BRAHAMPAL@SAMMAY vs. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVILAPPELLATEJURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2926 OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C) No.13645 of 2018] Brahampal @ Sammay and Anr       ...… Appellants Versus National Insurance Company                           .... Respondent JUDGMENT N. V. Ramana, J. 1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. This   appeal   arises   out   of   the   impugned   order   dated 17.10.2016   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   at Nainital   in   AO   No.266   of   2014,   wherein   the   High   Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of delay of 45 days.  The facts in brief giving rise to this appeal are as follows: The 4. deceased aged 26 years, met with an accident on 15.04.2011, as his bike crashed into a truck parked negligently on the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Vishal Anand Date: 2020.10.16 16:29:56 IST Reason: road,   without   any   back­light’s   indication.   Resultantly,   he 1 succumbed to the injuries while being taken to the hospital. The appellants (parents of the deceased) preferred a petition before   the   Motor   Accident   Claim   Tribunal   seeking compensation   to   the   tune   of   Rs.   10   lakhs.   Vide   order 07.02.2014,   the   tribunal   awarded   a   total   sum   of   Rs.2.24 Lakhs   as   compensation   along   with   interest   of   6%   p.a. Aggrieved,   the   appellants   approached   the   High   Court   for seeking enhancement of compensation. It is to be noted that the aforesaid appeal before the High Court was filed with 45 days delay. In order to explain the same, the appellants herein filed   an   application   being   CLMA   6569/2014,   seeking condonation of delay on the ground that his wife was ill, which prevented him from appealing in time. By   impugned   order   dated   17.10.2016,   the   High   Court 5. dismissed   the   aforesaid   delay   condonation   application, consequent   upon   which   the   appeal   also   got   dismissed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellants herein have approached this Court through special leave petition. 6. The counsel on behalf of the appellants submitted that High Court has acted in an unjustified manner in dismissing the 2 application   for   condonation   of   delay.   On   the   contrary,   the counsel on behalf of the Respondent supported the judgment passed by the High Court.  7. Having heard the counsel for both parties, the short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the High   Court   erred   in   dismissing   the   delay   condonation application for 45 days? This question turns on interpretation of Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 8. At the outset, we must note that, Chapter XII of the Act is a beneficial   legislation   intended   at   protecting   the   rights   of victims affected in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is a self­ contained code in itself which provides procedures for filing claims,   for   passing   of   award   and   for   preferring   an   appeal. Even, the limitations for preferring the remedies are contained in the code itself. The interpretation of a beneficial legislation must be remedial 9. and   must   be   in   furtherance   with   the   purpose   which   the statute seeks to serve. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this court on multiple occasions wherein this court has 3 highlighted the importance acknowledging legislative intention while interpreting the provisions of the statute. This court in the case of   Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation. ,  (2009) 9 SCC 61 while interpreting the provisions of the Employees   State Insurance Act held that it being a beneficial legislation should   receive   a   liberal   construction   so   as   to   promote   its objectives. This court held therein: “20 . The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a beneficial legislation. The main purpose of   the   enactment   as   the   Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to   employees   of   a   factory   in   case   of sickness,   maternity   and   employment injury and to make provision for certain other   matters   in   relation   thereto.   The Employees’   State   Insurance   Act   is   a social   security   legislation   and   the canons   of   interpreting   a   social legislation are different from the canons of   interpretation   of   taxation   law.   The courts   must   not   countenance   any subterfuge   which   would   defeat   the provisions of social legislation and the courts   must   even,   if   necessary,   strain the   language   of   the   Act   in   order   to achieve   the   purpose   which   the legislature   had   in   placing   this legislation on the statute book. The Act, 4 therefore,   must   receive   a   liberal construction   so   as   to   promote   its objects.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Similarly, this Court in the case of   Vimla Devi v. National (2019) 2 SCC 186 while interpreting the Insurance Co. Ltd. ,    provisions of the Act held that strict compliance of procedures can be relaxed in order to ensure that victims receive just compensation. This court observed therein: “15.  At the outset, we may reiterate as has been consistently said by this Court in a series of cases that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted to give solace to the victims of the motor accident who suffer bodily injury or die untimely.   The Act is designed in a manner, which relieves the victims from ensuring strict compliance provided   in   law,   which   are   otherwise applicable   to   the   suits   and   other proceedings while prosecuting the claim petition filed under the Act for claiming compensation for the loss sustained by them in the accident.” (emphasis supplied) While keeping in view, the general nature of the legislation, it 11. is  pertinent  for  us to have a look at Section 173 of the Act  5 which reads as under:

12. Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even after the expiry of 6 ninety   days,   if   the   appellant   satisfies   the   Court  that  there exists sufficient reason behind the delay.  1 13. Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion.  It is an   enabling   word   and   it   only   confers   capacity,   power   or 2 authority and implies discretion.   “It is used in a statute to indicate that something may be done which prior to it could

14. The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section 173 of the  Act,   conferred   sufficient   discretionary   powers   upon   the Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety days. The pertinent issue before us relates to what the extent

the   usage   of   the   word   “may”,   we   may   observe   Official Liquidator   v.   Dharti   Dhan   (P.)   Ltd. ,   (1977)   2   SCC   166, wherein this Court held:    

1  Justice G.P. Singh in  Principles of Statutory Interpretation , 14th Edn.,page 519 2   Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder ,  (1982) 1 SCC 159  3   Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. ,  1962 Supp (3) SCR 973 7

(emphasis supplied)     This Court has  firstly  held that purpose of conferment of such 16. power must be examined for the determination of the scope of such discretion conferred upon the court. [ refer to   Bhaiya Punjalal   Bhagwandin   v.   Dave   Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad ,   AIR   1963   SC   120;   Shri   Prakash   Chand , (1970) 2 SCC 806] .  Our Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. analysis   of   the   purpose   of   the   Act   suggests   that   such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. The legislature intended that Courts must have such power so as to ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities. 8 17. Secondly ,   it   has   been   held   that   if   the   specific   conditions wherein the power could be exercised is also provided in the statute, then the Court must exercise the aforesaid discretion in the manner as specified by the statute itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that Court has the power to condone   delay   only   if   it   is   satisfied   that   there   existed “sufficient cause”. 18. At   this   juncture,   we   need   to   interpret   the   term   “sufficient cause”   as   a   condition   precedent   for   the   granting   of   the discretionary relief of allowing the appeal beyond the statutory limit   of   ninety   days.   Although   this   Court   has   held   that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, but it is relevant to note that even while interpreting “sufficient cause” under the Limitation Act Courts have taken a liberal interpretation. This Court in the case of   Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs ,  (2008) 8 SCC 321, observed that: “13. … The   words   “sufficient   cause   for not   making   the   application   within   the period   of   limitation”   should   be 9 understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending   upon   the   facts   and circumstances of the case, and the type .   The   words   “sufficient   cause”   in of   case Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act   should receive   a   liberal   construction   so   as   to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.” (emphasis supplied) The   aforesaid   view   was   reiterated   in   the   case   of   19. Balwant ,  (2010) 8 SCC 685 ,  wherein Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh this Court held that: “25.   We may state that even if the term “sufficient   cause”   has   to   receive   liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct   of   the   party   concerned.   The purpose   of   introducing   liberal construction   normally   is   to   introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right   and   obligation   of   a   party   to   arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied   appropriately   depending   on   the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once   a   valuable   right   has   accrued   in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the 10 delay   by   showing  sufficient   cause  and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to   take   away   that   right   on   the   mere asking   of   the   applicant,   particularly when  the  delay   is  directly   a result  of negligence, default or inaction of that party.   Justice   must   be   done   to   both parties   equally.   Then   alone   the   ends   of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly   negligent   in   implementing   its rights   and   remedies,   it   will   be   equally unfair   to   deprive   the   other   party   of   a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly ” . (emphasis supplied) 20. The Court in the above­mentioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause “sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity  of distinguishing  cases  where delay  is  of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties. 11 21. The aforesaid view was taken by this Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai ,  (2012) 5 SCC 157   wherein the Court held that: “23.   What   needs   to   be   emphasised   is   that even   though   a   liberal   and   justice­oriented approach   is   required   to   be   adopted   in   the exercise   of   power   under   Section   5   of   the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact   that   the   successful   litigant   has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24.   What   colour   the   expression   “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation.  If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand,   the   explanation   given   by   the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly   negligent   in   prosecuting   his cause,   then   it   would   be   a   legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay .” (emphasis supplied) 22. Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a beneficial legislation, must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object. Keeping 12 in view the substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities. In such cases delay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed strictly, as compared to commercial claims under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In  P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar , (2019) 13 SCC 445, wherein this  Court while interpreting Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, held that the right to object to an award itself is substantively bound with the limitation period prescribed therein and the same cannot merely a procedural prescription. In effect the Court held that a complete petition, has to be filed within the time prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and ‘ not thereafter ’.   The   Court   while   coming   to   the   aforesaid conclusion, reasoned as under: “36.1  First, the purpose of the Arbitration Act  was   to   provide   for   a  speedy   dispute resolution   process.   The   Statement   of Objects   and   Reasons   reveal   that   the legislative   intent   of   enacting   the Arbitration Act was to provide parties with an efficient alternative dispute resolution system which gives litigants an expedited resolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the courts. Article 34(3) reflects this   intent   when   it   defines   the 13 commencement and concluding period for challenging   an   award.   This   Court   in Popular   Construction   case   [Union   of India   v.   Popular   Construction   Co., (2001)   8   SCC   470]   highlighted   the importance of the fixed periods under the   Arbitration   Act.   We   may   also   add that   the   finality   is   a   fundamental principle   enshrined   under   the Arbitration   Act   and   a   definitive   time­ limit   for   challenging   an   award   is necessary for ensuring finality.  If Section 17 were to be applied, an award can be challenged even after 120 days. This would defeat   the   Arbitration   Act’s   objective   of speedy resolution of disputes. The finality of award would also be in a limbo as a party can challenge an award even after the 120 day period.” ( emphasis supplied ) Coming back to the Motor Vehicles Act, the legislative intent is to provide appropriate compensation for the victims and to protect their substantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretation should not be as strict as commercial claims as elucidated above. 23. Undoubtedly,   the   statute   has   granted   the   Courts   with discretionary   powers   to   condone   the   delay,   however   at  the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the 14 existence of “sufficient cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not  only take  into consideration the  entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking   a   liberal   approach   must   weigh   in   the   rights   and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief.   24. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the opinion that the delay of 45 days has been properly explained by the appellants, which was on account of illness of the wife of Appellant No.1. It was not appropriate   on   the   part   of   the   High   Court   to   dismiss   the appeal   merely   on   the   ground   of   delay   of   short   duration, particularly   in   matters   involving   death   in   motor   accident claims. Moreover, in the present case no   mala fide   can be imputable against the appellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the 15 strict   approach   taken   in   the   impugned   order   is   hyper­ technical and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 25. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. As the adjudication on the merits of the case has not taken place, we remand the matter to the said Court for fresh consideration on merits. 26. Taking into consideration the fact that the appeal is of the year 2014, we request the High Court to dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. …………………………………………J (N.V. RAMANA) …………………………………………J (S.ABDUL NAZEER) …………………………………………J (SURYA KANT) NEW DELHI; AUGUST 07, 2020. 16