REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 640-641 OF 2016
| ARVIND SINGH | .....APPELLANT(S) |
|---|
| VERSUS<br>THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA | |
| .....RESPONDENT(S) |
W I T H
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1515-1516 OF 2017
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The present appeals are directed against the judgment and order
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench)
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on 5 May, 2016 whereby the appeals filed by the appellants
1 2
Rajesh Daware and Arvind Singh against their conviction for
offences punishable under Section 364A read with Section 34 of
3
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 302 read with Section 34
IPC was dismissed by confirming the death sentence imposed upon
them by the learned Sessions Judge, Nagpur vide its order dated
th
4 February, 2016.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2020.04.24
16:59:06 IST
Reason:
2. The prosecution process was set in motion on the basis of an oral
1 for short, ‘A-1’
2 for short, ‘A-2’
3 for short, ‘IPC’
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statement made by Dr. Mukesh Ramanlal Chandak (PW-1) to the
Police Sub-Inspector, Police Station Lakadganj, Nagpur City on
st
1 September, 2014 about his son Yug, aged 8 years being
missing. Dr. Chandak stated that, on 1st September, 2014, when
he was present with his wife at the hospital, she told him that their
driver Raju Tote had informed her on the phone that their son went
along with somebody. Dr. Chandak (PW-1) came home and
inquired from Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31), the watchman of
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their housing society, “Guru Vandana Apartment ”, who informed
him that at about 3:45 pm, when he was sitting near the gate of
the Apartment, an unknown, fair complexioned boy, aged about
20-25 years, wearing a red half sleeves T-shirt, full white pants with
a white handkerchief wrapped around his face, came to him, riding
a black scooty. This boy parked his vehicle near the footpath in
front of the gate and asked Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31)
whether Yug has come home. Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31)
replied in the negative and asked him to go inside and find out for
himself but the boy remained at the gate itself. He had worn the
clothes (uniform) like that of the clothes of the employees of Dr.
Chandak’s clinic. After about 15 minutes, Yug, came in his school
dress. He kept his school bag on chair meant for him and told Arun
Parmanand Meshram (PW-31) to leave the school bag at his
Apartment, who told him that he will require half an hour to do the
same. Thereafter, he saw Yug going towards Chhapru Nagar
Chowk along with the boy on his scooty. Arun Parmanand
4 for short, ‘Apartment’
2
Meshram (PW-31) was under the impression that the said boy
might be an employee of Dr. Chandak’s clinic because his clothes
were like the uniform that his employees wear.
3. On the basis of such statement received in the Police Station at
17:10 hours, FIR No. 287 of 2014 was registered for an offence
under Section 363 IPC but after the information of kidnapping and
death was received, offences under Section 364A and Section 302
read with Section 34 IPC were added. The initial investigation was
taken over by N.T. Gosawi (PW-25) and later taken over by S.K.
Jaiswal (PW-50). On completion of the investigation, including the
recovery of dead body, the prosecution presented a charge sheet
for the trial of the accused. The prosecution examined 50
witnesses in support of the charges levelled against A-1 and A-2.
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4. The learned trial court in its judgment dated 30 January, 2016
examined the prosecution evidence under the following heads:
“A) Ocular evidence of prosecution witnesses relating to
kidnapping/abduction of victim-Yug by the accused,
B) The theory of doctrine of last seen together of victim-
Yug in the company of accused,
C) The evidence of T.I. parade,
D) The evidence of CCTV footage,
E) The evidence of demand of ransom from the accused,
F) The evidence of recovery of dead body as well as
incriminating articles etc. u/s. 27 of the Evidence Act,
G) The circumstances of motive, preparation and
previous conduct of the accused u/s. 8 of the Evidence
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Act,
H) The evidence of criminal conspiracy,
I) The evidence of CDR & SDR of the relevant telephonic
conversation,
J) Presumption of factum of murder of victim-Yug on the
part of accused,
K) The C.A. report/DNA report inculpatory in nature.”
5. The learned trial court convicted A-1 and A-2 for the offences
punishable under Sections 120-B, 364A, 302, 201 read with Section
34 IPC. By a subsequent order, A-1 and A-2 were sentenced to
death for the offences punishable under Section 364A read with
Section 34 IPC and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC on both
offences. The learned trial court also convicted A-1 and A-2 for
offences punishable under Section 120-B of IPC, to suffer
imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- and for an
offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC,
A-1 and A-2 were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years
and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-. It is the said order of the learned
Sessions Judge which was affirmed by the High Court.
6. The prosecution had led evidence of the boy, Yug, last seen in the
company of the accused from 16:15 hrs. approximately to 17:30
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hrs. approximately on 1 September 2014. The post mortem was
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conducted on 3 September 2014 between 12.00 hrs. to 13:45 hrs.
by a team of three Doctors. Dr. Avinash Waghmode (PW-27) had
been examined to prove the postmortem report (Ex.103). The
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cause of death was found to be smothering and the time since
death was 36 to 48 hours. There were as many as 26 injuries found
on the dead body which included Injury Nos. 22 to 26 as post
mortem injuries. Dr. Avinash Waghmode (PW-27) deposed that
Injury Nos. 1 -21 and 26 may have been perimortem injuries i.e.
the injuries were caused during the activation and working of vital
functions. With this background, the evidence of the prosecution is
examined in the present appeals in the following manner:
(A) The evidence of last seen
(B) Discovery of incriminating facts
(C) Demand of Ransom
(D) Motive and Conspiracy
(E) Corroborative Evidence
7. The undisputed location of different places which are referred to by
the witnesses is broadly Guru Vandana Apartment (place of
kidnapping) leading to Outer Ring Road on the inter section of
Kalmana Market; then to Vinoba Bhave Nagar; then to Koradi
Saoner Chindwara Road leading to Loankhairi, Loankhairi Nullah;
Patansawangi Village and then to Itangoti Village leading to a lake
and a pump house. The Lakadganj Police Station is close to the
Itawari Railway Station on a road from the Itabutti Chowk on the
outer ring road.
(A) The evidence of last seen
(i) The kidnapping of the boy Yug from the Apartment.
8. The prosecution, as stated earlier, examined Arun Parmanand
Meshram (PW-31), the watchman of the Apartment, who deposed
that Dr. Chandak and his family of four were residents on the
nd
2 floor of the said Apartment. He stated that Dr. Chandak and his
5
wife are dentists and have their own clinic in Nagpur city. The
employees of Dr. Chandak used to wear red T-shirts as part of the
uniform of the clinic. Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31) deposed
that he was aware of such uniform as Dr. Chandak’s employees
used to visit his residence frequently. He stated that he was on
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duty on 1 September, 2014 and at about 16:00 hrs. on that day,
a boy, aged approximately 21-22 years came on a purple scooty,
wearing a red T-shirt with a scarf wrapped on his face. This person
removed his scarf, showing his face and inquired from him as to
whether Yug had returned home. Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-
31) told him to visit Dr. Chandak’s house and verify the same,
however, he did not go upstairs and remained standing on the
footpath, where he had parked his vehicle. After sometime, Yug
returned from school, wearing his sky-blue T-shirt and blue shorts
which was his school uniform. The boy standing on the footpath
gave out a call to him. Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31)
deposed that there was some conversation between the two.
Thereafter, Yug came back to Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31),
kept his school bag on his chair and told him to leave the same at
his Apartment. Yug also told him that he was going to his father’s
clinic. Yug then sat on the boy’s purple scooty and the two drove
away. At about 16:15 hrs., Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31)
went to Dr. Chandak’s Apartment to leave Yug’s school bag when a
maid-servant in the Apartment inquired about Yug’s whereabouts.
He informed her that Yug had gone to his father’s clinic. After
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sometime, Dr. Chandak’s driver came to the building and inquired
about Yug as well. Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31) told him
that Yug had gone to his father’s clinic with one of its employees.
Dr. Chandak was thereafter contacted and he returned from his
clinic. Mrs. Chandak also rushed to the Apartment. Later, the
Police arrived at about 18:00 hrs. and started inquiry.
9. Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31) received notice regarding the
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conduct of Test Identification Parade in the Central Jail premises
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for 25 September, 2014. He identified the boy standing at Sl. No.
4 as the same youngster who came to the Apartment on a purple
scooty and took away Yug, in the TIP so conducted. This boy
disclosed his name as Arvind Singh (A-2) to the Officer who was
present there. In cross-examination, Arun Parmanand Meshram
(PW-31) deposed that Dr. Chandak returned from his clinic on the
day of incident at about 16:45 hrs. He denied that he was tutored
to give evidence in the case. He also denied that the Officer
present in the room at the TIP disclosed to him that A-2 was the
same person in this crime who was identified. He further denied
having seen the photographs of A-1 and A-2 in the Newspaper as
well as that Dr. Chandak showed him the photographs prior to TIP
conducted.
10. Rajan Tiwari (PW-2) is a shopkeeper who has a firewood shop in
front of the Apartment. He deposed that at about 16:00 hrs. on
st
1 September, 2014, he was sitting in front of his shop and saw
two unknown boys coming from the side of Chhapru Nagar on a
5 for short, ‘TIP’
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purple scooty. They stopped in front of his shop. The boy driving
the scooty alighted in front of his shop and the boy who was the
pillion rider started proceeding further with the vehicle. The boy
who alighted in front of his shop used abusive language and told
the pillion rider to go straight by riding on the wrong side of the
road. The rider did the same and went towards the side of the
Apartment. Rajan Tiwari (PW-2) deposed that there is a showroom
of Mahindra Vehicles adjoining his shop and whilst he was having
tea at a stall near such Showroom, he saw that the earlier boy
riding the scooty, wearing a red T-shirt, had returned and brought a
boy, aged about 8 years with him. This minor boy was wearing a
sky blue colour school uniform. The boy who was standing in front
of his shop went running towards the scooty and sat on the seat
behind the minor boy. The boy who sat as pillion rider on the
scooty was wearing an almond coloured shirt. Rajan Tiwari (PW-2)
deposed that he can identify both the boys on the scooty.
Thereafter, when he was called for the TIP at Central Jail, Nagpur
th
on 30 October, 2014, in the presence of the Magistrate, he
identified both A-1 and A-2 therein. In the cross-examination, Rajan
Tiwari (PW-2) deposed that on the day of incident, both A-1 and A-2
covered their face with scarfs. He also denied knowledge of news
published in the daily Newspaper.
11. Biharilal Sadhuram Chhabariya (PW-17) is another witness of the
kidnapping of the boy from the Apartment. He deposed that he
has a grocery shop in Maskasath Square, Nagpur and is also a
8
resident of the Apartment. On the day of incident, he came back
home to the Apartment for lunch on his Scooter at 16:00 hrs. He
deposed that he saw a boy stationed behind a car owned by him,
in front of the building of the Apartment. He had suspicion that
this boy, wearing red T-shirt and sitting on a purple scooty, would
cause mischief to his vehicle. Biharilal Sadhuram Chhabariya (PW-
17) deposed that the boy took out a white handkerchief and tied it
on his face. After 10-15 minutes, when Biharilal Sadhuram
Chhabariya (PW-17) came back down, after having lunch, the boy
and his vehicle were not present. It is at about 17:15 hrs., he
received a telephone call from his wife that Dr. Chandak’s son was
kidnapped by a person wearing a red T-shirt and riding a purple
scooty. Biharilal Sadhuram Chhabariya (PW-17) rushed home at
around 17:30 hrs. and at about 19:00 hrs., Dr. Chandak met him in
the campus of the building. Biharilal Sadhuram Chhabariya (PW-17)
informed Dr. Chandak that he had seen a boy of the mentioned
description standing by the road outside the Apartment.
12. Biharilal Sadhuram Chhabariya (PW-17) was called for TIP on
th
25 September, 2014 in Central Jail, Nagpur. He identified the boy
standing at Sl. No. 4 as A-2. In cross-examination, he deposed that
on the day of incident, he returned home at around 15:45-16:00
hrs. and went back to his shop again after lunch at about 16:15
hrs. on his Scooter. He denied that he had not seen the boy
wearing a handkerchief on his face.
13. From the evidence of Arun Parmanand Meshram (PW-31) and
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Biharilal Sadhuram Chhabariya (PW-17), identity of A-2 is
established whereas Rajan Tiwari (PW-2) has identified both A-1
and A-2. It is on the basis of this evidence, the prosecution
established the identity of the accused at the time of the
kidnapping of the boy, Yug.
(ii) The evidence of A-2 visiting the house of A-1.
14. The prosecution has further led evidence that A-2 went to the
house of A-1. Rupali (PW-23), the neighbour of A-1, appeared as a
witness to identify both accused. She deposed that she is a
resident of the Pandurang Nagar area and is acquainted with A-1
being her neighbour. Smt. Bhumeshwari is the mother of A-1 and
Ankush his younger brother. Ankush was also apprehended in the
crime but was dealt with by the Juvenile Justice Board being a
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Juvenile. Rupali (PW-23) deposed that at about 16:30 hrs. on 1
September, 2014, she was washing clothes in the courtyard of her
house. A-1, accompanied by a friend, arrived on his scooty. There
was a minor boy, aged about 5-6 years, sitting on the scooty
between them. A-1 gave dash to the wooden entrance gate of
the boundary wall of his house. Rupali (PW-23) told A-1 that if he
drives the vehicle in such manner, it would hurt the boy sitting in
between them. However, she deposed that she had not seen the
clothes of the boy sitting on the scooty due to plants and trees of
the courtyard shrouding the same. When she asked about the
minor boy, A-1 informed her that he is the younger brother of his
friend. A-1 parked his scooty in the courtyard. Thereafter, A-1 took
his motorbike and trio went away. Rupali (PW-23) identified A-2 as
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the person who was with A-1 on that day. She also deposed that at
about 19:30 hrs., A-1’s father took her cellphone No. 8408025528
for his use as there was no balance in his own cellphone. In the
cross-examination by A-2, she deposed that she had delivered a
th st
child on 7 October, 2014 and was in the hospital even on 1
September, 2014 for a related ailment. Thereafter she was resting,
but later got up to wash her clothes. She denied that there was any
dispute between her and the family of the accused on account of
boundary wall. Thus, the next link of the prosecution evidence is
that both the accused were seen together on a scooty with the
kidnapped boy and that the three went away on a Hero Motor bike.
(iii) The evidence of taking fuel for the Motorcycle by A-1 and A-2
with the kidnapped boy at petrol station
15. The next link of prosecution evidence is of the accused being in the
company of Yug at Sunder Auto Center, Bhokara, on Koradi Road.
The prosecution examined Hitesh Tulsiram Rathod (PW-30),
Shrikant Walmik Sharma (PW-35), Pratik Rathi (PW-48), Ajay Aba
Salunke (PW-38), Chitra Sanjay Kamat (PW-47) and Madhuri
Permanand Dhawalkar (PW-34) in respect of the CCTV camera
footage of Sunder Auto Centre, Bhokara, Nagpur.
16. Ms. Madhuri Permanand Dhawalkar (PW-34) is the witness who had
filled petrol in the motorcycle of A-1 and A-2. She deposed that on
st
1 September, 2014 at about 16:00 hrs. - 16:30 hrs., she saw that
two boys came to the petrol pump to take petrol for their Hero
Honda bike. A minor boy was seen sitting in between both the
riders. She deposed that the boy who was driving the bike wore an
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almond shirt and that the pillion rider was wearing a red one. The
minor boy sitting in between them wore a sky blue colour T-shirt.
The boy who was driving the bike paid the money for fuel and
thereafter they went away. She deposed that both A-1 and A-2
present are the same motorbike riders who arrived at petrol pump
st
on 1 September, 2014 to take fuel for their Hero Honda bike. She
also deposed that she can identify the minor boy sitting in between
them, if shown to her. She identified Yug from the photograph
(Ex.26). Ms. Madhuri Permanand Dhawalkar (PW-34) further stated
that there were eight CCTV Cameras installed at the premises of
the petrol pump. Such CCTV footage was taken by the Police on
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4 September, 2014. The Police had shown her the recording of
CCTV No. 3 of the petrol pump through which she identified A-1
and A-2. In the cross-examination by A-1, she volunteered that the
cameras were kept on for 24 hours and the services of the petrol
pump were also rendered round the clock, 24x7. In cross-
examination by A-2, she deposed that after seeing the CCTV
footage, it is difficult for her to draw an inference as to whether the
minor boy was sleeping in between both the riders, or whether he
was dead, or whether he was in a withered condition at the
relevant time.
17. The CCTV footages were played in this court during the course of
hearing as well. It shows that the boy is sitting in between the two
riders on the motor bike, but he is inert as one of the riders was
always supporting the child.
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18. There are other witnesses who have deposed regarding the
recovery of CCTV footage, and the fact that it was not tampered
with. Hitesh Tulsiram Rathod (PW-30) is an employee of Kores India
Ltd. who installed the CCTV camera at the petrol pump. Shrikant
Walmik Sharma (PW-35) is the Manager of the petrol pump who
deposed regarding the seizure of the CCTV footage by the Police.
Pratik Ram Rathi (PW-48) is a panch witness of such seizure of the
CCTV footage whereas Chitra Sanjay Kamat (PW-47), an Assistant
Director, Govt. Forensic Laboratory and Ajay Aba Salunke (PW-38)
are the witnesses of the Chemical Analyser’s Report (Ex.160) dated
st
21 November, 2014.
(iv) The evidence of last seen near Itangoti lake.
19. From the petrol pump, A-1 and A-2 moved to Itangoti Lake. Divya
Chandel (PW-9), a student of Adarsh Vidyalaya of Village
Patansaongi deposed that her friend Tanushri Keche was residing in
the neighbourhood of her house. The timing of her school was
12 noon to 17:15 hrs. The school was at a distance of 5-6 km from
her house and she and her friend used to attend the school on
bicycle. They left school at about 17:15 hrs. on their bicycle for
returning home. In doing so, they saw a motorbike parked on the
road nearby the Pump House of Itangoti Lake. Divya Chandel
(PW-9) deposed that the motorbike was in a stationary condition
and three persons were sitting on it. She further deposed that the
motorbike riders started the vehicle after seeing her and her friend
and proceeded ahead towards them. The boy who was driving the
bike wore an almond colour shirt and the pillion rider wore a red
13
one. The boy in between both riders appeared to be in a sleeping
condition. The motorbike riders proceeded towards the
Patansaongi area. She deposed that all these events occurred at
about 17:30 hrs. On 25th September, 2014, she was called for the
TIP. She identified A-1 and A-2 as the persons who were the
motorbike riders and Yug from the photograph produced by the
Police. In cross-examination by A-1, she deposed the road on which
the motorbike riders were passing on the day of the incident
leading from Dhapewada to Patansaongi village. In cross-
examination by A-2, she deposed that she had seen the motorbike
riders from a distance of 15 feet approximately. She deposed that
initially she had not seen the back side of the motorbike riders, but
had seen the same thereafter.
20. Namdeo Dhawale (PW-11) is a resident of the Village Itangoti. He
st
deposed that on 1 September, 2014 at about dusk, he was
returning home whilst herding his goats, and saw a motorbike
coming from the opposite side of the road, with two persons and a
minor boy riding upon it. The motorbike riders were about 20-22
years old whereas the minor boy sitting in between them was aged
about 8-10 years. Namdeo Dhawale (PW-11) deposed that the
minor boy was in sleeping condition as his head was tilted on the
shoulder. He attempted to proceed towards the motorbike riders
but on seeing him, the riders took a U turn and went back. It is
after 2-3 days, that the Police arrived in his village. The Police had
shown the photograph of the boy and Namdeo Dhawale (PW-11)
14
then disclosed all the facts to the Police. In cross-examination by
A-2, he deposed that there was no scarf tied on the face of
motorbike riders. The statement of this witness is relevant only for
the purpose of corroborating the statement of Divya Chandel
(PW-9) that he had seen two persons on a motorcycle with a minor
boy.
(v) Near patansaongi lake
21. The last witness who had seen A-1 and A-2 with the kidnapped boy
is Shriram Shankarrao Khadatkar (PW-10). He deposed that he has
agricultural land, within the vicinity of Tandulwani village. On
st
1 September, 2014, he came to work on his field at about 11:00-
11:30 hrs. on the motorbike of his son. He remained in the field up
till 17:15 hrs. to 17:30 hrs. and thereafter waited at the road for
the motorbike his son to go back home. Whilst doing so, he saw a
black motorbike coming from Patansaongi village upon which two
boys aged about 20-22 years were sitting along with a young boy
between them. Shriram Shankarrao Khadatkar (PW-10) deposed
that the motorbike riders went ahead up to 100-150 ft. on the road,
and then stopped their vehicle after crossing the bridge. The boy
who was driving the motorbike stepped down from the vehicle.
The pillion rider caught-hold of the boy sitting in between them.
They both parked the vehicle and the driver lifted the boy on his
shoulder, proceeding towards the culvert. In the meantime, Pw-
10’s son arrived on his motorbike and he went away towards his
th
village. He deposed that he was called for the TIP on 25
15
September, 2014 and identified both A-1 and A-2 as the persons
who were on the motorbike. He identified the clothes (Arts. No. 1,
2 and 19) which were on the person of A-1 and A-2 and the minor
boy. He further deposed that Ex.26 is the photograph of the same
boy who was on motorbike by A-1 and A-2 on the day of incident.
(B) Discovery of incriminating facts
(i) Recovery of Dead Body
22. As per the prosecution, A-1 was arrested around 14:30 hrs.
nd
whereas A-2 was arrested around 16:30 hrs. on 2 September,
2014. Mahesh Chandulal Fulwani (PW-28) is the witness of
disclosure statement (Ex.106) of A-1 along with Girish Malpani.
Mahesh Chandulal Fulwani (PW-28) deposed that while passing
from Lakadganj Police Station, he saw a crowd there which
included some of his friends and, therefore, he stopped. The Police
called him into the Police Station where the IO sought his consent
to be a Panch. The Police personnel brough a person in the
chamber of IO who disclosed his name as A-1 as well as his age
and address. Mahesh Chandulal Fulwani (PW-28) identified A-1 as
the person who was brought in the chamber of the IO. He deposed
that he along with Girish Malpani; A-1, the IO and other police
personnel boarded a police vehicle. At that time, Dr. Chandak
followed them in his car separately. The police vehicle proceeded
as per the directions of A-1 whereas the car of Dr. Chandak was
following their car. A-1 led them up to vicinity of Patansaongi
village and thereafter towards village Babulkheda after which he
16
asked them to stop the vehicle near bridge. A-1 started
proceeding towards other end of the bridge on the road and
pointed out a pathway for going beneath the bridge. A-1 went
down under the bridge, towards the Rivulet and the rest followed
him. Mahesh Chandulal Fulwani (PW-28) deposed that there were
about seven to eight compartments of 30 feet length and 6 feet
width to allow water in the Rivulet to pass through but there was
no water in it. A-1 pointed out a place in the first channel of the
Rivulet where the dead body of a young boy was found covered
with leaves and sand particles. There was also a boulder/stone
covering the face of the victim. Mahesh Chandulal Fulwani (PW-28)
further deposed that the police personnel called an ambulance and
a photographer and also removed the leaves and other
obstructions from the dead body. Thereafter, Dr. Chandak who was
standing on the road near the bridge was called to come down and
he identified the dead body as that of his son, Yug. The panchnama
of the spot commenced at 21:15 hrs. and lasted up to 23:45 hrs.
The recovery of dead body is deposed by Dr. Chandak (PW-1) as
well as Shirish Sharadchandra Varhadpande (PW-18), the
photographer. On the basis of the disclosure statement of A-1, the
dead body was recovered, concealed under the bridge in the first
channel of the Rivulet.
ii) The recovery of other incriminating facts
23. The prosecution also examined Ajay Shankarrao Samarth (PW-21)
who is panch witness of the recovery of clothes at the instance of
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A-1. A-1 had disclosed that he had concealed the clothes in his
house. Ajay Shankarrao Samarth (PW-21) deposed that A-1’s
mother was also present when A-1 entered the house along with
the panch and the police. A-1 produced an ATM Card,
handkerchief, shirt, pant which were wrapped and kept in a box. A-
1 pointed out two vehicles which were parked in front of his house,
in the courtyard - A black Honda motorbike and a purple scooty.
The footrest of the motorbike was smeared with sand particles
which were removed and seized in a plastic bag. Both the vehicles
were taken in possession.
24. Sunil Kothari (PW-26) is a Panch witness of the disclosure
statement of A-2. A-2 had disclosed that the blue T-shirt of the
deceased was taken from his person and thrown it in the Rivulet
located within the vicinity of the Village Lonkhairi. A-2 showed his
readiness to point out such place. One Arun is another Panch
witness of A-2’s disclosure statement. A-2 led the Panches and the
Police to the spot mentioned, where he had thrown the clothes and
pointed out such place. The IO called the sweepers for proceeding
towards the spot and instructed them to search for the clothes.
After searching for about 45 to 60 minutes, a sweeper fished out a
blue colour T-shirt from the the Rivulet. A-2 stated that it was the
same T-shirt of the deceased which was thrown by him in the
Rivulet.
25. Harsh Prakashchand Firodiya (PW-29) is a witness of disclosure
18
th
statement of A-2 made on 9 September, 2014 at about 19:00 hrs.
(Ex.111). The same was made in the presence of another Panch
witness as well, one Sunil Ajitmal Kothari. Harsh Prakashchand
Firodiya (PW-29) deposed that A-2 took the Police and the Panches
to his house, at some distance from Jaripatka Police Station. A-2’s
father was present outside, when A-2 entered his house. In his
room, A-2 removed a bag from an almirah within which there was a
Maroon school bag, a red T-shirt, black jeans, a cream shirt, and a
white knotted handkerchief. After opening the knot of such
handkerchief, A-2 produced an ear ring kept therein, which was
disclosed to be that of the deceased. The accused also took out a
pair of sandals as well as the bicycle kept in the adjoining room
used by him in the commission of the crime. All these articles
were taken in possession vide recovery memo (Ex.111/A). Further,
Dr. Chandak (PW-1) has identified the ear ring produced to be that
of his son. The prosecution also examined Pravin Chudamanji
Ganuwala (PW-20) who was a witness of the identification of the
red T-shirt being one supplied to the staff of Dr. Chandak (PW-1) at
his clinic.
26. Prashant Pandhari Motghare (PW-43) is a witness of another
th
disclosure statement (Ex.192) suffered by A-2 on 11 September,
2014 at about 14:30 hrs. He marked the place where the murder
of the deceased was committed by throttling and smothering.
(C) Demand of Ransom
27. Manoj Thakkar (PW-4) is the panch witness in whose presence the
personal search of both the accused was conducted. From A-1, the
19
police recovered a black, Max Mobile Company cell phone and two
SIM cards. From the personal search of A-2, a black-silver Samsung
cell phone and two SIM cards were taken into possession.
28. Dr. Chandak (PW-1) deposed that he received a call at 20:17 hrs.
st
on his cell phone from the landline No. 3220601 on 1 September,
2014. The caller disclosed his name as Mohsin Khan and asked Dr.
Chandak (PW-1) to bring him Rs.10 crores as Yug, PW-1’s son, was
in his custody. Thereafter at about 20:40 hrs. on the same day, he
received another call on his cell phone from the phone No.
8380927706. The caller disclosed that he should bring Rs.5 crores
on the following day at about 15:00 hrs. in Mumbai. Dr. Chandak
(PW-1) tried to ask him about the place in Mumbai but the caller
disconnected the phone.
29. The prosecution produced a copy of the customer application form
of landline No.3220601 as Exs.179 and 179/1 whereas the Call
6
Detail Record of landline No. 3220601 has been produced on
record as Ex.178/1. There was a call to PW-1’s cell phone at
20:17:28 hours. It has come on record that such number was that
of a Public Call Office (PCO). However, it is not available on record
as to who is the owner of the PCO was as well as who had seen the
person making the call. The customer application form of phone
No. 8380927706 is produced on record as Exs.215/1 and 215/2
whereas the CDR is Ex.214/1. There was a call at 20:38:03 hrs. of
31 seconds to Dr. Chandak (PW-1). Mohandas Mitharam Balani
(PW-16) is the person who owns the PCO from where the second
6 for short, ‘CDR’
20
call was made. He deposed that there was a coin box telephone
installed on the counter of his shop and that at around 20:30 hrs.
st
on 1 September, 2014, a boy came to his shop on a bicycle,
wanting to make a call from it. Mohandas Mitharam Balani (PW-16)
saw that the boy was talking on the phone from his coin box said,
“Paanch Karod Leke Ana” (Bring Five Crore Rupees). He also
deposed that before he could pay more attention, the boy left the
shop and went away on his bicycle. Mohandas Mitharam Balani
(PW-16) thereafter received information about the conduct of a TIP
th
on 30 October, 2014 at the Central Jail. He identified the person
making the call from the persons present therein. Such person
disclosed his name as Arvind Singh to the Magistrate. Vikas Mali
(PW-41) is the witness who produced the CDR of the cellphone of
Dr. Chandak (PW-1) vide Ex.187/2. He had also prepared the
7
certificate under Section 65(B) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
which was produced vide Ex.187/3.
30. Dattaram Shantaram Angre (PW-46) produced the CDR of Phone
No. 8380927706, from which the second ransom call was made.
The same is Ex.218/1 whereas the certificate issued under Section
65(B) of the Evidence Act is Ex.218/4 and the customer application
forms are Exs.218/2 and 218/3. The CDR of cellphone No.
7745855431 of Smt. Bhumeshwari Daware, A-1’s mother, is Ex.219
and Ex 219/1 whereas the certificate issued under Section 65(B) of
the Evidence Act is Ex.219/4 and the customer application forms
7 for short, ‘Evidence Act’
21
are Exs.219/2 and 219/3.
(D) Motive and Conspiracy
31. Motive and conspiracy are quite interlinked in the present appeals
and are, therefore, taken up for consideration together. Firstly, the
motive herein is the grievance of A-1 against Dr. Chandak (PW-1).
The daughter of Naresh Machale (PW-6) was a patient of Dr.
Chandak (PW-1). Naresh Machale (PW-6) deposed that on
| 4 | th | August, 2014, Dr. Chandak (PW-1) told him to pay of sum of Rs. |
|---|
500/- towards the treatment of his daughter but the person at
reception charged him Rs. 600/-. The person who charged Rs. 600/-
was identified by him as A-1. On his second visit, Dr. Chandak
(PW-1) told Naresh Machale (PW-6) to deposit Rs. 1500/- towards
the treatment of his daughter but A-1 who was at the reception
again, asked him to deposit Rs. 1600/-. Later, Naresh Machale
(PW-6) informed Dr. Chandak (PW-1) about the extra charges and
Dr. Chandak (PW-1) told him to visit his clinic for the verification of
the same.
32. Dr. Chandak (PW-1) deposed that he confronted A-1 as to why he
had charged extra sums from Naresh Machale (PW-6), but A-1 did
not accept his fault and claimed innocence. He told him that he will
confront him with Naresh Machale (PW-6) on the following day but
when Naresh Machale (PW-6) came to the clinic, A-1 was not on
duty. Thereafter, A-1 stopped attending PW-1’s clinic altogether
and left his employment without giving any information to him.
33. The excess amount being charged from Naresh Machale (PW-6) has
22
been corroborated by Sonam Meshram (PW-19), A-1’s friend. She
deposed that A-1 disclosed to her that he was charging Rs. 100/- to
Rs. 200/- more from Dr. Chandak’s patients. She further deposed
that A-1 told her that Dr. Chandak was paying him a meagre salary
of Rs. 3000/- whilst taking lot of work. Sonam Meshram (PW-19)
also deposed that A-1 abused Dr. Chandak and said that he would
teach him a lesson.
34. It appears that A-1 had an ambition to be rich at the earliest. Such
intention is proved by the prosecution examining Sandeep Katre
(PW-8), another friend of A-1’s. Sandeep Katre (PW-8) deposed
that A-1 was always in a hurry to become an affluent person. He
stated that on the day of Raksha Bandhan in 2014, A-1 came to his
house with A-2. A-1 inquired from him as to when and in what
manner his employer carries the cash from the office. Sandeep
Katre (PW-8) shared with him the relevant time during which his
employer carries the bag of cash. A-1 thereafter told Sandeep
Katre (PW-8) that whenever his employer starts proceeding with
cash out of the office, he should inform him on cellphone so that he
would be able to intercept PW-8’s employer and loot the cash from
him. A-1 stated that such cash would be distributed among all of
th
them. On 14 August, 2014, Sandeep Katre (PW-8) received a
phone call from A-1 as to whether his employer would carry cash
from his office. He told A-1 that there was less cash and, therefore,
not to come on that day. On 16th August, 2014, he again received
call from A-1 who informed him that his friend A-2, and two others
23
came with full preparation and awaited his phone call, but he did
not give him any response. A-1 repeatedly tried to contact
Sandeep Katre (PW-8) on his mobile phone inquiring about his
employer. Again, on the following day, A-1 informed him that he
would come with full preparation and was waiting for his call.
Sandeep Katre (PW-8) deposed that he again did not give them any
information. A-1 called Sandeep Katre (PW-8) to meet him at Pili
River area and upon reaching there he found that A-1, A-2 and two
others, who were friends of A-1 were all present. A-1 disclosed to
him that he was intending to kidnap a boy for ransom whose father
was an affluent person. He also stated that he would get a huge
amount after such kidnapping, but would disclose the name of the
boy to be kidnapped later on. A-1 further told him that the
kidnapped boy would be kept at his house under the surveillance
of his younger brother Ankush. Sandeep Katre (PW-8) deposed
that he along with A-1’s other two friends opposed A-1 for wanting
th
to commit such illegality, but A-1 went away on his bike. On 30
August, 2014, A-1 called him on his cellphone No. 9595517745 and
told him that he was intending to complete the task of kidnapping
st
on the following day. Again, on 1 September, 2014 at about
15:30 hrs. to 15:45 hrs., A-1 contacted him from his cellphone and
told him that he wanted to kidnap a young boy. Sandeep Katre
(PW-8) told him that he does not want to get involved in such type
of illegal activities. However, on the following day, Sandeep Katre
(PW-8) came to know that Dr. Chandak’s son was kidnapped. He
24
contacted Dr. Chandak and informed him that such act of
kidnapping might have been committed by his employee i.e. A-1.
th
The police called Sandeep Katre (PW-8) on 4 September, 2014
and the Magistrate recorded his statement under Section 164
Cr.P.C.
35. Sonam Meshram (PW-19), as mentioned earlier, who had deposed
that A-1 used to charge excess amounts from Dr. Chandak’s
patients had also deposed that A-1 proposed to her for marriage.
However, she asked him how he would bear the expenditure of
Rs.2 lakhs to be incurred for her course, when he had previously
disclosed to her that he left Dr. Chandak’s employment as he was
supposedly paying him a meagre salary. A-1 told her that she
should not worry about the money as he would be earning huge
amounts after completing a job. A-1 then told her that he was
planning to abduct the son of a rich person. Sonam Meshram (PW-
st
19) further deposed that on 1 September, 2014, she made call to
A-1 from the cellphone of her room partner, but A-1 did not
respond. At about 11:30 hrs., when she contacted A-1 again, he
told her that he was busy in work. All these calls find mention in
CDR of A-1. The record shows that calls were exchanged between
Sonam Meshram ( PW-19) and A-1 through the mobile of her friend
and room partner at 07:31:55 hrs.; 08:45:56 hrs., 08:46:51 hrs.,
11:36:46 hrs., 11:38:34 hrs. and 11:42:20 hrs. All these calls show
tower location as that in Vinoba Bhave Nagar. There is also a call
from A-1 to A-2 at 16:12:54 hrs. and the location of the tower is
25
Guru Darshan Complex Chhapru Nagar, Lakadganj Nagpur. There
are calls between A-1 and Ankush (A-3), the juvenile brother of A-1,
at 16:17:44 hrs.,16:56:08 hrs. and 17:36:53 hrs. as well.
36. Nilesh Gosavi (PW-25) who was posted at Lakadganj Police Station
as PSO had made a call to A-1 at 17:50:49 hrs., when the tower
location on record is at Patansaongi Tal Saoner. Thereafter,
Satyanarayan Jaiswal (PW-50), the Investigating Officer (IO) had
called A-1 at 18:33:59 hrs., when the tower location is at Vinoba
Bhave Nagar i.e. the area of A-1’s house. The IO made a second
call to A-1 at 18:46:52 hrs. when the tower location was near the
Itwari Railway Station i.e. on way to Police Station. There was also
a call from the mobile number of Rupali (PW-23) to A-1 at 18:50:24
hrs. A-1 had made a call to another mobile no. 7745855431 at
19:00:53 hrs. Further, there is another call by A-1 to N.T. Gosawi
(PW-25) at 19:49:06 hrs. These calls are from the Lakadganj area
as per location tower.
37. Dharmendra Yadav (PW-24) an employee of Dr. Chandak, deposed
that he had received a call from A-2. He was acquainted with A-1
as he was also working in the clinic. He deposed that A-1 used to
chat with him about big things. Therefore, he believed that he was
a person of great influence. He sought his help for admission in
college. A-1 asked him to meet him in the college and bring
Rs.5,000/- with him. A-1 introduced A-2 to him as well, who had
taken his mobile number at that time. There were three calls
exchanged between A-2 and Dharmendra Yadav (PW-24) from
26
19:28:15 hrs. to 19:32:50 hrs. of duration of 80 seconds, 31
seconds and 20 seconds when the mobile of A-2 was covered by
tower location in Vinoba Bhave Nagar. From the call details of A-2,
it transpires that A-2 was in Vinoba Bhave Nagar from 18:41:45
hrs. till 19:33:41 hrs. During this period, A-2 made a call to Pankaj
Khurpade (PW-15) at 19:33:41 hrs. Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15)
further deposed that A-2 sought Dr. Chandak’s number. The last
call at 20:55:35 hrs. had been made by A-2 to A-3 when tower
location was Zingabai Takali Koradi Road, Nagpur, i.e. the road from
Vinobha Bhave Nagar to Patansaongi Lake.
(E) Corroborative Evidence
38. The prosecution also examined Chitra Kamat (PW-47) who was an
Assistant Director in the Government Forensic Laboratory, Kalina,
Mumbai. Chitra Kamat (PW-47) received two parcels, one
containing hard disks and CD’s and another containing four sealed
envelopes. In one of the envelopes there were photographs of a
vehicle whereas in the other three, there were photographs of a
person for analysis. She assigned all the articles to Ajay Salunke
(PW-38) for analysis in the forensic laboratory. Ajay Salunke
| (PW-38) prepared a report on 22 | nd | November, 2014. He deposed |
|---|
that the CD had six videos files and such video files were
continuous and not edited at any point of time. He matched the
photographs on the CD with the photographs referred to by the
Police. He prepared a report Exh.160. As per the report, the person
in the videos resembles the photographs (Ex. 2, 3, 4 and 5) i.e. the
27
photographs of motor cycle, the two accused A-1, A-2 and the
deceased victim.
39. The CDRs of A-1 (Ex.176/1) corroborate the six phone calls
exchanged between A-1 and Sonam Meshram ( PW-19) on
st
1 September, 2014 from 07:31:55 hrs. till 11:42:20 hrs., as
deposed by Sonam Meshram ( PW-19). Such call details further
corroborate that Pankaj Khurpade ( PW-15), an employee at Dr.
Chandak’s clinic had received a phone call from A-1 on his mobile
wherein, A-1 inquired about Dr. Chandak and his wife. Such call
was made soon before the kidnapping at 15:20:59 hrs. and stands
corroborated by the statement of Dharmendra Yadav ( PW-24).
Dharmendra Yadav ( PW-24) had deposed that he had received a
call from A-1 to find out as to whether Dr. Chandak and his wife are
in the clinic. Such CDRs also corroborate the statement of
Sandeep Katre (PW-8), when he deposed that he received a phone
st
call from A-1 on 1 September, 2014 at about 15:30 hrs. to 15:45
hrs. informing him that he wanted to kidnap a boy. The CDR shows
that such call was exchanged between A-1 and Sandeep Katre (PW-
8) at 15:44:31 hrs. The CDRs also corroborate the call made by
N.T. Gosawi (PW-25) and the IO to A-1.
40. On the other hand, the CDRs of A-2 (Ex.150/1) corroborate the calls
exchanged between A-2 and Dharmendra Yadav (PW-24) on
st
1 September, 2014 from 19:28 hrs. till 19:32 hrs. to inquire about
Dr. Chandak’s contact details, as also the call made by A-2 to
Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15), who had given the mobile number of Dr.
28
Chandak to A-2. The CDR’s also corroborate the call A-2 had made
to Dr. Chandak at 19:39:17 hrs. presumably to verify the number
given by Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15). It is thereafter the ransom call
was made at 20:53:18 hrs. and received by Dr. Chandak.
Mohandas Mitharam Balani (PW-16) has also corroborated such call
from his PCO. Thus, the oral testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses stand corroborated by the CDRs of both the accused.
Submissions on behalf of A-1
41. Before this Court, Mr. Yug Chaudhary, learned counsel for A-1
vehemently argued that both the Courts have overlooked material
evidence that A-1 was in Police custody from 18:50 hrs. on
st
1 September, 2014, though his formal arrest was reflected in the
nd
records on 2 September, 2014 at 17:10 hrs. The disclosure
statement was, thus, a direct result of his illegal custody and was
actuated by undue influence and coercion. It was also argued that
since A-1 was in custody of the Police, a fact admitted by the IO,
A-1 could not have played any role in the ransom call made on
st
1 September, 2014 at 20:38 hrs. Reliance herein was placed upon
8
Abdul Subhan & Anr. v. Emperor .
42. It was argued that the prosecution had not led any evidence to
suggest that the deceased died before 18:00 hrs. i.e. the period
during which the deceased can be said to be in custody of the
accused as A-1 had received a call from N.T. Gosawi (PW-25) at
17:50 hrs., when he was in the area of Patansaongi lake which is
about 26 kms and 33 minutes away from his house. Since he was
8 AIR 1940 All. 46
29
at his house by 18:33 hrs., he must have left the area of
Patansaongi lake latest by 18:00 hrs. No question has been put to
A-1 in the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the deceased
died before 18:00 hrs. It was argued that A-1 can be held guilty of
an offence under Section 302 IPC only if death is proved to have
been caused before 18:00 hrs. i.e. before he left the Patansaongi
lake. Reliance was placed upon Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v.
9
State of Madhya Bharat and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
10
State of Maharashtra . Further, a recent judgment of this Court
11
reported as Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam was also
referred to, to contend that the statement of an accused under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. is required to be considered. Non-consideration
therein would vitiate conviction.
43. It was argued that the deceased was sedated at the time of the
act of his smothering, a fact made out from the CCTV footage
played in the Court. However, the 13 abrasions on the face and
neck of the deceased shows that he resisted smothering and,
therefore, could not have been killed prior to 18:00 hrs. Since there
is a possibility that the deceased died after 18:00 hrs. i.e. after the
accused has surrendered, conviction for an offence under Section
302 IPC could not be sustained. It was further argued that the
ransom call was made after the arrest of A-1, therefore, the
conviction of A-1 for an offence under Section 364A IPC was not
sustainable.
9 AIR 1953 SC 468
10 (1984) 4 SCC 116
11 (2019) 13 SCC 289
30
44. The learned counsel for A-1 also argued that A-1 surrendered in the
Lakadganj Police Station at 18:50 hrs. Such surrender terminated
any conspiracy as he had withdrawn from it. The subsequent
conduct of a ransom call by his co-conspirator would not bind A-1,
especially in view of him being in custody when the ransom call
was made at 20:17 hrs. and 20:38 hrs. Reliance herein was
placed upon a judgment of this Court reported as State v. Nalini
12
& Ors. . It was also argued that Madhuri Dhawalkar (PW-34) or
Shriram Khadatkar (PW-10) had not noticed any injury on the
person of the boy. There was no evidence of any blood or saliva on
the clothes of A-1 when the child was sitting in between two
accused or when A-1 had carried the child on his shoulders, as
deposed by Shriram Khadatkar (PW-10). It was, thus, argued that
if the victim had these injuries, the blood or saliva was bound to be
on A-1’s clothes. In this light, such injuries were possibly caused
after 18:00 hrs. when A-1 had left his co-conspirator from the
Patansaongi lake.
45. It was further argued that A-1 may have had the intention to
kidnap for ransom, but since the ransom call was made after the
conspiracy terminated and there was no evidence of threat to
cause death in the event of the ransom not being paid, an offence
under Section 363 IPC alone can be made out. It is also argued
that when A-2 had allegedly made ransom call, such call
necessarily meant that the victim was alive, as human conduct in
12 (1999) 5 SCC 253
31
terms of Section 114 of the Evidence Act defies the logic of making
a ransom call when a victim has already been killed. Therefore, A-
1 could not have participated in the killing of the deceased in view
of the fact that he was in Police custody from 18:50 hrs. It was
also pointed out that since there was no repeat call of ransom, it
only showed that the victim was killed after the ransom call was
made at 20:38 hrs. It was argued that the intention of the accused
under Section 34 IPC must continue to exist till the completion of
the crime of the offence. Reliance herein was placed upon Jai
13
Bhagwan & Ors. v. State of Haryana and Suresh & Anr. v.
14
State of U.P.
46. Further, it was submitted that the argument that the victim died
before 18:00 hrs. is an argument raised in appeal before this Court
for the first time and, therefore, the prosecution cannot be
permitted to change the manner of commission of crime. Reliance
was placed upon Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. v. Raja
15
Kamakshya Narain Singh, etc. and Sri Venkataramana
16
Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. .
47. Learned Counsel for A-1 also disputed the recovery of the dead
body pursuant to the disclosure statement suffered by A-1. It was
argued that in such disclosure statement, no fact has been
disclosed about the manner of causing death. The disclosure
statement has to be recorded in the exact words used by the
13 (1999) 3 SCC 102
14 (2001) 3 SCC 673
15 AIR 1956 SC 446
16 AIR 1958 SC 255
32
accused as held by this Court in State of Karnataka v. David
17
Rozario & Anr. It was argued that since the manner of killing is
not mentioned in the disclosure statement, A-1 cannot be held
guilty of causing death.
48. In the alternative, it was argued that the recovery of the dead body
will only lead to an inference that the accused had knowledge of
the spot of concealment. It was argued that as per the statement
of S.K. Jaiswal (PW-50), the IO, A-1 confessed to crime on
interrogation but it has not been explained that how and why the
disclosure statement came to be recorded almost 24 hours after
his surrender. Learned counsel for A-1 also doubted the recovery
th
of clothes and the handkerchief from the house of A-1 on 8
September, 2014. Such handkerchief had two blood stains, one of
the deceased and the other of an unknown male. There was a
blood stain on the jeans as well. The blood stain on the jeans and
unknown blood stain on the handkerchief matched. Therefore, A-1
could not be held guilty of taking life of the deceased in the
absence of blood stain of the victim on his clothes.
Submissions on behalf of A-2
49. On the other hand, learned counsel for A-2 argued that there was
no motive attributed to A-2 as the prosecution relied upon
circumstantial evidence. There was no evidence of A-2 conspiring
with A-1 or that he had any idea about the real motive of A-1 of
taking vengeance from Dr. Chandak (PW-1), the complainant. A-1
first planned to execute the kidnapping with the help of Sandeep
17 (2002) 7 SCC 728
33
Katre (PW-8). This was discussed at the time when both A-1 and
Sandeep Katre (PW-8) were conspiring to loot the employer of
Sandeep Katre (PW-8). It was also argued that Rupali (PW-23) had
identified A-2 in the witness box for the first time as no TIP was
conducted to identify the A-2 by her. Further, it was submitted that
Rupali (PW-23) admitted that she had delivered a child by
th
caesarean surgery on 7 October, 2014 and was advised bed rest
st
on 1 September, 2014. Therefore, it is highly improbable that
during the advance stage of her pregnancy, she was able to wash
clothes and see both the accused along with a minor child.
50. Learned counsel for A-2 further argued that there was no TIP
conducted to identify the accused by Namdeo Dhawale (PW-11). It
was obvious that the said witness had seen the motorbike of the
accused in a running condition when he was managing his herd of
goats. The testimony of Divya Chandel (PW-9) was also criticized
for the reason that she saw the motorbike from a distance of 15
feet as it would take only 2-3 seconds for the motorbike to pass
through, therefore, it was highly improbable that she was able to
see the faces of the motorbike riders. It was also argued that the
dead body was recovered at the instance of A-1. A-2 remained near
the bridge and did not take any part in the commission of the
crime of murder of the minor child and, therefore, in all
probabilities, the crime has been committed by A-1 between 17:30
hrs. to 18:00 hrs. to wreak vengeance upon the complainant.
51. It was also argued that veracity of demand of ransom by A-2 was
34
doubtful. The FIR was lodged at 17:10 hrs. but the IO did not make
any arrangement for the recording of the ransom call. The IO did
not take the voice sample of the accused for identification by Dr.
Chandak (PW-1). A-2 was said to be identified by Mohandas
th
Mitharam Balani (PW-16) on 30 October, 2014 after much delay.
Further, the statement of Mohandas Mitharam Balani (PW-16) was
also doubted, that he had heard A-2 raising a demand of ransom as
a PCO would have some kind of privacy mechanism between the
caller and the owner.
52. It was further argued that the disclosure statement in respect of
articles said to be concealed in house of A-2 did not stand proved
rd
as his house was locked after 3 September, 2014. Haribhau
Dahake (DW-1), the landlord of the said house deposed that the
rd
family of A-2 had left the house on 3 September, 2014 and did not
return whereas the father of A-2 came to pay rent in October,
2014. It was also argued that an offence under Section 364A IPC is
not made out against A-2 as the ransom call did not include a
threat to life, which is a necessary ingredient of an offence under
Section 364A IPC.
53. Apart from disputing the findings recorded by both the courts, it
was argued that the sentence of death imposed upon the accused
was not justified as the accused were young, students of
undergraduate classes, had jobs to sustain them and had no
criminal antecedents. It was not a rarest of the rare case,
warranting death sentence. In respect of A-1, it was additionally
35
argued that A-1 immediately surrendered at the first available
opportunity and he did not even delay or tried to abscond. He fully
cooperated with the investigation. He confessed to the IO which
shows remorse.
Findings
st
i) Whether A-1 was arrested on 1 September 2014
54. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and find
no reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the
trial court and the High Court in the matter of conviction. The
entire sheet anchor of the argument of learned counsel for A-1 is
st
that A-1 was in Police custody from 18:50 hrs. on 1 September,
2014 and such aspect has not been considered either by the trial
court or by the High Court. In the written notes of the arguments
submitted by A-1 before the trial court, nothing has been raised
st
regarding A-1 being in custody from 18:50 hrs. on 1 September,
2014. Such an argument was not raised for good reasons, which
are delineated hereinafter.
55. Manoj Thakkar (PW-4) is the witness of seizure of mobile phones
and sim cards of A-1 and A-2. A-1 was arrested at 14:30 hrs.
nd
whereas A-2 was arrested at 16:30 hrs. on 2 September, 2014
as per column 8 of the arrest memo. 17.10 hrs. is the time, when
the accused were in the Police Station Lakadganj. As per
statement of Manoj Thakkar (PW-4), he was called upon to become
panch witness when he was returning from Wardhman Nagar to his
residence at Qweta Colony in Nagpur. Manoj Thakkar (PW-4)
36
deposed that the Police took personal search of the accused in his
presence and recovered the mobile phones. However, no cross-
examination has been conducted that the personal search was
done at any point earlier than the arrest. Still further, A-1 had
made a call to N.T. Gosawi (PW-25) at 19:49:06 hrs. An accused in
custody will not be permitted to make a call to a Police official. It
corroborates the stand of the prosecution that A-1 was arrested on
nd
2 September, 2014. Still further, the IO had admitted in the
st
cross-examination that he called A-1 in the Police Station on 1
September, 2014 for investigation. He denied that A-1 was in
police custody. He deposed that A-1 visited police station on the
day after he had called A-1 on his cell phone. A-1 was called for
inquiry as he was one of the former employees of the clinic of Dr.
Chandak.
56. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test
his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is; or
to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer
to such questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may
directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Section
146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross-
examined to bring forth inconsistencies, discrepancies and to prove
the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest
st
on 1 September, 2014 from 18:50 hrs., therefore, it was required
for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution
witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that
37
the accused was shown to be arrested around 19:00 hrs. is an
incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ex.17). In Col. 8, it has been
specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on
nd
2 September, 2014 at 14:30 hrs. at Wanjri Layout, Police Station,
Kalamna. The time i.e. 17:10 hrs. mentioned in Col. 2, appears to
be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. As per
the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an
employee of Dr. Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing red
colour T-shirt which was given by Dr. Chandak to his employees. A-
nd
1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2
September, 2014. Since, no cross-examination was conducted on
any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of
st
the arrest, such an argument that the accused was arrested on 1
September, 2014 at 18:50 hrs. is not tenable.
18
57. The House of Lords in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn
considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord
Chancellor Herschell, held that it is absolutely essential to the
proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a
witness if not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his
attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination
showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take
his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It
was held as under:
“ Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to
me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a
cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is
18 (1894) VI The Reports 67 (HL)
38
not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his
attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-
examination showing that that imputation is intended to
be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as
a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is
impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have
been able to do if such questions had been put to him,
the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that
the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that
he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have
always understood that if you intend to impeach a
witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give
him an opportunity of making any explanation which is
open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a
rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case,
but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with
witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made
upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it
has bene complained of as undue; but it seems to me
that a cross-examination of a witness which errs in the
direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to
leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards to
suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a
point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he
has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention
to impeach the credibility of the story which he is
telling.”
58. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under:
“My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the
evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily
express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to
the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my
mind nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not
to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they
have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them
an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very
often to defend their own character, and, not having
given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury
afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although
not one question has been directed either to their credit
or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to.”
| This Court in a judgment reported as | | State of U.P. | v. | Nahar |
|---|
39
| , | quoted from | Browne | to hold that | | i |
|---|
examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW-1
remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the
High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable
right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the
opposite party. This Court held as under: -
“ 13. It may be noted here that that part of the
statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the
accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the
explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained
unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the
High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a
valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered
in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that
provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act
by allowing a witness to be questioned:
| (1) to test his veracity, | |
|---|
| |
| (2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life,<br>or | |
| |
| (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character,<br>although the answer to such questions might tend<br>directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose<br>or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty<br>or forfeiture.” | |
| |
60. This Court in a judgment reported as Muddasani Venkata
20
Narsaiah (Dead) through LRs. v. Muddasani Sarojana laid
down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination
of witnesses of opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in
cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely
technical one. It was held as under:
“15. Moreover, there was no effective cross-
examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with
19 (1998) 3 SCC 561
20 (2016) 12 SCC 288
40
| respect to factum of execution of sale deed, PW 1 and | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to factum of | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| execution of sale deed. The cross-examination is a | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| matter of substance not of procedure one is required to | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| put one's own version in cross-examination of opponent. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| The effect of non-cross-examination is that the | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| statement of witness has not been disputed. The effect | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| of not cross-examining the witnesses has been | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| considered by this Court in | | | | | | | | | | | | Bhoju Mandal | | | | | | v. | Debnath | |
| Bhagat | | | [Bhoju Mandal | | | | | | v. | Debnath Bhagat | | | | | , AIR 1963 SC | | | | | |
| 1906] . This Court repelled a submission on the ground | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| that the same was not put either to the witnesses or | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| suggested before the courts below. Party is required to | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| put his version to the witness. If no such questions are | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| put the Court would presume that the witness account | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| has been accepted as held in | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Chuni Lal Dwarka | | | | | | |
| Nath | | v. | Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ | Chuni Lal | | |
| Dwarka Nath | | | | | v. | | Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd | | | | | | | | | | | | | ., 1957 |
| SCC OnLine P&H 177 : AIR 1958 P&H 440] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 16. | | | | | | In | Maroti Bansi Teli | | | | | | | v. | | | Radhabai | [ | Maroti Bansi | | | |
|---|
| Teli | | | | v. | Radhabai | | | | , 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128 : AIR 1945 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nag 60] , it has been laid down that the matters sworn | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| pleadings or cross-examination by other party must be | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| in | | A.E.G. Carapiet | | | | | | | | v. | | | A.Y. Derderian | | | | | | | | [ | A.E.G. |
| Carapie | | | | | | t v | . | A.Y. Derderian | | , 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44 : AIR | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1961 Cal 359] has laid down that the party is obliged to | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| examination is one of essential justice and not merely | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Court in | | | | | | Kuwarlal Amritlal | | | | | | v. | | Rekhlal Koduram | | | | | | [Kuwarlal | | |
| Amritlal | | | | | | v. | Rekhlal Koduram | | | | | | , 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35 : | | | | | | | | | |
| AIR 1950 Nag 83] has laid down that when attestation is | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| not specifci ally challenged and witness is not cross- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| for him to say that the document was attested. If the | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bench of the Patna High Court in | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Karnidan | | |
| Sarda | | | | | v. | Sailaja Kanta Mitra | | | | | | | | [ | Karnidan Sarda | | | | | v. | Sailaja | |
| Kanta Mitra | | | | | | | | , 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288 : AIR 1940 Pat | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 683] has laid down that it cannot be too strongly | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| emphasised that the system of administration of justice | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| allows of cross-examination of opposite party's | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
41
| witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and | |
|---|
| it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not | |
| tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily | |
| accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High | |
| Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the fni dings | |
| of the fri st appellate court as to the factum of execution | |
| of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.” | |
61. The rule of evidence is common both to the civil and the criminal
innocence in favour of the accused as a general rule, and it is the
duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused; to put it
in other words, the accused is presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is established by the prosecution. This Court held as follows:
“18 ….. In India, as it is in England, there is a
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused as a
general rule, and it is the duty of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused; to put it in other words,
the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is
established by the prosecution. But when an accused
relies upon the general exceptions in the Indian Penal
Code or on any special exception or proviso contained in
any other part of the Penal Code, or in any law defining
an offence, Section 105 of the Evidence Act raises a
presumption against the accused and also throws a
burden on him to rebut the said presumption. Under
that Section the Court shall presume the absence of
circumstances bringing the case within any of the
exceptions, that is, the court shall regard the non-
existence of such circumstances as proved till they are
disproved……..”
| In | | Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar | | v. | | State of Gujarat |
|---|
court while examining an argument of the accused that he was
medically insane person, it was held that it is a fundamental
21 AIR 1962 SC 605
22 AIR 1964 SC 1563
42
principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to
be innocent and, therefore, the fact that the accused was
incapable of knowing the nature of his act, the burden of proving
the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the
exception under Section 105 of Evidence Act lies on the accused.
It was held as under:
“ 5. ..…It is a fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case
of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused caused death with the requisite intention
described in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This
general burden never shifts and it always rests on the
prosecution. But, as Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code
provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the
time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of
mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or
what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.
This being an exception, under Section 105 of the
Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within the said
exception lies on the accused; ……….”
63. Thus, the prosecution is required to bring home the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It is open to an accused to raise such
reasonable doubt by cross-examination of the prosecution
witnesses to discredit such witness in respect of truthfulness and
veracity. However, where the statement of prosecution witnesses
cannot be doubted on the basis of the touchstone of truthfulness,
contradictions and inconsistencies, and the accused wants to
assert any particular fact which cannot be made out from the
prosecution evidence, it is incumbent upon the accused to cross-
43
examine the relevant witnesses to that extent. The witness, in
order to impeach the truthfulness of his statement, must be cross-
examined to seek any explanation in respect of a version, which
accused wants to rely upon rather to raise an argument at the trial
or appellate stage to infer a fact when the opportunity given was
not availed of as part of fair play while appreciating the statement
of the witnesses. Thus, we hold that a party intending to bring
evidence to impeach or contradict the testimony of a witness must
give an opportunity to explain or answer when the witness is in the
witness box.
64. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses does not lead to any
inference that A-1 was in Police custody from 18:50 hrs. He was
only called for an inquiry for the reason that the employees
engaged by Dr. Chandak used to wear a red colour T-shirt in his
clinic and as the information at that stage was that one of the
accused was wearing a red colour T-shirt, A-1 was called for
st
information. His presence in the Police Station on 1 September,
2014 was only as a suspect. He became an accused only when he
nd
was arrested on 2 September, 2014 at 14:30 hrs.
65. Mr. Chaudhary also pointed out that the CDR of A-1 (Ex.176/1)
shows that his mobile phone was always in the range of Police
Station Lakadganj from 18:50 hrs. The best witness to seek
information of his arrest was the IO. He denied the arrest on
st
1 September, 2014. The other witness who could be cross-
examined was Manoj Thakkar (PW-4). But he was not cross
44
examined in this respect. At this stage, it is not open to this Court
to infer any such fact, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary on record. He had access to his mobile all through before
nd
his arrest on 2 September, 2014. An accused will not be provided
access to mobile phone when in custody. He has called N.T. Gosawi
st
(PW-25) at 19:49:06 hrs. on 1 September, 2014. In fact, the
statement of DW-1, the mother of the A-1, contradicts the entire
st
argument of A-1 voluntary going to police station on 1
September, 2014. She deposed that 4-5 policemen had taken A-1
from her house as per the information of Ankush, the juvenile.
Thus, the accused has not been able to create doubt in respect of
nd
his arrest on 2 September 2014.
66. Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15) deposed that he was employed as an
attendant in the clinic of Dr. Chandak. He is acquainted with other
staff members of the clinic including Dharmendra Yadav and A-1.
He deposed that at 19:30 hrs., he received a phone call from A-2.
The caller disclosed his name as Arvind, friend of A-1. He wanted
cell number of Dr. Chandak. He gave the cell number of Dr.
Chandak to him. Such statement is corroborated by CDRs of A-2.
67. Mr. Chaudhary admitted the presence of A-1 with the kidnapped
boy from 16:00 hrs. till 17:30 hrs. or so, a finding which has been
recorded by the trial court as well as by the High Court. Such
finding is, in fact, unassailable at the instance of A-1 as well. The
argument is that the prosecution had failed to prove that A-1 was
responsible for causing death of the boy. He was near Patansaongi
45
lake, when he received a call from N.T. Gosawi (PW-25) at 17:50:49
hrs. He was to his house in Vinoba Bhave Nagar at 18:31:46 hrs.
and in the Police Station at 18:50 hrs. Thus, he must have left the
area of Patansaongi any time before 18:00 hrs. Therefore, to prove
the charge of culpable homicide amounting to murder against the
accused, the prosecution must prove that the victim died before
18:00 hrs. It is argued that in the absence of evidence of causing
death by accused, and in the absence of call of ransom before
18:00 hrs., he can at best be convicted for an offence under
Section 363 IPC. For an offence under Section 364A IPC, according
to Mr. Chaudhary, the prosecution is required to prove demand of
ransom, and threat to cause death in case of non-payment of
ransom. Since the ransom call is said to have been made by A-2 at
20:38 hrs. when A-1 was in the Police Station, therefore, the
prosecution has failed to prove that such ransom call is attributed
to A-1 and that there was a threat to take life of the victim.
68. We do not find any merit in the said argument as well. There is
overwhelming evidence of A-1 having motive to cause damage to
Dr. Chandak on account of payment of less salary, more work and
scolding on account of over-charging customers. Such motive gets
further strengthened by the desire in A-1 to get rich even by
robbing employer of Sandeep Katre (PW-8), when he planned
looting of cash. Such evidence is corroborated by Sonam Meshram
(PW-19), the friend of A-1. The desire to get rich by whatever
means was a driving force with A-1 to kidnap a young child of 8
46
years, who was a school going innocent child, who happened to be
a son of well-to-do dentist couple. Initially, A-1 conspired with
Sandeep Katre (PW-8) but on his developing cold-feet, he
associated A-2 in his nefarious design to make money by the
abduction of a young child. The conduct of A-1 in seeking
assistance of Sandeep Katre (PW-8) and the calls exchanged
between Sonam Meshram (PW-19) and A-1 shows the
desperation of A-1 to kidnap for ransom. The intention to kidnap
was only with a motive of becoming rich by obtaining a ransom. To
achieve that motive, A-1 had associated A-2, a fact deposed by
Sandeep Katre (PW-8) and Sonam Meshram (PW-19). A-1 and A-2
were together at different stages of the commission of the crime
from almost 16:00 hrs. till almost 18:00 hrs., and later till 18:33:59
hrs., when both of them were at the house of A-1 in Vinoba Bhave
Nagar. Such facts have come on evidence from the testimony of
Arun Meshram (PW-31); Rajan Tiwari (PW-2); Rupali (PW-23)-the
neighbour of A-1; Ms. Madhuri Permanand Dhawalkar (PW-34)-the
dispenser at the petrol pump; Divya Chandel (PW-9); Shriram
Shankarrao Khadatkar (PW-10) and Namdeo Dhawale (PW-11) and
the call details of both the accused. It has also come on record
that A-1 and Sonam Meshram (PW-19) had earlier visited the area
in question while on the way to visit the temple of Lord Ganesha.
Thus A-1 was familiar with the area, therefore, he found it
appropriate to achieve his nefarious design at that place.
69. The argument of Mr. Chaudhary is that the prosecution has not
47
proved the time of death i.e. before 18:00 hrs. If the prosecution is
able to the prove the death before 18:00 hrs., only then, A-1 can
be said to be guilty of an offence under Section 302 IPC, otherwise,
the accused cannot be held guilty of a culpable homicide
amounting to murder.
70. From the CDR, A-1 was in the area of Patansaongi Lake from
17:36:53 hrs. to 17:50:49 hrs.; in Vinoba Bhave Nagar, i.e. from
18:31:46 hrs. to 18:33:59 hrs.; whereas, A-2 was in Vinoba Bhave
Nagar area from 18:41:45 hrs. till 19:39:17 hrs. A-2 had called
Ankush - the juvenile at 20:55:35 hrs., when he was on Takali
Koradi Road i.e. the road between Patansaongi and Vinoba Bhave
Nagar. The calls between A-1, A-2 and Dharmendra Yadav ( PW-24)
were exchanged between 19:28:15 hrs. to 19:32:50 hrs.
Dharmendra Yadav ( PW-24) was also in employment in the clinic of
Dr. Chandak. He was acquainted with A-1 as he was also working
in that clinic. He deposed that at about 19:00 hrs., A-2 called him
and inquired about A-1. He also demanded the cellphone number
of Dr. Chandak disclosing his name as Arvind, friend of A-1. He had
not given him the cellphone number of Dr. Chandak as it was not
available with him. After sometime, the phone was disconnected
and within 5-10 minutes, he received another call from A-2 who
sought the cellphone number of Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15). He had
given cellphone number of Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15) to him.
71. The judgment in Abdul Subhan is not applicable to the facts of
the present case for the reason that A-1 was not proved to be
48
st
arrested on 1 September, 2014. In the reported judgment, the
person who was said to have arrested the accused prior to the
actual date of arrest, was examined before the High Court. It was
on the basis of the additional evidence recorded, the High Court
observed “ that the statement made by Punwan, accused, in his
| confession to the effect that he was apprehended on 1 | st | March, |
|---|
1938 is very probably true”. The IO in his statement before the
High Court could not convince the Court that he had not arrested
| Punnu, accused, till 6 | th | March, 1938. But the facts in the present |
|---|
| appeals does not lead to any inference of the arrest of A-1 on 1 | st |
|---|
September, 2014.
ii) Whether Common intention was terminated before the
demand of ransom and death of victim
72. The argument that the conspiracy terminated the moment, A-1
surrendered in the Lakadganj Police Station at 18:50 hrs. on
st
1 September, 2014, is again not tenable. In Nalini’s case itself, it
has been held as under:
| “ | 662. … | | It is not necessary that all the conspirators | |
|---|
| should participate from the inception to the end of the | | | | |
| conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time | | | | |
| when such intention was fri st entertained by any one of | | | | |
| them and some others may quit from the conspiracy. All | | | | |
| of them cannot but be treated as conspirators. Where in | | | | |
| pursuance of the agreement the conspirators commit | | | | |
| offences individually or adopt illegal means to do a legal | | | | |
| act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of | | | | |
| them will be liable for such offences even if some of | | | | |
| them have not actively participated in the commission | | | | |
| of those offences.” | | | | |
73. The said judgment was quoted with approval in Central Bureau
49
of Investigation & Anr. v. Mohd. Parvez Abdul Kayuum &
23
Ors. . Thus, it is not necessary that A-1 should participate till the
end of conspiracy as some may quit from the conspiracy but all of
them would be treated as conspirators. T he common intention
requires a pre-arranged plan and prior concert. Thus, there must
be prior meeting of minds. The common intention must exist prior
to the commission of the act in a point of time.
74. A-1 is the driving force behind the conspiracy to kidnap for ransom.
Merely because A-1 was physically separated from co-conspirator
either before or after the death of the victim will not absolve him of
offence under Section 302 IPC or Section 364A as both A-1 and A-2
were acting in tandem with each other. It is so evident that A-1
received a phone call from A-2 when he was in Police Station at
19:04:17 hrs. when Dr. Chandak was also present in Police Station.
Though, the ransom call was made by A-2 but in view of Section 34
IPC, the consequence of such ransom call will be equally borne by
A-1 also, as the planning of kidnapping for the purpose of ransom
was that of A-1. It is the A-1 who had the motive to harm Dr.
Chandak and also to be rich at the earliest. We do not find any
merit in the argument that to make out an offence under Section
302 IPC against A-1, the prosecution must prove the factum of
death of the victim prior to 18:00 hrs. The medical evidence
corroborates the time of death i.e. from 12 noon to midnight. The
opinion of the expert can only suggest the time range, and not the
precise time of death. The fact is that victim is proved to be in
23 (2019) 12 SCC 1
50
custody of A-1 and A-2 till 18:00 hrs. or so and, thus, in terms of
provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it is for the accused
to explain what happened to the victim before he was done to
death. Since the victim was in custody of A-1 and A-2 and there is
no evidence of any intervening factor to doubt that there could be
a possibility of third person, it is for them to discharge the burden
| 75. This Court in Jai Bhagwan relied upon by the appellant, held that<br>to apply Section 34 IPC apart from the fact that there should be<br>two or more accused, two factors must be established: (i) common<br>intention and (ii) participation of the accused in the commission of<br>an offence. If a common intention is proved but no overt act is at-<br>tributed to the individual accused, Section 34 IPC will be attracted<br>as it essentially involves vicarious liability but if participation of the<br>accused in the crime is proved and a common intention is absent,<br>Section 34 IPC cannot be invoked. In every case, it is not possible<br>to have direct evidence of a common intention. It has to be in-<br>ferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. In Suresh,<br>this Court held that the concept of presence of the co-accused at<br>the scene is not a necessary requirement to attract Section 34 IPC.<br>The one line in the para can be read in isolation to argue that phys-<br>ical presence of an accused is necessary. In fact, this Court held as<br>under: | This Court in | | Jai Bhagwan | relied upon by the appellant, held that |
|---|
| “ | 40. | | Participation in the crime in furtherance of the |
|---|
| common intention cannot conceive of some | | | |
| independent criminal act by all accused persons, | | | |
| besides the ultimate criminal act because for that | | | |
51
| individual act law takes care of making such accused | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| responsible under the other provisions of the Code. The | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| word “act” used in Section 34 denotes a series of acts | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| as a single act. What is required under law is that the | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| accused persons sharing the common intention must be | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| physically present at the scene of occurrence and be | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| shown not to have dissuaded themselves from the | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| intended criminal act for which they shared the common | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| intention. | Culpability under Section 34 cannot be | | | | | | | | | | | |
| excluded by mere distance from the scene of | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| occurrence. The presumption of constructive intention, | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| however, has to be arrived at only when the court can, | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| with judicial servitude, hold that the accused must have | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| preconceived the result that ensued in furtherance of | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| the common intention | | | | . A Division Bench of the Patna | | | | | | | | |
| High Court in | | | Satrughan Patar | | | v. | | Emperor | | | [AIR 1919 Pat | |
| 111 : 20 Cri LJ 289] held that it is only when a court with | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| some certainty holds that a particular accused must | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| have preconceived or premeditated the result which | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ensued or acted in concert with others in order to bring | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| about that result, that Section 34 may be applied.” | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | (Emphasis Supplied) | | | |
| |
| 76. In the present appeals, the facts speak volumes about the common<br>intention shared by both the appellants. Both the accused planned<br>the kidnapping and executed it together. A-1 called Dharmendra<br>Yadav (PW-24), even before the victim could be kidnapped to make<br>sure that the parents of the child were not at home. A-2 is the one<br>who picked up the child from the gate of the Apartment building.<br>They were together till at least 18:33 hrs. whereas; the tower loca-<br>tion of the mobile of A-2 was Vinoba Bhave Nagar till 19.39 hrs.,<br>which is the area of the House of A-1. The conspiracy never came<br>to an end when A-2 called Dr. Chandak (PW-1) demanding ransom,<br>which was the reason of kidnapping the boy. Thus, the facts prove<br>that both the accused had a common intention to kidnap the child. | |
52
iii) Applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act
77. The most important aspect in the present appeals is presumption
under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. This Court has examined
the scope of Section 106 of the Evidence Act in Shambu Nath
24
Mehra v. State of Ajmer , State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad
25 26
Omar & Ors. , Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab , Rajender v.
27
State (NCT of Delhi) . In Shambu Nath Mehra , this court held
that Section 106 must be considered in a commonsense way; and
the balance of convenience and the disproportion of the labour
that would be involved in finding out and proving certain facts
balanced against the triviality of the issue at stake and the ease
with which the accused could prove them, are all matters that
must be taken into consideration. The section cannot be used to
undermine the well-established rule of law that, save in a very
exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and
| This Court held as under: |
|---|
| “ | 9. | | This lays down the general rule that in a criminal | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that | | | | | | | | | | | |
| duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain | | | | | | | | | | | |
| exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at | | | | | | | | | | | |
| any rate disproportionately difcfi ult, for the prosecution | | | | | | | | | | | |
| to establish facts which are “especially” within the | | | | | | | | | | | |
| knowledge of the accused and which he could prove | | | | | | | | | | | |
| without difcfi ulty or inconvenience. The word | | | | | | | | | | | |
| “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are | | | | | | | | | | | pre- |
| eminently | | | | | or | | exceptionally | | within his knowledge. If the | | |
| section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead | | | | | | | | | | | |
| to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case | | | | | | | | | | | |
24 AIR 1956 SC 404
25 (2000) 8 SCC 382
26 (2001) 4 SCC 375
27 (2019) 10 SCC 623
53
| the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|
| commit the murder because who could know better than | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| refused to construe this section, as reproduced in | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| burden lies on an accused person to show that he did | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| are | Attygalle | | v. | | Emperor | | | | | | | | [AIR 1936 PC 169] | |
| and | Seneviratne | | | | | | v. | | R. | | [(1936) 3 All ER 36, 49]” | | | |
| The | Mir Mohammad Omar | | case | was a case of abduction. | | This |
|---|
Court after finding that the accused have abducted the deceased,
held as under:
“ 30. The abductors have not given any explanation as to
what happened to Mahesh after he was abducted by
them. But the learned Sessions Judge after referring to
the law on circumstantial evidence concluded thus:
“ On a careful analysis and appreciation of the evidence I
think that there is a missing link in the chain of events
after the deceased was last seen together with the
accused persons and the discovery of the dead body of
the deceased at Islamia Hospital. Therefore, the
conclusion seems irresistible that the prosecution has
failed to establish the charge of murder against the
accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt.”
| 31. | The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the | |
|---|
| prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not | | |
| be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no | | |
| process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of | | |
| presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it | | |
| impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the | | |
| traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the | | |
| prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic | | |
| coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the | | |
| major benefci iaries and the society would be the | | |
| casualty. | | |
33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the
existence of one fact from the existence of some other
54
| facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. | |
|---|
| Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a | |
| fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain | |
| other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a | |
| fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a | |
| process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as | |
| the most probable position. The above principle has | |
| gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 | |
| is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the | |
| court to presume the existence of any fact which it | |
| thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court | |
| shall have regard to the common course of natural | |
| events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of | |
| the case. | |
| 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court | |
|---|
| that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they | |
| took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what | |
| happened to him until he was with them. If he was | |
| found murdered within a short time after the abduction | |
| the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court | |
| to draw the presumption that the accused have | |
| murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the | |
| accused would tell the Court what else happened to | |
| Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.” | |
79. This Court in Sucha Singh held as under:
| “ | 19. | | We pointed out that Section 106 of the Evidence | |
|---|
| Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its | | | | |
| burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond | | | | |
| reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases | | | | |
| where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts | | | | |
| for which a reasonable inference can be drawn | | | | |
| regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the | | | | |
| accused by virtue of special knowledge regarding such | | | | |
| facts failed to offer any explanation which might drive | | | | |
| the court to draw a different inference.” | | | | |
| 80. This Court in Rajender was examining the applicability of Section<br>106 of the Evidence Act when the place of the murder of the de-<br>ceased was a secluded area. The deceased was last been seen<br>with the accused. The explanation in her statement under Section<br>313 Cr.P.C. was that she parted company with the deceased, when | This Court in | | Rajender | was examining the applicability of Section |
|---|
| 313 Cr.P.C. was that she parted company with the deceased, when | | | |
| 106 of the Evidence Act when the | | place of the murder of the de | - |
|---|
55
| the deceased got down from her car at the Inter-State Bus Termi-<br>nus (ISBT). This explanation has been disbelieved by the trial court<br>and the High Court. This Court held that the time-gap between the<br>last seen and the time of the death of the deceased is so small so<br>as to make it impossible for the deceased to come in the contact of<br>any other person. It was held as under: | the deceased got down from her car at the Inter-State Bus Termi | - |
|---|
“ 12.2.4. Having observed so, it is crucial to note that the
reasonableness of the explanation offered by the
accused as to how and when he/she parted company
with the deceased has a bearing on the effect of the last
seen in a case. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872
provides that the burden of proof for any fact that is
especially within the knowledge of a person lies upon
such person. Thus, if a person is last seen with the
deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and
when he parted company with the deceased. In other
words, he must furnish an explanation that appears to
the court to be probable and satisfactory, and if he fails
to offer such an explanation on the basis of facts within
his special knowledge, the burden cast upon him under
Section 106 is not discharged. Particularly in cases
resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails
to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the
burden placed on him, such failure by itself can provide
an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved
against him. This, however, does not mean that Section
106 shifts the burden of proof of a criminal trial on the
accused. Such burden always rests on the prosecution.
Section 106 only lays down the rule that when the
accused does not throw any light upon facts which
are specially within his/her knowledge and which cannot
support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his
innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce
an explanation as an additional link which completes the
chain of incriminating circumstances.”
81. The Judgments referred to by Mr. Chaudhary, Sawal Das v. State
28 29
of Bihar , Reena Hazarika and Gargi v. State of Haryana ,
were to argue that the last seen evidence will not absolve the
28 (1974) 4 SCC 193
29 (2019) 9 SCC 738
56
prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary
burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt.
It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed,
will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case,
that the question arises of consideration of facts of which the
burden of proof may lie upon the accused. However, the principles
laid down in the aforesaid judgment are not applicable to the facts
of the present case, when the prosecution has proved the act of
kidnapping and the last seen evidence soon before the
approximate time of death of victim. Therefore, the prosecution
has discharged the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It was
then for the accused to rebut the presumption of any other
intervening fact before the death of the victim. In fact, none of the
prosecution witnesses have been cross- examined on that
possibility at all.
iv) Changing version of the prosecution case
82. The Judgments of this court reported as Karanpura
Development Co. Ltd. and Sri Venkataramana Devaru have
been relied upon to argue that an argument of fact cannot be
raised for the first time before this Court. The reliance on such
judgments is not tenable. In both the Judgments, no fact sought to
be raised in appeal before this court, was pleaded in civil
proceedings. The reference to such judgments is inappropriate. In
the present appeals, the arguments raised by the prosecution are
on the basis of evidence led and available on record.
v) Recovery of dead body at the instance of A-1 cannot be
57
believed
83. The dead body was recovered on the basis of disclosure statement
of A-1. The body was lying concealed under a bridge constructed
over a Rivulet. The body could not be visible to any person
passing through that road. The photograph (Ex. Art./6) produced
by the prosecution shows that the compartment under the bridge
was more than 6 feet of diameter in which, one person could stand
erect. Since the body was recovered from a concealed area
covered by leaves and sand, it is the A-1 alone who could point out
the concealment of dead body.
84. It is wholly immaterial whether the death was caused before 18:00
hrs. or afterwards as both the accused were seen with the victim
together and the victim was in an inert condition. The injuries and
the placement of the boulder/stone on the face of the victim was to
hide the identity of the victim. As per Dr. Avinash Waghmode
(PW-27), the injuries were perimortem i.e. when the vitals of the
victim were functioning. That part of the statement corroborates
the oral evidence led by the prosecution about the inert condition
of the victim and the fact that he was carried on the shoulder by A-
1 as deposed by Shriram Shankarrao Khadatkar (PW-10) near
Patansaongi Lake. It is matter of conjectures that such injuries
could be caused by one person or two persons as the injuries could
be caused even without any resistance by the victim in view of his
inert condition. In fact, the statement of Dr. Avinash Waghmode
(PW-27) is to the effect that the injuries caused to the victim
58
occurred when the vitals were functioning, but the victim may not
be in position to resist the physical assault on him.
85. The argument that the disclosure statement was not recorded in
the exact language of the accused since the manner of killing is
not recorded in such disclosure statement, is immaterial. In terms
of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the discovery of facts alone is
admissible evidence when the accused is in police custody. The
manner of killing is inculpatory and, therefore, not admissible in
evidence. In such a case, the mere fact that the disclosure
statement does not record the manner of killing of the victim is
wholly inconsequential. Thus, we do not find any merit in the
argument raised by the learned counsel for A-1.
86. The reliance of Mr. Chaudhary on the Judgment of this court in
| Bakhshish Singh | v. | State of Punjab |
|---|
the said case, the recovery of dead body was not believed as it
was found to be possible for the accused to know the place where
dead body was thrown in the river as broken teeth and parts of
human body was lying near the place of recovery. In the present
case, the dead body was lying in a concealed place and that there
was no possible explanation on behalf of the accused as to how the
body came to be concealed at that particular place, when the
prosecution evidence proves that the accused were near the place
of recovery of dead body almost at the probable time of death.
vi) The effect of putting of incriminating evidence to the
accused under Section 313 of the Code.
30 (1971) 3 SCC 182
59
87. In Reena Hazarika , a two Judge Bench has taken a view that the
Court is duty bound to consider defense taken by the accused
under Section 313 of the Code. Factually, in this case, A-1 and A-2
have not taken any defense except the statement that they have
been implicated falsely. A-1 has been put as many as 848
questions whereas A-2 has been put as many as 754 questions but
the accused have not taken any other stand except of denial of
material facts. In fact, A-1 admitted to Question No. 54 that all the
staff of Dr. Chandak’s clinic were called in to the police station. Dr.
Chandak received calls of ransom when he was in the police
station. Therefore, the said judgment is of no help to the accused.
An accused, as mentioned earlier, is required to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses to give him an opportunity to make any
explanation which is open to him. It is a rule of professional
practice in the conduct of a case. However, in the absence of any
cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, an argument
cannot be built, in the absence of any evidence to that effect.
88. The judgments in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh and Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda are not applicable to the facts of the present
case. Therein, it has been laid down that in a prosecution based
upon a circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to rule
out all other probabilities except that the offence was committed
by the accused and no one else. In the present case, there is
overwhelming evidence that shows the victim to be in company of
the accused at five different places from 16:00 hrs. to 17:30 hrs –
60
18.00 hrs. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the accused to explain
the circumstances which occurred thereafter till the time of the
recovery of dead body. There is no evidence to create a doubt on
the prosecution version that somebody else had access to the
victim before he died. The fact that the child was carried on
shoulder by A-1 shows that the child was not in a position to move
and was done to death in that condition which is corroborated by
medical evidence of injuries being perimortem.
Arguments on behalf of A-2
89. Learned counsel for A-2 argued that A-1 had planned to commit a
crime in terms of looting PW-8’s employer for money, but at the
last minute, A-2 was joined in the kidnapping of the victim and he
had no idea about the real motive of A-1 of seeking vengeance
from the complainant and his family. However, such an argument
is wholly untenable as he is the one who picked up the child from
the gate of the Apartment where the family of the child used to
stay and had been seen by a number of persons up to 17:30 hrs. It
is thereafter that a ransom call is proved to have been made by A-
2 on the basis of statement of Mohandas Mitharam Balani (PW-16)
from whose PCO, A-2 made the call. He was an active participant
in the orchestration of the crime with A-1. Still further, the blue T-
shirt worn by the victim was recovered on the basis of disclosure
statement of A-2. Such disclosure statement corroborates that it is
he who had taken off the shirt and thrown it in a rivulet/nullah
which was at a distance of 5 kms. from the place of occurrence.
90. An argument was raised that the child was kidnapped for ransom
61
but there was no intention to take life of the child, therefore, an
offence under Section 364A is not made out. To appreciate the
arguments, Section 364A of the IPC is reproduced as under:
| “ | 364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.—Whoever kidnaps | |
|---|
| or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention | | |
| after such kidnapping or abduction and threatens to | | |
| cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct | | |
| gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such | | |
| person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or | | |
| death to such person in order to compel the | | |
| Government or any foreign State or international inter- | | |
| governmental organisation or any other person to do or | | |
| abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be | | |
| punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and | | |
| shall also be liable to fni e.” | | |
91. Section 364A IPC has three ingredients relevant to the present
appeals, one, the fact of kidnapping or abduction, second,
threatening to cause death or hurt, and last, the conduct giving
rise to reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to
death or hurt.
92. The kidnapping of an 8-year-old child was unequivocally for
ransom. The kidnapping of a victim of such a tender age for
ransom has inherent threat to cause death as that alone will force
the relatives of such victim to pay ransom. Since the act of
kidnapping of a child for ransom has inherent threat to cause
death, therefore, the accused have been rightly been convicted for
an offence under Section 364A read with Section 34 IPC. The threat
will remain a mere threat, if the victim returns unhurt. In the
present case, the victim has been done to death. The threat had
become a reality. There is no reason to take different view that the
62
view taken by learned Sessions Judge as well by the High Court.
Sentence
93. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on the question of
sentence. Mr. Chaudhary argued that this Court has imposed a
higher standard of proof for the purposes of a death sentence over
and above “beyond reasonable doubt” necessary for criminal
conviction similar to “residual doubt”. He referred to a judgment of
31
this court in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura wherein it
was held as under:
“ 31. … In our criminal justice system, for recording guilt
of the accused, it is not necessary that the prosecution
should prove the case with absolute or mathematical
certainty, but only beyond reasonable doubt. Criminal
courts, while examining whether any doubt is beyond
reasonable doubt, may carry in their mind, some
“residual doubt”, even though the courts are convinced
of the accused persons' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”
| | |
| | |
| 94. | | This Court following the principle of residual doubt in a judgment |
| reported as | Ravishankar | v. | State of Madhya Pradesh |
|---|
that “another nascent evolution in the theory of death sentencing
can be distilled. This Court has increasingly become cognizant of
“residual doubt” in many recent cases which effectively create a
higher standard of proof over and above the “beyond reasonable
doubt” standard used at the stage of conviction, as a safeguard
against routine capital sentencing, keeping in mind the irre-
versibility of death”.
31 (2014) 4 SCC 747
32 (2019) 9 SCC 689
63
ted that apart from aggravating circumstances considered by the
learned Sessions Judge and the High Court, there is an additional
fact brought on record of this appeal by an affidavit of Senior Po-
lice Inspector, Police Station Lakadganj, Nagpur City that the A-1 is
in fact an accused in FIR No. 3 of 2015 for the offences under Sec-
tions 457, 380, 109, 120-B and 34 of IPC. A supplementary charge
th
sheet has been filed against A-1 on 30 July, 2019. The allegations
are that two accused who committed house burglary were to-
gether with A-1 in the cell of Police Station Sadar Nagpur. It is A-1
who gave a tip to the other accused that there remains huge cash
in the Dental Clinic of the PW-1. The accused, after they were
released on bail, breached into the clinic of PW-1. Stolen goods
such as cash, mobiles, camera and an ipad were recovered from
the other accused. Therefore, it was argued that the accused has
not left his activities even after the present case.
sheet filed against A-1 to avoid any prejudice in a trial which may
proceed on the basis of charge sheet already filed against ac-
cused. We find that the accused have taken the life of a young
school going boy of only 8 years of age to become rich by ransom
and to take vengeance against Dr. Chandak. The argument is that
since the accused are young, aged about 19 years, and have no
criminal antecedents, the sentence of death imposed upon them
is not warranted. It is argued that A-1 surrendered at the first
64
available opportunity and he was fully cooperative with the inves-
tigation, therefore, there are the mitigating circumstances to ab-
solve them from noose. We do not find any merit in the argument
that being young or having no criminal antecedents are mitigating
circumstances. What is required to be examined is whether there
is a possibility of rehabilitation and whether it is the rarest of the
rare case where the collective conscience of the community is so
shocked that it will expect the holders of judicial power to inflict
death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards de-
sirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The manner of
commission of murder when committed in an extremely brutal,
grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner are aggravat-
ing factors.
tion are by now well settled. We would not like to repeat such cir-
cumstances again. This court in Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State
33
of Punjab held that as part of the “rarest of rare” test, the court
should address itself as to whether:
“ (i) there is something uncommon about the crime
which renders sentence of imprisonment for life
inadequate and calls for a death sentence;
(ii) the circumstances are such that there is no
alternative but to impose death sentence even after
according maximum weightage to the mitigating
circumstances which speak in favour of the offender.”
“ (i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted
33 (1983) 3 SCC 470
65
except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the
circumstances of the “offender” also require to be taken
into consideration along with the circumstances of the
“crime”.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is
an exception. In other words death sentence must be
imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an
altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the
relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and
only provided, the option to impose sentence of
imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously
exercised having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the crime and all the relevant
circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the
mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
weightage and a just balance has to be struck between
the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances
before the option is exercised.”
| |
| 99. Later this Court in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of<br>Karnataka34, held that in, the interest of justice, the court could<br>commute the death sentence imposed on the convict and<br>substitute it with life imprisonment with a direction that the convict<br>would not be released from prison for the rest of his life. This view<br>stands approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of<br>India v. V. Sriharan & Ors.35 holding that the power to impose a<br>modified punishment providing for any specific term of<br>incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to<br>death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the | |
34 (2008) 13 SCC 767
35 (2016) 7 SCC 1
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Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court. This Court held
as under:
“ 105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived
from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within
the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such
specified offences can only be exercised by the High
Court and in the event of further appeal only by the
Supreme Court and not by any other court in this
country. To put it differently, the power to impose a
modified punishment providing for any specific term of
incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an
alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the
High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other
inferior court.
106. Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid
down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy
Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC
767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] that a special category of
sentence; instead of death; for a term exceeding 14
years and put that category beyond application of
remission is well founded and we answer the said
question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in
agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court
in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [Sangeet v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611]
that the deprival of remission power of the appropriate
Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or
without any remission as not permissible is not in
consonance with the law and we specifically overrule
the same.”
| |
|---|
| |
| The motive of the accused to take life was to become rich by not | |
doing hard work but by demanding ransom after kidnapping a
young, innocent boy of 8 years. Thus, having considered all the
circumstances and facts on record, we are of the considered view
that the present case falls short of the “rarest of rare” cases where
a death sentence alone deserves to be awarded to the appellants.
It appears to us in light of all cumulative circumstances that the
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cause of justice will be effectively served by invoking the concept
| of special sentencing as evolved by this Court in | | the cases of |
|---|
| Swamy Shraddananda | and | Sriharan | . | | Thus, | the present appeals |
|---|
succeed in part. The Judgment and Order passed by the learned
Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court convicting the accused
for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 364A read with
Section 34 IPC is hereby confirmed. However, the death sentence
imposed by the learned Trial Court, confirmed by the High Court, is
| converted into the life imprisonment. It is further observed and di | - |
|---|
| rected that the life means till the end of the life with the further ob | - |
|---|
servation and direction that there shall not be any remission till the
accused completes 25 years of imprisonment.
| |
|---|
| 101. The appeals stand dismissed except modification in respect of sen-<br>tence. | |
.............................................J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
.............................................J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 24, 2020.
68