Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/03/1952
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
BOSE, VIVIAN
CITATION:
1952 AIR 167 1952 SCR 839
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1954 SC 204 (5)
D 1956 SC 116 (49,63)
R 1956 SC 546 (5)
R 1962 SC1116 (10)
C 1965 SC 328 (8,9)
R 1988 SC1353 (16)
F 1990 SC1982 (3)
ACT:
Evidence Act (1 of 1872), sec. 27--Statements of several
accused leading to discoveries--Admissibility--Necessity of
proof as to which statement was made first--Scope of sec.
27.
HEADNOTE:
Three persons K, M and S, who were accused of murder
made statements to the police which disclosed that the dead
bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream and
the police party thereafter went with the three accused to
the stream where each of them pointed out a place where
different
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840
parts of the dead bodies were discovered. It was contended
on behalf of the accused that it was only the information
which was first given that was admissible under sec. 27 of
the Evidence Act, that once a fact has been discovered in
consequence of information received from a person accused
of an offence, it cannot be said to be re-discovered in
consequence of information received from another accused
person, and that in the absence of evidence to show which of
the accused first gave the information the discoveries
alleged cannot be proved against any of the accused persons:
Held, that, even assuming that this argument was correct, as
it appeared from the evidence that S led the police to a
particular spot on the stream and it was at his instance
that some blood stained earth was recovered from a place
outside the village and he had also pointed out the trunk of
one of the dead bodies, and the High Court was satisfied
that there was an "initial pointing out" by S, the case was
covered by the rule and the evidence as to the discoveries
was admissible.
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With regard to the rule applicable to cases where there
is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and
authentic statements of the nature referred to in sec. 27 of
the Evidence Act having been made by several accused persons
either simultaneously or otherwise, some of the decided
cases have gone further than is warranted by the language of
sec. 27 of the Evidence Act and may have to be reviewed on a
future occasion.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
22 of 1950. Appeal from the judgment and order dated 29th
June, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Simla (Weston
C.J. and Khosla J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 432 of 1949
arising out of a judgment dated 5th August, 1949, of the
Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, in Ses-
sions Trial No. 7 of 1949 and Case’ No. 8 of 1949.
Jai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the appel-
lants.
Gopal Singh for the State.
1952. March 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
FAZL ALl J. --The three appellants were tried by the
Additional Sessions Judge at Amritsar and found guilty of
having murdered two persons named Darshan Singh and Achhar
Singh and sentenced to transportation for life. The High
Court of Punjab upheld their
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conviction and sentence and granted them a certificate under
article 134(1)(c)of the Constitution that the case is a fit
one for appeal to this Court. Hence this appeal.
The facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows.
On the evening of 16th December, 1948, a little before
sunset, Achhar Singh, one of the murdered persons, went to
the house of one Inder Singh in village Dalam for getting
paddy husked. Achhar Singh’s brother, Darshan Singh, who
was working as a driver at Amritsar, came to Dalam from
Amritsar the same evening, and, on coming to know from his
father that Achhar Singh had gone to Inder Singh’s house, he
also went there. while the two brothers were returning
home, they were attacked by the three appellants and two of
their relatives in a lane adjoining Inder Singh’s house. The
five assailants, who were armed with deadly weapons, in-
flicted a number of injuries on the two victims, as a result
of which they died then and there. After the murder, the
appellants and their companions tied the two dead bodies in
two kheses (wrappers) and took them to village Saleempura
where two other persons, named Ajaib Singh and Banta Singh,
joined them, and the dead bodies after being dismembered
were thrown into a stream known as Sakinala at a place about
five miles from village Dalam. Bela Singh, father of the
deceased persons, who was one of the persons who claims to
have witnessed the occurrence, did not leave the village at
night on account of fear, but he started about two hours
before sunrise on the next morning and lodged the first
information report at 10 A.M. at the nearest police station.
A police officer arrived in village Dalam shortly after-
wards, and after investigation a charge-sheet was submitted
against seven persons including the present appellants. At
the trial, five of the accused were charged with offences
under section 302 read with section 149 and under section
201 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. and the
remaining two accused were charged with the offence under
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section 201 read with section 149 of that Code. The learned
Judge who tried
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the accused, convicted the appellants and two other persons
under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code
and sentenced them to transportation for life, and convicted
Ajaib Singh under section 201 read with section 149 and
sentenced him to three years’ R.I. Bantu Singh, accused, was
acquitted. On appeal, the Punjab High Court upheld the
conviction of the present appellants and acquitted the
remaining three persons.
Before proceeding to discuss the evidence in the case,
it is necessary to refer to what has been. described as the
motive for the murder. It appears that in June, 1947, Natha
Singh, father of the third appellant, Swaran Singh, was
murdered, and Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh, the two mur-
dered persons in the case before us, and their third broth-
er, Sulakhan Singh, were charged with the murder of that
person. As a result of the trial, Darshan Singh was acquit-
ted and Achhar Singh was sentenced to 11/2 years’ R.I.,
while Sulakhan Singh was sentenced to 7 years’ R.I. The
judgment of the Sessions Judge in that case was delivered
shortly before the date of the present occurrence, and it is
common ground that Achhar Singh had been released on bail by
the appellate court and was at large at that time. It is
said that the appellants and their relatives felt aggrieved
by the acquittal of Darshan Singh and by the light sentence
passed on Achhar Singh, and therefore committed this murder
in a spirit of frustration and revenge. It was conceded
before us by the learned counsel for the appellants that the
facts stated above constituted a strong motive for the
murder, but he also contended that they constituted an
equally strong motive for the appellants being falsely
implicated in case the murder was committed, as was suggest-
ed by him, in circumstances under which the murderers could
not be seen or identified. It therefore becomes necessary to
set out the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support
of the murder.
The evidence led by the prosecution may be divided under
two main heads :--(1) Direct evidence, and(2) Circumstantial
evidence. The direct evidence consists
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of the testimony of four eye-witnesses, namely, Bela Singh,
father of the deceased, who claims to have gone to the scene
of occurrence on hearing an outcry and to have witnessed the
murderous assault on his sons; Inder Singh and his wife,
Mst. Taro, to whom the murdered persons had gone for getting
paddy husked and who lived in a house adjoining the lane
where the murder took place; and Gurcharan Singh, a resident
of a different village, who states that he saw the occur-
rence when he was going towards village Dhadar on a cycle.
The circumstantial evidence in the case, on which the
High Court has relied, may be briefly summarised as follows
:--
(1) The second appellant, Massa Singh, who was arrested
on the 18th December, 1948, was wearing a pyjama stained
with human blood.
(2) The third appellant, Swaran Singh, who was arrested
on the 18th December, 1948, took the police on the 19th
December to his haveli which was locked, and, on opening it
two kheses (wrappers) which were stained with human blood
were recovered.
(3) Swaran Singh pointed out a spot on the way to Saki-
nala, where the two dead bodies were placed for a short time
while they were being taken to Sakinala, and the police
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scrapped blood-stained earth from that spot. He also led the
police to the bank of Sakinala and pointed out the trunk of
the body of Darshan Singh which was lying in the nala.
(4) Lachhman Singh, who was arrested on the 28th Decem-
ber, 1948, pointed out a dilapidated khola near Sakinala
where 3 spears, one kirpan and a datar, all stained with
human blood, were recovered.
The learned Sessions Judge, who heard the evidence,
seems to have been impressed by the evidence of the eye-
witnesses, and he has summed up his conclusion in these
words :--
"This evidence was so consistent, so reliable, and of
such nature that in my opinion it is definitely established
that the five accused Lachhman Singh, Katha
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Singh, Massa, Singh, Charan Singh and Swaran Singh are
proved to have actually murdered both Darshan Singh and
Achhar Singh. This fact is further proved from subsequent
events as deposed by P.W. 8 Bahadur Singh and P.W. 9 Gian
Singh and P.W. 11 Bhagwan Singh. These witnesses had wit-
nessed the various recoveries in this case which were made
at the instance of all the accused."
The learned Judges of the High Court, though they re-
pelled most of the criticisms levelled against the witness-
es, ultimately came to the conclusion that "in all the
circumstances (of the case) it would be proper not to rely
upon the oral evidence implicating particular accused unless
there is some circumstantial evidence to support it".
Having laid down this standard, they examined the circum-
stantial evidence against each of the accused persons and
upheld the conviction of the three appellants on the ground
that the circumstantial evidence, to which reference has
been made, was sufficient corroboration of the oral evi-
dence.
The case of the appellants was argued at great length by
Mr. Sethi, who appeared for them, and everything that could
possibly be said in their favour was urged by him with great
force and clarity. Proceeding, however, upon the principles
laid down by this court, circumscribing the scope of a
criminal appeal after the case has been sifted by the trial
court and the High Court, it seems to us that the question
involved in the present appeal is a short and simple one.
According to our reading of the judgment of the High Court,
the learned Judges, who dealt with the case, did not condemn
the oral evidence outright, but, as a matter of prudence and
caution, they decided not to convict an accused person
unless there were some circumstances to lend support to the
evidence of the eye-witnesses with regard to him. It is
quite clear on reading the judgment that the corroboration
which the learned judges required to satisfy themselves
was not that kind of corroboration which one requires in the
case of the evidence of an approver or an accomplice,
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but corroboration by some circumstances which would lend
assurance to the evidence before them and satisfy them that
the particular accused persons were really concerned in the
murder of the deceased. Judged by this standard, which it
was open to them to prescribe, it seems to us that the case
of each of the appellants clearly fell within the rule which
they had laid down for their own guidance.
The comment of the learned counsel for the appellants
with regard to the blood-stained pyjama which was recovered
from Massa Singh was, firstly, that it was not possible to
gather from the evidence the extent of the blood stains, and
secondly that it would be highly improbable that this ac-
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cused person would be so reckless as to continue to wear a
blood stained pyjama after having perpetrated the crime.
This criticism has been considered by the courts below, and
it does not appear to us to be of such a nature as to affect
the conclusion arrived at by them. As to the recovery of
blood-stained weapons at the instance of Lachhman Singh, it
was urged that the entire evidence with regard to this
recovery should be discarded, as the police investigation in
the case was not a straightforward one but was conducted in
such a way as to raise suspicion that the police were delib-
erately trying to create some evidence of recovery against
each of the accused persons. It is sufficient to say that it
is not the function of this court to reassess evidence and
an argument on a point of fact which did not prevail with
the courts below cannot avail the appellants in this court.
The comment against the discoveries made at the instance of
Swaran Singh was that they are not admissible in evidence
under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which
provides--
"When any fact is deposed to as discovered in conse-
quence of information received from a person accused of an
offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as’
relates distinctly to the fact there. by discovered, may be
proved,"
846
The main facts which it is necessary to state to under-
stand the argument on this point, may be summed up as fol-
lows :-
According to the prosecution, all the three accused,
namely, Katba Singh, Massa Singh and Swaran Singh, were
interrogated by the police on the morning of the 19th Decem-
ber, 1948, and they made certain statements which were
duly recorded by the police. In these statements, it was
disclosed that the dead bodies were thrown in the Sakinala.
Thereafter, the police party with the three accused went to
Sakinala where each of them pointed out a place where dif-
ferent parts of the dead bodies were discovered.
The learned counsel for the appellants cited a number of
rulings in which section 27 has been construed to mean that
it is only the information which is first given that is
admissible and once a fact has been discovered in conse-
quence of information received from a person accused of an
offence, it cannot be said to be re-discovered in conse-
quence of information received from another accused person.
It was urged before us that the prosecution was bound to
adduce evidence to prove as to which of the three accused
gave the information first. The head constable, who record-
ed the statements of the three accused has not stated which
of them gave the information first to him, but Bahadur
Singh, one of the witnesses who attested the recovery memos,
was specifically asked in cross-examination about it and
stated: "I cannot say from whom information was got first".
In the circumstances, it was contended that since it cannot
be ascertained which of the accused first gave the informa-
tion, the alleged discoveries cannot be proved against any
of the accused persons. It seems to us that if the evidence
adduced by the prosecution is found to be open to suspicion
and it appears that the police have deliberately attributed
similar confessional statements relating to facts discovered
to different accused persons, in order to create evidence
against all of them, the case Undoubtedly demands a most
cautious approach.
847
But as to what should be the rule when there is clear and
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unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic
statements of the nature referred to in section 27 of the
Evidence Act, having been made by several accused persons,
either simultaneously or otherwise, all that we wish to say
is that as at present advised we are inclined to think that
some of the eases relied upon by the learned counsel for the
appellants have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by
the language of section 27, and it may be that on a suitable
occasion in future those cases may have to be reviewed. For
the purpose of this appeal, however, it is sufficient to
state that even if the argument put forward on behalf of the
appellants. which apparently found favour with the High
Court, is correct, the discoveries made at the instance of
Swaran Singh cannot be ruled out of consideration. It may
be that several of the accused gave information to the
police that the dead bodies could be recovered in the
Sakinala, which is a stream running over several miles, but
such an indefinite information could not lead to any discov-
ery unless the accused followed it up by conducting the
police to the actual spot where parts of the two bodies were
recovered. From the evidence of the head constable as well
as that of Bahadur Singh, it is quite clear that Swaran
Singh led the police via Salimpura to a particular spot on
Sakinala, and it was at his instance that blood-stained
earth was recovered from a place outside the village, and he
also pointed out the trunk of the body of Darshan Singh.
The learned judges of the High Court were satisfied, as
appears from their judgment, that his was "the initial
pointing out" and therefore the case was covered even by the
rule which, according to the counsel for the appellants, is
the rule to be applied in the present case.
The learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that
the doctor who performed the post-mortem examination of the
corpses, found partially digested rice in the stomach of the
two deceased persons, and he
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urged that from this it would be inferred that the
occurrence must have taken place sometime at night after
the deceased persons had taken their evening meals together.
This argument again raises a question of fact which the High
Court has not omitted to consider. It may however be stated
that a reference to books on medical jurisprudence shows
that there are many factors affecting one’s digestion, and
cases were cited before us in which rice was not fully
digested even though considerable time had elapsed since the
last meal was taken. There are also no data before us to
show when the two deceased persons took their last meal, and
what article of food, if any, was taken by them along with
rice. The finding of the doctor therefore does not neces-
sarily affect the prosecution case as to the time of occur-
rence.
It was also contended that there being no charge under
section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
the conviction of the appellants under section 302 read with
section 149 could not have been altered by the High Court to
one under section 302 read with section 34, upon the acquit-
tal of the remaining accused persons. The facts of the case
are however such that the accused could have been charged
alternatively, either under section 302 read with section
149 or under section 302 read with section 34. The point has
therefore no force.
In our opinion, there is no ground for interfering with
the judgment of the courts below, and we accordingly dismiss
this appeal and uphold the conviction and sentence of the
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appellants. We however wish to endorse the opinion of the
High Court that having regard to the gruesome nature of the
crime, the sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge
was inappropriate and his reasons for imposing the lighter
penalty are wholly inadequate.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant : R.N. Sachthey.
Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.
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