Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5556 of 2003
PETITIONER:
T.K. Rangarajan
RESPONDENT:
Vs.
Government of Tamil Nadu & others
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/08/2003
BENCH:
M.B. SHAH & AR LAKSHMANAN.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.12224 of 2003)
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) Nos. 298, 308 & 330 OF 2003
& C.A. Nos. ____________OF 2003 ARISING OUT
OF SLP (C) Nos.12577 & 13102 OF 2003.
Shah, J.
Leave granted.
Unprecedented action of the Tamil Nadu Government
terminating the services of all employees who have resorted to strike
for their demands was challenged before the High Court of Madras by
filing writ petitions under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
Learned Single Judge by interim order inter alia directed the State
Government that suspension and dismissal of employees without
conducting any enquiry be kept in abeyance until further orders and
such employees be directed to resume duty. That interim order was
challenged by the State Government by filing writ appeals. On behalf
of Government employees, writ petitions were filed challenging the
validity of the Tamil Nadu Essential Services Maintenance Act, 2002
and also the Tamil Nadu Ordinance No.3 of 2003.
The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the interim
order and arrived at the conclusion that without exhausting the
alternative remedy of approaching the Administrative Tribunal, writ
petitions were not maintainable. It was pointed out to the Court that
the total detentions were 2211, out of which 74 were ladies and only
165 male and 7 female personnel have so far been enlarged on bail,
which reveals pathetic condition of the arrestees. The arrestees were
mainly clerks and subordinate staff. The Court, therefore, directed
that those who were arrested and lodged in jails be released on bail.
That order is challenged by filing these appeals. For the same
reliefs, writ petitions under Article 32 are also filed.
At the outset, it is to be reiterated that under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court is empowered to exercise its extra-
ordinary jurisdiction to meet unprecedented extra-ordinary situation
having no parallel. It is equally true that extra-ordinary powers are
required to be sparingly used. The facts of the present case reveal that
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this was most extra-ordinary case, which called for interference by the
High Court, as the State Government had dismissed about two lacs
employees for going on strike.
It is true that in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and
others [(1997) 3 SCC 261], this Court has held that it will not be open
to the employees to directly approach the High Court even where the
question of vires of the statutory legislation is challenged. However,
this ratio is required to be appreciated in context of the question which
was decided by this Court wherein it was sought to be contended that
once the Tribunals are established under Article 323-A or Article
323B, jurisdiction of the High Court would be excluded. Negativing
the said contention, this Court made it clear that jurisdiction conferred
upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a part of
inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and it cannot be said that
such Tribunals are effective substitute of the High Courts in
discharging powers of judicial review. It is also established principle
that where there is an alternative, effective, efficacious remedy
available under the law, the High Court would not exercise its extra-
ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and that has been reiterated by
holding that the litigants must first approach the Tribunals which act
like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which
they have been constituted and therefore, it will not be open to the
litigants to directly approach the High Court even where the question
of vires of the statutory legislation is challenged.
In L. Chandra Kumar’s case, the Court inter alia referred to
and relied upon the case in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India [1956
SCR 267], wherein Bose, J. made the following observations:â\200\224
"The heart and core of a democracy lies in the
judicial process, and that means independent and fearless
Judges free from executive control brought up in judicial
traditions and trained to judicial ways of working and
thinking. The main bulwarks of liberty and freedom lie
there and it is clear to me that uncontrolled powers of
discrimination in matters that seriously affect the lives
and properties of people cannot be left to executive or
quasi-executive bodies even if they exercise quasi-
judicial functions because they are then invested with an
authority that even Parliament does not possess. Under
the Constitution, Acts of Parliament are subject to
judicial review particularly when they are said to infringe
fundamental rights, therefore, if under the Constitution
Parliament itself has not uncontrolled freedom of action,
it is evident that it cannot invest lesser authorities with
that power."
The Court further referred to the following observations from
the decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [(1973) 4
SCC 225] as under:â\200\224
"77. From their conclusions, many of which have
been extracted by us in toto, it appears that this Court has
always considered the power of judicial review vested in
the High Courts and in this Court under Articles 226 and
32 respectively, enabling legislative action to be
subjected to the scrutiny of superior courts, to be integral
to our constitutional scheme."
The Court further held:
"78. â\200¦â\200¦ We, therefore, hold that the power of
judicial review over legislative action vested in the High
Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article
32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential
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feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic
structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High
Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional
validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
81. If the power under Article 32 of the
Constitution, which has been described as the "heart" and
"soul" of the Constitution, can be additionally conferred
upon "any other court", there is no reason why the same
situation cannot subsist in respect of the jurisdiction
conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution. So long as the jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Articles 226/227 and that of this Court
under Article 32 is retained, there is no reason why the
power to test the validity of legislations against the
provisions of the Constitution cannot be conferred upon
Administrative Tribunals created under the Act or upon
Tribunals created under Article 323-B of the
Constitution..."
Thereafter, the Court to emphasise that Administrative
Tribunals are not functioning properly, quoted the observations with
regard to the functioning of the Administrative Tribunals from the
Malimath Committee’s Report (1989-90), which are reproduced
hereunder:â\200\224
"Functioning of Tribunals
8.63 Several tribunals are functioning in the
country. Not all of them, however, have inspired
confidence in the public mind. The reasons are not far to
seek. The foremost is the lack of competence, objectivity
and judicial approach. The next is their constitution, the
power and method of appointment of personnel thereto,
the inferior status and the casual method of working. The
last is their actual composition; men of calibre are not
willing to be appointed as presiding officers in view of
the uncertainty of tenure, unsatisfactory conditions of
service, executive subordination in matters of
administration and political interference in judicial
functioning. For these and other reasons, the quality of
justice is stated to have suffered and the cause of
expedition is not found to have been served by the
establishment of such tribunals.
8.64 Even the experiment of setting up of the
Administrative Tribunals under the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, has not been widely welcomed. Its
members have been selected from all kinds of services
including the Indian Police Service. The decision of the
State Administrative Tribunals are not appealable except
under Article 136 of the Constitution. On account of the
heavy cost and remoteness of the forum, there is virtual
negation of the right of appeal. This has led to denial of
justice in many cases and consequential dissatisfaction.
There appears to be a move in some of the States where
they have been established for their abolition."
[It is to be stated that in Tamil Nadu, at present, the
Administrative Tribunal is manned by only one man.]
Finally the Court held thus:â\200\224
"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we
hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of
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Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction
of the High Courts and the Supreme court under Articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional.
Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction"
clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of
Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be
unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the
High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a
part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution.
While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and
Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in
discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227
and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under
Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are
possessed of the competence to test the constitutional
validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions
of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny
before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals
will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first
instance in respect of the areas of law for which they
have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for
litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in
cases where they question the vires of statutory
legislations (except where the legislation which creates
the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of
the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted
in the manner we have indicated."
There cannot be any doubt that the aforesaid judgment of larger
Bench is binding on this Court and we respectfully agree with the
same. However, in a case like this, if thousands of employees are
directed to approach the Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal would
not be in a position to render justice to the cause. Hence, as stated
earlier because of very very exceptional circumstance that arose in the
present case, there was no justifiable reason for the High Court not to
entertain the petitions on the ground of alternative remedy provided
under the statute.
Now coming to the question of right to strike â\200\224 whether
Fundamental, Statutory or Equitable/Moral Right â\200\224 in our view, no
such right exists with the government employees.
(A) There is no fundamental right to go on strike:--
Law on this subject is well settled and it has been repeatedly
held by this Court that the employees have no fundamental right to
resort to strike. In Kameshwar Prasad and others v. State of Bihar
and another [(1962) Suppl. 3 SCR 369] this Court (C.B.) held that the
rule in so far as it prohibited strikes was valid since there is no
fundamental right to resort to strike.
In Radhey Shyam Sharma v. The Post Master General
Central Circle, Nagpur [(1964) 7 SCR 403], the employees of Post
and Telegraph Department of the Government went on strike from the
midnight of July 11, 1960 throughout India and petitioner was on duty
on that day. As he went on strike, in the departmental enquiry,
penalty was imposed upon him. That was challenged before this
Court. In that context, it was contended that Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the
Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance No.1 of 1960 were
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violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) and (b) of
Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The Court (C.B.) considered the
Ordinance and held that Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the said Ordinance did
not violate the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) and
(b) of the Constitution. The Court further held that a perusal of
Article 19(1)(a) shows that there is no fundamental right to strike
and all that the Ordinance provided was with respect to any illegal
strike. For this purpose, the Court relied upon the earlier decision in
All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial
Tribunal & others [(1962) 3 SCR 269] wherein the Court (C.B.)
specifically held that even very liberal interpretation of sub-clause
(C) of clause (1) of Article 19 cannot lead to the conclusion that trade
unions have a guaranteed right to an effective collective bargaining or
to strike, either as part of collective bargaining or otherwise.
In Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and Another
[(2003) 2 SCC 45], the Court (C.B.) held that lawyers have no right to
go on strike or give a call for boycott and even they cannot go on a
token strike. The Court has specifically observed that for just or
unjust cause, strike cannot be justified in the present-day situation.
Take strike in any field, it can be easily realised that the weapon does
more harm than any justice. Sufferer is the society â\200\224 public at large.
In Communist Party of India (M) v. Bharat Kumar and others
[(1998) 1 SCC 201], a three-Judge Bench of this Court approved the
Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court by holding thus:â\200\224
"â\200¦.There cannot be any doubt that the
fundamental rights of the people as a whole cannot be
subservient to the claim of fundamental right of an
individual or only a section of the people. It is on the
basis of this distinction that the High Court has rightly
concluded that there cannot be any right to call or enforce
a "Bandh" which interferes with the exercise of the
fundamental freedoms of other citizens, in addition to
causing national loss in many ways. We may also add
that the reasoning given by the High Court particularly
those in paragraphs 12, 13 and 17 for the ultimate
conclusion and directions in paragraph 18 is correct with
which we are in agreement."
The relevant paragraph 17 of Kerala High Court
judgment reads as under:â\200\224
"17. No political party or organisation can claim that it
is entitled to paralyse the industry and commerce in the
entire State or nation and is entitled to prevent the
citizens not in sympathy with its viewpoints, from
exercising their fundamental rights or from performing
their duties for their own benefit or for the benefit of the
State or the nation. Such a claim would be unreasonable
and could not be accepted as a legitimate exercise of a
fundamental right by a political party or those comprising
it."
(B) There is no legal / statutory right to go on strike.
There is no statutory provision empowering the employees to
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go on strike.
Further, there is prohibition to go on strike under the Tamil
Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Conduct Rules"). Rule 22 provides that "no Government
servant shall engage himself in strike or in incitements thereto or in
similar activities." Explanation to the said provision explains the term
’similar activities’. It states that "for the purpose of this rule the
expression ’similar activities’ shall be deemed to include the absence
from work or neglect of duties without permission and with the object
of compelling something to be done by his superior officers or the
Government or any demonstrative fast usually called "hunger strike"
for similar purposes. Rule 22-A provides that "no Government servant
shall conduct any procession or hold or address any meeting in any
part of any open ground adjoining any Government Office or inside
any Office premises â\200\224 (a) during office hours on any working day;
and (b) outside office hours or on holidays, save with the prior
permission of the head of the Department or head of office, as the case
may be.
(C) There is no moral or equitable justification to go on strike.
Apart from statutory rights, Government employees cannot
claim that they can take the society at ransom by going on strike.
Even if there is injustice to some extent, as presumed by such
employees, in a democratic welfare State, they have to resort to the
machinery provided under different statutory provisions for redressal
of their grievances. Strike as a weapon is mostly misused which
results in chaos and total maladministration. Strike affects the society
as a whole and particularly when two lakh employees go on strike
enmasse, the entire administration comes to a grinding halt. In the
case of strike by a teacher, entire educational system suffers; many
students are prevented from appearing in their exams which ultimately
affect their whole career. In case of strike by Doctors, innocent
patients suffer; in case of strike by employees of transport services,
entire movement of the society comes to a stand still; business is
adversely affected and number of persons find it difficult to attend to
their work, to move from one place to another or one city to another.
On occasions, public properties are destroyed or damaged and finally
this creates bitterness among public against those who are on strike.
Further, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing
for the State of Tamil Nadu also submitted that there are about 12 lacs
Government employees in the State. Out of the total income from
direct tax, approximately 90% of the amount is spent on the salary of
the employees. Therefore, he rightly submits that in a Society where
there is a large scale unemployment and number of qualified persons
are eagerly waiting for employment in Government Departments or in
public sector undertakings, strikes cannot be justified on any equitable
ground.
We agree with the said submission. In the prevailing situation,
apart from being conscious of rights, we have to be fully aware of our
duties, responsibilities and effective methods for discharging the
same. For redressing their grievances, instead of going on strike, if
employees do some more work honestly, diligently and efficiently,
such gesture would not only be appreciated by the authority but also
by people at large. The reason being, in a democracy even though
they are Government employees, they are part and parcel of governing
body and owe duty to the Society.
We also agree that misconduct by the government employees is
required to be dealt with in accordance with law. However,
considering the gravity of the situation and the fact that on occasion,
even if the employees are not prepared to agree with what is contended
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by some leaders who encourage the strikes, they are forced to go on
strikes for reasons beyond their control. Therefore, even though the
provisions of the Act and the Rules are to be enforced, they are to be
enforced after taking into consideration the situation and the capacity
of the employees to resist. On occasion, there is tendency or
compulsion to blindly follow the others. In this view of the matter, we
had suggested to the learned senior counsel Mr. Venugopal that
employees who went on strike may be reinstated in service and that
suggestion was accepted by Mr. Venugopal after obtaining instructions
from the State Government. Hence, on 24.7.2003, we had passed the
following order:â\200\224
"Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu after obtaining
necessary instructions states that:
1. The State Government will re-instate all the
government employees who are dismissed because they
had gone on strike, except (i) 2,200 employees who had
been arrested and (ii) employees against whom FIR had
been lodged.
2. This reinstatement in service would be
subject to unconditional apology as well as undertaking
to the effect that employees would abide by Rule 22 of
the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules
1973 which provides as under: -
"22. Strikes: No Government servant shall
engage himself in strike or in incitements thereto
or in similar activities."
Explanation â\200\224 For the purpose of this rule
the expression ’similar activities’ shall be deemed
to include the absence from work or neglect of
duties without permission and with the object of
compelling something to be done by his superior
officers or the Government or any demonstrative
fast usually called "hunger strike" for similar
purposes."
It is also stated that Government will proceed
under the Disciplinary Rules only against those
employees who had indulged in violence and who had
incited the other employees to go on strike.
From 25th July such employees would be reinstated
in service subject to their giving unconditional apology
for resorting to strike and also an undertaking to the
effect that in future he would abide by Rule 22.
He also states that for the employees who would
be reinstated in service with regard to the period for
which they remained absent, appropriate order would be
passed by the State Government for regularizing their
absent. However, this would not be treated as a break in
service.
Ordered accordingly.
For further orders and directions list the matter on
31.7.2003."
On 31st, number of affidavits were filed contending that large
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number of employees are not reinstated in service despite the assurance
given by the State Government. Matter was adjourned at the request of
learned counsel for the respondent for verification of the said
contention. After verification, additional affidavit has been filed by
Secretary to Government, Personnel and Administrative Reforms
Department, Secretariat, Chennai, revealing the exact figures with
regard to dismissed and reinstated employees. In paragraph 6, it has
been stated as under:â\200\224
"6. The following details are submitted for reference of this
Hon’ble Court:â\200\224
1. Total number of Government servants 1,70,241
dismissed as per Section 7 of TESMA
and teachers of Aided Colleges suspended.
2. Total number reinstated so far, as per the 1,56,106
statement made before this Hon’ble Court.
3. Number of employees and teachers not 14,135
reinstated.
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEES AND
GOVERNMENT TEACHERS WHO CANNOT CLAIM
A RIGHT TO BE REINSTATED.
(a) Government servants arrested. 2,211
(b) Secretariat staff for the reasons mentioned 2,215
earlier.
(c) Officers holding higher position. 534
(d) Government servants (other than the 1,112
Secretariat staff) involved in offences
Under Section 5 or Section 5 read with
Section 4 of TESMA.
Total number of persons who cannot 6,072
Claim a right to be reinstated.
REMAINING NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 8,063
WHOM THE STATE GOVERNMENT IS
WILLING TO REINSTATE."
For the categories (b) and (c) i.e. Secretarial staff of 2215 and
534 officers holding higher positions, it is agreed and made clear that
they would be treated as suspended instead of dismissed. Remaining
8063 employees, as stated above, will be reinstated in service (w.e.f.
25th July, 2003) on their tendering unconditional apology for resorting
to strike and also an undertaking to abide by Rule 22 of Conduct Rules
in future. He further makes a statement that with regard to the
representations which are made or are to be made by the employees
who are in category (a), (b), (c) and (d), the same would be considered
by three retired High Court Judges to be named by the Chief Justice of
the High Court of Madras. Each Judge would decide approximately
representations of 2000 employees within a period of one month or
thereabout from the date of allocation of representations. For this
purpose, a convenient place for their office work and the secretarial
staff would be made available to all the three Judges by the State
Government within a period of seven days from today without fail.
The concerned Judges would decide the representation of the
employees without taking into consideration Section 7 of the
Ordinance and as far as possible in accordance with the Conduct Rules
and equity. Retired Judges to be paid honorarium at the rate of
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Rs.50000/- per month. All the three Judges are requested to evolve a
common procedure for disposing of the representations. The decision
of the Judge on the representation would be binding to the State
Government and the State Government would act in accordance with
the same. However, if any of the employees is aggrieved, it would be
open to such employee to challenge the same before an appropriate
forum.
Finally, it is made clear that employees who are re-instated in
service would take care in future in maintaining discipline as there is
no question of having any fundamental, legal or equitable right to go
on strike. The employees have to adopt other alternative methods for
redressal of their grievances. For those employees who are not re-
instated in service on the ground that FIRs are lodged against them or
after holding any departmental enquiry penalty is imposed, it would be
open to them to challenge the same before the Administrative Tribunal
and the Tribunal would pass appropriate order including interim order
within a period of two weeks from the date of filing of such application
before it. It is unfortunate that the concerned authorities are not
making the Administrative Tribunals under the Administrative
Tribunal Act, 1985, functional and effective by appointing men of
caliber. It is for the High Court to see that if the Administrative
Tribunals are not functioning, justice should not be denied to the
affected persons. In case, if the Administrative Tribunal is not
functioning, it would be open to the employees to approach the High
Court.
Lastly, we make it clear that we have not at all dealt with and
considered the constitutional validity of Tamil Nadu Essential Services
Maintenance Act, 2002 and the Tamil Nadu Ordinance No.3 of 2003
or interpretation of any of the provisions thereof, as the State
Government has gracefully agreed to re-instate most of the employees
who had gone on strike. For this, we appreciate the efforts made and
the reasonable stand taken by the learned Counsel for the parties.
Further, we have not dealt with the grievances of the employees
against various orders issued by the State Government affecting their
service benefits. We hope that Government would try to consider the
same appropriately.
The Appeals and Writ Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
There shall be no order as to costs.