CHANDRA PRATAP SINGH vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 09-10-2023

Preview image for CHANDRA PRATAP SINGH vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Full Judgment Text

2023INSC887 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1209 OF 2011 Chandra Pratap Singh         … Appellant versus State of M.P.               … Respondent     J U D G M E N T ABHAY S. OKA, J. FACTUAL ASPECTS This   is   an   appeal   by   accused   no.   2   who   has   been 1. convicted by the High Court for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). The appellant was also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC.  For the first offence, he was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. For the   second   offence   under   Section   201   of   IPC,   he   was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2023.10.09 18:06:07 IST Reason: Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 1 of 12 2. There were 17 accused  prosecuted for  the  offence of triple murder.  Out of 17 accused, the Trial Court acquitted accused nos. 3 to 8, 10, 13, 15 and 17.   The Trial Court convicted accused nos. 2, 9, 11, 12, and 16 for the offence punishable under Section 302, read with sections 148 and 149   and   Section   201   of   IPC.   Accused   nos.1   and   14   were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 148 of IPC.   The Trial Court did not frame a charge against any accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.   The High Court acquitted accused nos. 9, 11 and 12. 3. The allegation was of the triple murder of Uma Prasad, Vinod Kumar and Munau @ Anant Kishore Khare.  According nd to the prosecution case, on 2  June 1987, Vinod Kumar had taken his brother Munau to village Naugaon by scooter for medical treatment.   As they did not return till 5 pm, Uma Prasad Khare (deceased), who was the father of Vinod Kumar Khare and Munau, deputed Naval Kishore (PW­1) and Manua Chammer (PW­2) to search his sons.  PW­1 Naval Kishore was the nephew of Uma Prasad.  Even Uma Prasad proceeded to search Vinod Kumar and Munau Khare.  When they reached Hanuman temple, they saw the accused gathered near the temple   with   firearms   and   other   arms   like   farsa,   axe   and ballam.   The appellant – accused no.2 and accused no.16 were armed with a spear.  The role ascribed to accused nos.2 and 16 is that they stopped Uma Prasad. As a result, he fell off his bicycle.   According to the prosecution case, accused Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 2 of 12 nos. 3, 5 and 7 (acquitted) exhorted the other accused to chop Uma Prasad into pieces.  Accused nos. 7, 9 and 11 (acquitted) pointed their guns at PW­1 Naval Kishore and PW­2 Manua and told them not to interfere.   The act of assaulting and killing Uma Prasad was allegedly done by accused no.1 and accused no.14. Another allegation against the appellant is that as per 4. suggestion of acquitted accused no.6, he, along with accused no.1, dragged the body of deceased Uma Prasad and threw the same into a well. 5. Further   allegation   of   the   prosecution   is   that   after committing the murder of Uma Prasad, all the accused went towards   the  bus  stand   with   the  intention   of   killing   Vinod Kumar Khare and Munau Khare.  It is alleged that after about 15 minutes, the sound of two gun fires was heard, and it is alleged   that   Vinod   Kumar   Khare   and   Munau   Khare   were killed.  As far as the allegation of killing these two persons is concerned, the Trial Court acquitted all the accused, and that part of the judgment of the Trial Court has become final. 6. A   joint   appeal   was   preferred   by   accused   no.1,   the present appellant­accused no.2 and accused no.16.  Separate appeals were preferred by the other accused.   While partly allowing the appeals, by the impugned Judgment, the High Court acquitted accused nos. 9,11 and 12. The High Court partly   allowed   the   appeal   of   the   present   appellant   and accused nos. 1,14 and 16 by substituting their conviction Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 3 of 12 under Section 302 read with Sections 148 and/or 149 of IPC with Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.  The appellant's conviction for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC was maintained.  7. We may note here that Special Leave Petition (criminal) no. 876 of 2012 filed by accused no.1 was dismissed as the said accused did not file proof of surrender.  The application for   restoration   of   the   Special   Leave   Petition   was   also dismissed.     It appears that accused nos.14 and 16 did not prefer any appeal to this Court. They may have undergone the entire sentence. SUBMISSIONS 8. The   first   submission   of   the   learned   senior   counsel appearing   for   the   appellant   is   that   the   appellant   was   not represented by his advocate when the appeal was called out for hearing before the High Court.   In the cause title of the impugned judgment, the absence of the appellant's advocate has been mentioned.  Moreover, the judgment does not refer to any submission made on behalf of any accused.  He would, therefore, submit that the High Court has committed a gross illegality by proceeding with the hearing of the appeal in the absence of his advocate. 9. He submitted that in view of the decision of this Court 1 in   the   case   of   Mala   Singh   v.   State   of   Haryana ,   the 1 ( 2019) 5 SCC 127 Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 4 of 12 appellant   could   not   have   been   convicted   with   the   aid   of Section   34   of   IPC   as   there   was   no   evidence   of   common intention, which was necessary for attracting Section 34 of IPC.   Moreover, the appellant and other accused ought to have been put to notice by the High Court that it intended to modify the charge for invoking Section 34.  He submitted that prejudice has been caused to the appellant by   alteration of the charge apart from the fact that ingredients of Section 34 of IPC were not proved. Hence, the appellant is entitled to acquittal.  10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent urged that from the impugned judgment, it appears that the High Court has carefully perused the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.  He submitted that in an appeal against conviction, under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for   short   ‘Cr.PC’)   read   with   Section   216   of   Cr.PC,   the Appellate Court, has the power to alter or add the charge when no prejudice is shown to the accused.   He submitted that   there   was   enough   evidence   on   record   to   prove   the ingredients of Section 34 of IPC.  He invited our attention to the gravity of the offence and submitted that no interference is called for. CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS 11. The first issue is whether any prejudice was caused to the appellant, as his appeal was heard in the absence of his advocate.   The cause title of the judgment clearly mentions Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 5 of 12 that the advocate representing the appellant was absent.  The order sheet of the appeal preferred by the appellant and two th others   (Annexure   P­3)   records   that   on   26   October   2004, when the appeal preferred by the appellant and two others was called out, the appellant’s advocate was present.   The rd appeal was heard on 23  November 2004.  The order sheet of that  date   records  that   the  advocate  for  the   appellant  was absent. It also notes that  the arguments were heard, and judgment  was   reserved.   The   impugned   judgment   does   not refer to any submission canvassed on behalf of the appellant. The High Court has, thus, committed illegality by deciding the appeal   against   the   conviction   preferred   by   the   appellant without hearing the appellant or his advocate.  After finding that the advocate appointed by the appellant was absent, the High Court ought to have appointed a lawyer to espouse his cause. 12. In view of the wide powers conferred by Section 386 of Cr.PC, even an Appellate Court can exercise the power under Section 216 of altering or adding the charge.  However, if the Appellate Court  intends to  do so, elementary principles of natural justice require the Appellate Court to put the accused to the notice of the charge proposed to be altered or added when   prejudice   is   likely   to   be   caused   to   the   accused   by alteration or addition of charges.  Unless the accused was put to notice that the Appellate Court intends to alter or add a charge in a particular manner, his advocate cannot effectively argue the case.   Only if the accused is put to notice by the Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 6 of 12 Appellate Court that the charge is intended to be altered in a particular   manner,   his   advocate   can   effectively   argue   that even the altered charge was also not proved.  For example, in the present case, it was necessary for the Appellate Court to put the appellant to notice that it intended to convict him with the aid of Section 34 of IPC, for which a charge was not framed. We may add here that the Court can give the notice of the   proposed   alteration   or   addition   of   the   charge   even   by orally informing the accused or his advocate when the appeal is being heard. In a given case, the Court can grant a short time to the advocates for both sides to prepare themselves for addressing the Court on the altered or added charge. 13. In the facts of the case, the appellant’s advocate was absent on the date of the hearing.   Therefore, there was no occasion   for   the   High   Court   to   put   the   advocate   for   the appellant to the notice that the charge under Section 302 read with Sections 148 and/or 149 of IPC was proposed to be altered to a charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.     Therefore,   grave   prejudice   has   been   caused   to   the appellant by altering the charge without giving any notice to the appellant or his advocate about the charge. The reason is that there was no opportunity available to the accused to argue   that   there   was   no   evidence   on   record   to   prove   the existence   of   common   intention,   which   is   the   necessary ingredient of Section 34 of IPC.   There is one more crucial aspect of  the case.   A  perusal  of the impugned  judgment shows that the High Court has extensively referred to the Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 7 of 12 evidence of PW­1 Nand Kishore and PW­2 Manua.  However, the entire judgment does not mention that the Court was altering the charge for the reasons recorded.   No finding is recorded in terms of sub­section (4) of Section 216 of Cr.PC that the proposed alteration of the charge will not prejudice the accused in his defence. There is no reason recorded in the impugned judgment 14. to show that Section 34 of IPC was applicable.  There is no discussion   on   this   aspect   in   the   judgment.     Only   in   the operative part (paragraph 15), without assigning any reasons, the   High   Court   held   that   the   appellant   was   liable   to   be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302, read with Section 34 of IPC.  As stated earlier, there is a complete absence of any reason for concluding that Section 34 of IPC was attracted. The High Court has not recorded a finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the four accused who were ultimately convicted had done the criminal act in furtherance of a common intention. 15. Obviously, the Trial Court’s conviction of the appellant under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 of IPC could not   be   sustained.     As   per   Section   141   of   IPC,   unlawful assembly must be of five or more persons.  As the High Court confirmed the conviction of only four and acquitted all others, the   offence   of   unlawful   assembly   was   not   made   out,   and therefore, the offences under Sections 148 and 149 were not made out. Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 8 of 12 16. In the ordinary course, we would have remanded the appeal to the High Court for a fresh hearing on the ground that the appellant was not heard before confirming conviction on a modified charge. However, we cannot ignore that the incident   is   of   1987,   and   the   present   appeal   is   of   2011. Therefore, it will be unjust to pass an order of remand. Hence, we have examined the evidence on record. 2 17. In the case of  Chittarmal v. State of Rajasthan , this Court dealt with the conversion of charge from Section 302 read   with   Section   149   of   IPC,   to   Section   302,   read   with Section 34 of IPC.   Paragraph 14 of the said decision reads thus: “14.  It   is   well   settled   by   a   catena   of decisions   that   Section   34   as   well   as Section   149   deal   with   liability   for constructive   criminality   i.e.   vicarious liability   of   a   person   for   acts   of   others. Both the sections deal with combinations of   persons   who   become   punishable   as sharers in an offence. Thus they have a certain   resemblance   and   may   to   some extent overlap.  But a clear distinction is made   out   between   common   intention and   common   object   in   that   common intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a   prearranged   plan   implying   a   prior meeting of the minds, while common object   does   not   necessarily   require proof   of   prior   meeting   of   minds   or preconcert.   Though   there   is   a 2 (2003) 2 SCC 266 Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 9 of 12
substantial difference between the two<br>sections, they also to some extent<br>overlap and it is a question to be<br>determined on the facts of each case<br>whether the charge under Section 149<br>overlaps the ground covered by Section<br>34. Thus, if several persons numbering<br>five or more, do an act and intend to do<br>it, both Section 34 and Section 149<br>may apply. If the common object does<br>not necessarily involve a common<br>intention, then the substitution of<br>Section 34 for Section 149 might result<br>in prejudice to the accused and ought<br>not, therefore, to be permitted. But if it<br>does involve a common intention then the<br>substitution of Section 34 for Section 149<br>must be held to be a formal matter.<br>Whether such recourse can be had or not<br>must depend on the facts of each case.<br>The non­applicability of Section 149 is,<br>therefore, no bar in convicting the<br>appellants under Section 302 read with<br>Section 34 IPC, if the evidence<br>discloses commission of an offence in<br>furtherance of the common intention<br>of them all. (See Barendra Kumar<br>Ghosh v. King Emperor [AIR 1925 PC 1 :<br>26 Cri LJ 431], Mannam<br>Venkatadari v. State of A.P. [(1971) 3 SCC<br>254: 1971 SCC (Cri) 479 : AIR 1971 SC<br>1467] , Nethala Pothuraju v. State of<br>A.P. [(1992) 1 SCC 49: 1992 SCC (Cri) 20:<br>AIR 1991 SC 2214] and Ram<br>Tahal v. State of U.P. [(1972) 1 SCC 136:<br>1972 SCC (Cri) 80: AIR 1972 SC 254])”
(Emphasis added)
Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 10 of 12 18. We have carefully perused the evidence of PW­1 and PW­2.     There   is   no   evidence   of   the   presence   of   common intention.  Only the act of stopping the deceased Uma Prasad will not, by itself, bring the case within the purview of Section 34 of IPC.  There is no overt act attributed to the appellant by any   prosecution   witness   in   the   assault   on   deceased   Uma Prasad. It is difficult to infer a prior meeting of minds in this case. There is no material to prove the existence of common intention which is the necessary ingredient of Section 34 of IPC.   In   this   case,   there   is   no   overlap   between   a   common object and a common intention. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, read with Section 34 will have to be set aside. 19. However, the evidence of two eyewitnesses (PW­1 and PW­2) is very consistent on the role played by the appellant in dragging the dead body of the deceased and throwing the same into a well.  There is hardly any cross­examination on this aspect of both PW­1 and PW­2. Therefore, there is every justification   for   convicting   the   appellant   for   the   offence punishable   under   Section   201   of   IPC   of   causing   the disappearance   of   the   evidence   of   the   crime.     Hence,   the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence under Section 201 of IPC will have to be maintained.   The order th dated 20  April 2012 passed in this appeal records that the appellant was enlarged on bail as he remained incarcerated for about nine years.  The appellant was sentenced to undergo Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 11 of 12 rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence under Section 201 of IPC, which he has already undergone. Hence, the appeal partly succeeds.   We set aside the 20. appellant's   conviction   for   the   offence   punishable   under Section   302,   read   with   Section   34   of   IPC.     However,   the appellant's   conviction   for   the   offence   punishable   under Section 201 of IPC is confirmed.   The appellant has already undergone the sentence for the said offence.   Therefore, the bail bonds of the appellant stand cancelled. 21. The appeal is allowed on the above terms.  ..….……………….J. (Abhay S. Oka) ....………………...J.       (Pankaj Mithal) New Delhi; October 9, 2023. Criminal Appeal no. 1209 of 2011                                      Page 12 of 12