Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BHAG SINGH & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH, THROUGH THE LAND ACQUISITIONC
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/08/1985
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)
SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)
MADON, D.P.
CITATION:
1985 AIR 1576 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 949
1985 SCC (3) 737 1985 SCALE (2)246
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1987 SC 720 (7)
RF 1987 SC1565 (9)
RF 1988 SC 943 (11,12,14)
RF 1988 SC1652 (9,23,24)
O 1989 SC1933 (4,5,30,32,34,35)
O 1990 SC 981 (9)
D 1991 SC 730 (5)
ACT:
Land Acquisition Act 1894, Sections 23 and 28 & Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, Sections 15(b), 18(a) and
30(2).
Land acquisition - Solatium and compensation - Enhanced
rates of ’thirty per centum’ and ’nine per centum’ -
Entitlement of - When arises - Awards made after April 30,
1982 - Appeals arising from such awards - Whether covered.
Compensation - Determination of by courts - Market
value of the land acquired - Courts restricting compensation
to amount of court-fee paid by claimants - Whether legal and
valid.
HEADNOTE:
The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 by Section
15(b) amended section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 to provide that in sub-section (2) of section 23 for
the words "fifteen per centum", the words "thirty per
centum" shall be substituted, and by Section 18(a) provided
that in Section 28 of the Principal Act for the words ’six
per centum the words ’ nine per centum’ shall be
substituted. Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act provided
that the increased Solatium was to be applicable "in
relation to any award made by the collector or Court or to
any order passed by the High Court’ or Supreme Court in
appeal against any such award under the provisions of the
Principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of
introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982
in the House of the People) and before the commencement of
this Act.
The State Government issued a notification on 19th
October 1974 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 for acquisition of land for the purpose of
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establishment of a cantonment. The Land Acquisition
Collector thereafter issued a notice under section 9 and
required persons interested in the land to submit their
claims for compensation. The claims submitted by various
claimants including the appellants, were considered by the
Land Acquisition Collector and an award made on 9th October
1975 dividing the land acquired into three belts and
awarding compensation at varying rates. The appellants and
other
950
claimants being aggrieved by the aforesaid award sought
references under section 18 of the Act, and the Additional
District Judge, enhanced the rates of compensation. The
appellants who were still dissatisfied preferred appeals to
the High Court.
A single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amount of
compensation, and directed that the claimants shall be
entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum and
Solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of
compensation. This order awarding enhanced compensation was,
however, made subject to the claims put forward in the
memoranda of appeal preferred by the claimants and the Court
fee paid on such claims. As the appellants had not paid the
requisite court fee on the enhanced amount of compensation
they could not get the benefit of the said order.
The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeals. The
Division Bench dismissed the appeals taking the view that
the appellants were entitled to the enhanced amount of
compensation for acquisition of their land, but restricting
the benefits of the enhanced compensation only to those
claimants who had made payment of proper court fee.
In the Appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf
of the appellants: (1) that they should have been given an
opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee, so that like
other claimants, they could also get enhanced compensations
and (2) that by virtue of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act
of 1984, the claimants are entitled to be paid Solatium at
the rate of 30 of the compensation ultimately awarded to
them instead of 15 awarded by the Division Bench as also
interest at the rate of 9 instead of 6% per annum on the
enhanced amount of compensation.
Allowing the Appeals,
^
HELD: 1. (i) The order passed by the Division Bench in
so far as it refused to grant enhanced compensation to the
appellants on account of non-payment of deficit court fee is
set aside. It is directed that the appellants shall be paid
enhanced compensation at the rate determined by the Division
Bench. They shall also receive Solatium calculated at the
rate of 30% on the amount of enhanced compensation under the
amended Section 23 sub-section (2) as also interest at the
rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation
from the date on which
951
possession was taken up to the date of payment cf such
enhanced compensation. The appellants will pay up the
deficit amount of court fee within two months. [963 A-C]
(ii) The Division Bench and the single judge should not
have adopted a technical approach and denied the benefit of
enhanced compensation to the appellants merely because they
had not initially paid the proper amount of court fee. They
should have allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit
court fee and awarded to them compensation at the higher
rate or rates determined by them. [956 B]
(iii) In the instant case, a claim was made by the
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appellants against the State Government for compensation for
acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was
bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of
the market value of the land acquired and if according to
the judgments of the single Judge and the Division Beach,
the market value of the land acquired was higher than that
awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional
District Judge there is no reason why the appellants should
have been denied the benefit of payment of the market value
so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants would
be tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire
the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true
market value. Under agrarian reform legislation, the holder
of land may legitimately, as a matter of social justice, be
deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by
him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment
of little compensation or no compensation at all, but where
land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it
would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of land
without payment of the true market value when the law
declares that he shall be paid such market value. [955 E-H]
2. (i) Under Section 30 sub-section (2) the provisions of
the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are
made applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation
pending on 30th April 1982 or filed subsequent to that date,
whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High
Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally
terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act. [961 H]
(ii) The Amendment Act came into force with effect from
24th September 1984 but the Bill which ultimately became the
Amending Act was introduced in Parliament on 30th April
1982.
952
Parliament desired that the amended provisions of Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 should be given effect from
the date of introduction of the Bill in Parliament and
therefore enacted Section 30 sub-section (2) making the
provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and
Section 28 applicable to and in relation to "any award made
by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High
Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award and
before the commencement of this Act", that is, the Amending
Act after the 30th day of April 1982. [959 F, 962 D-G]
(iii) The intendment of Parliament in enacting Section
30 sub-section (2), is brought out in no uncertain terms by
the express language of Section 30 sub-section (2). The
adverbial phrase "after the 30th day of April 1982 and
before the commencement of this Act" governs not only the
words "any award made by the Collector or Court" but also
the words "any order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal against any such award". The amended
provisions of section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are
applicable not only in relation to an award made by the
Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and before the
commencement of the Amending Act but also in relation to an
order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal
between 30th April 1982 and the commencement of the Amending
Act. [960 E-F]
(iv) Parliament deliberately and advisedly introduced
the adverbial phrase "after the 30th day of April, 1982 and
before the commencement of this Act", so as to qualify both
"any award made by the Collector or Court" as also "any
order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal
against any such award. The word "such award" in the context
in which they occur mean only the award made by the
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Collector or court and do not import the time element which
finds place only at the end of the sentence and not
immediately following the words "any award made by the
Collector or Court". [961 F-G]
In the instant case, the award of the Collector was
made on 9th October 1975 and the award of the court was made
on 31st July 1979. The award of the Court as well as the
award of the Collector were thus made prior to 30th April
1982. So also was the order passed by the single Judge of
the High Court in appeal against the award of the court made
on 10th November 1981, that is, before 30th April, 1982. But
on 30th April, 1982 the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by
the appellants was pending before the Division Bench of the
High Court and that was disposed of on 8th December 1982 and
this was followed by the present appeal before
953
this Court. The present appeal was pending at the date of
commencement of the Amending Act and therefore, this Court
18 bound to given effect to the provisions of the amended
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 in determining the
amount of compensation. [962 D-G]
State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh & another approved
Kamalajamannivaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 1985
(1) SCC 582 disapproved.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1519-23
of 1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.9.1982 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.F.A. Nos. 2317, 2318,
2319, 2320 of 1980 and 331 of 1981.
A.K. Goel, for the Appellants.
Atul Jain and Raj Birbal, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, CJ. This appeal by special leave raises a
short but interesting question of law relating to the
interpretation of Section 30 sub-section (2) of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to
as the Amending Act). There are divergent views expressed by
different Benches of this Court in regard to the
interpretation, of this provision and hence it is necessary
to examine this question afresh in order to arrive at a
proper interpretation, particularly since the interpretation
placed by us will affect the determination of compensation
in a large number of cases.
The facts giving rise to this appeal are few and may be
briefly stated as follows. On 9th October 1974 a
notification was issued by the State of Punjab under Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
as the Act) stating that a large chunk of land admeasuring
10768 Bighas 18 Biswas was likely to be needed for the
purpose of establishment of a cantonment within the revenue
estate of Bhatinda. This notification was followed by
another notification issued by the State of PunJab under-
section 6 of the Act declaring that the entire area
admeasuring 10768 Bighas 18 Biswas was needed for the
establishment of a cantonment. The Land Acquisition
Collector thereafter
954
issued a notice under-section 9 of the Act and required
persons interested in the land forming the subject matter of
the declaration to submit their claims for compensation for
acquisition of their interest in the land. The claims
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submitted by various claimants including the appellants in
the present appeal were considered by the Land Acquisition
Collector and he made an award on 11th June 1975 dividing
the land acquired into three belts and awarding compensation
at varying rates according to the belt in which a particular
piece of land was situated. The appellants and other
claimants being aggrieved by the award made by the Land
Acquisition Collector, sought references under-section 18 of
the Act and the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda, hearing
the references, amalgamated belts 2 and 3 and enhanced the
rates of compensation for the two belts. The appellants and
the other claimants were still dissatisfied with the award
made by the Additional District Judge and they thereupon
preferred appeals to the High Court. On appeal, the learned
single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amount of
compensation by awarding the rate of Rs. 72,600 per acre for
the first belt and Rs. 25000 per acre for the second belt
and in addition, directed that the claimants shall be
entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum and
solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of
compensation. This order awarding enhanced compensation was,
however, made subject to the claims put forward in the
memoranda of appeal preferred by the claimants and the court
fee paid on such claims. It seems that the appellants had
not paid the requisite court fee on the enhanced amount of
compensation and they, therefore, could not get the benefit
of the order of the learned single Judge. They according
preferred a letters patent appeal to a division Bench of the
High Court and the other claimants also being dissatisfied
with the order made by the learned single Judge preferred
letters patent appeals to the Division Bench. The Division
Bench of the High Court, by an order dated 8th December
1982, affirmed the judgment of the learned single Judge in
regard to the rate of compensation tor the land situate in
first belt but so far as the land situate in the second belt
was concerned, it enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs.
38,720 per acre. The Division Bench, however, restricted the
benefit of the enhanced compensation only to those claimants
who had made payment of proper court fee. The result was
that the letters patent appeal of the appellants was
dismissed, though according to the view taken by the
Division Bench the appellants were entitled to the enhanced
amount of compensation tor acquisition of their land. The
appellants thereupon preferred the present appeal with
special leave obtained from this Court.
955
We are of the view that when the learned single Judge
and the Division Bench took the view that the claimants
whose land was acquired by the State of Punjab under the
notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were
entitled to enhanced compensation and the case of the
appellants stood on the same footing, the appellant should
have been given an opportunity of paying up the deficit
court fee so that, like other claimants, they could also get
enhanced compensation at the same rate as the others. The
learned single Judge and the Division Bench should not have,
in our opinion, adopted a technical approach and denied the
benefit of enhanced compensation to the appellants merely
because they had not initially paid the proper amount of
court fee. It must be remembered that this was not a dispute
between two private citizens where it would be quite just
and legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim made by
him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed
though even in such a case there may be situations where an
amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the
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claimant as for instance where an amount is claimed as due
at the foot of an account. Here was a claim made by the
appellants against the State Government for compensation for
acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was
bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of
the market value of the land acquired and if according to
the judgments of the learned single Judgement and the
division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was
higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector
or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the
appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of
the market value so determined. To deny this benefit to the
appellants would tantamount to permitting the State
Government to acquire the land of the appellants on payment
of less than the true market value. There may be cases
where, as for instance, under-agrarian reform legislation,
the holder of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social
justice with a view to eliminating concentration of land in
the hands of a few and bringing about its equitable
distribution, be deprived of land which is not being
personally cultivated by him or which is in excess of the
ceiling area with payment of little compensation or no
compensation at all, but where land is acquired under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to
deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true
market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that
he shall be paid such market value. The State Government
must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not,
as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is
received or recovered without protest or where the state
Government would
956
otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a
technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of
the citizen. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the
present case, the Division Bench as well as the learned
single Judge should have allowed the appellants to pay up
the deficit court fee and awarded to them compensation at
the higher rate or rates determined by them.
But this view taken by us does not an end to the
present appeal because another more important question has
been raised before us arising out of Section 30 sub-section
(2) of the Amending Act. The appellants on the basis of this
provision, have contended that they are entitled to be paid
solatium at the rate of 30% of the compensation ultimately
awarded to them instead of 15% awarded by the Division Bench
as also interest at the rate of 9% instead of 6% per annum
on the enhanced amount of compensation. It is necessary, in
order to adjudicate upon the validity of this contention to
refer to a few relevant provisions of the Act as it stood
prior to its amendment by the Amending Act. Section 23 sub-
section (2) of the unamended Act provided inter alia as
follows:-
"23 (2) In addition to the market value of the
land as above provided, the Court shall in every
case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such
market value, in consideration of the compulsory
nature of the acquisition.
Section 28 of the unamended Act provided for payment of
interest on excess compensation in the following terms:
If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the
Collector ought to have, awarded as compensation
is in excess of the sum which the Collector did
awarded as compensation, the award of the Court
may direct that the Collector shall pay interest
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on such excess at the rate of six per centum per
annum from then date on which he took possession
of the land to the date of payment of such excess
into Court."
The Act was amended by the Amending Act h effect from 24th
September 1984. Section 15 clause (b) of the Amending Act
reads as follows :
957
15. In section 23 of the Principal Act :
(a) .......................... ..........
(b) in sub-section (2), for the words "fifteen
per centum", the words "thirty per centum" , shall
be substituted."
Section 18 clause (a) of the Amending Act provides that "in
Section 28 of the principal Act for the words ’six per
centum’ the words ’nine per centum’ shall be substituted.
Section 30 sub-section (2) is the material provision which
falls to be construed and since the entire controversy
between the parties turns upon the true interpretation of
this provision, we may reproduce it in extenso. It runs as
follows :
"30(2). The provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as
amended by clause (b) of section 15 and section 18
of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall
be deemed to have applied, also to, and in
relation to, any award made by the Collector or
Court or to any order passed by the High Court or
Supreme Court in appeal against any such award
under the provisions of the principal Act after
30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction
of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in
the House of People) and before the commencement
of this Act.’
The question is as to what is the extent to which
retrospective effect is given by the provision enacted in
Section 3() sub-section (2). Does it make the amended
provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28
applicable only to cases where an award is made by the
Collector or Court after 30th April 1982 or does it make
these amended provisions applicable also to cases where an
award may have been made by the Collector or Court prior to
30th April 1982 but the proceedings by way of appeal were
pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April
1982 and were disposed of subsequent to that date. The
former view has prevailed with Chinnappa Reddy, J. and
Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. in Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer [1985] S.C.C. 582 while the latter
view has found acceptance with S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.,
Varadarajan, J. and Ranganath Misra, J. in Civil Appeal No.
3267 of 1979, State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh & Anr..
decided on 1st May 1985. Since the latter decision is one
958
given by a Bench of three Judges, we would have ordinarily
regarded it as over-ruling the earlier decision in
Kamalajammanniavaru case which was a decision of only two
Judges, but it seems Chat the earlier decision was not cited
before the Bench of three Judges in Mohinder Singh’s case
and moreover there is no discussion of the provision enacted
in Section 30 sub-section (2) and hence we have to consider
for ourselves which decision, on a true interpretation of
the language of Section 30 sub-section (2) represents the
correct view.
We may first consider what would be the position if
Section 30 sub-section (2) were not enacted and the
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amendments in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were
effective only from the date on which they were made, namely
24th September 1984 when the Amending Act received the
assent of the President and was brought into force. If at
the date of the commencement of the Amending Act, any
proceedings for determination of compensation were pending
before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or
before the Court on a reference under Section 18 of the
Act, the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28
would admittedly be applicable to such proceedings. This
much indeed was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents and even in Kamalajammanniavaru
case (supra) it was accepted to be the correct position.
Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking on behalf of the Court in
Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra) observed : "The new Section
23 (2), of course, necessarily applies to award made by the
Collector or court after the commencement" of the Amending
Act. But if an award were made by the Court on a reference
under Section 18 prior to the commencement of the Amending
Act and an appeal against such award were pending before the
High Court under Section 54 at the date of the commencement
of the Amending Act, which provisions would the High Court
have to apply in deciding the appeal and determining the
amount of compensation : the amended provisions in section
23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 or the unamended
provisions. The answer can only be that the High Court would
have to apply the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub-
section (2) and Section 28. The appeal against the award
would be a continuation of the proceeding initiated before
the Court by way of reference under Section 18 and when the
High Court hears the appeal, it would be in effect and
substance be hearing the reference and while determining the
amount of compensation, it would have to give effect to
Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them
at the date of decision of the appeal. then Section 23 sub-
section (1) provides that in determining the amount of
959
compensation the court shall take into consideration matters
specified in the various sub-clauses of that sub-section and
sub-section (2) of Section 23 directs that in addition to
the market value of the land the court shall in every case
award a sum of 15 per centum of such market value in
consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition,
the mandate of these two sub-section must apply equally
whether the court is hearing a reference or the High Court
is hearing an appeal against an award has been decided by
the Court amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2)
and Section 28 would therefore have to be applied by the
High Court in determining the amount of condensation. The
same position would obtain where an appeal against an award
has been decided by the High Court prior to the commencement
of the Amending Act and an appeal against the order of the
High Court is pending before the Supreme Court at the date
of commencement of the Amending Act or is filed after such
date. me Supreme Court also while deciding the appeal and
determining the amount of compensation would have to take
into account the amended provisions in Section 23 sub-
section (2) and Section 28, because when the Supreme Court
decides the appeal and determines the amount of
compensation, it would have to comply with the mandate
contained in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 and
that mandate would be as found in the amended provisions of
Section 23 Sub-Section (2) and Section 28. Thus the amended
provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28
would apply in determination of the amount of compensation
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where proceedings are either pending at the date of
commencement of the amending Act or are filed subsequent to
the date, whether before the Collector or before the Court
or before the High Court or the Supreme Court.
Now, as we have already pointed out above, the
Amending Act came into force with effect from 24th September
1984 but the Bill which ultimately became the Amending Act
was introduced in Parliament on 30th April 1982. Parliament
obviously desired that the amended provisions of Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 should be given effect from
the date of introduction of the Bill in Parliament and
therefore enacted Section 30 sub-section (2) making the
provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and
Section 28 applicable to and in relation to "any award made
by the Collector or court or to any order passed by the High
Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such
award...... after the 30th day of April 1982...... and
before the commencement of this Act", that is, the Amending
Act. The object of Parliament clearly was that the amended
provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28
should be applicable in determination of
960
compensation where proceedings before the collector or the
court or the high Court or the Supreme Court were pending on
30th April 1982 or were commenced after that date, even if
such proceedings and finally terminated before the enactment
of the Amending Act and no proceedings were pending before
the Collector or the court or the High Court or the Supreme
Court at the date of enactment on the Amending. If the
proceedings had not finally concluded before the enactment
of the Amending Act and were pending on that date or were
started subsequently, whether before the Collector or the
Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, the amended
pervasions of Section 23 subsection (2) and section 28 would
apply on their own terms in determining compensation. But by
virtue of Section 30 sub-section (2), the amended provisions
of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were made
applicable also where the proceedings were pending 30th
April 1982 or were commenced after that date even though
they might have finally come to an end before the enactment
of the amending Act. Of course, if the proceedings had
finally terminated on or before 30th April 1982, the amended
provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28
could not possibly be intended to apply to the determination
made in such proceedings. This was clearly the intendment of
Parliament in enacting Section 30 sub-section (2).
This intendment is brought out in no uncertain terms by
the express language of Section 30 sub-section (2). It says
that the t provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section
(2) and Section 28 shall apply and shall be deemed to have
applied to and in relation to any award made by the
Collector or court or to any order passed by the High Court
or the Supreme court in appeal against any such award after
30th April 1982 and before the commencement of the Amending
Act. It is significant that the adverbial phrase "after the
30th day of April 1982 and before the commencement of this
Act" governs not only the words ’any award made by the
Collector or court but also the words "any order passed by
the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such
award" The amended provisions Of Section 23 sub-section (2)
and Section 28 are applicable not only in relation to an
award made by the Collector or court after 30th April 1982
and before the commencement of the amending Act but also in
relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal between 30th April 1982 and the commencement
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of the Amending Act. The appeal in which the order is passed
by the High Court or Supreme Court may be against an award
made by the Collector or court prior to 30th April 1982 or
subsequent to that date. The only requirement is that the
order must have been
961
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against
such award, after 30th April 1982 but before the
commencement of the amending Act. If it was the intention of
Parliament to confine the applicability of the provisions Of
the amended section 23 sub-section (2) and section 28 only
to an award made by the collector or Court after 30th April
1982 and before the commencement of the Amending Act and to
an order made by the High Court or the Supreme Court in
appeal only against such an award, Parliament would have
inserted the adverbial phrase after the 30th day of April
1982...... and before the commencement of this Act
immediately after the words "any award made by the Collector
or court , so as to indicate clearly and beyond doubt that
the adverbial phrase was intended to govern only award made
by the Collector or court and in that event the words "such
award" would have carried only one meaning, namely, award
made by the Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and
before the commencement of the Amending Act. The words "any
order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal
against any such award" would then have had a limited
meaning, namely, order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in an appeal preferred against an award made by the
Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and before the
commencement of the Amending Act. The words "any order
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against
any such award would then have had a limited meaning,
namely, order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court, in
an appeal preferred against an award made by the Collector
or Court after 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement
of the Amending Act. These words would not in that event
have comprehended order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal against an award made by the Collector or
court on or before 30th April 1982. But Parliament
deliberately and advisedly introduced the adverbial phrase F
after the 30th day of April 1982....... and before the
commencement of this Act" at the end of the sentence, so as
to quality both "any award made by the Collector or court as
also any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court
in appeal against any such award". The words ’such award’ in
the context in which they occur mean only the award made by
the Collector or court and do not import the time element
which finds place only at the end of the sentence and not
immediately following the words ’any award made by the
Collector or court". It is therefore clear that under
Section 30 sub-section (2) the provisions of the amended
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made
applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation
pending on 30th April 1982 or filed subsequent to that date,
whether before the Collector or before the court or the High
Court or the Supreme Court,
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even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of
the Amending Act. It would not be a correct interpretation
of Section 30 sub-section (2) to say that the provisions of
the amended section 2 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would
be applicable in relation to an order passed by the High
Court or Supreme Court only if the order is passed in appeal
against an award made by the Collector or Court between 30th
April 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. Even if
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an award is made by the Collector or court on or before 30th
April 1982 and an appeal against such award is pending
before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April
1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, the provisions of
the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 23 would
be applicable in relation to an order passed in such appeal
by the High Court or the Supreme Court, we accordingly
affirm the view taken by the Bench of three Judges in
Mohinder Singh’s case (supra) and express our respectful
disagreement with the view taken by the Bench of two Judges
in Kamalammanniavaru‘s case (supra). The latter decision
cannot be rewarded as laying down the correct law in regard
to the interpretation of Section 30 sub-section (2).
Here in the present case the award of the Collector was
made on 11th June 1975 and the award of the court was made
on 31st July, 1979. The award of the court as well as the
award of the Collector were thus made prior to 30th April
1982. So also was c the order passed by the learned single
Judge of the High Court in appeal against the award of the
Court made on 10th November 1981, that is, before 30th April
1982. But on 30th April 1982, the Letters patent appeal
preferred by the appellants was pending before the Division
bench of the High Court and that was disposed of on 8th
December 1982 and this was followed by the present appeal
before this court. The order in the letters patent appeal
was thus passed by the Division Bench after 30th April 1982
and before the commencement of the amending Act and the
provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and
Section 28 were therefore applicable in relation to this
order passed by the Division Bench, on the interpretation
placed by us on Section 30 sub-section (2). Moreover, the
present appeal was pending at the date of commencement of
the Amending Act and therefore, in any view of the matter,
this court is bound to given effect to the provisions of the
amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 in
determining the amount of compensation.
We must therefore allow the present appeal and set
aside the order passed by the Division Bench in so far as it
refused to grant enhanced compensation to the appellants on
account of
963
non-payment of deficit court fee and direct that the
appellants A shall be paid enhanced compensation at the rate
determined by the Division Bench, according as the land
belonging to them fell within one or the other belt, and
they shall also receive solatium calculated at the rate of
30% on the amount to enhanced compensation under the amended
Section 23 sub-section (2) as also interest at the rate of
9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the
date on which possession of their land was taken up to the
expiration of a period of one year and thereafter at the
rate of 15% per annum. The appellant will pay up the deficit
amount of court fee within two months from today and a final
order in the above terms will be drawn up in favour of the
appellants only after payment of the deficit court fee is
made within the time stipulated by us. We think that the
fair order of costs in the present case would be that each
party shall bear and pay its own costs throughout.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
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