Full Judgment Text
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.37983799 OF 2016
Sudarsan Puhan Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Jayanta Ku. Mohanty & Anr. Etc. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) These appeals are filed by the appellant
claimant against the final judgment and order dated
09.11.2015 passed by the High Court of Orissa at
Cuttack in M.A.C.A. No.690 of 2014 and M.A.C.A.
No.839 of 2014 whereby the High Court allowed the
Signature Not Verified
appeal filed by the Insurance Company and reduced
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2018.09.22
11:41:09 IST
Reason:
the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident
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Claims Tribunal (in short ‘the Tribunal”) from
Rs.24,62,065/ to Rs.20,00,000/ and in
consequence dismissed the M.A.C.A. No.690 of
2014 filed by the appellantclaimant in terms of the
main order passed in M.A.C.A. No.839 of 2014.
2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in
these appeals, few facts need mention infra .
3) The appellant herein was the claimant before
the Tribunal whereas respondentowner of the
vehicle (motorcycle) was the nonapplicant No.1 and
the Insurance Company was nonapplicant No.2 in
the appellant’s claim petition.
4) On 31.10.2012, the appellantclaimant with
one Dipak Kumar Pradhan was going on a
motorcycle bearing No.OR07 S 3133 from Baisinga
to Baripada on National Highway 18 in the State of
Orissa. The abovesaid Motorcycle met with an
accident with a Mini Truck (407) wherein the
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appellantclaimant suffered severe injuries. The
motorcycle was owned by Jayanta Kumar Mohanty
(respondent No.1 in CA 3798/2016 & respondent
No.2 in CA No.3799/2016) and was insured with
the National Insurance Company Ltd. (respondent
No.2 in CA 3798/2016 & respondent No.1 in CA
3799/2016).
5) According to the appellantclaimant, he was in
the age group of 2527 years at the time of accident
and suffered the disease of “paraplegia” (injury in
spinal cord) as a result of the abovesaid accident.
6) The appellantclaimant, therefore, filed a claim
petition before the Tribunal, Mayurbhanj Baripada
(Orissa) under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the MV Act”)
against the respondents (owner of the motorcycle
and the Insurance company) and claimed
reasonable compensation for the injuries sustained
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by him and other statutory compensation payable
under the MV Act for causing such injuries. The
respondents contested the claim petition.
7) By award dated 17.05.2014, the Tribunal
allowed the appellant’s claim petition in part and
holding the respondents(nonapplicants) liable for
payment of the compensation to the appellant
claimant jointly and severely awarded a total sum of
Rs.24,62,065/ with interest payable at the rate of
7% per annum under various heads.
8) The appellantclaimant and the Insurance
Company both felt aggrieved by the award, filed
appeals in the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack.
9) So far as M.A.C.A.No.690/2014 is concerned,
it was filed by the appellantclaimant for
enhancement of the amount awarded by the
Tribunal whereas so far as M.A.C.A.No.839/2014 is
concerned, it was filed by the Insurance Company
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against the award challenging therein the quantum
of compensation to be on a higher side.
10) By impugned order, the High Court allowed
the appeal filed by the Insurance Company
(M.A.C.A.No.839/2014) in part and accordingly
reduced the compensation from Rs.24,62,065/ to
Rs.20,00,000/. As a result of the main order
passed in favour of the Insurance Company in their
appeal, the appeal filed by the appellantclaimant
(M.A.C.A. No.690/2014) seeking enhancement in
the quantum of compensation was dismissed as
having rendered infructuous.
11) The appellantclaimant felt aggrieved by the
order of the High Court filed two appeals by way of
special leave in this Court. One is filed against an
order by which the claimant’s appeal for
enhancement in the quantum of compensation was
dismissed as having rendered infructuous and the
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other is filed against an order by which the
Insurance Company’s appeal was partly allowed by
reducing the quantum of compensation from
Rs.24,62,065/ to Rs.20,00,000/.
12) It may be mentioned that so far as the
Insurance Company is concerned, they have not
filed any appeal against the order of the High Court.
In other words, the Insurance Company seems
satisfied with the quantum of compensation amount
of Rs.20,00,000/awarded by the High Court by the
impugned order.
13) The short question, which arises for
consideration in these two appeals, is whether the
High Court was justified in allowing the Insurance
Company's appeal (M.A.C.A. No.839/2014) and
was, therefore, justified in reducing the quantum of
compensation amount from Rs.24,62,065/ to
Rs.20,00,000/ and, in consequence, was justified
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in dismissing the claimant’s appeal for
enhancement of the quantum of compensation as
having rendered infructuous.
14) Learned counsel for the appellantclaimant
while assailing the legality and correctness of the
impugned order contended that the High Court
without adverting to any factual and legal issue
arising in the case simply allowed the Insurance
Company’s appeal and reduced the compensation
from Rs.24, 62,065/ to Rs.20,00,000/ awarded by
the Tribunal and, in consequence, dismissed the
appellantclaimant’s appeal in a cryptic manner.
15) According to learned counsel, the High Court
neither set out the facts, nor dealt with any issue,
nor appreciated the ocular and documentary
evidence much less in its proper perspective, nor
examined the legal principles applicable to the
issues arising in the case and nor rendered its
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findings on any contentious issues decided by the
Tribunal except to observe “Considering the
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties”
and “ I feel, the interest of justice would be best
served if the awarded compensation amount of
Rs.24,62,065/ is modified and reduced to
Rs.20,00,000/”.
16) Learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that it was not the consideration of the case of
either parties at all and yet the Insurance Company
succeeded in their appeal and appellantclaimant
lost which caused prejudice to him due to reduction
in quantum of compensation.
17) Learned counsel further contended that it was
the duty of the High Court exercising its first
appellate powers under Section 173 of the M.V. Act
to have dealt with all the submissions urged by the
parties and after appreciating the entire evidence
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should have come to its own conclusion one way or
the other keeping in view the legal principles
governing the issues as to whether any case was
made out for enhancement or reduction in quantum
of compensation, as the case may be. It was urged
that since it was not done by the High Court, a
jurisdictional error is committed which renders the
impugned order legally unsustainable.
18) Lastly, the learned counsel urged that if his
arguments are accepted, the remand of the case to
the High Court to decide the appeal filed by the
appellantclaimant alone on merits is inevitable.
19) Learned counsel for the respondents
(Insurance Company), however, supported the
impugned orders and urged that they do not call for
any interference.
20) Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
9
find force in the submissions of the learned counsel
for the appellantclaimant.
21) The powers of the first Appellate Court while
deciding the first appeal are indeed well defined by
various judicial pronouncements of this Court and
are, therefore, no more res integra .
22) As far back in 1969, the learned Judge – V.R.
Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge
of Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal
under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) Kurian
Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316,
reminded the first appellate court of its duty to
decide the first appeal. In his distinctive style of
writing with subtle power of expression, the learned
judge held as under:
“1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two
Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the
dismissal of his suit which was one for
declaration of title and recovery of
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possession. The defendant disputed the
plaintiff's title to the property as also his
possession and claimed both in himself. The
learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded
findings against the plaintiff both on title and
possession. But, in appeal, the learned
Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole
matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences.
2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact
ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled
to a full and fair and independent
consideration of the evidence at the appellate
stage. Anything less than this is unjust to
him and I have no doubt that in the present
case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen
far short of what is expected of him as an
appellate Court. Although there is furious
contest between the counsel for the appellant
and for the respondent, they appear to agree
with me in this observation…..”
(Emphasis supplied)
23) This Court also in various cases reiterated the
aforesaid principle and laid down the powers of the
Appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code while
deciding the first appeal.
24) We consider it apposite to refer to some of the
decisions.
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25) In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari
. (2001) 3 SCC 179, this Court
(Deceased) by L.Rs
held (at pages 188189) as under:
“.……..the appellate court has jurisdiction to
reverse or affirm the findings of the trial
court. First appeal is a valuable right of the
parties and unless restricted by law, the
whole case is therein open for rehearing both
on questions of fact and law. The judgment of
the appellate court must, therefore, reflect
its conscious application of mind and record
findings supported by reasons, on all the
issues arising along with the contentions put
forth, and pressed by the parties for decision
of the appellate court……while reversing a
finding of fact the appellate court must come
into close quarters with the reasoning
assigned by the trial court and then assign its
own reasons for arriving at a different
finding. This would satisfy the court hearing
a further appeal that the first appellate court
had discharged the duty expected of
it…………”
26) The above view was followed by a threeJudge
Bench decision of this Court in
Madhukar & Ors.
v. Sangram & Ors. ,(2001) 4 SCC 756, wherein it
was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal,
it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the
12
issues and the evidence led by the parties before
recording its findings.
27) In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith ,(2005) 10
SCC 243, this Court (at p. 244) stated as under:
(SCC para 3)
“ . The first appeal has to be decided on
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facts as well as on law. In the first appeal
parties have the right to be heard both on
questions of law as also on facts and the first
appellate court is required to address itself to
all issues and decide the case by giving
reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in
the present case has not recorded any finding
either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first
appellate court it was the duty of the High
Court to deal with all the issues and the
evidence led by the parties before recording
the finding regarding title.”
28) Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa & Anr .,
(2005) 12 SCC 303, while considering the scope of
Section 96 of the Code, this Court (at pp. 30304)
observed as follows: (SCC para 2)
“ 2 . A court of first appeal can reappreciate the
entire evidence and come to a different
conclusion……...”
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29) Again in B.V Nagesh & Anr. vs. H.V.
, (2010) 13 SCC 530, this Court
Sreenivasa Murthy
taking note of all the earlier judgments of this court
reiterated the aforementioned principle with these
words:
“3. How the regular first appeal is to be
disposed of by the appellate court/High
Court has been considered by this Court in
various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with
appeals from original decrees. Among the
various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the
judgment of the appellate court shall state:
( ) the points for determination;
a
( ) the decision thereon;
b
( ) the reasons for the decision; and
c
( ) where the decree appealed from is
d
reversed or varied, the relief to which the
appellant is entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to
reverse or affirm the findings of the trial
court. The first appeal is a valuable right of
the parties and unless restricted by law, the
whole case is therein open for rehearing both
on questions of fact and law. The judgment of
the appellate court must, therefore, reflect
its conscious application of mind and record
findings supported by reasons, on all the
issues arising along with the contentions put
forth, and pressed by the parties for decision
of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of
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first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court
to deal with all the issues and the evidence
led by the parties before recording its
findings. The first appeal is a valuable right
and the parties have a right to be heard both
on questions of law and on facts and the
judgment in the first appeal must address
itself to all the issues of law and fact and
decide it by giving reasons in support of the
findings. (Vide v.
Santosh Hazari
, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at p.
Purushottam Tiwari
188, para 15 and v. ,
Madhukar Sangram
(2001) 4 SCC 756 at p. 758, para 5.)
5. In view of the above salutary principles,
on going through the impugned judgment, we
feel that the High Court has failed to
discharge the obligation placed on it as a first
appellate court. In our view, the judgment
under appeal is cryptic and none of the
relevant aspects have even been noticed. The
appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory
manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment
in the regular first appeal shows that it falls
short of considerations which are expected
from the court of first appeal. Accordingly,
without going into the merits of the claim of
both parties, we set aside the impugned
judgment and decree of the High Court and
remand the regular first appeal to the High
Court for its fresh disposal in accordance
with law.”
30) The aforementioned cases were relied upon by
this Court while reiterating the same principle in
State Bank of India & Anr. vs. Emmsons
15
International Ltd. & Anr. , (2011) 12 SCC 174 and
Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation vs. Mamta & Ors. (2016) 4 SCC 172.
31) An appeal under Section 173 of the M.V. Act is
essentially in the nature of first appeal alike Section
96 of the Code and, therefore, the High Court is
equally under legal obligation to decide all issues
arising in the case both on facts and law after
appreciating the entire evidence. [See National
vs.
Insurance Company Ltd. Naresh Kumar &
Ors. ((2000) 10 SCC 198 and State of Punjab &
vs. (2004) 13 SCC 680].
Anr. Navdeep Kuur & Ors.
32) As observed supra, as a first Appellate Court,
it was the duty of the High Court to have decided
the appeals keeping in view the requirements of
Order XX Rule 4 (2) read with Order XLI Rule 31 of
the Code which requires that judgment/order shall
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contain a concise statement of the case, points for
determination, decisions thereon and the reasons.
33) Coming now to the facts of the case at hand,
we consider it appropriate to reproduce the order of
the High Court infra:
“Considering the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and keeping
in view the quantum of compensation
amount awarded and the basis on which the
same has been arrived at I feel, the interest
of justice would be best served if the awarded
compensation amount of Rs.24,62,065/ is
modified and reduced to Rs.20,00,000/
which is payable to the claimant along with
the awarded interest. The impugned award is
modified to the said extent.
The appellantInsurance Company is
directed to deposit the modified
compensation amount of Rs.20,00,000/
along with awarded interest with the learned
Tribunal within six weeks hence. On deposit
of the amount, the same shall be disbursed to
the claimant proportionately, as per the
direction of the learned Tribunal given in the
impugned award. ”
34) Mere perusal of the aforequoted order of the
High Court would show that the High Court neither
set out the facts of the case of the parties in detail,
17
nor dealt with any of the submissions urged except
to mention them, nor took note of the grounds
raised by the claimant and nor made any attempt to
appreciate the evidence in the light of the settled
legal principles applicable to the issues arising in
the case and proceeded to allow the appeal filed by
the Insurance Company and reduced the
compensation from Rs.24,62,065/ to
Rs.20,00,000/.
35) The High Court only observed “C onsidering the
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties ”
and “ I feel that compensation should have been
awarded as Rs.20,00,000/ and not
Rs.24,62,065/“ . No reasons were given by the High
Court as to why the amount of compensation
should be reduced from Rs.24,62,065/ to
Rs.20,00,000/ and why it cannot be enhanced.
Since the appellantclaimant had also filed appeal
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for enhancement of the compensation, the entire
controversy was again open for decision before the
High Court at the instance of the claimant and
Insurance Company. It was, therefore, necessary
for the High Court to assign the reasons for not
granting enhancement of compensation and/or its
reduction. In the absence of any reasons, we are
unable to uphold the impugned orders of the High
Court.
36) As mentioned above, the Insurance Company
did not choose to file any special leave to appeal in
this Court against the impugned order of the High
Court. The effect of nonfiling of appeal is that the
Insurance Company has in principle accepted the
High Court’s order.
37) This Court having allowed the claimant’s
appeal and setting aside the impugned order, it
results in dismissal of the appeal filed by the
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Insurance Company (M.A.C.A. No.839 of 2014) and
allowing of the appeal (M.A.C.A.No.690/2014) filed
by the claimant. Had the Insurance Company filed
special leave to appeal against the impugned order
in this Court seeking further reduction in the
compensation awarded by the High Court like what
the Insurance Company did when they had filed
appeal before the High Court questioning inter alia
the quantum of compensation being on higher side,
the Insurance Company too would have been
entitled to prosecute their appeal on merits after
remand before the High Court in terms of this order.
It was, however, not done by the Insurance
Company.
38) In this view of the matter, the appellant
claimant alone will have a right to prosecute his
appeal (M.A.C.A. No.690 of 2014) on merits before
the High Court after remand of the case by this
20
Court wherein the High Court will examine the
question as to whether any case for further
enhancement in the quantum of compensation
awarded by the Tribunal is made out or not and, if
so, on what grounds.
39) In view of the foregoing discussion, we remand
only the appellantclaimant’s appeal (M.A.C.A.
No.690 of 2014) to the High Court for deciding the
question as to whether any case is made out for
further enhancement from Rs.24,62,065/ awarded
by the Tribunal and, if so, on what grounds.
Needless to say, the Insurance Company will have a
right to oppose the appellantclaimant’s appeal on
the merits.
40) However, we make it clear that we have not
applied our mind to the merits of the issues
involved in the case having formed an opinion to
remand the case to the High Court and hence the
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High Court would decide M.A.C.A. No.690/2014
strictly in accordance with law on merits
uninfluenced by any of our observations. We
request the High Court to decide the appeal
preferably within six months.
41) The appeals thus succeed and are accordingly
allowed in part. The impugned orders are set aside.
No costs.
.……...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
.……...................................J.
[S. ABDUL NAZEER]
New Delhi,
September 20, 2018.
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