Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
AKHILESH PRASAD
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION TERRITORY OF MIZORAM
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/02/1981
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)
CITATION:
1981 AIR 806 1981 SCR (2) 789
1981 SCC (2) 150 1981 SCALE (1)292
ACT:
Code of Criminal Procedure, section 197(2)-Whether
Central Reserve Police Force falls within the expression
"Armed Forces of the Union" as used thereat-Section 3(1) of
the Central Reserve Police Force Act and Entry 2 in List I
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
Allowing the appeal, the Court
^
HELD : 1 : 1. The Central Reserve Police Force squarely
falls within the expression "Armed Forces of the Union" as
used in sub-section (2) of section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. [794 F]
1 : 2. The expression must be given its ordinary
meaning which would certainly not be limited to the
inclusion of only the military, naval and air-forces of the
Union as defined in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section
132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [793 F-G]
1 : 3. Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution clearly envisages armed forces other than the
three well known forces of the State, namely, the naval,
military and air-forces. [793 H, 794 A-B]
1 : 4. Sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Central
Reserve Police Force Act itself declares in no uncertain
terms that the Central Reserve Police Force is an armed
force of the Central Government which is the same thing as
saying that it is a part of the "Armed Forces of the Union".
[794D]
1 : 5. Just because the Central Reserve Police Force is
a reserve force it does not follow that it is not a
regularly operating force. [794 E-F]
2. The question whether the offences alleged to have
been committed by the appellant in the instant case, are or
are not such as may be said to have been committed while he
was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty is to be left over. [794 G]
Pancham Lal v. Dadan Singh, [1979] Criminal Law Journal
1018; S. B. Saha v. M. S. Kochar, [1980] 1 SCR 111-1979
Criminal Law Journal 1367, approved and followed.
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JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
439 of 1980.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 20-2-1980 of the Gauhati High Court in Cr. Revision
No. 173/78.
790
H. K. Puri for the Appellant.
N. Nettar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
P. A. Francis, K. S. Gurumurthy and R. N. Poddar for
the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KOSHAL, J. This is an appeal by special leave against a
judgment dated the 20th February, 1980, of a learned Single
Judge of the Gauhati High Court dismissing an application
made by the appellant under sections 482 and 407 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure praying that the proceedings pending
in the Court of the Assistant District Magistrate, Aizawal
which have been initiated through a police report against
the appellant with a prayer that he be punished for offences
under sections 307, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code
alleged to have been committed by him on the 30th May, 1978,
be quashed or, in the alternative, that the proceedings be
transferred to a competent court beyond the territory of
Mizoram.
2. The relevant facts are not in dispute and may be
stated briefly. On the 30th May, 1978, a case was registered
at the Vairengte Police Station at the instance of one
Thanugura alleging that men of the Central Reserve Police
Force (hereinafter referred to as CRPF), of which the
appellant is a member had fired shots at handyman Thara and
a driver the two of whom received injuries in the arm and
thigh respectively. After investigation the police submitted
a report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
against the appellant to the Assistant District Magistrate
Aizawl.
3. Aggrieved by the commencement of proceedings against
him in the Court of the Assistant District Magistrate, the
appellant sought redress from the High Court through the
application which has been dismissed by the impugned order.
The prayer for quashing the proceedings contained in the
application was based on various grounds only one of which
has now been canvassed before us and that is that the
offences attributed to the appellant are alleged to have
been committed by him while he was acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty as a member of the
Armed Forces of the Union and that in view of the provisions
of sub-section 2 of section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.P.C.) no Court
had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of those offences.
The prayer made in the alternative was supported by various
assertions indicative of surcharged atmosphere in Mizoram
which had resulted in
791
the entire population becoming hostile to the appellant so
that it would not at all be safe for him to attend the Court
at Aizawl.
4. The learned Single Judge noted the provisions of
sub-section (2) of section 197 of Cr. P.C. which runs thus :
"No Court shall take cognizance of any offence
alleged to have been committed by any member of the
Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty, except with
the previous sanction of the Central Government."
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He correctly analysed the section while holding that it
would operate only if
(1) the concerned accused was a member of the
"Armed Forces of the Union" and
(2) the offence attributed to him was alleged to
have been committed while he was acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty.
The learned Judge then proceeded to find out the
meaning of the expression "Armed Forces of the Union" as
occurring in the subsection, with reference to various
provisions of the Army Act, of the Cr. P.C. the Central
Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as
the CRPF Act) and of entry 2 in List I of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution of India, and thereafter
concluded :
"If the expression ‘Armed Forces’ of the Union is
understood as including any other armed forces of the
Union, then the C.R.P.F. may be included therein, and
not otherwise. Considering the fact that the C.R.P.F.
is a Reserve Police Force, the conventional
interpretation to mean only the regular armed forces of
the Union may be acceptable. Members of the Police
Force are holders of civil
posts............................ In AIR 1965 All 236
(238), it was held that the Armed Forces of the Union
mean the regular Army, Navy and Air Force or any part
of any one or more of them as defined in the Army Act,
and it could never have meant the members of the
National Cadet Corps who are not part of the regular
forces of the Union."
The learned Judge then went on to decide the question as to
whether the appellant was alleged to have committed the
offences covered by
792
the proceedings against him while acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty and decided it in
the negative with the observations :
"The alleged occurrence is not such as may be said
to have been directly and reasonably connected with
performance of his official duty. It was neither in his
official capacity nor under colour of his office. It
does not, therefore, appear to have been while acting
or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty. Active duty, as defined in the Act, means the
duty to restore and preserve order in any local area in
the event of any disturbance therein."
However, the learned Judge left the question open with
the remarks :
"The question of necessity of sanction has to be
determined from stage to stage as the case progresses
(1979 Crl. L.J. 1018)(1). It may be considered at any
stage of the proceeding and while considering, it is
not necessary for the Court to confine itself to the
allegations in the complaint, and the court can take
into consideration all the materials on the record at
the time the question is raised (1979 Crl. L.J.
1367).(2) More materials may come up for consideration
by the trial court and it will be inopportune to decide
the question at this stage."
On the question of transfer the views of the learned
Single Judge were :
"The petitioner has not alleged any thing directly
against the Court itself. His apprehension is a
derivative one from the activities of the Drivers’
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Union and the meetings and publicity given to the
incident. The Mizoram Government in its affidavit have
stated that the officer in seisin of the case is a
judicial officer without any administrative functions,
and is not likely to be influenced by these events. The
contemporary events of publicity, meetings and
processions are all past, and may not have benumbing
effects in future. At this stage, nothing having been
alleged against the particular court, it is not
reasonable on the part of the petitioner to apprehend
that he will not
793
receive a fair trial. The judicial administration in
Mizoram has to run according to law despite such
events. If a case is transferred on the alleged
grounds, there may be no end to such transfers. That
may cast reflection on the judiciary. The other
difficulty, namely, that the Lushai Hills Autonomous
District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, which
applies in Mizoram is not applicable elsewhere is also
to be considered. There will also be difficulties of
examining witnesses in Mizo language at other places.
Considering the above facts, it will not be desirable
to transfer the case at this stage. The Government of
Mizoram will take appropriate measures for safety of
the petitioner and his witnesses, and for conduct of
the case in a befitting atmosphere."
It was in the above premises that the learned Single
Judge dismissed the appellant’s application on both counts.
5. The first question which falls for determination by
us is as to whether the appellant was a member of the "Armed
Forces of the Union" within the meaning of that expression
as occurring in sub-section (2) of section 197 of the Cr.
P.C. The expression "Armed Forces" has been defined in
clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 132, Cr. P.C. as
meaning the military, naval and air forces, operating as
land forces and as including any other armed forces of the
Union so operating. That definition however, is limited in
its application, by the express language of that clause
itself, to the interpretation of sections 129 to 132 of the
Cr. P.C. and the argument, therefore, advanced in support of
the impugned judgment that definition will not govern the
interpretation of section 197 cannot be said to lack
plausibility. Nor has it been shown to us that the
expression "Armed Forces of the Union" as occurring in sub-
section (2) of section 197, Cr. P.C. is governed by a
definition occurring elsewhere either in the Cr. P.C. or in
any other statute. In this situation it must be given its
ordinary meaning which, it appears to us, would certainly
not be limited to the inclusion of only the military, naval
and air forces of the union. In this connection a reference
to the contents of entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution of India may be made with advantage.
They are :
"Naval, military and air forces; any other armed
forces of the Union"
794
The entry clearly envisages armed forces other than the
three well known forces of the State, namely the naval,
military and air forces. All that remains to be done,
therefore, is to find out answers to the following two
questions :
(a) Is the C.R.P.F. a force ?
(b) If question (a) is answered in the
affirmative, whether C.R.P.F. is an armed
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force ?
In our opinion the answer to both the questions must be
given in the affirmative in view of the provisions of sub-
section (1) of section 3 of the CRPF Act which unfortunately
do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the
learned Single Judge. That sub-section reads thus :
"There shall continue to be an armed force
maintained by the Central Government and called the
Central Reserve Police Force."
The sub-section itself declares in no uncertain terms
that the CRPF is an armed force of the Central Government
which is the same thing as saying that it is a part of the
"Armed Forces of the Union". We may make it clear, however,
that even if the provisions just above extracted were not
available our answer to the two questions would still be in
the affirmative. The reason given by the learned Single
Judge for holding a contrary opinion, namely, that the force
was "only a reserve force and not a regular force" by which
expression he appears to mean that it was not a continually
operating force does not commend our concurrence. Just
because the CRPF is a reserve force it does not follow that
it is not a regularly operating force and no provision of
the CRPF Act has been pointed out to us such as may lend
support to a contrary view.
5. We hold that the CRPF squarely falls within the
expression "Armed Forces of the Union" as used in sub-
section (2) of section 197 of the Cr.P.C.
6. We leave open the question whether the offences
alleged to have been committed by the appellant are or are
not such as may be said to have been committed while he was
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty. This course we follow in view of the exposition of law
contained in that paragraph quoted by us from the impugned
judgment which makes a reference to 1979 Criminal Law
Journal, 1018 and 1979 Criminal Law Journal 1367, which
exposition is not only correct according to learned counsel
for all parties before us but also has our full approval.
795
7. Learned counsel for the parties are also agreed that
the case against the appellant be transferred to the Court
of a Magistrate functioning at Gauhati. We consider the
proposal to be conducive to a fair trial and, accepting it,
transfer the proceedings to the Court of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Gauhati. We further direct that the State of
Assam and the CRPF shall afford full protection to the life
and liberty of the appellant.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
796