Prakash Asphaltings And Toll Highways (India) Limited vs. Mandeepa Enterprises

2025 INSC 1108


REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11418 OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 12510 OF 2024)


PRAKASH ASPHALTINGS AND
TOLL HIGHWAYS (INDIA) LIMITED APPELLANT(S)


VERSUS

MANDEEPA ENTERPRISES
AND OTHERS RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.
This civil appeal is directed against the judgment
and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by a Division Bench of the
High Court at Calcutta (High Court) in MAT No. 93 of 2024.
Signature Not Verified
2. Be it stated that MAT No. 93 of 2024 was filed by
Digitally signed by
CHETAN ARORA
Date: 2025.09.12
16:43:13 IST
Reason:
the respondent No. 1 as an intra-court appeal against the final

order dated 03.01.2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of
the High Court dismissing the writ petition, WPA No. 29001 of
2023, filed by respondent No. 1.
3. Respondent No. 1 had filed the aforesaid writ
petition assailing the action of respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4
(State of West Bengal and its officials) refusing to treat
respondent No. 1 as the highest bidder by permitting it to
rectify its financial bid after the bidding process was over. After
observing that there was no scope for interference, learned
Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.
4. Aggrieved by such dismissal, respondent No. 1
preferred an intra-court appeal which was registered as MAT
No. 93 of 2024. According to the Division Bench, the error in
quoting the figure by respondent No. 1 was inadvertent;
instead of quoting the price for the entire contract period of
1095 days, respondent No. 1 had uploaded per day amount of
the Bill of Quantity (BOQ) of Rs. 9,72,999.00. Division Bench
further observed that respondent No. 1 had promptly sought
for correction of the error immediately after reopening of the
2


price bids. Therefore, the Division Bench allowed the writ
appeal vide the judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 by
setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge, further
directing respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to evaluate the BOQ rate
of respondent No. 1 by treating the amount offered by
respondent No. 1 as the per day amount and then on that
basis to compute the total amount for the entire contract
period of 1095 days. However, the Division Bench was of the
view that an opportunity should be granted by the tendering
authority to the other bidders as well to match the price of
respondent No. 1 and thereafter to take a final decision with
regard to the award of contract.
5. It is this judgment and order which is under
impugnment in the present proceeding.
6. At the outset, relevant facts may be noted.
7. A notice inviting electronic bid No. 7 of 2023-24
dated 17.10.2023 was issued by the Superintending Engineer
and Project Director, Project Implementation Unit – I, Public
Works (Roads) Directorate, Government of West Bengal for
3


engaging complete Road User Fee (RUF) collection operator for
RUF collection from commercial vehicles (non-passenger) at
designated locations on few roads in the State of West Bengal.
In this case, we are concerned with the following work:
RUF Collection with HNETC System Integration and
Transaction Acquiring services at Fee collection plaza
under NETC programme through NPCI approved
acquirer bank including engagement of required man
power for operation of Road User Fee collection plaza for
Dankuni Chandannagar Mogra in Hooghly district SH
13.

8. The contract period is for 1095 days. While the
annual potential collection was pegged at Rs. 21.60 crores, the
earnest money deposit/bid security was fixed at Rs.
25,00,000.00. As per Clause 2 of the notice inviting electronic
bid, there would be two bids: technical bid and financial bid,
both of which would have to be submitted concurrently duly
digitally signed in the website of the West Bengal Government.
Clause 3 mentioned that the rates should be quoted both in
words and in figures in specific format i.e. BOQ. In case of any
discrepancy between words and figures, the rate quoted in
4


words would be treated as the actual rate offered. After
bidding, the selected bidder will be the H1 bidder who will offer
the highest remittance for the contract period and will make
necessary agreement with the condition that the accepted bid
amount over the stipulated period will have to be deposited in
advance as per payment schedule to the government account
in lieu of RUF collection right.
9. Clause 4 lays down the eligibility criteria for
participation in the Bid. Clause 4(g) is very specific. It says that
any change in the template of BOQ will not be accepted under
any circumstances. Clause 4(g) reads thus:
Any change in template of BOQ will not be accepted
under any circumstances.

10. The date and time schedule of the tender process
as provided in Clause 9 was as follows:
9. Date & Time Schedule:

5

11. Instructions to Bidders is part of the notice inviting
electronic bid. Clause 5 thereof deals with submission of bids.
It clarified that the notice inviting bid was of two bid system:
(i) technical and (ii) financial, both to be submitted
concurrently in the portal. Bidders who would be technically
pre-qualified in respect of technical and financial
eligibility/capability criteria would only be permitted to
participate in the financial bidding. Bidders were required to
submit online in two folders for each work, one being technical
proposal and the other being financial proposal. It was clarified
that at the time of uploading bid, care should be taken so that
during evaluation, all the documents required to be submitted
6


by the bidders are found in a neat, clear and in a readable
format, otherwise the bid might be treated as cancelled. The
instructions to bidders also clarifies that technical proposals
will be opened by the Bid Inviting Authority (BIA) or by the Bid
Evaluation Committee, and thereafter to upload the summary
list of technically qualified bidders. Heading of sub-clause B is
bid evaluation. As per sub-clause B(v), in the course of
evaluation, the notice inviting authority may seek
clarification/information or additional supporting documents
or original hard copies of documents already submitted and if
these are not produced by the bidders within the stipulated
time frame, their proposals will be liable for rejection. Clause
5B (v) of the Instruction to Bidders is as follows:
v. While evaluation the Notice Inviting Authority may
summon of the bids and seek clarification/information or
additional supporting documents or original hard copies
against any of the documents only, which are already
submitted/uploaded to the web portal and if these are not
produced by the intending Bidders within the stipulated
time frame, their proposals will be liable for rejection.

7


12. The following seven bidders had participated in the
present tender process. These seven bidders are as follows:
1. Ainul Hoque
2. SK Nasir.
3. Mandeepa Enterprises
4. RMN Infrastructures Limited.
5. M/S GVR Infra Projects Limited.
6. Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways India Ltd
7. Eagle Infra India Ltd.
13. Tender evaluation was carried out by a five-member
screening committee for bid evaluation on 06.12.2023 which
was constituted vide G.O. No. 3410-PW/O/E-1/2M-17/2017
dated 18.09.2017. After evaluation of the technical bids by
aforesaid committee, it was found that out of the aforesaid
total seven bidders, only four numbers of bidders were found
to be technically qualified. Three bidders were found to be non
eligible and declared as disqualified. The short listed four
bidders are as follows:
(i) Ainul Hoque
(ii) Mandeepa Enterprises
8


(iii) Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India)
Limited
(iv) Eagle Infra India Limited
It was mentioned that financial bids would be
opened on 08.12.2023 at 06:30 pm.
14. Accordingly, forty eight hours after declaration of
technical evaluation, financial bids of the four technically
qualified bidders were opened electronically as per the
e-tender mechanism. On such opening, it was found that the
appellant Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India)
Limited was the highest bidder with the quoted amount of
Rs. 91,19,00,000.00 (for 1095 days). It was also found that
respondent No. 1 was the lowest bidder (H4) at the offered
amount of Rs. 9,72,999.00. Details of financial bid evaluation
are as under:

9

15. Since much hinges on this, we may extract the item
rate BOQ of respondent No. 1 which is as under:
Item Rate BoQ
Tender Inviting Authority: Superintending Engineer & Project
Director, Project Implementation Unit-I.

Name of Work: RUF Collection with HNETC System Integration and
Transaction Acquiring services at Fee collection plaza under NETC
programme through NPCI approved acquirer bank including
engagement of required man power for operation of Road User Fee
collection plaza for Dankuni Chandannagar Mogra in Hooghly
district SH 13.

Contract No: SL No. 3 of eNIB No. 07 of 2023-2024 of S.E. & PD/PIU-I

10

16. After the financial bids were opened and became
public, respondent No. 1 made a request to the tender
committee vide e-mail dated 13.12.2023. The e-mail was
accompanied by an affidavit stating that the amount offered
was per day rate and that the said figure should be worked out
for the total contract period of 1095 days in
which event, the offer of respondent No. 1 would stand at
Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the contract period. The tendering
authority was requested to treat the figure of Rs. 9,72,999.00
as a typographical error and the figure offered by respondent
No. 1 should be read as 106,54,33,905.00. The authority was
further requested to consider the same keeping higher revenue
in mind.
17. It appears that vide communication dated
20.12.2023, respondent No. 4 rejected the prayer of
respondent No. 1 stating that such request for correction of
11


financial bid was not possible to be entertained as it would
impeach the sanctity of the tender process.
18. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition
before the High Court seeking the following reliefs:
a) Leave under Rule 26 of the Rules relating to
petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
to move the writ petition before service of copy of the
petition be granted to the petitioner to move the writ
petition before service of copy thereof, in view of extreme
urgency as narrated hereinabove;
b) A Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents and
each of them esp., the respondent No. 3, to rescind
and/or cancel and/or withdraw the letter rejecting the
prayer of the petitioner to amend the rate quoted by the
petitioner in the bid in respect of the tender process
being Annexure "P-1”to the petition forthwith;
c) A Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent No.
3 to allow the petitioner to amend and/or rectify the
petitioner's bid in respect of the tender process dated
17th October, 2023 being Annexure "P-1" hereto by
quoting the rate for 1095 days instead or one day
treating the same as bonafide and inadvertent mistake
of the petitioner and then to consider the bid of the
petitioner in the financial bid upon rectification of the
same in terms of the prayers of the petitioner made in
the letters and documents submitted by the petitioner
12


on 13.12.2023, 15.12.2023 and 20.12.2023 in respect of
the tender process dated 17th October, 2023 being
Annexure "P-5”, “P-6” and "P-7"· hereto;
d) A writ of Certiorari calling upon the respondents
and each of them to certify and transmit all records in
respect of tender having Memo No. 590-R/PIU-I dated
17th October, 2023 being notice inviting Electronic Bid
No. 07-2023-24 by the Superintending Engineer/ Project
Director Unit-I Public Works (Roads) Directorate being
Annexure "P-1" hereto and all subsequent letters and
correspondences being Annexure "P-2" to "P-8" hereto to
this Hon'ble Court so that conscionable justice may be
done by quashing and/or setting aside the letter of
rejection by the respondent No.3 dated 20th December,
2023 being Annexure "P-8" hereto and by directing the
respondent No. 3 to allow the petitioner to rectify and/
or amend the bid for 1095 days and further process the
bid of the petitioner upon such rectification in the
financial bid of the said tender process being Annexure
"P-1" hereto;
e) A Writ of Prohibition prohibiting the respondents
and each of them, esp., the respondent No. 3 from
indulging any further non-action and/or inaction in
allowing the petitioner from rectifying the bid of the
petitioner for l095 days and from further taking any
steps for issuing the Letter of Acceptance (LOA) to the H-
13


1 bidder in respect of the said tender process being
Annexure "P-1" hereto;
f) Interim order directing the respondents and each
of them, esp., the respondent No. 3 from proceeding
further in the tender process being Annexure "P-1"
hereto including issuing the Letter of Acceptance (LOA)
to the H-1 bidder in respect of the tender process being
Annexure "P-1" hereto till the disposal of the writ
petition;
g) Ad-interim order of terms of prayer (f) above;
h) Rule NISI in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f)
and (g) above;
i) Costs;
j) Such further or other order or orders be passed
and/or direction or directions be given as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper.
19. The writ petition was registered as W.P.A. No. 29001
of 2023. A Single Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ
petition vide the order dated 03.01.2024 by holding as under:
8. Bona fides cannot be attributed to the petitioner;
rather, the petitioner was grossly negligent, since
the price schedule indicated in the BOQ, which
found place even in the bid of the petitioner itself,
clearly showed that the amount of Road User Fee
14


in the figures was to be entered by the bidder for
1095 days. Even after knowing the same and being
aware of the various amounts involved by way of
annual potential collection and bid security, the
petitioner committed the error which it did.
9. After the financial bid was opened, the petitioner
wrote to the tender issuing authorities. If such an
opportunity is to be given to a particular bidder,
the same would upset the entire tender process
and, as rightly argued by the respondents, would
make the tender process opaque and arbitrary.
10. The petitioner, with its eyes open, participated in
the bid and quoted an erroneous amount. As such,
the petitioner ought to suffer for the same and take
responsibility therefor. Even if the petitioner's bid,
if taken to be for 1095 days, would far exceed the
next highest bid, such opportunity cannot be given
to the petitioner to rectify its error after the entire
bidding process was over and the financial bids of
all the bidders were opened. Such chance, if given
to the petitioner, would be contrary to every known
principle of fairness pertaining to tenders and
would amount to a special favour being extended
to the petitioner for no particular reason.
11. Thus, there is no scope of interference in the
tender process.
15


20. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No. 1 preferred a
letters patent appeal before the Division Bench of the High
Court which was registered as MAT No. 93 of 2024. Vide the
judgment and order dated 23.02.2024, the Division Bench of
the High Court observed as under:
8. *
Thus, in the light of the above undisputed factual
position we are of the considered view that the
Tender Inviting Authority had sufficient leverage
and play in the joints to seek for any clarification
or information during the entire evaluation process
and sub-clause (b) of clause 5 of the Instruction to
Bidders is not restricted to the stage of evaluation
of the technical bid along but it encompasses the
evaluation of the entire tender right from the stage
of inception till the issuance of work order. This
interpretation is proper interpretation that should
be given to the said clause or else it would put
shackles on the right of the Tender Inviting
Authority. The explanation offered by the appellant
is acceptable and the appellant’s offer is Rs.16
crore over and above the highest offer which is now
come to the light after the financial bid has been
opened.
9. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and
order passed in the writ petition is set aside and
16


the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are
directed to evaluate the appellant’s BOQ by taking
the amount of Rs.106,54,33,905.00 for the period
of 1095 days as called for in the tender notification.
10. Since admittedly the affidavit for correction of the
bid document was submitted after opening the
financial bid, this Court feels that an opportunity
is to be granted to other bidders to match the price
quoted by the writ petitioner. The Tender Inviting
Authority shall call upon all the bidders who were
found to be technically qualified including the
petitioner and after evaluating the bids of all such
bidders and after giving opportunity to the other
bidders, who are found technically qualified, to
match the corrected figures quoted by the writ
petitioner shall take a final decision with regard to
award of the contract in question.
21. It may be mentioned that both before the learned
Single Judge as well as before the Division Bench, appellant
was not arrayed as a party respondent, though on evaluation
of the financial bids, it was found to be the highest bidder (H1).
22. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order
dated 23.02.2024, appellant preferred the related special leave
petition. By order dated 27.05.2024, this Court granted
17


permission to the appellant to file the special leave petition.
While issuing notice, this Court also stayed the impugned
judgment and order dated 23.02.2024. Thereafter, the matter
was heard on 08.08.2025 when leave was granted.
23. Mr. Kavin Gulati, learned senior counsel for the
appellant submits that after the financial bids were opened,
appellant was found to be and was declared as the highest (H1)
bidder by the tendering authority on 13.12.2023. Admittedly,
respondent No. 1 sought rectification/correction of its
financial bid only after the financial bids were opened and only
after the appellant was declared as H1. The tendering
authority was fully justified in rejecting the request of
respondent No. 1 for rectification/correction of its financial
bid.
23.1. Learned Single Judge was justified in observing that
if the opportunity as sought for by respondent No. 1 is allowed,
the same would upset the entire tender process. Learned
Single Judge had rightly observed that respondent No. 1 had
participated in the tender process with its eyes wide open and
18


had quoted an erroneous amount. Even if its bid taken for the
entire contract period exceeds the highest bid, such
opportunity for rectification cannot be given to respondent No.
1 to rectify its error after the entire bidding process was over
and the financial bids of all the tenderers were opened. If this
is accepted and respondent No. 1 is given such an opportunity,
it would be contrary to every known principle of fairness
pertaining to tenders and would amount to a special favour
being extended to respondent No. 1 for no particular reason.
Learned senior counsel submits that the view taken by the
learned Single Judge is the correct view and should not have
been interfered with by the Division Bench in a letters patent
appeal.
23.2. Mr. Gulati submits that in the proceedings before
the learned Single Judge, appellant was not made a party
respondent though it was the highest (H1) bidder. Though the
relief claimed by respondent No. 1, if granted, would have
adversely affected the appellant, this issue did not arise
because the learned Single Judge did not accept the
19


contentions of respondent No. 1 and had declined to interfere
with the tender process.
23.3. However, in the intra-court appeal before the
Division Bench, respondent No. 1 again did not array the
appellant as a party respondent. Division Bench took the view
that the tendering authority had sufficient leverage and play
in the joints to seek any clarification or information during the
tender evaluation process. Learned senior counsel submits
that the Division Bench had interpreted Clause 5B(v) of the
Instructions to Bidders erroneously to hold that the tendering
authority had the discretion to seek any clarification or
information at any stage of the tender process right from the
stage of inception till issuance of the work order and thereafter
to hold that any other interpretation would put shackles on
the functioning of the tendering authority. Learned senior
counsel submits that the aforesaid view taken by the Division
Bench is palpably erroneous having the effect of unsettling the
entire tender process. Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to
Bidders cannot be given such a broad interpretation. Referring
to Clause 4(g) of the tender conditions, he submits that it is
20


clear therefrom that change of Bill of Quantity (BOQ) would
not be accepted under any circumstances. If the view of the
Division Bench is accepted, there would be no finality attached
to a tender process which in turn would impeach the sanctity
of the tender process itself.
23.4. Learned senior counsel further submits that the
final direction of the Division Bench directing the tendering
authority to evaluate the BOQ of respondent No. 1 not at Rs.
9,72,999.00 which it held to be per day figure but to accept
respondent No. 1’s BOQ at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 for the entire
contract period has changed, the entire complexion of the
tendering process thereby rendering the position of the
appellant wholly untenable despite being declared as the
highest (H1) bidder by the tendering authority. This direction
of the Division Bench entails adverse civil consequences upon
the appellant. Despite being so, the Division Bench did not
deem it appropriate to get the appellant impleaded in the
appellate proceedings. Consequently, no notice was issued or
opportunity of hearing granted to the appellant by the Division
21


Bench before disposing of the intra-court appeal. This is in
clear violation of the principles of natural justice.
23.5. According to him, the reasoning adopted by the
Division Bench is highly questionable. Division Bench has
taken the view that if the BOQ amount of respondent No. 1 is
read as Rs. 106,54,33,905.00, the difference between the
amount quoted by respondent No. 1 and what is being offered
by the H1 bidder i.e. the appellant would be about 15 crores
and this additional amount would enure to the benefit of the
state exchequer. He submits that collecting higher revenue is
only one facet of public interest. The other aspect, which is
more important, is that because of the avoidable litigation
instituted by respondent No. 1, the State could not timely start
the contract work. As a result, it lost considerable amount of
revenue. However, this aspect of the matter was overlooked by
the Division Bench. He reiterates that if the view taken by the
Division Bench is accepted then there would be no finality to
a tender process.
22


23.6. Learned senior counsel to buttress his arguments
has submitted a compilation of judgments. Additionally, he
has also placed reliance on few other judgments. The decisions
relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant are as under:
(i) West Bengal State Electricity Board Vs. Patel
1
Engineering Company Limited
2
(ii) Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa
(iii) Afcons Infrastructure Limited Vs. Nagpur
3
Metro Rail Corporation Limited
4
(iv) Johra Vs. State of Haryana
(v) M/s. ABCI Infrastructures Private Limited Vs.
5
Union of India

23.7. Finally, learned senior counsel submits that
whether on account of violation of the principles of natural
justice or on the point of unduly interfering with a tender
process, the impugned judgment and order of the Division
Bench cannot be sustained. Therefore, the same is liable to be
set aside and quashed.

1
(2001) 2 SCC 451
2
(2007) 14 SCC 517
3
(2016) 16 SCC 818
4
(2019) 2 SCC 324
5
(2025) INSC 215
23


24. Mr. Anurag Soan, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No. 1 has opposed the challenge made by the
appellant. He submits that the Division Bench has rightly
observed that the tendering authority have the leverage to
consider the clarifications as sought for by respondent No. 1.
According to him, the mistake committed by respondent No. 1
was a bona fide one and completely unintentional. Since
ordinarily, the rates sought for and offered in the tenders
floated in the State of West Bengal are on the basis of per day
figures, respondent No. 1 offered per day BOQ figure whereas
the figure ought to have been a consolidated one for the entire
contractual period of 1095 days. This inadvertent mistake was
detected only when the financial bids were opened and without
loss of time, respondent No. 1 promptly e-mailed the tendering
authority pointing out the mistake and sought for rectification.
This was supported by an affidavit. If the BOQ amount of
respondent No. 1 for the entire contractual period is calculated
based on the per day rate, the bid offer of respondent No. 1
would be by far the highest; by an amount of Rs. 15 crores
over the bid value of the appellant. Therefore, there was no
24


reason why the tendering authority should have ignored the
rectification effort of respondent No. 1.
24.1. Learned counsel submits that to the extent the
Division Bench held that the tendering authority had the
leverage to consider such clarification, the decision is in favour
of respondent No. 1. However, the Division Bench ought to
have declared respondent No. 1 as the highest bidder because
that would be the natural consequence of acceptance of
respondent No. 1’s rectification effort. But the direction of the
Division Bench to the state authorities to provide an
opportunity to the other bidders to match the BOQ figure of
respondent No. 1 is completely unwarranted. Viewed in that
context, though the intra-court appeal has been decided in
favour of respondent No. 1, it has actually been denied the
consequential relief.
24.2. Mr. Soan submits that the BOQ figure offered by
respondent No. 1 was highest (H1) from day one; it was an
inadvertent mistake to declare the said amount as per day
figure instead of computing the total amount for the entire
25


contractual period. He submits that there is a material
difference between a total revision of price by quoting a new
amount and clarifying the existing price. The case of
respondent No. 1 falls in the latter category.
24.3. Regarding non-joinder of appellant as a party
respondent, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that
respondent no. 1 had approached the High Court seeking a
writ of mandamus against respondent No. 4 to allow
rectification/clarification of its financial bid owing to
inadvertent mistake and also sought for quashing of the
rejection letter dated 20.12.2023 issued by respondent No. 4
whereby the request for rectification/clarification of financial
bid by respondent No. 1 was rejected. No relief was sought for
against the appellant. Evidently, bid of respondent No. 1 is
substantially higher than that of the appellant. Public at large
would have benefitted by such rectification/clarification.
Therefore, non-joinder of appellant as respondent to the
proceedings before the High Court is not fatal. Consequently,
it cannot be said that there is any violation of the principles of
natural justice.
26


24.4. Learned counsel has referred to Clause 5B(v) of the
Instructions to Bidders which empowers the tendering
authority to seek clarification of the documents submitted by
the bidders. In terms of Clause D(ii) of the notice inviting bid,
both the technical bid and the financial bid were required to
be submitted simultaneously. Division Bench has correctly
interpreted Clause 5B(v) of the Instructions to Bidders and
such interpretation warrants no interference. Learned counsel
for respondent No. 1 submits that the clarified financial bid of
respondent No. 1 should be accepted in the light of the larger
public interest otherwise the State would lose revenue by
about 15 crores. Public exchequer should not be made to
suffer because of an inadvertent mistake in quoting the BOQ
figure by respondent No. 1. In this connection, learned counsel
has placed reliance on a decision of the Delhi High Court in
the case of Supreme Infrastructure India Limited Vs. Rail Vikas
6
Nigam Limited in which case, rectification/clarification was
allowed by the Delhi High Court.

6
2012 SCC Online Delhi 616
27


24.5. Learned counsel further submits that matters
relating to tender and awarding of contract are essentially
commercial functions. In such matters, principles of equity
and natural justice should be kept at a distance.
24.6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that
the mistake committed by respondent No. 1 was so apparent
when compared with the annual potential collection of the
contract which is estimated in crores and the bid security is
fixed at Rs. 25 lakhs. Therefore, there was no reason for
respondent No. 1 to quote a figure of Rs. 9,72,000.00 as the
bid price for the entire contractual period of 1095 days. In the
absence of any allegation of malafides or collusion or fraud,
respondent No. 1’s right to request for clarification was
correctly allowed by the Division Bench.
24.7. Clarifying the position, learned counsel submits
that in an earlier bid process in which respondent No. 1
participated, per day figure was sought for. It was because of
this that there was confusion and respondent No. 1 followed
the same protocol in the present case. It was only when the
28


financial bid was opened that respondent No. 1 realised the
inadvertent mistake. Rectification of such apparent mistakes
can in no manner be said to vitiate the sanctity of the tender
process as respondent No. 1 is also a technically qualified
bidder.
24.8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, learned
counsel submits that no case for interference in the impugned
judgment is made out by the appellant and, therefore, the
appeal is liable to be dismissed.
25. Ms. Nandini Sen Mukherjee, learned counsel
appearing for respondent Nos. 2 to 4, at the outset submits
that though the State has not challenged, the impugned
judgment and order of the Division Bench, nonetheless it is ad
idem with the appellant who has questioned the impugned
directions of the Division Bench.
25.1. Learned counsel submits that both on the issue of
violation of the principles of natural justice and interference
with an ongoing tender process by a court in a proceeding
29


under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the impugned
judgment and order cannot be sustained.
25.2. She submits that both appellant and respondent
No. 1 alongwith two other bidders were found to be technically
qualified. Thereafter, when the financial bids were opened, it
was found that the bid offered by the appellant was the highest
and therefore it was declared as H1. On the other hand, bid of
respondent No. 1 was found to be the lowest. Accordingly, the
tendering authority had finalized the bidders. Therefore, when
respondent No. 1 moved the High Court and the Division
Bench had substantially granted relief to respondent No. 1
having the potential to upset the financial bids of the bidders
as finalized by the tendering committee, it was necessary that
appellant should have been made a party respondent in the
proceedings before the High Court. As the appellant was not
put to notice and was not heard, the impugned directions
which are prejudicial to the appellant cannot be sustained.
25.3. Ms. Mukherjee further submits that the sanctity of
the entire tender process would be affected in case the
30


corrections suggested by the Division Bench are sustained.
This would not only be unfair to the bidders higher in rank
than respondent No. 1 but has unduly delayed finalisation of
the contract.
25.4. After adverting to the facts of the case, learned
counsel representing respondent Nos. 2 to 4 submits that in
the BOQ template contained in the tender papers, it was
clearly mentioned that the rate was to be quoted for the entire
duration of the contractual period i.e. for 1095 days.
Therefore, the assertion of respondent No. 1 that it had
inadvertently quoted rate on per day basis instead of 1095
days cannot be accepted. In this connection, learned counsel
has also referred to Clause 4(g) of the notice inviting bid which
clearly prohibits change in the template of BOQ. This type of
post tender modification of quoted rate as sought for by
respondent No. 1 is not at all permissible. In fact, because of
this attempt on the part of respondent No. 1, finalisation of the
contract has been unduly delayed which in turn has affected
collection of government revenue.
31


25.5. Elaborating further, learned counsel for respondent
Nos. 2 to 4 submits that respondent No. 1 did not mention
anywhere in its bid that the rate quoted by it was on ‘per day’
basis. It was only after opening of the financial bid that
respondent No. 1 claimed that the quoted rate was on per day
basis. Respondent No. 4 had rightly rejected such request
construing it to be an attempt to influence the bidding process.
25.6. In these circumstances, learned counsel submits
that the Division Bench was not justified in setting aside the
order of the learned Single Judge and by directing respondent
Nos. 2 to 4 to accept the computed bid of respondent No. 1 by
converting the figure from per day basis to the entire contract
period of 1095 days and thereafter to make an analysis with
the bids offered by the other bidders. In view of a catena of
judgments of this Court, such interference by a writ court is
simply not permissible.
25.7. Learned counsel therefore submits that as a matter
of fact, following the impugned judgment and order, all the
four technically qualified bidders were called upon to submit
32


their sealed bids afresh for 1095 days keeping the rates of
106,54,33,905.00 as the minimum. However, after this Court
granted stay, the aforesaid process has been cancelled.
25.8. Learned counsel finally submits that permitting an
unsuccessful bidder to raise grievance after opening of the
financial bid would set a bad precedent. If it is permitted,
grievance of all kinds and of all sorts would be forthcoming
and the contracts would never get executed.
26. Submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties have received the due consideration of the Court.
27. Though we have adverted to the facts in the
preceding paragraphs, nonetheless for a proper appreciation it
would be apposite to briefly sum up the factual contours of the
present controversy.
28. The contract in question relates to RUF collection at
fee collection plaza for Dankuni Chandannagar Mogra section
of SH 13 in the District of Hooghly, West Bengal. In terms of
the notice inviting electronic bid dated 17.10.2023, the
contract period is for 1095 days. While the annual potential
33


collection was pegged at Rs. 21.60 crores, the earnest money
deposit/bid security was fixed at Rs. 25,00,000.00. The tender
comprised of two bid system: technical bid and financial bid to
be submitted concurrently digitally in the website of the West
Bengal Government. The rates should be quoted in both words
and figures in BOQ format. In case of any discrepancy between
words and figures, the rate quoted in words would be accepted
as the actual rate offered. After the bidding process, the
selected bidder will be treated as H1 bidder who will offer the
highest remittance for the contract period. The eligibility
criteria made it clear that under no circumstances, change in
template of BOQ will be accepted.
28.1. In all, total of seven bidders had participated in the
tender process out of which four were shortlisted by the
screening committee on 06.12.2023 as being technically
qualified. These four included appellant and respondent No. 1.
28.2. Thereafter, financial bids of the four technically
qualified bidders were opened. On such opening, it was found
that the bid offered by the appellant at Rs. 91,19,00,000.00
34


for 1095 days was found to be the highest (H1) whereas the
bid offered by respondent No. 1 at Rs. 9,72,999.00 was found
to be the lowest (H4).
28.3. After the financial bids were opened and finalized,
respondent No. 1 made a request to respondent No. 4 vide
email dated 13.12.2023 to change the rate offered by it by
treating the same as per day offer and on that basis, to
compute the amount for the entire contractual period of 1095
days which figure would stand at Rs. 106,54,33,905.00. It was
contended that respondent No. 1 was therefore the highest
bidder and its rate was more than Rs. 15 crores above that of
the appellant. The mistake committed by it was an inadvertent
one. Since it would be beneficial to the public exchequer,
respondent No. 4 was requested to correct the inadvertent
mistake.
28.4. This prayer of respondent No. 1 was rejected by
respondent No. 4 vide the communication dated 20.12.2023.
28.5. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition
before the High Court being WPA No. 29001/2023. A learned
35


Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition vide
the order dated 03.01.2024.
28.6. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No. 1 preferred a
letters patent appeal before the Division Bench of the High
Court being MAT No. 93 of 2024. Vide the judgment and order
dated 23.02.2024, the Division Bench allowed the appeal by
directing respondent Nos. 2 to 4 to evaluate the BOQ rate of
respondent No. 1 by treating Rs. 106,54,33,905.00 as the
amount for the entire contractual period of 1095 days instead
of Rs. 9,72,999.00 which was treated to be a per day figure.
However, since the other bidders were not before the court, it
was directed that opportunity be granted to such bidders to
match the price quoted by respondent No. 1. After evaluating
the bids of all such bidder, the said respondents were directed
to take a final decision with regard to award of the contract in
question.
29. Having noted the factual backdrop of the case, let
us now examine the relevant provisions of the tender
conditions. We have already noted that Clause 4 of the notice
36


inviting electronic bid lays down the eligibility criteria for
participation in bid. Clause 4(g) specifically says that any
change in the template of BOQ will not be accepted under any
circumstances. Clause 5 of the Instructions to Bidders which
form part of the notice inviting electronic bid cautions the
bidders that care should be taken so that during evaluation of
the documents submitted by the bidders those are found to be
neat and clear and in a readable format, otherwise the bid
would be treated as cancelled. Clause 5B of the Instruction to
Bidders deals with bid evaluation. Clause 5B(v) says that
during the process of evaluation of bids, the notice inviting
authority may summon and seek clarification/information on
additional supporting documents or original hardcopies
against any of the documents which are already
submitted/uploaded in the web portal. In the event, these are
not produced by the intending bidders within the stipulated
time frame, their proposals will be liable for rejection.
30. Division Bench of the High Court has interpreted
this clause in a broad way to include rectification of bona fide
mistakes in quoting BOQ rates by the bidders. In our view, this
37


will be stretching things a bit too far. This provision is meant
to empower the notice inviting authority to seek clarification
or further information regarding any document filed by a
bidder. This cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include
rectification of the BOQ rates which is governed by Clause 4(g)
of the notice inviting electronic bid putting a complete embargo
to any change in the template of BOQ; the prohibition is
specific: change in the template of BOQ will not be accepted
under any circumstances.
31. Our view is fortified by the item rate BOQ of
respondent No. 1 which we have extracted in paragraph 15 of
this judgment. In column 5, the heading is : amount of road
user fee in figures to be entered by the bidder for 1095 days.
As against this, respondent No. 1 quoted the figure of Rs.
9,72,999.00. In words, i.e. in column 6, the quoted rate was
mentioned as nine lakhs seventy two thousand nine hundered
and ninety nine only.
32. Therefore, though the contention of respondent
No. 1 is that it had made an inadvertent mistake in quoting
38


the BOQ rate of per day figure instead of the total contract
period of 1095 days, a closer scrutiny would however belie
such contention. In columns 5, 6 and 7, respondent No. 1 filled
up the amount in figures and words as Rs. 9,72,999.00 and
Rupees nine lakhs seventy two thousand nine hundred and
ninety nine respectively for 1095 days. In such circumstances,
it cannot be said to be an inadvertent or unintentional
mistake, as is being contended on behalf of respondent No. 1.
Therefore, allowing respondent No. 1 to rectify such mistakes
after finalization of the financial bid would be highly improper
as it would have the effect of unsettling the entire tender
process.
33. In Patel Engineering Company Limited (supra), this
Court had rejected a similar contention that the mistakes were
unintentional and had occurred due to fault of the computer
in the following manner:
23. The mistakes/errors in question, it is stated, are
unintentional and occurred due to the fault of computer
termed as “a repetitive systematic computer
typographical transmission failure”. It is difficult to
accept this contention. A mistake may be unilateral or
39


mutual but it is always unintentional. If it is intentional
it ceases to be a mistake. Here the mistakes may be
unintentional but it was not beyond the control of
Respondents 1 to 4 to correct the same before
submission of the bid. Had they been vigilant in
checking the bid documents before their submission,
the mistakes would have been avoided. Further,
correction of such mistakes after one-and-a-half
months of opening of the bids will also be violative of
clauses 24.1, 24.3 and 29.1 of the ITB.

33.1. This Court also held that tenders are invited on the
basis of competitive bidding. On the one hand, it offers a fair
opportunity to all those who are interested in competing for
the contract and on the other hand it affords the authority a
choice to select the best of competitors on a competitive price
without prejudice to the quality of the work. Above all, it
eliminates favoritism and discrimination in allotting public
works to contractors. While benefit to the public exchequer is
certainly an important criteria in award of contract, it is
equally in public interest to adhere to the rules and conditions
subject to which bids are invited.
40


34. This Court in Jagdish Mandal (supra) after referring
to earlier decisions of this Court succinctly summed up the
scope of judicial review of award of contracts and held thus:
22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness,
bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether
choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check
whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of
judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or
award of contracts, certain special features should be
borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction.
Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are
essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity
and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision
relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public
interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial
review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error
in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out.
The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be
invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public
interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer
or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages
in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers
with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and
business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of
some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice
to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising
41


power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such
interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public
works for years, or delay relief and succour to
thousands and millions and may increase the project
cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in
tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of
judicial review, should pose to itself the following
questions:
( i ) Whether the process adopted or decision made by
the authority is mala fide or intended to favour
someone;
or
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so
arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the
decision is such that no responsible authority acting
reasonably and in accordance with relevant law
could have reached”;
( ii ) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no
interference under Article 226. Cases involving
blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a
tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse
(allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships
and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may
require a higher degree of fairness in action.

35. Afcons Infrastructure Limited (supra) is a case where
this Court reiterated the proposition that the words used in
42


the tender documents cannot be ignored or treated as
redundant or superfluous: they must be given the due
meaning and their necessary significance. The owner or a
employer of a project having authored the tender documents
is the best person to understand and appreciate its
requirements and interpret its documents. Constitutional
courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of
the tender documents unless there is mala fides or perversity
in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of
the terms of the tender documents. It is possible that the view
taken by the owner or the employer may not be acceptable to
the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for
interfering with the interpretation given. This Court held as
follows:
13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the
decision-making process or the decision of the
administrative authority is no reason for a
constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of mala
fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness,
irrationality or perversity must be met before the
constitutional court interferes with the decision-making
process or the decision.
43



36. In the recent case of M/s. ABCI Infrastructures
Private Limited (supra), this Court has dealt with a similar
issue as in the present case. In that case, appellant was
ranked as L-1 bidder with the bid price of Rs. 1,569.00 (rupees
one thousand five hundred and sixty nine only). According to
the appellant, they had quoted a bid price of Rs. 1,569 crores
but due to system error, the quoted amount appeared just as
1,569.00. After the financial bids were opened and announced,
appellant stated that it had discovered the mistake and
accordingly the mistake was informed to the respondent
authority stating that its actual bid was Rs. 1,569 crores and
not Rs. 1,569.00. Though the mistake was bald-faced, Border
Roads Organization, the respondent authority, insisted on
accepting the bid inspite of the letters from the appellant
seeking to withdraw from the tender. Ultimately Border Roads
Organization declared the appellant as a defaulter and decided
to forfeit its bid security. Consequently, the bank guarantee
was sought to be encashed. It was in that context, this Court
though observed that the mistake was self evident,
44


nonetheless it agreed with the Border Roads Organization that
the appellant was at fault and had made the mistake of having
failed to add the required zeroes in the financial bid. The plea
of system glitch put forth by the appellant was not acceptable
as the others had successfully uploaded their bids without any
problem. In the facts of that case, this Court noted that there
were subsequent developments leading to fresh tender and
award of contract though at a lower price. In the
circumstances, this Court directed the appellant to pay
Rs. 1 crore to the Border Roads Organization as a consequence
of its error and upon receipt of the same, Border Roads
Organization was directed to return appellant’s original bank
guarantee.
37. Reverting back to the case of Afcons Infrastructure
Limited (supra), we find that this Court had also examined the
issue regarding impleadment of other bidders when a
challenge is made to an award of contract. This Court was of
the view that it would be appropriate for the constitutional
courts to insist on all eligible bidders being made parties to the
45


proceedings filed by an unsuccessful or ineligible bidder. It has
been held as under:
18. Before we conclude, it is necessary to point out that
the High Court was of the opinion that the eligible
bidders were not entitled to be either impleaded in the
petition filed in the High Court by the ineligible bidder
GYT-TPL JV or were not entitled to be heard. With
respect, this is not the appropriate view to take in
matters such as the present. There are several reasons
for this, one of them being that there could be occasions
(as in the present appeals) where an eligible bidder
could bring to the notice of the owner or employer of the
project that the ineligible bidder was ineligible for
additional reasons or reasons that were not within the
contemplation of the owner or employer of the project.
It was brought to our notice by Afcons Infrastructure in
these appeals that GYT-TPL JV did not have any
experience in the construction of a viaduct by the
segmental construction method and that the
translations of documents in Mandarin language filed
in the High Court were not true English translations.
Submissions made by the learned counsel for Afcons
Infrastructure in this regard are important and would
have had a bearing on the decision in the writ petition
filed in the High Court but since Afcons Infrastructure
was not a party in the High Court, it could not agitate
these issues in the writ petition but did so in the review
petition which was not entertained. It is to avoid such a
46


situation that it would be more appropriate for the
constitutional courts to insist on all eligible bidders
being made parties to the proceedings filed by an
unsuccessful or ineligible bidder.

38. In Johra (supra), this Court reiterated the
fundamental principle that no order can be passed by any
court in any judicial proceeding against any party without
hearing and without giving such party an opportunity of
hearing. In the facts of that case, the impugned order was set
aside on the ground that the same was passed without hearing
the appellant.
39. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in CIDCO Vs.
7
Shishir Realty Private Limited , observed that when a contract
is being evaluated, the mere possibility of more money in the
public coffers does not in itself serve public interest. This
Court held as follows:
61. When a contract is being evaluated, the mere
possibility of more money in the public coffers, does not
in itself serve public interest. A blanket claim by the
State claiming loss of public money cannot be used to

7
(2012) 16 SCC 527
47


forego contractual obligations, especially when it is not
based on any evidence or examination. The larger public
interest of upholding contracts and the fairness of
public authorities is also in play. The courts need to
have a broader understanding of public interest, while
reviewing such contracts.

40. The above proposition has been followed by another
three-Judge Bench of this Court in the recent case of Subodh
8
Kumar Singh Rathore Vs. Chief Executive Officer , when it
examined the concept of public interest in administrative
decisions relating to award of contracts. This Court held that
even assuming for a moment that there was technical fault in
the tender, which if rectified had the possibility of generating
more revenue, the same by no stretch could be said to be a
cogent reason for concealing an already existing tender. This
Court highlighted the importance of maintaining the sanctity
of tenders in governmental procurement processes. Public
tenders are the cornerstone of governmental procurement
processes, being competitive and ensuring fairness and
transparency in the allocation of public resources. Public

8
2024 SCC Online SC 1682
48


tenders are designed to provide a level playing field for all
potential bidders, fostering an environment where competition
thrives. The integrity of this process ensures that public
projects and resources are delivered efficiently and effectively,
benefiting the society at large. Therefore, sanctity of public
tenders and contract is a fundamental principle that
underpins the stability and predictability of legal and
commercial relationships. Infact this Court put in a word of
caution that considerations of public interest should not be
narrowly confined to financial aspect only.
41. Applying the above legal principles to the facts of
the present case, we are of the view that the Division Bench of
the High Court clearly fell in error in directing respondent No.
2 to 4 to allow rectification of the financial bid of respondent
No. 1 by treating the amount offered by it as the per day figure
and on that basis to compute the total amount for the entire
contractual period of 1095 days. Such an exercise is clearly
impermissible having regard to the terms and conditions of the
contract which are required to be understood on the anvil of
this Court’s judgments. The authority granted to the tendering
49


authority by clause 5B (v) of the Instruction to Bidders cannot
be stretched to construe the price bid of respondent No. 1 as
the per day offer, contrary to the bid declaration of respondent
No. 1 itself, and thereafter, on that basis to work out a new bid
amount for the entire contractual period making it the highest.
In the present case, respondent No. 1 was not at all vigilant;
rather, it displayed a very casual approach. In such
circumstances, clause 5B(v) cannot be invoked to resurrect the
bid of respondent No. 1 to make it H1. Clause 5B(v) of the
Instruction to Bidders has to read conjointly with clause 4(g)
of the notice inviting electronic bid.
42. While judicial review is not excluded to assail
administrative decisions even in matters of tenders and
contract, the long line of consistent judicial pronouncements
tells us that the constitutional courts should exercise utmost
restraint in interfering with a tender process unless the
threshold of judicial review are met, as explained in Jagdish
Mandal (supra) and in Afcons Infrastructure Limited (supra).
50


43. As is clearly discernible, appellant was a necessary
party to the proceedings before the High Court instituted by
respondent No. 1 being the H1 bidder. Impugned directions of
the High Court has adversely affected the case of the appellant,
downgrading its H1 status. The proposition that equity and
natural justice should be kept at bay during the course of
tender evaluation, while fully applicable to the case of
respondent No. 1, cannot be applied to judicial proceedings
where tender evaluation is under judicial scrutiny, fairness
and natural justice being integral to the judicial process.
Therefore, non-impleadment and consequential non-hearing
of the appellant by the High Court, has vitiated the impugned
judgment and order.
44. The expression ‘public interest’ in the arena of
commercial transactions cannot and should not be confined to
any straight jacket definition. While benefit or accrual of more
revenue to the public exchequer is certainly an important
aspect, equally important, if not more, is adherence to the
rules and conditions of tender; sanctity of the tender process
being paramount and should be maintained at all cost.
51


45. Thus, having regard to the above, impugned
judgment and order dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court in MAT No. 93 of 2024 cannot be
sustained and is hereby set aside and quashed. Respondent
Nos. 2 to 4 would be free to proceed with and finalise the award
of contract in terms of the notice inviting electronic bid dated
17.10.2023.
46. Civil appeal is accordingly allowed. However, there
shall be no order as to cost.
……………………………J.
[MANOJ MISRA]





……………………………J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 12, 2025.
52