Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRITSAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HAZARA SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/03/1975
BENCH:
GUPTA, A.C.
BENCH:
GUPTA, A.C.
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 1083
ACT:
Practice--Criminal appeal under Art. 136 of
Constitution--Improper invocation.
HEADNOTE:
A milk vendor was prosecuted for alleged adulteration, on
the ground that there was a minimal shortfall in the
percentage of "milk solids not fat" prescribed by the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The trial court
convicted but on appeal, the Sessions Judge made a passing
reference to an obiter observation of this Court in the
Malwa Cooperative-Milk Union Ltd., lndore v. Biharlial,
(Criminal Appeal No. 235 dated 14-8-1967) ignored the minor
deficiency observing that it was in the nature of
permissible error and acquitted the accused. An appeal
against acquittal was dismissed by the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal to, this Court,
HELD : In the Malwa Cooperative Milk Union Ltd. v. Biharilal
this Court while holding that the revisional power of the
High Court is reserved for setting right miscarriage of
justice and not for being invoked by private prosecutors,
made an obiter observation, to drive home the point, that
the case itself was so marginal that the difference from the
set standard was microscopic. The Sessions Judge was
perhaps wrong in tearing that passage out of context and
devising a new defence out of it in respect of food
adulteration cases. But an appeal with special leave under
Art. 136 should not have been filed merely to get a
declaration that a casual statement in a judgment of the
Court is not its ratio. [915 E-G, 916 E]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 228 of
1972.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
the 12th June, 1972 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 883 of 1972.
Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. We regret to begin this judgment with the
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observation that the high purpose of reserving the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction for substantial legal issues affecting
the nation, should not be taken by cases of lesser
consequence. The present criminal appeal is a signal
instance of litigation of little public interest being
brought up here, holding up other momentous causes.
The facts
A petty milk vendor was prosecuted for alleged adulteration,
proof of which rested on a minimal shortfall in the
percentage of ’milk solids not fat’ going by the prescribed
standard (Rule 5 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Rules). The plea of the accused that, if at all, there
might have been a marginal error, while the analysis was
conducted was rightly rejected and the Magistrate sentenced
him to imprisonment and fine as laid down in s-7 and s.16(1)
of the Prevention of Food
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Adulteration Act (hereinafter called the Act). The milk
vendor hopefully appealed and impressed by the fact that the
milk solids were of the required standard and the ’milk
solids not fat’ were slightly sub-standard, the Sessions
Judge ignored the minor deficiency which is in the nature of
permissible error’ and acquitted the accused.
The Municipal Committee pursued the matter to the High Court
in appeal. But a Division Bench of that Court dismissed it
in limine, presumably as too trivial for an appeal against
acquittal. However, the appellant has arrived in this Court
claiming that this is a test case and making it appear that
some important question of law hangs on the, decision,
although it was represented, at the time special leave was
sought by the counsel, ’that his clients will not press for
the conviction of the respondent’. This latter
representation itself is suggestive of the absence of
seriousness surrounding this particular case. Apart from
this tell-tale circumstance, the facts we have set out above
show that nothing grave or great in law, by way of
miscarriage of justice or general public importance is
involved. This is one of those routine cases, comparatively
insignificant, where one court has acquitted and the High
Court has felt it unjustified for appellate reversal. It is
of paramount importance that this Court’s time should not be
consumed by questions which are trifles.
It is plain from submission of counsel that the appellant’s
grievance is not so much against the acquittal as against a
passing reference by the Sessions Court to an obiter
observation of this Court in The Malwa Cooperative Milk
Union Ltd., Indore v. Biharilal(1). Obviously, the Sessions
Judge had concluded that a minor error in the chemical
analysis might have occurred: He was perhaps not right in
saying so. Anyway, a reading of his judgment-shows that the
mention of this Court’s unreported ruling (supra) was meant
to fortify himself and not to apply the ratio of that case.
Indeed, this Court’s decision cited above discloses that
Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) was not laying down the
law that minimal deficiencies in the milk components justi-
fied acquittal in food adulteration cases. The point that
arose in that case was whether the High Court was justified
in upsetting an acquittal in revision, when the jurisdiction
was invoked by a rival trader, the alleged adulteration
having been so negligible that the State had withdrawn the
prosecution resulting in the acquittal. Certainly, the
revisional power of the High Court is reserved for setting
right miscarriage of justice, not for being invoked by
private persecutors. Such was the ratio but, in the course
of the judgment, Hidayatullah J, to drive home the point
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that the case itself was so marginal, referred to the
microscopic difference, from the set standard. To distort
that passage, tear it out of context and devise a new
defence out of it in respect of food adulteration cases, is
to be grossly unjust to the judgment. Indeed, the Kerala
case cited before us by counsel viz., State of Kerala v.
Vasudevan Nair(2) itself shows that such distortion of the
passage in the judgment did not and could not pass muster.
When
(1) Crl. As Nos. 235 & 236 of 1964, decided on 14-8-1967.
(2) Crl. A. 89 of 1973 decided by the Kerala High Court on
18-7-1974-All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases
Reporter, 1975 Part 1, p. 8.
916
pressed with such misuse of this ruling, the High Court
repelled it. ’The law of food adulterations as also the
right approach to decisions of this Court, have been set out
correctly there,
"Judicial propriety, dignity and decorum
demand that being the highest judicial
tribunal in the country even obiter dictum of
the Supreme Court should be accepted as bind-
ing. Declaration of law by that Court even if
it be only by the way has to be respected.
But all that does not mean that every
statement contained in a judgment of that
Court would be attracted by Art. 141.
Statements on matters other than law have no
binding force. Several decisions of the
Supreme Court are on facts and that Court
itself has pointed out in Gurcharan Singh and
Anr. v. State of Punjab (1972 FAC 549) and
Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (AIR 1960 SC 195) that as on facts no
two cases could be similar, its own decisions
which were essentially on questions of fact
could not be relied upon as precedents for
decision of other cases."
"The standard fixed under the Act is one that
is certain. If it is varied to any extent,
the certainty of a general standard would be
replaced by the vagaries of a fluctuating
standard. The disadvantages of the resulting
unpredictability, uncertainty and
impossibility of arriving at fair and
consistent decisions are great."
It is extraordinary that an appeal with special leave under
Art. 136 should have been filed, to get a declaration that a
casual statement in a judgment of this Court which ex facie
had no kinship with the question under decision, was not the
ratio in the case.
This. appeal was ill-advised, misconceived and unnecessary
and merits dismissal.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
917