court in Muddada
Chayanna v. Karnam Narayana and Another etc.. In that case
Chinnappa Reddy, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court
was concerned with the interpretation to be placed on
section 56 of the Andhra Act which repeats word for word the
contents of section 56 of the Madras Act. In holding that
the authorities mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 56
of the Andhra Act had exclusive jurisdiction to decide a
dispute between rival claimants for a ryotwari patta, this
Court approved the decision in T. Munuswami Naidu (died) and
Others v. R. Venkata Reddi and Others, in which the same
interpretation had been given to section 56 of the Andhra
Act as a result of an elaborate discussion. This Court
further held that Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopala-
1014
Krishnayya which was also decided by a Full Bench but had
been overruled by a larger Full Bench in Munuswami’s case
(supra) had been wrongly decided.
3. Faced with the above situation, learned counsel for
the plaintiffs sought support for a contrary view from the
two Madras cases on which reliance had been placed by the
High Court in the impugned judgment. We may state at once
that those cases are wholly irrelevant for deciding this
case and that the High Court erred in taking them into
consideration. In this connection all that need be stated is
that section 56 of the Madras Act was repealed by Madras Act
XXXIV of 1958 and both the Madras cases above mentioned were
decided after section 56 had ceased to be part of the Madras
Act. That those cases may well have been differently decided
if section 56 had continued to be part of the Madras Act was
recognized by Ramachandra Iyer, J., who decided Krishnaswami
Thevar’s case (supra) with the following observations :-
"The Abolition Act as originally enacted contained
section 56 which conferred in terms a power to decide
any dispute as to who the lawful ryot of a holding is.
Sub-section (2) provided for an appeal from such a
decision. If that provision were still to exist, it can
be said that as the question whether the person was the
lawful ryot or not was one to be decided by the
Settlement Officer, the issue of ryotwari patta by him
presumably after such decision could not be challenged
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in a civil court; to that extent there would be an
ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court. But
section 56(1) has been repealed by Act XXXIV of 1958.
There is now no machinery to decide the case of a
disputed claim to patta. Thus, if a ryot is entitled to
the ryoti land before the notification, he would by
virtue of that right be entitled to the grant of
ryotwari patta. There is nothing in the procedure to be
adopted for the grant of patta under section 11, to
justify an adjudication of title. Nor is there anything
in the nature of the patta itself to show that there
must have been an adjudication of title in favour of
the pattadar."
Krishnaswami Thevar’s case was followed in Sanjeevi
Naicker’s case which is again a Single Bench decision in
which Ramamurti, J., also made a reference to the repeal of
section 56 of the Madras Act by a later Madras enactment.
1015
4. In the above view of the matter no assistance can be
drawn by learned counsel for the plaintiff who has to meet
the challenge of the provisions of section 56 because that
section was a part of the Madras Act on the 1st of October,
1953, and continues to be so in so far as its application to
the district of Chittoor in Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the
repeal of that section by the Madras Legislature being
wholly ineffective in so far as territories forming part of
the State of Andhra are concerned.
The only other case to which reference was made by
learned counsel for the plaintiff was Pinninty Peda
Govindayya v. Pinninty Subbarao. That was a case in which
sections 3, 4, 7, 12 and 14 of the Andhra Inams (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 and rule 15 of the
rules framed thereunder came in for interpretation. The
relevancy of the case is not apparent inasmuch as it makes
no reference to a provision similar to the one enacted by
section 56 of the Madras Act as forming part of the statute
or rules then under consideration. We do not see, therefore,
that the plaintiff’s case is in any manner advanced by the
decision cited.
5. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is accepted.
The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the
plaintiff’s suit is dismissed on the ground that the civil
courts have no jurisdiction to entertain it by reason of the
provisions of section 56 of the Madras Act and that the
order of the Additional Settlement Officer dated the 14th of
September, 1957 (exhibits B-3 and B-4) is final and not
liable to be questioned in any court of law in so far as the
determination of the dispute between the rival claimants to
the ryotwari patta is concerned. The plaintiff-respondent’s
costs of the proceedings in this Court shall, however, be
paid to him by the appellants in accordance with the order
dated 30-9-1969 passed by this Court while granting special
leave.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
1016