M/S. Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. vs Ravi Sethia
- Court
- Supreme Court
<div> <br /> <b>REPORTABLE </b><br /> 2026 INSC 338<br /> <b>IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA </b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION </b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11193 OF 2025 </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>M/S NIRMAL UJJWAL CREDIT </b><br /> <b>…APPELLANT </b><br /> <b>CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>VERSUS </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>RAVI SETHIA & ORS. </b><br /> <b>…RESPONDENTS </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <b>J U D G M E N T</b><br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Digitally signed by<br /> VISHAL ANAND<br /> Date: 2026.04.09<br /> 16:15:58 IST<br /> Reason:<br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>J.B. PARDIWALA, J.: </b><br /> For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the <br /> following parts:- <br /> <b>INDEX </b><br /> <b>A.</b> <b><i> </i></b> <b>FACTUAL MATRIX</b> <b><i> ................................................................................ </i></b> <b>2</b> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <b>B.</b> <b><i> </i></b> <b>SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT</b> <b><i> ......................... </i></b> <b>9</b> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <b>C.</b> <b>SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS</b> <b>11</b><br /> <b><i> </i></b> <b><i> ................. </i></b> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <b>D.</b> <b><i> </i></b> <b>ANALYSIS</b> <b><i> .............................................................................................. </i></b> <b>15</b> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i>(I) </i> <i>Meaning and scope of the expression “any other institution in the </i><br /> <i>same line of business”. ............................................................. 15 </i><br /> <i>(II) Applicability of the standard of “same line of business” to the </i><br /> <i>facts of the present case. .......................................................... 21 </i><br /> <b>E.</b> <b>CONCLUSION</b> <b><i>27</i></b><br /> <b><i> </i></b> <b><i> ........................................................................................ </i></b> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <br /> 1. At the outset, we must state that the present statutory appeal was <br /> finally heard by us, and the judgment was reserved. Before we <br /> could deliver the judgment, Mr. Amit Pai, the learned Advocate on <br /> Record appearing for the appellant, orally mentioned the matter <br /> and made a humble request that the appellant may be permitted to <br /> withdraw the present appeal in the wake of some developments. We <br /> expressed our willingness to permit the appellant to withdraw the <br /> appeal in the wake of the developments highlighted. However, at <br /> the same time, we also clarified that having regard to the <br /> importance of the issue involved in the present litigation we would <br /> be looking into the facts of the present appeal, the submissions <br /> canvassed on either side, the provisions of IBC and other relevant <br /> materials only with a view to explain the position of law or rather, <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 1 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> the principles governing the pivotal issue in question without <br /> returning any findings on the merits of the appeal. <br /> <br /> 2. For this limited purpose, as afore-stated, we have looked into the <br /> facts, the submissions canvassed on either side and the provisions <br /> of law for the purpose of explaining the position of law governing <br /> the issue. <br /> <br /> 3. This statutory appeal arises from the judgment and order passed <br /> by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi <br /> (hereinafter referred to as “ <b>NCLAT</b> ”), dated 21.08.2025, in <br /> Company Appeal (AT)(Ins) No. 790 of 2025. The NCLAT had <br /> affirmed the decision of the National Company Law Tribunal, <br /> Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as “ <b>NCLT</b> ”) dated 09.04.2025 in CP <br /> (IB) No. 1318 of 2025, wherein it was declared <i> </i> that the appellant <br /> was ineligible to submit its resolution plan in the CIRP of Morarji <br /> Textiles Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “ <b>Corporate Debtor</b> ”) <i>inter </i><br /> <i>alia</i> on the ground that the bye-laws of the appellant cooperative <br /> society did not permit it to invest in the corporate debtor. <br /> <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>A.</b> <b>FACTUAL MATRIX </b><br /> <br /> 4. The appellant is a co-operative society registered under the <br /> provisions of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 <br /> (hereinafter referred to as “ <b>2002</b> <b>Act</b> ”). The appellant operates a <br /> textile unit named “Nirmal Textile” in Nagpur bearing a separate <br /> GST registration dated 23.04.2021 and a factory licence dated <br /> 28.10.2022. <br /> <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 2 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 5. On 03.08.2023, the Government of India brought an amendment <br /> to Section 64 of the 2002 Act with a view to insert certain qualifying <br /> terms in Clause (d) therein. The amended Section 64 provided in <br /> Clause (d) that a Multi-State Co-operative Society (“ <b>MSCS</b> ”) may <br /> invest or deposit its funds, among other things, <i> </i> in the shares, <br /> securities, or assets of a subsidiary institution or <i> </i> any other <br /> institution <i> in the same line of business as the MSCS</i> . The amended <br /> Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act reads as under: <br /> <br /> <i>“64. Investment of funds.— A multi-State co-operative </i><br /> <i>society may invest or deposit its funds — </i><br /> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>(d) in the shares, securities or assets of a subsidiary </i><br /> <i>institution or any other institution [in the same line of </i><br /> <i>business as the multi-State co-operative society] or” </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <br /> 6. Pursuant to the above, the appellant issued a notice dated <br /> 01.09.2023 for conducting the Annual General Meeting (AGM) with <br /> an agenda to amend its bye-laws. Accordingly, an AGM was <br /> conducted on 24.09.2023 proposing amendments to the various <br /> clauses of its bye-laws. Among the amended clauses, Clause 52 was <br /> also amended to include in its Clause (iv) the verbatim provision of <br /> amended Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act as extracted above. <br /> Proposed amendment to Clause 52 reads as follows: <br /> <br /> <i>“23. To make Amendment in Bye Laws Clause No. 52 of the </i><br /> <i>society to make amendment in the “Investment of Funds” to </i><br /> <i>comply with the Provisions of the MSCS (Amendment) Act </i><br /> <i>2023 </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>The Chairman of the society informed that it is necessary to </i><br /> <i>make amendment in the bye laws of the society in </i><br /> <i>accordance with the provisions of The Multi State </i><br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 3 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <i>Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2023 and rules </i><br /> <i>made thereunder. </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>It was resolved that the clause number 52 of bye laws </i><br /> <i>related to Investments of funds is changed from; </i><br /> <i>The society may invest or deposit its funds in: </i><br /> <i>a)Co-operative Banks; </i><br /> <i>b) Securities specified in section 20 of the Indian Trust Act </i><br /> <i>1882; </i><br /> <i>c) shares and securities of any other co-operative </i><br /> <i>society/subsidiary institution; </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>To </i><br /> <i>a) the society may invest or deposit its funds in accordance </i><br /> <i>with Section 64 of the MSCS Act, 2002 in: </i><br /> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <i>iv) in the shares, securities and assets of any subsidiary </i><br /> <i>institution or any other institution in the same line of </i><br /> <i>business as the Multi-State Co-operative Society; </i><br /> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <i>vi) In such other manner as may be determined by the </i><br /> <i>Central Government, </i><br /> <i>c) any other Scheduled Bank/Nationalized Bank </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>“Further resolved that this change will come into effect from </i><br /> <i>the date of approval of clause in Bye laws from Central </i><br /> <i>Registrar” </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>“Further resolved that chairman is authorized to execute all </i><br /> <i>documents required for and to sign all documents required </i><br /> <i>to be filed with office of the Central Registrar Cooperative </i><br /> <i>Societies, New Delhi.” </i><br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <br /> 7. Following this, a unanimous resolution was passed in the said AGM <br /> on 24.09.2023 to carry out the amendment of the bye-laws. <br /> Thereafter, the Chairman of the AGM issued a certificate of <br /> compliance dated 25.10.2023 in terms of Section 11 of the 2002 <br /> Act pursuant to which the proposed amendment to Clause 52 was <br /> placed before the Central Registrar. Pursuant to this, the Central <br /> Registrar issued a certificate of registration of an amendment dated <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 4 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> 24.01.2024 and, thereby, approved the amendment to the bye-laws <br /> of the appellant. <br /> <br /> 8. The CIRP proceedings of the corporate debtor were commenced <i> vide</i> <br /> order dated 09.02.2024, passed by the NCLT. To carry out various <br /> functions in accordance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, <br /> 2016 (“ <b>IBC</b> ”), the NCLT appointed respondent no. 1 as the IRP/RP. <br /> <br /> 9. On 01.05.2024, the respondent no. 1 – RP issued an invitation <br /> seeking expression of interests (“ <b>EOI</b> ”) under Section 25(2)(h) of the <br /> IBC <i>inter alia,</i> from various prospective resolution applicants <br /> (“ <b>PRA</b> ”) by the end date 12.06.2024. The last date of submission of <br /> the resolution plan was set as 19.07.2024. <br /> <br /> 10. Accordingly, the appellant, after receiving the resolution to bid in a <br /> general meeting on 23.09.2024, submitted its EOI on 18.05.2024. <br /> Thereafter, the respondent no. 1 – RP on 23.06.2024 circulated a <br /> provisional list of PRAs to the Committee of Creditors (“ <b>COC</b> ”), <br /> which included the appellant. On 25.06.2024, the respondent no. <br /> 1 – RP sought the constitutional documents and other documents <br /> of the appellant in accordance with Regulation 36A(9) of the IBBI <br /> (CIRP) Regulations, 2016. On 27.06.2024, the appellant submitted <br /> all required documents, including the bye-laws. The appellant <br /> further clarified the reason for investing in the corporate debtor, <br /> specifically mentioning the details of its cotton ginning, pressing, <br /> and spinning mill. The respondent no. 1 – RP then circulated a final <br /> list of PRAs to COC on 02.07.2024, which also included the name <br /> of the appellant. <br /> <br /> 11. In pursuance of the aforesaid, the appellant submitted its <br /> resolution plan on 27.08.2024 for a total sum of Rs. 120 Crores. <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 5 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> Upon receiving the resolution plan, the respondent no. 1 – RP <br /> invited the appellant to the next meeting of the COC. The appellant <br /> th<br /> attended the 10 meeting of the COC on 01.10.2024, wherein the <br /> COC negotiated with the appellant on the value of the resolution <br /> plan. Thereafter, the respondent no. 1 – RP sent an email dated <br /> 11.11.2024 to the appellant, <i>inter alia</i> , seeking clarification on <br /> whether the constitutional documents of the appellant permitted it <br /> to acquire the corporate debtor under the regime of IBC. The <br /> appellant <i>vide</i> its email dated 18.11.2024 clarified the following to <br /> the above query: <br /> <br /> <i>“Since the IBC law came into effect recently, it was not </i><br /> <i>specifically </i> <i>mentioned. </i> <i>However, </i> <i>the </i> <i>constitutional </i><br /> <i>document/charter document allows collaboration, joint </i><br /> <i>ventures, partnerships with national and, international </i><br /> <i>companies. The charter document also mentioned that the </i><br /> <i>objective is to purchase and procure the agro-products, </i><br /> <i>modern techniques and other activities in the processing </i><br /> <i>sector. The corporate debtor is also engaged in the business </i><br /> <i>of processing of cotton into the spinning, weaving, printing </i><br /> <i>and finishing business in the textile segment. Hence, we are </i><br /> <i>well within the objectives of the charter document.” </i><br /> <br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <br /> th th<br /> 12. In the 10 and 17 COC meetings, respectively, the value of the <br /> resolution plan was increased to Rs. 169 Cr. After perusing the <br /> constitutional documents of the appellant, the respondent no. 1 – <br /> RP <i>vide</i> its email dated 10.02.2025 declared the appellant to be <br /> ineligible <i>inter alia</i> on the ground of the resolution plan being <br /> against the provisions of the bye-laws of the appellant, hence in <br /> contravention to Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC. <br /> <br /> <br /> 13. Aggrieved by the declaration of its ineligibility, the appellant filed <br /> an Interlocutory Application No. 880 of 2025 before the NCLT in the <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 6 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> pending CIRP proceedings. Pursuant to which, the NCLT passed its <br /> order dated 09.04.2025 in the said IA <i>inter alia</i> holding that the <br /> appellant was ineligible to submit the resolution plan in the CIRP <br /> of the corporate debtor on the ground that the bye-laws of the <br /> appellant do not allow it to invest in the corporate debtor. In this <br /> respect, the NCLT found that the appellant is neither a subsidiary <br /> institution of the corporate debtor nor in the same line of business <br /> as the corporate debtor. <br /> <br /> 14. Thereafter, in order to challenge the aforesaid ruling of NCLT, the <br /> appellant filed Company Appeal (AT) No. 790 of 2025 before NCLAT. <br /> The NCLAT, after hearing the parties, kept the matter reserved for <br /> judgment. The appellant, at this juncture, upon knowing that the <br /> certificate of registration of the amendment of bye-laws was not <br /> placed before the NCLT, sought to place the same before the NCLAT <br /> on 21.07.2025 by e-filing an IA with e-filing no. <br /> 9910138/06622/2025 with a request to reopen the hearing. <br /> However, on 22.07.2025, when the appellant mentioned the <br /> matter, the request for reopening the hearing was declined by the <br /> NCLAT. <br /> <br /> <br /> 15. Finally, the NCLAT <i>vide</i> the impugned judgment and order <br /> dismissed the appeal of the appellant <i>inter alia</i> holding that the <br /> appellant was not eligible to submit a resolution plan due to the <br /> restriction under Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act; the limited objective <br /> of the appellant’s production in <i> “agro-product”</i> ; and the bye-laws <br /> were not amended on the date of submission of the resolution plan. <br /> The relevant observations of the NCLAT in the impugned judgment <br /> and order are as under: <br /> <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 7 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <i>“61. We observe that although the co-operative society is </i><br /> <i>allowed to invest its funds or deposit in the shares, security </i><br /> <i>or assets of the subsidiary institution or any other </i><br /> <i>institution, this is qualified with the words i.e., it has to be </i><br /> <i>in the same line of business as a multistate co-operative </i><br /> <i>society like the Appellant herein. This implies that Section </i><br /> <i>64(d) of 2002 Act entitles as well as restricts the cooperative </i><br /> <i>society to invest its fund only in subsidiary institution or an </i><br /> <i>institution in the same line of the business or the multi state </i><br /> <i>co-operative society. </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>62. It is an undisputed fact that the Corporate Debtor was </i><br /> <i>not a subsidiary institution as of date of the submission of </i><br /> <i>the Resolution Plan. We have also noted that the Appellant </i><br /> <i>was indeed in business of agro-based textile under the </i><br /> <i>name and style of 'Nirmal Textiles', however, the business </i><br /> <i>of the Corporate Debtor was man-made fibre/ viscos which </i><br /> <i>Resolution Professional, CoC and Adjudicating Authority </i><br /> <i>differentiated with business of the Appellant as Agro based </i><br /> <i>textile processing. </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>63. We find logic as contained in the Impugned Order that </i><br /> <i>the Appellant was not in the same line of the business and </i><br /> <i>therefore was not entitled to invest in fund of the Corporate </i><br /> <i>Debtor to acquire the business as a going concern. We </i><br /> <i>further note that the objective and functions of the Appellant </i><br /> <i>as of society have been clearly mentioned in Clause (5). We </i><br /> <i>are conscious that Clause 5(s) of the bye-laws entitles the </i><br /> <i>Appellant society to purchase, produce, procure, distribute </i><br /> <i>like agro product for processing of product and by product </i><br /> <i>and further entitles to make available to its member modem </i><br /> <i>technique used in processing agro products and other </i><br /> <i>activity in processing. Thus, we find that the objectives of </i><br /> <i>the Appellant are clearly relative to agro based project </i><br /> <i>which is different from business of the Corporate Debtor. </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>64. […] We find that the CoC in, exercise of its commercial </i><br /> <i>wisdom has taken the legal opinions including independent </i><br /> <i>legal opinion before coming to conclusion that Appellant was </i><br /> <i>not eligible to submit the Resolution Plan, in view of the </i><br /> <i>relevant Sections of the 2002 Act as well as the restrictions </i><br /> <i>on the Appellant by its own bye-laws, which we have </i><br /> <i>already discussed at length in our earlier discussions.” </i><br /> <br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 8 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 16. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here <br /> before us with the present appeal. <br /> <br /> <b>B.</b> <b> </b> <b>SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT </b><br /> <br /> 17. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Rajiv Shakdher, the learned senior <br /> counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the appellant <br /> is not barred from submitting a resolution plan or from investing <br /> in the corporate debtor. They argued that, as per the object clause <br /> in the bye-laws, the appellant is entitled to purchase, produce, <br /> procure, and distribute the for the processing of the <br /> <i> “agro-products”</i><br /> product and byproduct. It also proposes to make available to its <br /> members the various modern techniques used in the processing of <br /> agro-products and other activities in the processing sector. <br /> <br /> 18. The learned counsel argued that the appellant had carried out <br /> certain amendments to its bye-laws, particularly to Clause 52, as <br /> mentioned above, to include the investment in the shares, <br /> securities, assets of any subsidiary institution or any other <br /> institution in the same line of business as the appellant. It is <br /> argued that the sole purpose of the amendment was to bring the <br /> bye-laws of the appellant in consonance with the 2023 amendment <br /> to Section 64 of the 2002 Act and permit the appellant to invest in <br /> an entity <i> “in the same line of business”</i> . <br /> <br /> 19. The learned counsel also relied on the note submitted by the central <br /> registrar before us in order to argue that the appellant is not barred <br /> from submitting a resolution plan under Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC, <br /> more particularly on the following submissions of the central <br /> registrar in his note: <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 9 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> (a) That there is no express or implied bar or blanket restriction <br /> under the 2002 Act for any MSCS to invest its funds by <br /> following the process provided in IBC; <br /> (b) That the provisions of the 2002 Act do not <i>per se</i> prohibit an <br /> MSCS from participating as a resolution applicant in a CIRP <br /> for the purpose of acquiring shares, securities, and assets of a <br /> corporate debtor, as long as it is in conformity with (i) Section <br /> 64 of the 2002 Act, (ii) the bye laws of the society, and (iii) <br /> Section 29A of the IBC; <br /> (c) That an MSCS registered under the 2002 Act functions as an <br /> autonomous cooperative organisation and is required to <br /> function as per the provisions of the 2002 Act and the <br /> approved bye-laws of the society. <br /> <br /> 20. The learned counsel further contended that the principal ground <br /> for the rejection of the resolution plan of the appellant by the <br /> respondent no. 1 - RP was that the bye-laws of the appellant did <br /> not permit it to invest in the corporate debtor, and that the <br /> appellant was not in the same line of business as the corporate <br /> debtor. They submitted that the expression <i>“in the same line of </i><br /> <i>business”</i> has not been defined in the Act, and so, resorting to the <br /> ordinary meaning it would mean to engage in a business which is <br /> the same or similar in nature. Developing on this context, the <br /> learned counsel argued that in the present case, the appellant has <br /> a textile vertical in the name and style of ‘Nirmal Textile’ which <br /> would be within the phrase of <i>“in the same line of business”</i> for the <br /> purpose of investment/acquisition of the corporate debtor, which <br /> also is in the textile business, as a going concern. Further, it was <br /> argued that the appellant’s bye-laws has the objective of being in <br /> the business of purchase, process, procure in the <i> “agro products”</i> , <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 10 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> which would also include the textile business in it, and therefore <br /> having amended Clause 52 of its bye-laws in line with the amended <br /> Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act, the appellant cannot be said to be <br /> not in the same line of business as the corporate debtor. <br /> <br /> <b>C.</b> <b> </b> <b>SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS </b><br /> <br /> 21. Mr. Navin Pahwa, the learned senior counsel appearing for the <br /> respondent no. 1 - RP, submitted that the resolution plan <br /> submitted by the appellant did not meet the requirement of Section <br /> 32(2)(e) of IBC since the investments made by an MSCS are <br /> governed by Section 64 of the 2002 Act, according to which an <br /> MSCS can only invest in share securities or assets of: <br /> (i) a subsidiary institution, or <br /> (ii) any other institution in the same line of business <br /> He submitted that prior to investing its resources, the appellant <br /> must demonstrate that the institution it is investing in is either its <br /> subsidiary or that it is <i> “in the same line of business”</i> . <br /> <br /> 22. In the aforesaid context, the learned senior counsel made a two-<br /> fold argument: (i) that the corporate debtor is not an existing <br /> subsidiary institution of the appellant and (ii) that the corporate <br /> debtor is not in the same line of business as the appellant. While <br /> dealing with the first argument, the learned counsel submitted that <br /> the corporate debtor is admittedly not a subsidiary institution of <br /> the appellant. He rebutted the appellant’s submission that upon <br /> the approval of the resolution plan, 100% of the shares of the <br /> corporate debtor would vest in the appellant, making the corporate <br /> debtor a subsidiary (in the future), and consequently, investment <br /> therein would be permissible under Section 64(d). According to the <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 11 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> learned counsel, such an interpretation is untenable and against <br /> the plain language of Section 64(d). <br /> <br /> 23. While dealing with the second fold of the argument, the learned <br /> counsel submitted that as regards the appellant’s contention that <br /> it is an investment in an institution in the <i> “same line of business”</i> , <br /> the appellant would not be eligible to invest in the corporate debtor <br /> inasmuch as, the two entities i.e., the appellant and the corporate <br /> debtor are not in the same line of business. The learned counsel <br /> submitted that the appellant is predominantly involved in financial <br /> services and that its textile unit is not a separate body corporate, <br /> nor is the resolution plan submitted under the name of ‘Nirmal <br /> Textile’. It was argued that, in terms of the appellant’s byelaws, it <br /> is involved in the processing of agro-based products, and not in <br /> their manufacturing. According to him, Nirmal Textiles is merely a <br /> unit of the appellant cooperative society and that the textile <br /> manufacturing is not the main line of business of the appellant. <br /> <br /> 24. Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, the learned senior counsel appearing for <br /> the respondent no. 2 - Successful Resolution Applicant, submitted <br /> that the appellant lacks locus to maintain the present appeal as the <br /> appellant was never a resolution applicant within the meaning of <br /> Section 5(25) of IBC as its resolution plan was not legally capable <br /> of being placed before the COC owing to clear statutory prohibition <br /> under Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act and limitations under its bye-<br /> laws. <br /> <br /> 25. Mr. Kaul submitted that the appellant is barred by Section 64(d) of <br /> the 2002 Act, as the corporate debtor is neither a subsidiary <br /> institution of the appellant nor will it come under the phrase <i> “any </i><br /> <i>other institution in the same line of business”</i> . It was submitted that <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 12 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> the corporate debtor is engaged in the manufacturing and dyeing <br /> of man-made fibre/viscose, which is substantially an industrial <br /> and chemically driven manufacturing activity. Whereas the <br /> appellant is a credit co-operative society whose predominant <br /> business activity is in finance. The learned counsel submitted that <br /> even the textile unit of the appellant, namely, Nirmal Textile, is <br /> limited only to the processing of agro-products, and not industrial <br /> manufacturing of the same. <br /> <br /> 26. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellant’s main <br /> business is to render banking and financial services to its <br /> members. Its agro-processing activity is incidental and carried out <br /> through a small internal vertical called Nirmal Textiles. The learned <br /> counsel also submitted that on one hand the appellant’s business <br /> is agro based i.e., procured from agricultural sources, on the other <br /> hand, the corporate debtor’s business is industrial manufacturing <br /> of viscose/man-made fibre which is chemically processed synthetic <br /> product. As per the learned counsel, this is entirely different in <br /> nature, scale, technology, and regulatory environment as compared <br /> to agro-processing, as is being undertaken by the appellant <br /> through its internal vertical, Nirmal Textile. He contended that the <br /> corporate debtor’s activities involve man-made fibres and <br /> processing such fibres into fabrics, which processes are not agro-<br /> based but industrial manufacturing of synthetic and blended <br /> textiles. Thus, the corporate debtor’s industry does not align with <br /> Clause 5(s) of the appellant’s byelaws. <br /> <br /> 27. Further, the learned counsel argued that the Financial Statements <br /> of the appellant for FY 2023–24 would indicate that income <br /> generated from the appellant co-operative society’s financial <br /> services is to the tune of Rs. 194.27 crore, whereas the income <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 13 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> generated from its agro-based processing unit i.e. Nirmal Textiles <br /> is to the tune of a loss of Rs. 3.37 crore. <br /> <br /> 28. To further demonstrate that the appellant and the corporate debtor <br /> are not in the same line of business, the learned counsel relied on <br /> one SEBI Circular dated 06.07.2021, which defined the phrase <i>“in </i><br /> <i>the same line of business”</i> in context of the delisting of a listed <br /> <b> </b><br /> subsidiary company wherein it is required, <i>inter alia</i> , that both <br /> entities must fall under the same digit NIC code. Under the NIC <br /> code, the appellant would fall into NIC 649; Nirmal Textile would <br /> fall under NIC 01632; and the corporate debtor would fall under <br /> NIC 131/139/203. Thus, none of them would fall under the same <br /> NIC code. The learned counsel submitted that while the SEBI <br /> Circular applies specifically to listed companies, the underlying <br /> principles, particularly the reliance on NIC Codes and <br /> revenue/asset linkage, provide a useful, relevant and objective <br /> benchmark. <br /> <br /> 29. Mr. Gopal Jain, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the <br /> respondent no. 3 – COC submitted that the mere fact that the <br /> appellant is running a textile unit cannot bind the CoC if the <br /> appellant is otherwise ineligible in law to run the textile unit, <br /> contrary to the provisions contained in its own bye-laws. He <br /> submitted that the CoC, in its commercial wisdom, took a decision <br /> by a majority to consider and approve the resolution plan <br /> submitted by the respondent no. 2 and at the same time decided <br /> not to consider the resolution plan submitted by the appellant, <br /> being ineligible for the purpose of revival of the CD in its best <br /> judgment. He further contended that the appellant is credit <br /> cooperative society limited and is in the business of giving credit to <br /> its members, therefore, the appellant as per the bye-laws and <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 14 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act cannot involve itself in any other line <br /> of business other than giving credit to its members, its existing <br /> subsidiary institution or any other institution which is in the same <br /> line of business i.e., an MSCS that is giving credit to its own <br /> members. <br /> <br /> <b>D.</b> <b> </b> <b>ANALYSIS </b><br /> <br /> <b>(I)</b> <b> </b> <b>Meaning and scope of the expression </b> <b><i>“any other institution in </i></b><br /> <b><i>the same line of business”.</i></b> <b> </b><br /> <br /> 30. Section 30 of the IBC deals with the submission of the resolution <br /> plan. As per Section 30(2)(e), the RP is required to confirm that each <br /> resolution plan <i>inter alia</i> does not contravene any provisions of the <br /> law for the time being in force. Such a law, for the time being in <br /> force in the present case, is Section 64 of the 2002 Act, which deals <br /> with the investment of funds by an MSCS and certain restrictions <br /> therein. As per Section 64(d), an MSCS may invest or deposit its <br /> funds <i>inter alia</i> in shares, securities, or assets of a subsidiary <br /> institution or “ <i>any other institution in the same line of business as </i><br /> <i>the MSCS”</i> . The relevant extract from Section 30 of the IBC and <br /> Section 64 of the 2002 Act is as under: <br /> <br /> <i>“IBC 2016 </i><br /> <i>30. Submission of resolution plan. — (1) A resolution </i><br /> <i>applicant may submit a resolution plan [along with an </i><br /> <i>affidavit stating that he is eligible under section 29A] to the </i><br /> <i>resolution professional prepared on the basis of the </i><br /> <i>information memorandum. </i><br /> <i>(2) The resolution professional shall examine each </i><br /> <i>resolution plan received by him to confirm that each </i><br /> <i>resolution plan— </i><br /> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 15 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <i>(e) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for </i><br /> <i>the time being in force; […] </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> <i>MSCS Act, 2002 </i><br /> <i>64. Investment of funds.— A multi-State co-operative society </i><br /> <i>may invest or deposit its funds — </i><br /> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <i>(d) in the shares, securities or assets of a subsidiary </i><br /> <i>institution or </i> <b><i>any other institution [in the same line of </i></b><br /> <b><i>business</i></b> <i> as the multi-State co-operative society] or […] </i><br /> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <i>(f) in such other manner as may be determined by the </i><br /> <i>Central Government.]” </i><br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <br /> 31. According to Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act, an MSCS may invest or <br /> deposit in the shares, securities, or assets of: <br /> (i) a subsidiary institution, or <br /> (ii) any other institution in the same line of business <br /> Thus, prior to investing its resources, an MSCS must demonstrate <br /> that the institution it is investing in is either its subsidiary <br /> institution or that, in the case of any other institution, it is <i> </i> in the <i> </i><br /> <i>“same line of business”</i> . <br /> <br /> 32. The plain reading of the interpretation clause in the 2002 Act, <br /> indicates that it does not define the expression <i> “same line of </i><br /> <i>business”</i> . However, the deliberations of the parliamentary <br /> committee around the aims and objectives of including this phrase <br /> in the statute guide us to its meaning and scope. <br /> <br /> 33. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), while examining the <br /> amendment to Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act, noted that the existing <br /> provision permitting investment in was open-<br /> <i> “any other institution”</i><br /> ended in nature and had given rise to concerns of misuse. The <br /> Ministry of Cooperation, in its comments, specifically highlighted <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 16 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> that the absence of any limiting standard had enabled certain <br /> societies to deploy funds in a manner that did not align with <br /> prudential considerations. The concern was expressed based on the <br /> experience of improper and unsafe investments by MSCSs, thereby <br /> necessitating discipline in the investment regime. The rationale of <br /> the amendment was tied to the broader objective of ensuring the <br /> safety and security of members’ funds and strengthening <br /> governance standards. The Committee noted that several <br /> provisions in Section 64 of the 2002 Act, including clause (d), were <br /> susceptible to abuse due to their wide and undefined nature. The <br /> introduction of restrictions, including the phrase <i> “same line of </i><br /> in Section 64(d), formed part of a larger legislative <br /> <i>business”</i><br /> attempt to curb the misuse of society’s funds, prevent risky <br /> investments, and bring about overall financial discipline in the <br /> functioning of MSCSs. The relevant extract from the JPC report <br /> dated 15.03.2023 is as under: <br /> <br /> <i>“In the existing MSCS Act, 2002, Section 64 (f) provides that </i><br /> <i>an MSCS may invest or deposit its funds ‘in such other </i><br /> <i>modes as may be provided in the bye-laws’. This leaves </i><br /> <i>scope for investment into dubious entities & fraudulent </i><br /> <i>investment. In the amendment bill, clause 25 (section 64) is </i><br /> <i>being proposed which will substitute in Section 64(f) the </i><br /> <i>words “in such other mode as may be provided in the bye-</i><br /> <i>laws” with “in such other manner as may be determined by </i><br /> <i>Central Govt.” This will prevent misuse and fraudulent </i><br /> <i>investments. Since the future emerging instruments </i><br /> <i>/avenues for investments may vary from time to time, </i><br /> <i>flexibility is required for the Central Government to </i><br /> <i>determine the manner in which such investments can be </i><br /> <i>made; keeping the overall interest of Cooperatives in mind. </i><br /> <i>The phrase ‘any other institution’ in 64(d) is open-ended </i><br /> <i>and has been misused by some societies for making </i><br /> <i>dubious investment [sic]. The proposed amendment will </i><br /> <i>help in preventing such kinds of investments” </i><br /> <br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 17 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> 34. Further, during the consultation process, the stakeholders, <br /> including one KRIBHCO, raised specific objections to the proposed <br /> restriction. It was contended that limiting investments to the <i> “same </i><br /> <i>line of business”</i> would restrict the diversification and expansion <br /> into new sectors, which, according to them, was contrary to the <br /> Government’s broader policy objective of promoting growth in the <br /> cooperative sector. They advocated for retention of flexibility by <br /> allowing investments in any business permitted under the bye-laws <br /> of the society. The Ministry of Cooperation, however, did not accept <br /> this objection and clarified that the amendment was necessary to <br /> address misuse arising from the unregulated nature of the earlier <br /> provision, while still preserving the autonomy of societies through <br /> their bye-laws in determining their business domain. It was <br /> emphasised that the line of business of an MSCS is itself drawn <br /> through its bye-laws, and therefore, the restriction operates within <br /> the framework already chosen by the society. The relevant extract <br /> from the JPC report dated 15.03.2023 is as under: <br /> <br /> <i>“Since the future emerging instruments/avenues for </i><br /> <i>investments may vary from time to time, flexibility is </i><br /> <i>required for the Central Government to determine the </i><br /> <i>manner in which such investments can be made; keeping </i><br /> <i>the overall interest of Cooperatives in mind. Therefore, </i><br /> <i>changes have been proposed in the interest of safety and </i><br /> <i>security of deposits of the members. The businesses to be </i><br /> <i>carried out by an MSCS are described in the bye-laws and </i><br /> <i>the societies can frame their bye-laws democratically and </i><br /> <i>autonomously to decide their line of business. There is no </i><br /> <i>contradiction as the subsidiary institution as per section 19 </i><br /> <i>has also to be in furtherance of the stated objects of the </i><br /> <i>society which are in the bye-laws.” </i><br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 18 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 35. Upon considering the concerns expressed by stakeholders and the <br /> response of the Ministry, the JPC finally accepted the amendment. <br /> Thus, from the above, it appears that the insertion of the phrase <i> </i><br /> <i>“in the same line of business”</i> was intended to address the following: <br /> <br /> (i) The earlier provision, i.e., <i>“any other institution,”</i> was open-<br /> ended and had been misused by some societies for making <br /> dubious investments in any other institution; <br /> (ii) This had to be ensured by limiting the investments to <br /> institutions falling within the line of business as reflected in <br /> the bye-laws of the MSCS; <br /> (iii) While at the same time preventing diversion of funds into <br /> unrelated investments and securing the interest and safety of <br /> deposits of the members. <br /> (iv) However, an MSCS was still empowered to frame or amend its <br /> bye-laws democratically and autonomously to decide its line of <br /> business. <br /> <br /> 36. In light of the deliberations of the JPC, it is clear that the <br /> determination of whether an institution operates in the same line <br /> of business as an MSCS must be made with reference to its bye-<br /> laws, which constitute the decisive charter document in this <br /> regard. It is pertinent to note that every MSCS is required to frame <br /> its bye-laws in accordance with the provisions of the 2002 Act and <br /> the rules made thereunder, particularly Section 10(2), which, <i>inter </i><br /> <i>alia</i> , provides for the inclusion of an object clause in the bye-laws. <br /> Further, the 2002 Act also empowers an MSCS under Section 11 <br /> to amend its bye-laws, including its objects, in accordance with the <br /> prescribed procedure therein. <br /> <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 19 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 37. In construing the expression <i> “same line of business”</i> , which is not <br /> defined under the 2002 Act, some guidance may also be drawn from <br /> analogous regulatory frameworks to discern its ordinary and <br /> contextual meaning in addition to the JPC report. In this regard, <br /> reference may be made to the approach adopted in the Securities <br /> and Exchange Board of India (Delisting of Equity Shares) <br /> Regulations, 2021, wherein the determination of the question <br /> whether two entities are in the same line of business is assessed on <br /> the basis of their principal or predominant economic activities, <br /> including classification under the National Industrial Classification <br /> (NIC) Code. This indicates that the expression <i> “same line of </i><br /> refers to a substantive sameness or close nexus in core <br /> <i>business”</i><br /> business activities, and not a remote or incidental connection. <br /> However, at this juncture, it is important to note that such <br /> guidance to SEBI Regulation is only illustrative. In the present <br /> context, the determination must ultimately be made with reference <br /> to the objects and business activities as set out in the bye-laws of <br /> the MSCS, which govern the inquiry. <br /> <br /> In view of the aforesaid legislative intent underlying the 2023 <br /> amendment, and the guidance available from the JPC <br /> deliberations, it becomes evident that the expression <i> “any other </i><br /> <i>institution in the same line of business”</i> under Section 64(d) is not <br /> to be construed in an expansive manner. It requires that, before <br /> deploying its funds, an MSCS must satisfy a threshold condition <br /> that the proposed investment aligns with its own line of business <br /> as reflected in its bye-laws. This requirement keeps a check on the <br /> manner in which funds of members of MSCS are being utilised and <br /> is intended to prevent diversion into activities that are unrelated or <br /> only remotely connected to the core business that an MSCS is <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 20 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> entitled to do as per its bye-laws. Consequently, the determination <br /> of eligibility under Section 64(d) must involve an examination of the <br /> objects and functions contained in the bye-laws of the MSCS and a <br /> comparison thereof with the business activities of the target <br /> institution, so as to ascertain whether there exists a predominant <br /> or substantial sameness between the two. <br /> <br /> <b>(II)</b> <b> </b> <b>Applicability of the standard of</b> <b><i> “same line of business”</i></b> <b> to the </b><br /> <b>facts of the present case. </b><br /> <br /> 38. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is imperative to first set <br /> out the objects and functions as stated in the bye-laws of the <br /> appellant, since the determination of <i> “line of business”</i> must <br /> necessarily flow from the same. Clause 5 of the bye-laws of the <br /> appellant deals with the objects and functions, which reads as <br /> under: <br /> <br /> <i>“5. </i> <b><i>OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS:</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <i>The following are the objectives & functions of the society: </i><br /> <i>a. To encourage the members to thrifty and abide by the </i><br /> <i>cooperative principles. </i><br /> <i>b. To Accept Deposit from Members and Nominal Members </i><br /> <i>and advancing Loans to Members. </i><br /> <i>c. To own land or building for the use of the society with </i><br /> <i>prior permission of Central Registrar of the society. </i><br /> <i>d. To arrange for the recovery of the loans by disposal of the </i><br /> <i>movable or immovable property that has been pledged </i><br /> <i>towards the society against loans receivables. </i><br /> <i>e. To manage the properties of the society, maintain it and </i><br /> <i>to run it smoothly. </i><br /> <i>f. To serve the interest of the poor and middle class of people </i><br /> <i>more than one state by admitting as members. </i><br /> <i>g. To solve the Housing Problems of the Members, </i><br /> <i>Employees and the Agents of the Society, for the purpose </i><br /> <i>Purchase Land and Construct Houses for them. </i><br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 21 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <i>h. To enhance or build the social, ethical and educational </i><br /> <i>level of the members and to bring about religious </i><br /> <i>awareness/movement amongst them. </i><br /> <i>i. To make available the services of health, nutrition and </i><br /> <i>diet, services shall be to the member, employees, </i><br /> <i>representatives and general public from the humanitarian </i><br /> <i>point of view of the society. </i><br /> <i>j. To arrange for the transportation or conveyance for the </i><br /> <i>members, employees, and representatives of every branch </i><br /> <i>of the society, also conveyance to and from school for their </i><br /> <i>wards and other children. </i><br /> <i>k. To provide for financial aid for the purposes of better </i><br /> <i>education of the wards out of Nagpur and also provide for </i><br /> <i>their accommodation in hostels and provide them with </i><br /> <i>Libraries. </i><br /> <i>l. To construct godowns for storage of farm produce and </i><br /> <i>sanction loans of 50% of the price of such stored produce. </i><br /> <i>m. To provide service of ambulance and funeral cortege </i><br /> <i>vans. To construct & run multi-specialty hospitals. </i><br /> <i>n. To form production and consumer programmes for the </i><br /> <i>farmer members of the society. </i><br /> <i>o. To organise Medical camps in the Rural & Urban Areas. </i><br /> <i>p. Opening Branches and Sub-Offices in the Area of </i><br /> <i>Operation. </i><br /> <i>q. To provide Safe Deposits Vaults to member. </i><br /> <i>r. To do all such acts for the promotion and enhancing the </i><br /> <i>Socio Economic Status of the members of the Society. </i><br /> <i>s. To purchase, produce, procure, distribute the “agro-</i><br /> <i>products” for the processing of product and by-product in </i><br /> <i>order to make the same available to its members. </i><br /> <i>t. To enter into Partnership with other co-operative societies </i><br /> <i>to promote or expand the society business.” </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <br /> 39. Further, Clause 6(B) of the bye-laws provides that the funds of the <br /> appellant may be utilised for carrying out the aforesaid objects and <br /> functions, which reads as under: <br /> <br /> <i>“6. </i> <b><i>RAISING OF FUNDS:</i></b> <i> </i><br /> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 22 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <i>B) The funds of the society shall be utilised for the </i><br /> <i>attainment of the objects of the society as specified in these </i><br /> <i>bye-laws.” </i><br /> (Emphasis Supplied) <br /> <br /> 40. Having regard to the aforesaid objects and the permitted utilisation <br /> of funds, the line of business of the appellant must be understood <br /> from a cumulative reading of these clauses. It is in this background <br /> that the second limb of Section 64(d), namely, whether the <br /> corporate debtor is in the same line of business as the appellant, is <br /> required to be examined. <br /> <br /> 41. For this purpose, the line of business of the appellant must be <br /> understood from the objects as stated in its bye-laws as a whole. <br /> Clauses 5(a) to 5(r) show that the appellant is primarily a co-<br /> operative society engaged in accepting deposits, advancing loans, <br /> and providing various facilities to its members, such as housing, <br /> healthcare, education, and other welfare activities. These clauses <br /> indicate that the main business activity that the appellant is <br /> entitled to carry out as per the bye-laws is that of a financial service <br /> provider and member-oriented co-operative, and not a standalone <br /> industrial manufacturing entity. <br /> <br /> 42. A careful reading of the relevant clauses of objects and functions <br /> further clarifies this position. Clause 5(b) provides for accepting <br /> deposits from members and advancing loans, forming the core of <br /> its financial activity. Clause 5(d) enables recovery of such loans <br /> through the disposal of pledged assets, which is incidental to its <br /> lending function. Clause 5(g) relates to solving housing problems of <br /> members through acquisition of land and construction, while <br /> Clauses 5(h), 5(i), 5(j) and 5(k) respectively deal with social, <br /> educational, medical, transport and welfare services for members <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 23 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> and their families. Clause 5(q), which provides for safe deposit <br /> vaults, also falls within the domain of financial services. These <br /> Clauses, when read together, show that the business activities that <br /> the appellant is entitled to do as per the bye-laws are centred <br /> around financial intermediation and member welfare, and not <br /> industrial manufacturing. <br /> <br /> 43. Thus, when the bye-laws are read in their entirety, the appellant’s <br /> line of business is predominantly that of a financial and member-<br /> oriented co-operative, with limited engagement in agro-based <br /> processing activities. It cannot be said that the appellant is engaged <br /> in industrial manufacturing activities. This understanding <br /> assumes significance while examining whether the business of the <br /> corporate debtor bears a substantial or predominant sameness so <br /> as to fall within the expression <i> “same line of business”</i> under <br /> Section 64(d). <br /> <br /> 44. Clause 5(s) must be read in this backdrop as argued by the counsel <br /> for both parties. It permits the appellant <i> “to purchase, produce, </i><br /> <i>procure, distribute the agro-products for the processing of product </i><br /> <i>and by-product”</i> . It further provides that <i>“it is also proposed to make </i><br /> <i>available to members modern technique used in processing of agro </i><br /> <i>product and other activities in processing sector”</i> . From a plain <br /> reading, two aspects emerge. First, the permissible business <br /> activity under Clause 5(s) of the appellant’s bye-laws is centred <br /> around <i> “agro-products”</i> , i.e., products derived from agriculture. <br /> Secondly, the role of the appellant is to facilitate the processing of <br /> such agro-products and to support such processing by making <br /> available modern techniques to its members. Thus, the clause does <br /> not envisage standalone industrial manufacturing across all <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 24 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> categories, but confines the activity to agro-products and allied <br /> processing, coupled with technical support to its members within <br /> that sector. Therefore, Clause 5(s) permits processing activity, but <br /> only in connection with agro-products and within the processing <br /> sector linked to such products. Further, Clause 5(t) permits the <br /> appellant to enter into a partnership with <i> </i> other <i> “co-operative </i><br /> <i>societies”</i> to promote or expand its business. This provision is <br /> restricted in terms of the nature of the entity, being confined to <br /> other co-operative societies only and not companies like corporate <br /> debtors. <br /> <br /> 45. In contrast, the corporate debtor is engaged in the business of man-<br /> made fibre/viscose-based textiles, which involves synthetic or <br /> semi-synthetic raw materials. This is distinct from agro-based <br /> processing, which the appellant is permitted to undertake under <br /> the bye-laws. Although both may broadly fall under the textile <br /> sector, yet the actual nature of their activities is different. One is <br /> agro-product processing, while the other is synthetic or semi-<br /> synthetic fibre manufacturing. Under the second limb of Section <br /> 64(d), the requirement is for predominantly or substantially the <br /> same or closely related business activities. Such sameness is not <br /> present in the present case. Thus, it can be said that the processing <br /> activity contemplated in Clause 5(s) is integrally linked to agro-<br /> products and not to processing in general. <br /> <br /> 46. Therefore, applying the standard of the same line of business, it <br /> cannot be said that the appellant and the corporate debtor are in <br /> the same line of business. As far as the reasoning of the NCLAT on <br /> the aforesaid aspect is concerned, we are in agreement with the <br /> same, inasmuch as the appellant cannot be said to fall within the <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 25 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> second limb of Section 64(d) on the touchstone of <i> “same line of </i><br /> <i>business”</i> . However, the NCLAT went one step further in observing <br /> that the income earned from the financial business was Rs. 194.27 <br /> Cr., whereas Nirmal Textile incurred a loss of Rs. 3.37 Cr., to arrive <br /> at the conclusion that the appellant is predominantly involved in <br /> the financial business and not in the textile business. We must <br /> clarify that the revenue earned or profit/loss incurred has no <br /> relevance in determining the standard of the same line of business, <br /> which necessarily has to be determined through the bye-laws of the <br /> MSCS only. <br /> <br /> 47. At this juncture, it is also imperative for us to address one further <br /> argument of the appellant, wherein it has been contended that it <br /> had carried out certain amendments to its bye-laws, particularly to <br /> Clause 52, so as to incorporate the verbatim language of Section <br /> 64(d) therein. It was argued that the object of such an amendment <br /> was to bring the bye-laws in consonance with the 2023 amendment <br /> to Section 64, thereby enabling the appellant to invest in an entity <br /> in the same line of business. On this basis, it was submitted that <br /> once Clause 52 stood amended, the appellant could not be held to <br /> be outside the same line of business as the corporate debtor. <br /> However, this contention does not merit acceptance. <br /> <br /> 48. In the first place, it is an admitted position that although the <br /> certificate of registration of amendment dated 24.01.2024 was <br /> available with the appellant, yet the same was not placed before the <br /> NCLT or the NCLAT. In the absence of such material, both the <br /> forums proceeded on the basis that the amendment had not come <br /> into effect as on the date of submission of the resolution plan. The <br /> appellant, having failed to place the said document at the <br /> appropriate stage despite due opportunity, cannot now be <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 26 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> permitted to rely upon it. The attempt to introduce the same at this <br /> stage by way of an application for production of additional <br /> documents dated 31.08.2025 does not satisfy the well-settled <br /> requirements under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil <br /> Procedure, 1908, and is accordingly liable to be rejected. <br /> <br /> 49. Secondly, even assuming that such an amendment were to be <br /> taken on record, though it is not, it would not advance the case of <br /> the appellant on the issue of the same line of business. This is <br /> because the amendment to Clause 52 merely reproduces the <br /> language of Section 64(d) and governs the manner in which funds <br /> may be invested. It does not, in any manner, amend, alter or <br /> expand the objects and functions of the appellant as contained in <br /> Clause 5 of the bye-laws, which in substance determines the nature <br /> and scope of its business activities. In the absence of any <br /> corresponding amendment to the object clause so as to bring the <br /> appellant’s permissible activities in alignment with those of the <br /> corporate debtor, the requirement of being in the same line of <br /> business cannot be said to be satisfied merely by adopting the <br /> statutory language of Section 64(d). <br /> <br /> <br /> <b>E.</b> <b> </b> <b>CONCLUSION </b><br /> <br /> <br /> 50. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the totality of <br /> the circumstances, the inevitable conclusion on the position of law <br /> is that Section 64(d) of the 2002 Act permits an MSCS to invest or <br /> deposit its funds in two distinct categories of institutions: (a) a <br /> subsidiary institution, and (b) any other institution in the same line <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 27 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> of business. As per the JPC Report dated 15.03.2023, the second <br /> limb, i.e., <i>“any other institution in the same line of business”</i> , was <br /> introduced as a restrictive standard to address the misuse of the <br /> earlier open-ended provision and restrict the dubious or fraudulent <br /> investments. This expression requires a substantial or <br /> predominant, or closely related sameness in business activities, <br /> which must be determined with reference to the objects and <br /> functions contained in the bye-laws of an MSCS. <br /> <br /> 51. Accordingly, the application for withdrawal is allowed, and the <br /> present appeal stands dismissed as withdrawn. It is needless to <br /> clarify that the CIRP of the corporate debtor shall continue in <br /> accordance with the provisions of IBC. <br /> <br /> 52. At this stage, after the Judgment was pronounced, Mr. Navin <br /> Pahwa, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the Resolution <br /> Professional (RP) submitted that the under the Order of this Court <br /> dated 13-10-2025, the Committee of Creditors (CoC) was directed <br /> to deposit an amount of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crore) <br /> towards the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CRIP) costs. <br /> <br /> 53. He brought to our notice that CoC has deposited <br /> Rs.1,63,42,661.15/- The CoC has to still deposit the balance <br /> amount of Rs.36,57,338.85/-. <br /> <br /> 54. Since we have now clarified that the CRIP shall continue in <br /> accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy <br /> Code, 2016 (IBC), the RP can take up the aforesaid issue with the <br /> Adjudicating Authority. <br /> <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 28 of 29</b> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 55. The pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <b>....................................... J. </b><br /> <b>(J.B. Pardiwala) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>....................................... J. </b><br /> <b>(K.V. Viswanathan) </b><br /> <br /> <b>New Delhi; </b><br /> <b>th</b><br /> <b>9</b> <b> April, 2026.</b> <br /> <b>Civil Appeal No. 11193 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <b>Page 29 of 29</b> </div>